Hakobyan v. Rokosky et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Narek Hakobyan,
Petitioner,
v.
Eric Rokosky, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-26-01241-PHX-MTL (DMF)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE MICHAEL T. LIBURDI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE:
This matter is on referral to the undersigned for further proceedings and a report and
recommendation pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure
(Doc. 3 at 3).1
I. BACKGROUND, PROCEDURAL POSTURE, AND HABEAS CLAIMS
Through counsel, Petitioner Narek Hakobyan (“Petitioner” and/or “Hakobyan”)
filed this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his immigration detention (“Petition”)
(Doc. 1). In the Screening Order, the Court described Petitioner’s claim as follows:
Petitioner asserts he has been held at the Eloy Detention Center for over 365
days without a bond redetermination hearing. He claims his prolonged
detention violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights and he is entitled
1 Citation to the record as “Doc.” indicates documents as displayed in the official Court
electronic document filing system maintained by the District of Arizona under Case No.
CV-26-01241-PHX-MTL (DMF).
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to immediate release or a custody redetermination hearing.
(Doc. 3 at 1). The Court ordered Respondents to answer the Petition (Id.).
Respondents answered the Petition (“Answer”) (Doc. 14); Petitioner replied
(“Reply”) (Doc. 15).
The parties agree that Petitioner is a native and citizen of Armenia who arrived at a
United States port of entry on February 1, 2025, was initially placed in expedited removal
proceedings, “passed a credible fear interview,” and was thereafter detained pending full
removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (Doc. 1 at 2, 4; Doc. 14 at 1; Doc. 15 at 1).
More specifically, the Notice to Appear attached to Respondents’ Answer alleges that
Petitioner is “an arriving alien” who applied for admission into the United States at the San
Ysidro, California Port of Entry on or about February 1, 2025 (Doc. 14-1 at 2). The Notice
to Appear further alleges that Petitioner is subject to removal from the United States
pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)2 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) as
“an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of a valid
unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry
document” (Id. at 5). Petitioner concedes that he “is an arriving alien and as such subject
to mandatory detention under INA § 235(b)”3 (Doc. 1 at 4). Petitioner avers that he has
been in continuous immigration detention since his arrival at the United States port of entry
on February 1, 2025 (Doc. 1 at 2, ¶¶ 3, 5; Doc. 15 at 1). Based on the publicly available
ICE Online Detainee Locator System, Petitioner is currently confined in the Eloy Detention
Center.4 The parties agree that Petitioner’s immigration proceedings remain ongoing (Doc.
1 at 2; Doc. 14 at 1-2).
In his Petition, Petitioner argues that his immigration detention of over one year
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (Doc. 1 at 6-9). Specifically,
Petitioner asserts that under the test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
2 Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).
3 Section 235(b) of the INA is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
4 See https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/search (last accessed May 14, 2026).
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(1976), due process requires his immediate release or in the alternative a bond hearing (Id.
at 7-9).
Respondents oppose the Petition, arguing that Petitioner’s due process claim is
foreclosed by the “entry fiction” doctrine (Doc. 14 at 2-6). Respondents argue that aliens
such as Petitioner must be detained through the completion of their removal proceedings
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (Doc. 14 at 4). Respondents contend that, although
physically present in the United States, Petitioner has not legally entered the United States
and therefore Petitioner is entitled to only the procedural rights granted by Congress (Id. at
2-3). Respondents ask the Court to deny the Petition (Id. at 6).
In his Reply, Petitioner argues that he faces indefinite detention and urges the Court
to adopt the test set forth in Banda v. McAleen, 385 F. Supp. 3d. 1099, 1117 (W.D. Wash.
2019), to find that Petitioner’s prolonged detention under § 1225(b) without a custody
redetermination hearing violates his due process rights (Doc. 15 at 1-2). For relief,
Petitioner asks the Court to grant the Petition and order Petitioner’s immediate release from
immigration detention or in the alternative order Respondents to provide Petitioner “a
custody redetermination hearing before a neutral adjudicator” (Doc. 1 at 9). Petitioner also
requests award of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412(2).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
A federal district court is authorized to grant a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 where the petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States . . . in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1), (3). Generally, “challenges to the statutory framework that permits
the alien’s detention without bail,” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018),
“questions of law” raised in the application or interpretation of detention statutes, Leonardo
v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011), and “[c]laims that the discretionary bond
process itself was constitutionally flawed are cognizable in federal court on habeas because
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they fit comfortably within the scope of § 2241.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976,
987 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2011)). Thus,
this Court has jurisdiction over the Petition.
B. Petitioner’s Detention is Not Unlawful and His Petition Claim Fails
1. Petitioner is Detained Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)
As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Respondents’ contention that Petitioner
is detained subject to § 1225 (see Doc. 14 at 1, 4). Petitioner was initially placed in
expedited removal proceedings, but after Petitioner was found to have a credible fear, he
was placed into full removal proceedings pursuant to § 1229a (Doc. 14 at 1; see also Doc.
14-1). Additionally, Petitioner concedes that he is “subject to mandatory detention under
INA § 235(b)” (Doc. 1 at 4). Section 1225(b) governs Petitioner’s detention.
2. Petitioner Is Entitled to Due Process as Provided by Congress
Through Statute
Notwithstanding the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b), Petitioner argues
that due process requires a custody redetermination hearing at minimum (Doc. 15 at 1-2).
Yet, “[a]n alien detained after arriving at a port of entry . . . is ‘on the threshold [of initial
entry].’” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 139 (2020) (quoting
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)). Accordingly, such
an alien is “‘treated’ for due process purposes ‘as if stopped at the border.’” Id. at 139
(quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215).
As to the constitutionality of Petitioner’s continued detention through his
immigration proceedings, the United States Supreme Court has squarely held that the rights
of an alien applying for admission at the border are limited to those rights provided by
Congress through statute. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107 (“[T]he Court long ago held
that Congress is entitled to set the conditions for an alien’s lawful entry into this country
and that, as a result, an alien at the threshold of initial entry cannot claim any greater rights
under the Due Process Clause . . . other than those afforded by statute.” (internal citation
omitted)); see also Mendoza-Linares v. Garland, 51 F.4th 1146, 1167 (9th Cir. 2022)
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(“[A]ny rights [an alien seeking initial admission to the United States] may have in regard
to removal or admission are purely statutory in nature and are not derived from, or protected
by, the Constitution’s Due Process Clause.”). The Supreme Court has also determined that
an alien such as Petitioner has no statutory right to a bond hearing during removal
proceedings. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297 (“Until [removal proceedings end] nothing in the
statutory text imposes any limit on the length of detention. And neither § 1225(b)(1) nor
§ 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond hearings.”). Petitioner does not cite, let
alone discuss, Thuraissigiam in his filings nor does Petitioner explain why he is entitled to
process and procedures beyond that authorized by Congress (see Docs. 1, 15). Importantly,
the termination point for the government’s detention authority has not yet been reached.
As discussed in Jennings, the government’s detention authority lasts only for a “specified
period of time” and ceases upon completion of an alien’s asylum or removal proceedings.
583 U.S. at 299. Here, Petitioner’s immigration proceedings remain ongoing. Thus,
Petitioner’s present and continued detention pending his immigration proceedings is lawful
and is not unreasonably prolonged. See Mamedova v. Noem, No. CV-25-04619-PHX-
DWL, 2026 WL 1162282, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2026); Savin v. Rivas, No. CV-26-
01120-PHX-DWL, 2026 WL 1162384, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2026); Green v. Rosa, No.
CV-26-00888-PHX-MTL (ASB), 2026 WL 947942, at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 2026).
Furthermore, even if the Court agreed that Petitioner has raised a viable due process
challenge regarding his detention, there exists no guidance from the Ninth Circuit or the
Supreme Court on what analysis district courts should employ to determine when detention
becomes unreasonably prolonged. Rather, district courts have applied a variety of
balancing tests, and sometimes no balancing test at all, to evaluate on a case-by-case basis
whether mandatory detention under § 1225(b) without a bond hearing violates due process.
See Munoz v. Bondi, No. CV-25-02951-PHX-MTL, 2026 WL 380610, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb.
11, 2026) (“The Court is unaware of—and Petitioner does not identify—any Ninth Circuit
authority adopting the proposed test.”).
Accordingly, the Court declines to apply the tests proposed by Petitioner and
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concludes that Petitioner is not presently entitled to relief under statutory or constitutional
authority.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to any relief and the Petition
should be denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that no relief be granted to Petitioner in this matter, that
the Petition (Doc. 1) be denied and that the Clerk of Court be directed to terminate this
matter.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s
judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this
recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which
to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and
Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-
Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual
determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to
appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. In addition, LRCiv 7.2(e)(3)
provides that “[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and
Recommendation issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.”
Dated this 14th day of May, 2026.
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