Wayf Digital Sp. z o.o. v. Government Employees Insurance Company

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Wayf Digital Sp. z o.o.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Government Employees Insurance
Company,
Defendant.
No. CV-26-00703-PHX-DWL
ORDER
In May 2025, Plaintiff Wayf Digital Sp. z o.o. (“Wayf”), a Polish software company,
registered the domain name <GEICO.AI> (“the Domain Name”). In response, Defendant
Government Employees Insurance Company (“GEICO”) filed a Uniform Domain-Name
Dispute-Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) complaint with the World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”). In January 2026, a WIPO panel ruled in GEICO’s favor and
ordered the Domain Name to be transferred to GEICO.
Afterward, Wayf initiated this action, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”), and asked the
registrar to postpone complying with the WIPO panel’s decision pending the resolution of
this action. GEICO, in turn, contacted the registrar to question whether Wayf had complied
with the technical requirements necessary to trigger a postponement. The registrar
ultimately disregarded Wayf’s postponement request and proceeded with the transfer, and
Wayf then amended its complaint to add a claim against GEICO for tortious interference
with contract.
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 1 of 26

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
These developments provide the backdrop for two motions now pending before the
Court: first, GEICO’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 16); and second, Wayf’s motion for a
preliminary injunction (Doc. 15). For the reasons that follow, both motions are denied.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
The following factual allegations, presumed true for purposes of GEICO’s motion
to dismiss, are derived from Wayf’s operative pleading, the First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”). (Doc. 10.)
A. The Parties
Wayf is a software consultancy and development company co-founded by Pawel
Utr and Chris Kraszewski in 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 23.) Its principal place of business is
Warsaw, Poland. (Id. ¶ 16.)
GEICO provides insurance services to consumers in the United States and also
offers “overseas coverage through non-affiliated partners.” (Id. ¶¶ 64-66.) GEICO “owns
several U.S. trademark registrations for the mark GEICO” and related marks in connection
with its insurance business. (Id. ¶ 67.) It “also owns an E.U. trademark for the mark
GEICO.” (Id. ¶ 68.) GEICO does not directly provide insurance services abroad. (Id.
¶ 73.)
B. Wayf’s Development Of “Gei & Co.”
In January 2023, Wayf began “developing a platform focused on personalized
dietary supplements with a recommendation engine and gift voucher functionality,” which
eventually morphed into “a B2B-focused corporate gifting platform with health and
wellbeing at its core.” (Id. ¶¶ 2, 31-32.) “Under this concept, corporate clients would
purchase gift vouchers for employees, who redeem them through an AI-powered interface
that recommends personalized gifts.” (Id. ¶ 33.) In early 2025, Wayf determined that it
would name this gifting platform “Gei & Co.” (Id. ¶ 38.)
The idea for the name “Gei & Co.” arose when Utr “was discussing names for the
platform with his life partner,” who speaks fluent Mandarin, and his partner “joked that
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 2 of 26

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
dawać (the Polish word for ‘to give’) in Mandarin sounds like the English word for ‘gay.’”
(Id. ¶¶ 30, 39.) The “actual word is 给 or gěi” in Mandarin. (Id. ¶ 40). Utr liked the term
because he “anticipated that China, where gift-giving is deeply ingrained in the culture,
would be a prime market for” the digital platform. (Id. ¶ 46.) Also, “[a]s a member of the
LGBTQ community,” Utr liked that the word “gei” is “pronounced like the English word
‘gay.’” (Id. ¶ 47.) “After additional consideration and discussion with others,” and
inspired by “another top global design and technology company, Work & Co.,” Wayf
added “& Co.” to the digital program’s name to “combin[e] the Chinese root” (Gei) with
“the classic, trade-related suffix” (& Co.). (Id. ¶¶ 48-49.)
C. The Domain Registration
In May 2025, Wayf began the process of registering a domain for the gifting project
with a commercial domain registrar called Spaceship. (Id. ¶ 51.) Domain Name System
(“DNS”) standards limit the characters allowed in internet domains “to alphanumeric
characters and hyphens.” (Id. ¶ 52.)
On May 8, 2025, Wayf registered the domain name <GEICO.AI> with Spaceship.
(Id. ¶ 54.) Wayf alleges that “numerous GEICO-formative domain names were available
for purchase” at that time. (Id. ¶ 53.)
On May 9, 2025, Wayf “registered the domain name <OVERGIVE.COM>” based
on “another name it was considering for the platform.” (Id. ¶ 55.) Both domains were
registered with domain privacy services. (Id. ¶ 56.) “All major registrars,” including
Spaceship, “offer a similar privacy service” automatically upon purchase. (Id. ¶¶ 57-58.)
Domain privacy services are used “for privacy reasons and to avoid the constant
communications from marketers who scrape the WHOIS registry for leads.” (Id. ¶ 56.)
Wayf “has not yet posted a website to <GEICO.AI>.” (Id. ¶ 63.) Because GEICO
does not market or operate on a broad scale in Poland, the rest of Europe, or China, Wayf
was unaware of GEICO or its marks before registering the Domain Name. (Id. ¶¶ 71-81,
83.) “Because the Domain Name was based on a combination of words” with “no
dictionary definition,” and “because [Wayf’s] principals had never heard of [GEICO],”
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 3 of 26

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Wayf “did not[] search online for other uses” of the term “Geico.” (Id. ¶ 84.)
D. The UDRP Action
On October 31, 2025, GEICO filed a UDRP action with the WIPO Arbitration and
Mediation Center. (Id. ¶ 86.) That same day, consistent with its internal policies,
Spaceship “locked the domain name, thereby prohibiting [Wayf] from utilizing the Domain
Name” pending the outcome of the UDRP action. (Id. ¶ 87.)
In its WIPO complaint, GEICO accused Wayf of “registering and using its GEICO
mark in bad faith.” (Id. ¶ 88.) GEICO argued that “it is inconceivable that [Wayf] was not
aware of [GEICO’s] mark when it registered the Domain Name in 2025, in obvious bad
faith . . . .” (Id. ¶ 89.) GEICO also argued Wayf’s use of domain privacy services was
evidence of bad faith. (Id. ¶ 90.)
On January 20, 2026, the WIPO panel issued its ruling. (Id. ¶ 92.) The panel noted
that “although there ultimately was some evidence before the Panel that [GEICO] had to
some degree a European presence . . . the exact nature of that presence is still not fully
clear, and in any event, it appears that this presence may not extend to Poland where [Wayf]
is located.” (Id. ¶ 96.) Nevertheless, the panel stated that it was “‘inherently implausible’
that a software consultancy and product development company working for international
clients would not have conducted at least a simple online search for the term ‘Geico’ when
choosing the domain name.” (Id. ¶ 97.) The panel also found it “‘inherently odd’ that a
Polish software company would choose to combine a Mandarin term and an English
abbreviation for its product name.” (Id. ¶ 98.)
The panel “indicated that it would want to see more documentary evidence to
support the factual assertions” made by the parties and “ultimately ruled in [GEICO’s]
favor, concluding that ‘on the balance of probabilities . . . the Domain Name was registered
and is being held in bad faith.’” (Id. ¶ 98, 103.) Wayf alleges the WIPO panel “improperly
placed the burden of proof on Wayf” in making this determination. (Id. ¶ 102.) The panel
ordered the Domain Name transferred to GEICO. (Id. ¶ 104.)
…
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 4 of 26

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
E. The Domain Registration Agreement And This Lawsuit
Spaceship’s Domain Registration Agreement incorporates the UDRP. (Id. ¶ 122.)
Under the UDRP, “a domain registrant that loses a UDRP proceeding can challenge the
decision and halt the ordered transfer” of the domain name “by filing a lawsuit in the
appropriate venue and providing” the domain registrar, within 10 business days after
receipt of the UDRP decision, “official documentation (such as a copy of a complaint, file-
stamped by the clerk of the court)” that the lawsuit has been commenced. (Id. ¶¶ 123-24,
citing UDRP ¶ 5.12.)
On February 2, 2026—nine business days after the WIPO panel issued its
decision—Wayf initiated this action. (Doc. 1.) The same day, Wayf “notified Spaceship
by email that it had filed the lawsuit and provided Spaceship a copy of the [c]omplaint with
an official ECF filing receipt” but not a case number, which “was not assigned
immediately.” (Doc. 10 ¶¶ 130-31.)
On February 4, 2026—11 business days after the WIPO panel issued its decision—
Wayf provided a file-stamped copy of the complaint to Spaceship. (Id. ¶¶ 132-33.)
On February 10, 2026, “Spaceship confirmed receipt of all [of] the submitted
documents, explicitly accepted the documents, and stated that the ‘implementation of the
UDRP decision ha[d] been paused’” pending the outcome of this lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 134.)
F. The Domain Transfer
On February 18, 2026, before GEICO was served with the initial complaint,
Spaceship transferred the Domain Name to GEICO. (Id. ¶ 136.) “Spaceship provided no
explanation for why it had changed course.” (Id. ¶ 137.) Wayf alleges that the transfer
was the result of improper influence by GEICO, including “misrepresent[ing] the filing
status of the [c]omplaint as well as the requirements for notice under the UDRP policy”
and “convinc[ing] Spaceship’s legal team, which is believed to be based abroad, that the
UDRP requires the registrant to provide a file-stamped copy of a [c]omplaint” to the
registrar, as opposed to the materials that Wayf provided. (Id. ¶¶ 140, 145.) Wayf alleges
that this transfer constituted a breach of the Domain Registration Agreement and the UDRP
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 5 of 26

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
by Spaceship. (Id. ¶ 140.)
Once the Domain Name was transferred to GEICO, “the Domain Name was no
longer in Spaceship’s control, and Spaceship could not reverse the transfer.” (Id. ¶ 139.)
GEICO then “moved the Domain Name to a registrar in Germany.” (Id. ¶ 149.)
II. Procedural History
On February 2, 2026, Wayf initiated this action. (Doc. 1.) In its one-count
complaint, Wayf sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the ACPA. (Id.)
On April 22, 2026, Wayf filed the FAC, which adds a second claim for tortious
interference with Wayf’s contract with Spaceship. (Doc. 10 ¶¶ 164-74.)
On June 22, 2026, Wayf filed the pending motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc.
15.) That motion is now fully briefed. (Docs. 18, 20.)
On June 23, 2026, GEICO filed the pending motion to dismiss. (Doc. 16.) That
motion is now fully briefed. (Docs. 19, 21.)1
DISCUSSION
I. GEICO’s Motion To Dismiss
A. Legal Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6), “to survive a motion to dismiss, a party must allege sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” In re
Fitness Holdings, Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “[A]ll well-pleaded allegations of
material fact in the complaint are accepted as true and are construed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. at 1144-45 (citation omitted). However, the Court
need not accept legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-
80. Moreover, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
1 GEICO’s request for oral argument as to the motion to dismiss (Doc. 21 at 1) is
denied because the issues are fully briefed and argument would not aid the decisional
process. See LRCiv. 7.2(f).
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 6 of 26

- 7 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. The Court may also dismiss due
to “a lack of a cognizable legal theory.” Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th
Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
B. Count One
In Count One of the FAC, Wayf seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under 15
U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v). (Doc. 10 ¶¶ 150-63.) Under that provision, “a domain name
registrant who is aggrieved by an overreaching trademark owner may bring an action to
declare that the domain name registration and use is not unlawful under the ACPA’s
‘cyberpiracy prevention’ clause, § 1125(d).” IFIXITUSA LLC v. iFixit Corp., 2022 WL
2117845, *2 (D. Ariz. 2022). “This ‘reverse domain hijacking claim,’ requires [Wayf] to
establish four elements: (1) [Wayf] is the domain name registrant; (2) [Wayf’s] domain
name was suspended, disabled, or transferred under a policy implemented by a domain
name registrar; (3) [GEICO], as the trademark owner seeking the domain name transfer,
had notice of the action; and (4) [Wayf’s] use or registration of the domain name was not
unlawful under the ACPA.” Mira Holdings Inc. v. UHS of Delaware Inc., 2023 WL
5333262, *6 (D. Ariz. 2023).
1. The Parties’ Arguments
GEICO’s motion to dismiss only attacks the sufficiency of Count One as to the
fourth element—i.e., whether Wayf’s registration of the Domain Name was unlawful under
the ACPA. (Doc. 16 at 4.) GEICO contends that for Wayf to satisfy the fourth element,
Wayf must plausibly allege either that (1) the Domain Name is not identical or confusingly
similar to a distinctive mark; or (2) Wayf did not have a bad faith intent to profit from that
mark. (Id. at 4, citing Strong Coll. Students Moving Inc. v. Coll. Hunks Hauling Junk
Franchising LLC, 2015 WL 12602438, *8 (D. Ariz. 2015).) GEICO contends that Wayf
cannot establish the former because the Domain Name is “identical to GEICO’s distinctive
marks.” (Id. at 5.) As for the latter, GEICO notes that “[w]hen evaluating bad faith intent
to profit under the ACPA, courts consider nine non-exclusive statutory factors set forth in
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)” and proceeds to offer arguments as to why those nine factors,
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 7 of 26

- 8 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
on balance, support a finding of bad faith. (Id. at 6-12.) GEICO concludes: “Analyzed
through the lens of the bad-faith intent to profit factors, the [FAC] on its face concedes, at
the very least, that Wayf registered and seeks to use a domain name featuring the
distinctive, registered, and famous GEICO mark, that Wayf has no IP rights in the domain
and never used the domain in commerce, that Wayf concealed its identity through a privacy
service, and engaged in conduct supporting an inference that the domain’s value lay in its
leverage over GEICO rather than any legitimate business use. At a minimum, the pleadings
foreclose any claim that Wayf can establish lawful registration and use under the ACPA.
Count One should therefore be dismissed.” (Id. at 12.)
In response, Wayf asserts, as an initial matter, that Count One requires “a de novo
inquiry into the lawfulness of the registration under the ACPA—not a review of the WIPO
panel’s decision.” (Doc. 19 at 5.) Turning to the merits, Wayf does not dispute that it
cannot satisfy the first prong of the Strong College Students Moving test (i.e., it cannot
show that the Domain Name is not identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive mark)
but argues that the FAC contains allegations that satisfy the second prong (i.e., the absence
of bad-faith intent). (Id. at 5-6.) Wayf also contends that courts “routinely deny 12(b)(6)
motions in ACPA cases where the pleadings tell a plausible story of innocent adoption.”
(Id. at 6.) Wayf then proceeds to address the nine statutory bad-faith factors. (Id. at 7-11.)
Finally, Wayf argues that “[e]ven setting aside the factor-by-factor analysis, the ACPA’s
mandatory safe harbor provision independently forecloses dismissal” and summarizes its
position as follows: “Whether [a registrant’s belief in the legality of its conduct was]
‘reasonable’ is an inherently fact-specific inquiry that cannot be resolved at the pleading
stage. Wayf’s belief was grounded in the independent Chinese linguistic origin of the name
and the absence of any prior knowledge of [GEICO]. That good-faith basis is further
supported by the parties’ distinct commercial fields (gifting platform v. insurance); distinct
brand names (Gei & Co. v. GEICO); distinct geographic markets; and the existence of at
least eleven distinct parties across the globe that own GEICO-formative trademark
registrations. These are specific factual allegations—not mere labels or conclusions—that
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 8 of 26

- 9 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
plausibly support a reasonable good-faith belief. . . . Whether the safe harbor applies here
is a question of fact that must be resolved on a developed record, not on the pleadings
alone.” (Id. at 12, citations omitted.)
In reply, GEICO argues that “Wayf’s Opposition boils down to two allegations: (1)
that Wayf had never heard of GEICO at the time of registration, and (2) that Wayf has a
linguistics-based good-faith reason for choosing [the Domain Name]. Neither fact, even if
true, establishes lack of bad-faith intent to profit. But even if they did, the other facts pled
in the [FAC] establish that each allegation is implausible, and the Court need not accept
them over myriad other pled facts demonstrating the more likely explanation—bad-faith
registration.” (Doc. 21 at 2.) GEICO also contends the cases cited in Wayf’s brief are
distinguishable because “each involved registrants with preexisting rights, bona fide use,
or identification with the disputed mark or domain name.” (Id.) Next, GEICO asserts that
“[t]he ACPA does not treat a post hoc explanation as dispositive because cybersquatters
can often articulate some apparently legitimate reason for selecting a domain.” (Id. at 3.)
Next, GEICO responds to Wayf’s arguments regarding the nine statutory factors. (Id. at
3-7.) Finally, GEICO argues that the ACPA safe harbor does not apply because even
“[a]ccepting as true Wayf’s allegation that it had never heard of GEICO before the UDRP
proceeding, that allegation does not establish reasonable grounds to believe that
registration and use of [the Domain Name] was lawful. The [FAC] alleges that Wayf
searched for available domains through its registrar, found numerous ‘GeiCo-formative’
domains, registered [the Domain Name], and never posted a website, yet seeks a
declaration that its ‘registration, ownership, and ongoing use’ of the domain are lawful.
Wayf did not have reasonable grounds to believe its registration was lawful.” (Id. at 7-8.)
2. Analysis
Although the issue presents a close call, the Court concludes that Wayf has done
just enough to avoid dismissal of Count One. The issue presents a close call because most
of the relevant statutory bad-faith factors are unfavorable to Wayf, even when all well-
pleaded factual allegations in the FAC are accepted as true and even when all reasonable
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 9 of 26

- 10 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
inferences are drawn in Wayf’s favor.
As background, “Congress enumerated a list of nine factors to consider in
determining whether a person has a bad faith intent. Congress did not mean these factors
to be an exclusive list; instead, the most important grounds for finding bad faith are the
unique circumstances of the case, which do not fit neatly into the specific factors
enumerated by Congress.” Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936,
946-47 (9th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). See also Anlin Indus., Inc. v. Burgess, 301 F. App’x
745, 746 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Determining bad faith intent to profit using the nine statutory
factors and the ‘unique circumstances of the case’ is fact dependent.”). “The first four
factors are circumstances indicating good faith use, the next four factors are circumstances
indicating bad faith use, and the last factor can point in either direction.” Blair v.
Automobili Lamborghini SpA, 754 F. Supp. 3d 849, 855 (D. Ariz. 2024).
“The first statutory factor is ‘the trademark or other intellectual property rights of
the person, if any, in the domain name.’” Christian Copyright Licensing Int’l LLC v.
Multitracks.com LLC, 2025 WL 1615462, *33 (D. Ariz. 2025). This factor is unfavorable
to Wayf—the FAC does not allege that Wayf held any trademark or intellectual property
rights in the Domain Name as of May 2025, when registration took place. Wayf does not
argue otherwise and only disputes how much weight the first factor should be given. (Doc.
19 at 7.)
“The second statutory factor is ‘the extent to which the domain name consists of the
legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that
person.’” Christian Copyright Licensing Int’l LLC, 2025 WL 1615462 at *33. This factor
is also unfavorable to Wayf—the FAC does not allege that Wayf or its founders have ever
used the name “Geico” or are otherwise known by that name. Contrary to Wayf’s
argument, the second factor does not turn on whether the registrant was also “developing
a platform under [a] brand name” that is similar to the Domain Name. (Doc. 19 at 7.)
“The third statutory factor is ‘the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name in
connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or services.’” Christian Copyright
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 10 of 26

- 11 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Licensing Int’l LLC, 2025 WL 1615462 at *33. This factor “asks whether, at the time of”
registration, the registrant “had engaged in ‘prior use’ of that domain name for the bona
fide sale of goods or services.” Id. This factor is unfavorable to Wayf—the FAC does not
allege that Wayf has ever used the Domain Name to sell goods and services, much less that
it did so before May 2025. Wayf’s argument that “pre-launch registration is entirely
consistent with legitimate business development” (Doc. 19 at 7-8) only goes to how much
weight the third factor should be afforded, not to how the third factor should be resolved.
“The fourth statutory factor is ‘the person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of
the mark in a site accessible under the domain name.’” Christian Copyright Licensing Int’l
LLC, 2025 WL 1615462 at *36. Once again, this factor is unfavorable to Wayf—as GEICO
notes, Wayf “admits that its gifting platform remains in development, and that it never
posted a website at [the Domain Name]. Nor does Wayf allege any noncommercial or fair
use of the domain.” (Doc. 16 at 7-8.)
“The fifth statutory factor is ‘the person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark
owner’s online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the
goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish
or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship,
affiliation, or endorsement of the site.’” Christian Copyright Licensing Int’l LLC, 2025
WL 1615462 at *37. Wayf contends the fifth factor favors it because “likelihood of
confusion between an AI corporate gifting platform and an American insurance company
is not self-evident.” (Doc. 19 at 8.) But as GEICO correctly notes in reply, “[t]he relevant
diversion occurs at the domain name level, where internet users are drawn to [the Domain
Name] by GEICO’s mark before they ever reach any product comparison. Thus, a
defendant may violate the ACPA even where it later becomes apparent from the website’s
content that the site is unaffiliated with the trademark owner.” (Doc. 21 at 5.) As one court
explained: “A court should not look beyond the domain name to consider the content of
the website. The inquiry under the ACPA is thus narrower than the traditional multifactor
likelihood of confusion test for trademark infringement. Consequently, even if it might be
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 11 of 26

- 12 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
evident from the content of the website that it is not sponsored by or affiliated with the
plaintiff, there may nonetheless be a violation of the ACPA.” Super-Krete Int’l, Inc. v.
Sadleir, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1032-33 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (cleaned up).
Alternatively, Wayf contends the fifth factor favors it because the FAC “specifically
alleges that Wayf’s founders had never heard of [GEICO] before the UDRP proceeding.”
(Doc. 19 at 9.) GEICO does not directly address this argument in reply, although GEICO
argues elsewhere that Wayf’s professions of ignorance are implausible. Under these
circumstances, the Court concludes that the fifth factor, standing alone, is unhelpful in the
dismissal calculus, as it merely seeks to evaluate the presence or absence of bad-faith
intent—the same issue the remaining factors are also intended to help evaluate. Cf.
Christian Copyright Licensing Int’l LLC, 2025 WL 1615462 at *38 (“Factor five is rarely
discernable directly and must typically be inferred from pertinent facts and
circumstances.”) (cleaned up).
“The sixth statutory factor is ‘the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign
the domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having
used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or
services, or the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct.’” Christian
Copyright Licensing Int’l LLC, 2025 WL 1615462 at *39. This factor favors Wayf at this
stage of the proceedings, as the FAC “contains no allegation—nor has [GEICO] identified
any—that Wayf ever offered to sell [the Domain Name] to [GEICO] or anyone else.” (Doc.
19 at 10.) It is true, as GEICO notes (Doc. 16 at 10), that “an explicit offer to sell to the
mark owner is not required,” Blair, 754 F. Supp. 3d at 859, but here there was not even an
implied or indirect offer, as least when the facts alleged in the FAC are construed in the
light most favorable to Wayf.
“The seventh statutory factor is ‘the person’s provision of material and misleading
false contact information when applying for the registration of the domain name, the
person’s intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the person's prior
conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct.’” Christian Copyright Licensing Int’l LLC,
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 12 of 26

- 13 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2025 WL 1615462 at *39. Here, although it is possible that a factfinder could draw a
negative inference from Wayf’s use of a privacy service to conceal its identity as the
registrant, the Court must accept—at least for purposes of GEICO’s motion to dismiss—
the FAC’s allegation that Spaceship automatically applies the privacy service to all
domains, and the Court must also draw reasonable inferences in Wayf’s favor. Thus, at
least for purposes of GEICO’s motion to dismiss, the seventh factor is either neutral or
favors Wayf. Tellingly, GEICO acknowledges that “using a proxy service alone is unlikely
to support [a] finding of bad faith.” (Doc. 16 at 11.)
“The eighth statutory factor is ‘the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple
domain names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of
others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of
famous marks of others that are famous at the time of registration of such domain names,
without regard to the goods or services of the parties.’” Christian Copyright Licensing
Int’l LLC, 2025 WL 1615462 at *40. In the FAC, Wayf acknowledges that it has also
registered certain other “linguistically innovative domain names” in addition to the Domain
Name, including <hik.ma> and <wayfindi.ng>. (Doc. 10 ¶ 29.) GEICO has, in turn, come
forward with judicially noticeable evidence2 establishing that the former, <hik.ma>, “is
nearly identical to the multibillion-dollar, multinational pharmaceutical brand Hikma”
(Doc. 16 at 11), and that the latter, <wayfindi.ng>, “plays on ‘WayFinding,’ a mark owned
by multi-billion-dollar health care company Transcarent for its AI-powered healthcare
navigation service.” (Doc. 18 at 10).
On the one hand, and as discussed in more detail in the portion of this order
addressing Wayf’s request for a preliminary injunction, a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that this evidence is devastating to Wayf and eviscerates Wayf’s contention that
2 “Generally, the scope of review on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is
limited to the contents of the complaint.” Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir.
2006). “A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents attached to the
complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial
notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”
United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 13 of 26

- 14 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
it had no idea, at the time it registered the Domain Name, that a company named GEICO
even existed. (Doc. 10 ¶ 29.) It is hard to believe that a company could, by sheer
coincidence, choose to register three “linguistically innovative” domain names that just so
happen to overlap with the names of three established multi-billion-dollar companies. Cf.
Lahoti v. VeriCheck, Inc., 586 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (summary judgment finding
of bad-faith intent to profit was supported in part by evidence that the plaintiff had
“registered hundreds of domain names resembling distinctive or famous trademarks and
has been admonished by judicial bodies for doing so”).
On the other hand, it is important not to confuse the distinct roles that a court plays
when ruling on a motion to dismiss and a motion for preliminary injunction. In response
to GEICO’s motion to dismiss, Wayf asserts that the FAC’s “explanation of the linguistic
origins of each of its domains is a factual allegation the Court must accept as true on this
motion” and that GEICO’s counterarguments present “at best[] a factual dispute that cannot
be resolved in [GEICO’s] favor on a motion to dismiss.” (Doc. 19 at 10.) The Court
agrees. Even though Wayf’s arguments regarding the eighth factor may stretch the outer
limits of plausibility, and acknowledging that “determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim is context specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience
and common sense,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663-64, the eighth factor does not, on this record
and at this stage of the case, cut in favor of dismissal.
“The ninth statutory factor is ‘the extent to which the mark incorporated in the
person’s domain name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning
of subsection (c).’” Christian Copyright Licensing Int’l LLC, 2025 WL 1615462 at *41.
As to this factor, Wayf does not dispute that GEICO is a longstanding and highly distinctive
mark in the United States but argues that “fame in the American insurance market is not
the same as global recognition, and the ACPA’s bad-faith analysis turns on what Wayf
knew or should have known at the time of registration. The [FAC] alleges that neither
Wayf nor its principals had ever heard of Defendant before the UDRP proceeding. Wayf
is a Polish software company. GEICO does not operate in Poland, does not market to
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 14 of 26

- 15 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Polish consumers, and does not provide insurance to Polish citizens.” (Doc. 19 at 11.) In
reply, GEICO contends that the analysis must focus on the distinctiveness of its mark under
U.S. law. (Doc. 21 at 7.) The Court concludes that it is unnecessary to resolve this
complicated legal question (to which the parties have dedicated very little briefing) at this
stage of the case because the outcome under Rule 12(b)(6) does not turn on the resolution
of the ninth factor.
As the preceding analysis shows, most of the relevant factors under § 1125(d)(1)(B)
cut against Wayf’s position. But it doesn’t follow that Count One is therefore subject to
dismissal. Cf. Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]f we are to
have multiple factors, we should also have a trial. A fact-bound approach calling for the
balancing of incommensurables, an approach in which no ascertainable legal rule
determines a unique outcome, is one in which the trier of fact plays the principal part.”)
(citation omitted). As noted, “Congress did not mean these factors to be an exclusive list.”
Interstellar Starship Servs. Ltd., 304 F.3d at 946. Indeed, “[c]ourts need not march through
the nine factors seriatim because their use is merely permissive and the most important
grounds for finding bad faith are the unique circumstances of the case.” IFIXITUSA, 2022
WL 2117845 at *4 (cleaned up). Because the FAC contains well-pleaded factual
allegations that Wayf had a legitimate, innocent reason for choosing the name “Gei & Co.”
and had no knowledge of GEICO’s business or marks (due in part to Wayf’s presence in
Poland), and because there is no indication that Wayf has ever attempted to sell the Domain
Name, Wayf has done enough at the pleading stage to allege a lack of bad-faith intent to
profit from the GEICO mark and thus avoid dismissal.
C. Count Two
In Count Two of the FAC, Wayf asserts a claim for tortious interference with
contract. (Doc. 10 ¶¶ 164-74.) Under Arizona law, a “prima facie case of intentional
interference requires: (1) existence of a valid contractual relationship, (2) knowledge of the
relationship on the part of the interferor, (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a
breach, (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship has been disrupted, and (5)
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 15 of 26

- 16 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
that the defendant acted improperly.” Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters &
Cement Masons Loc. No. 395 Pension Tr. Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 31 (Ariz. 2002).
Wayf’s theory of liability underlying Count Two is that it had a contract with
Spaceship; that under that contract, Spaceship was required to “pause[] the transfer of the
Domain Name” upon receiving timely notice that Wayf had filed a lawsuit challenging the
WIPO panel’s decision; that Wayf properly provided such notice by giving Spaceship “a
copy of the Complaint along with the official ECF filing receipt” on February 2, 2026; and
that GEICO then improperly persuaded Spaceship to disregard this notice and proceed with
the transfer. (Doc. 10 ¶¶ 122-49.) As to the final point, the FAC alleges that GEICO
“improperly convinced Spaceship’s legal team . . . that the UDRP requires the registrant to
provide a file-stamped copy of the Complaint to satisfy the notice requirement and halt the
implementation of the UDRP decision,” when in fact “[t]he UDRP does not require the
registrant to provide a file-stamped copy of the Complaint to satisfy the notice requirement
and halt the implementation of the UDRP decision” and instead only requires some form
of “official documentation.” (Id. ¶¶ 145-48.)
1. The Parties’ Arguments
Although “GEICO disagrees that Wayf has pled facts sufficient to plausibly support
that GEICO knew of this contractual relationship or that GEICO acted improperly (it most
assuredly did not), for purposes of this 12(b)(6) motion, GEICO focuses on elements 3 and
4, as the allegations put forth in [FAC] establish there has been no breach of contract and
Wayf has not been damaged.” (Doc. 16 at 14.) As for the element of breach, GEICO
advances two theories: first, “the facts pled establish that Wayf did not comply with the
UDRP requirement to provide ‘official documentation’ of the filed suit within 10 days of
the panel decision, meaning Spaceship was obligated to transfer the domain”; and second,
“even if Wayf could plead such facts, the terms of the agreement still permit Spaceship to
transfer the domain for any reason and at its sole discretion, meaning the contract still is
not breached.” (Id. at 14-16.) As for damages, GEICO contends that the FAC’s allegation
of “damages in an amount to be proven at trial” is a “conclusory allegation” that is
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 16 of 26

- 17 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
insufficient because Wayf “has not yet launched any business using the Domain Name,”
has “not yet posted a website at the disputed Domain Name,” and “has other domains
available to use for its future offering.” (Id. at 16.) According to GEICO, this shows that,
“[a]t most . . . Wayf hoped to use the domain in the future for a still-developing gifting
platform.” (Id.)
In response, Wayf argues that GEICO’s first no-breach theory fails because the
UDRP provides that implementation of a panel decision will be postponed if the registrant
timely provides “official documentation (such as a copy of a complaint, file-stamped by
the clerk of the court) that [they] have commenced a lawsuit against the complainant” and
this language “identifies a file-stamped copy of the complaint as merely an example of the
requisite ‘official documentation.’” (Doc. 19 at 13-14.) Wayf contends that the filing
receipt it provided to Spaceship on February 2, 2026 “constitutes ‘official documentation’
of the commencement of a lawsuit within any reasonable construction of the UDRP’s
notice requirements.” (Id.) Next, Wayf argues that GEICO’s second no-breach theory
fails because GEICO’s proposed reading of § 27 of the Domain Registration Agreement—
which Wayf calls a “boilerplate clause”—would “immunize a trademark owner from
liability for misrepresenting UDRP requirements to a registrar,” would preclude
cybersquatting victims from “ever challeng[ing] a wrongful transfer,” and would “mean
that domain registrants who timely file federal lawsuits can never rely on the UDRP’s
transfer-pause mechanism—because a registrar can always invoke its general discretion to
override its specific UDRP obligations.” (Id. at 14-16.) Wayf emphasizes that “[a] general
reservation-of-rights clause . . . cannot nullify a specific, bargained-for protection that the
same contract incorporates by reference.” (Id.) Finally, as for damages, Wayf argues that
the “wrongful transfer” of the Domain Name “deprived Wayf of [its] personal property for
which it paid valuable consideration and around which it arranged its branding and business
planning.” (Id. at 16.) Wayf contends that it has “a concrete, cognizable injury—regardless
of whether Wayf monetized the domain before the transfer” and that “[t]he inability to
quantify lost profits to the cent at the pleading stage does not preclude a claim for damages;
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 17 of 26

- 18 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
it is precisely the kind of detail to be developed through discovery.” (Id. at 16-17.)
In reply, GEICO argues that “the Court need not accept” Wayf’s “conclusory
assertion” that it provided “official documentation” before the 10-day deadline and that
Wayf’s effort to provide a file-stamped copy of the complaint after the deadline shows that
the materials Wayf provided before the deadline were insufficient. (Doc. 21 at 8-9.) As
for its second no-breach theory, GEICO reiterates its earlier argument that Spaceship had
the ability to “transfer the domain away from Wayf at will” under § 27 of the Domain
Registration Agreement and contends that Wayf’s “policy arguments and conclusory
assertions” are misdirected. (Id. at 9.) GEICO also disagrees that § 27 is “merely a ‘general
reservation-of-rights clause’” that should be given less weight than the UDRP, because
although the agreement “incorporates” the UDRP, § 27 “appears in the agreement itself
and provides specific, express language addressing [Spaceship’s] retained authority to
cancel or transfer a domain name registration.” (Id.) Next, GEICO raises two new
arguments: first, that Wayf has not adequately pleaded causation (id. at 9-10); and second,
that Wayf has not adequately pleaded that GEICO’s alleged interference was “improper”
(id. at 10). Finally, as for damages, GEICO argues that although Wayf “attempts to recast
its alleged harm as a ‘concrete and cognizable’ loss,” the FAC does not plausibly allege
damages from GEICO’s conduct. (Id.) Further, GEICO argues Wayf cannot “manufacture
damages from a transfer that was lawful under the UDRP and [Spaceship’s] agreement.”
(Id.)
2. Analysis
As an initial matter, GEICO expressly stated in its motion that it was only
challenging the sufficiency of Count Two as to the elements of breach and damages. (Doc.
16 at 14.) The Court will thus disregard the dismissal arguments that GEICO raised for
the first time in its reply brief regarding the elements of causation and impropriety. See
generally Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court need
not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”).
As for breach, GEICO’s first theory is that because Wayf did not provide Spaceship
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 18 of 26

- 19 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
with an official, file-stamped version of the complaint within 10 days of receipt of WIPO
panel’s decision, Spaceship had no corresponding obligation under the UDRP to postpone
the transfer. The problem with this argument is that the relevant provision of the UDRP
merely identifies a file-stamped version of the complaint as an illustrative example of the
sort of “official documentation” that will trigger a postponement: “The UDRP states, in
relevant part, that . . . we will wait ten (10) business days . . . after we are informed by the
applicable Provider of the Administrative Panel’s decision before implementing that
decision. We will then implement the decision unless we have received from you during
that ten (10) business day period official documentation (such as a copy of a complaint,
file-stamped by the clerk of the court) that you have commenced a lawsuit against the
complainant in a jurisdiction to which the complainant has submitted under Paragraph
3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure. . . . If we receive such documentation within the ten
(10) business day period, we will not implement the Administrative Panel’s decision . . . .”
(Doc. 10 ¶ 124, emphasis added.) The inclusion of the phrase “such as” in this portion of
the UDRP indicates that other forms of “official documentation,” separate from a file-
stamped version of the complaint, may suffice. United States v. Technic Servs., Inc., 314
F.3d 1031, 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The use of the phrase ‘such as’ implies that the ensuing
list is not exhaustive, but is only illustrative.”).
The more complicated question is whether the materials Wayf actually submitted to
Spaceship before expiration of the 10-day deadline—namely, a non-file-stamped version
of the complaint accompanied by “the official ECF filing receipt, showing that the lawsuit
had been filed” (Doc. 10 ¶ 130)—also qualify as “official documentation.” Unfortunately,
GEICO makes little effort to address this issue in its motion papers. Instead, GEICO’s
dismissal arguments rest on the faulty premise that the one and only form of “official
documentation” that is sufficient to trigger a postponement is a file-stamped copy of the
complaint. At any rate, at this early stage of the case, it is sufficient to say that it is plausible
that a non-file-stamped version of the complaint accompanied by the official ECF filing
receipt would together qualify as the sort of “official documentation” required under the
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 19 of 26

- 20 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UDRP.
GEICO’s second breach theory fares no better, at least at this stage of the case and
on this undeveloped record. GEICO has shown that the relevant contract includes both (1)
a provision stating that Spaceship reserves the right, in its discretion, to transfer a domain
name for any reason, and (2) a conflicting provision stating that Spaceship “will not
implement the Administrative Panel’s decision, and we will take no further action” if
Spaceship timely receives the sort of “official documentation” discussed above. However,
GEICO makes no effort to identify the law that governs the interpretation of this contract,
let alone to show how that unspecified jurisdiction’s law would resolve such an internal
conflict. Furthermore, to the extent both sides invoke the general rule of contractual
interpretation that “specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general
language” (Doc. 19 at 15; Doc. 21 at 9), that principle, if anything, favors Wayf here given
that the former provision is a general statement about Spaceship’s authority to transfer a
domain name while the latter provision deals specifically with the mechanics and timing
of implementing a transfer decision by a WIPO panel.
Finally, Wayf has also sufficiently pleaded damages. Although the FAC does not
purport to quantify the damages Wayf allegedly sustained from the transfer of the Domain
Name—it merely alleges that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of this interference, Wayf
. . . has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial” (Doc. 10 ¶ 172)—that sort of
detail is unnecessary to survive dismissal at the pleading stage. Wayf has alleged that it
registered the Domain Name with the expectation of using the Domain Name as part of a
new business and that GEICO’s challenged conduct deprived it of the ability to use the
Domain Name in that manner (and, thus, interfered with its development of the new
business). Although Wayf may very well encounter difficulty at a future stage of this case
in establishing any lost profits arising from interference with this new business, see
generally McAlister v. Loeb & Loeb, LLP, 571 P.3d 891, 898 (Ariz. 2025) (acknowledging
that “a plaintiff may recover lost profit damages in the context of a new business venture
or a prospective business transaction that failed” but clarifying that “it is substantially more
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 20 of 26

- 21 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
difficult for a new business to establish lost profits damages with reasonable certainty than
it is for an established business to do so” and that such “damages may be established with
reasonable certainty with the aid of expert testimony, economic and financial data, market
surveys and analyses, business records of similar enterprises, and the like”) (cleaned up),
at the pleading stage it is sufficient to allege, as Wayf has done here, that the interference
has caused as-yet-unquantified harm. Cf. Jet Packaging Grp., LLC v. Votaw, 2024 WL
5239888, *10 (M.D. Tenn. 2024) (“The plaintiff must plead damages resulting from the
tortious interference. The Complaint alleges that the ‘Plaintiff has been damaged by
Defendant’s tortious interference in an amount to be determined at trial.’ The defendant
refers to this as ‘conclusory,’ but otherwise makes no argument that such an allegation of
damages is insufficient for an IIBR claim. . . . A plaintiff need not allege specific damages
at the pleading stage to state a cause of action for tortious interference with business
relations. Thus, the court finds that the plaintiff has adequately pled damages—and,
therefore, that the defendant has stated a claim for intentional interference with business
relationships.”) (cleaned up).
II. Wayf’s Motion For Preliminary Injunction
Wayf seeks a preliminary injunction requiring GEICO to transfer the Domain Name
back to Spaceship or, in the alternative, enjoining GEICO from transferring or using the
Domain Name pending the outcome of this action. (Doc. 15.)
A. Legal Standard
Preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.” Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). See also
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (“A preliminary injunction is
an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”) (citation omitted); Dymo Industries,
Inc. v. Tapeprinter, Inc., 326 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1964) (“The grant of a preliminary
injunction is the exercise of a very far reaching power never to be indulged in except in a
case clearly warranting it.”).
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 21 of 26

- 22 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction
is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. However, “if a plaintiff can only show
that there are serious questions going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of
success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of
hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor, and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.”
Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).
Regardless of which standard applies, the movant “carries the burden of proof on each
element of either test.” Env’t. Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027
(E.D. Cal. 2000).
B. Prohibitory vs. Mandatory Injunction
The parties disagree whether Wayf seeks a prohibitory or mandatory injunction. “A
mandatory injunction orders a responsible party to take action,” while “[a] prohibitory
injunction prohibits a party from taking action and preserves the status quo pending a
determination of the action on the merits.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma
GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). The Ninth Circuit has
emphasized that where “a party seeks mandatory preliminary relief that goes well beyond
maintaining the status quo pendente lite, courts should be extremely cautious about issuing
a preliminary injunction.” Martin v. Int’l Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir.
1984). The status quo is defined as “the last uncontested status which preceded the pending
controversy.” GoTo.com Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000).
Here, identifying the “last uncontested status” is complicated by the fact that the
Domain Name was locked at Spaceship at the time Wayf filed its initial complaint but had
been transferred to GEICO by the time Wayf filed the FAC (which is the pleading that
provides the foundation for Wayf’s request for injunctive relief). Although the Ninth
Circuit has sometimes looked to the date on which the complaint was filed for purposes of
pinpointing the relevant “status quo,” Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 22 of 26

- 23 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Cir. 1994), it is unclear whether the same approach would be appropriate here, given that
an “amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-
existent.” Ramirez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015).
It is unnecessary to delve too deeply into the prohibitory/mandatory distinction
here.3 Even assuming the requested injunction is prohibitory (which would trigger a more
favorable standard for Wayf), the request fails for the reasons discussed below.
C. Analysis
The first step in the preliminary injunction analysis is determining whether Wayf
has shown a likelihood of success on the merits or at least serious questions going to the
merits. Roe v. Critchfield, 137 F.4th 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2025) (“Likelihood of success on
the merits is the most important Winter factor and is a threshold inquiry.”) (cleaned up).
As discussed below, Wayf has not made either showing as to either of its claims. This
obviates the need to consider the remaining Winter factors. Id. (“In the absence of serious
questions going to the merits, the court need not consider the other factors.”) (cleaned up).
1. Count Two
Wayf argues, in summary fashion, that it is likely to prevail on its tortious inference
claim in Count Two. (Doc. 15 at 11-12.) In response, GEICO reiterates the arguments
regarding breach and damages it asserted in its motion to dismiss and also asserts the
causation and no-improper-conduct arguments it raised for the first time in its reply in
support of its motion to dismiss. (Doc. 18 at 6-9.)4 As for the no-improper-conduct
argument specifically, GEICO contends that it merely made factually accurate statements
3 The Ninth Circuit has questioned the utility of the prohibitory/mandatory
distinction. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2017). Other circuits
have rejected it. See, e.g., Chicago United Indus., Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 445 F.3d 940,
944 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Preliminary relief is properly sought only to avert irreparable harm
to the moving party. Whether and in what sense the grant of relief would change or
preserve some previous state of affairs is neither here nor there. To worry these questions
is merely to fuzz up the legal standard.”) (citations omitted); United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 348 (6th Cir.
1998) (“[T]he distinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctive relief is not
meaningful.”).
4 Because GEICO properly raised the latter arguments in response to the motion for
preliminary injunction, they are not forfeited as they are in relation to the motion to dismiss.
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 23 of 26

- 24 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
to Spaceship and then advanced legal arguments—which Spaceship’s “senior legal team”
ultimately accepted—about why Wayf’s submission should be viewed as insufficient under
the UDRP. (Id. at 7-8.) In reply, Wayf argues as follows:
Defendant’s literal-truth defense fails because half-truths mislead: reference
to the complaint bearing no file stamp as a “deficiency” misled by omitting
that the ECF filing receipt is official documentation (and, in fact, contains an
electronic document stamp); “PACER shows no case” misled by suggesting
no case had been filed when the filing receipt established otherwise and when
filed cases do not appear on PACER until processed; that “Wayf provided no
information connecting the purported complaint to the purported filing
receipt” and “the case name is ‘Plaintiff v. Defendant’” misled because the
filing receipt itself provided a connection to the complaint including the
filing date, the filing fee and receipt number, the filing attorney, and docket
text identifying the parties to the dispute; and “February 2nd [was] the last
day” was flatly false.”
(Doc. 20 at 5.)
Wayf has not established that it is likely to succeed on, or has even established
serious questions going to the merits of, its tortious interference claim. As noted, one of
the elements of that claim is that GEICO “acted improperly.” Wells Fargo Bank, 38 P.3d
at 31. “To be improper, an interference must be wrongful by some measure beyond the
fact of the interference itself.” Snow v. Western Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 730 P.2d 204, 212
(Ariz. 1986) (cleaned up). A defendant does not act improperly where “(1) he has or
honestly believes he has a legally protected interest, (2) which he in good faith asserts or
threatens to protect, and (3) he threatens to protect it by proper means.” Id. at 212-13.
Here, the record indicates that GEICO honestly believed it had a legally protected interest
in the Domain Name and sought to protect that interest by sending, via counsel, a letter to
Spaceship. (Doc. 18-2 at 5-6.) That letter included factually accurate statements and
advanced GEICO’s position as to a disputed legal issue—whether the materials that Wayf
sent to Spaceship on February 2, 2026 qualified as “official documentation.” Wayf has not
identified any case suggesting that the submission of such a letter—which, to be clear,
Spaceship’s own legal department was free to independently evaluate—constitutes
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 24 of 26

- 25 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
“improper” conduct for purposes of a tortious interference claim and courts have concluded
that analogous conduct was not “improper.” See, e.g., Wesbrook v. Ulrich, 840 F.3d 388,
395-98 (7th Cir. 2016) (emphasizing that “transmission of truthful information . . . cannot
subject one to liability for tortious interference with a contract” and that “a statement may
be substantially true—and thus privileged—even if some fine splitting of semantic hairs
might leave room to argue about its literal truth” and concluding that defendants were
entitled to summary judgment on tortious interference claim where “the statements on
which Wesbrook bases his claims against Ulrich and Belongia were each true or
substantially true”) (cleaned up); Loftus v. Nazari, 21 F. Supp. 3d 849, 854 (E.D. Ky. 2014)
(rejecting tortious interference claim where the challenged statements constituted the
defendant’s “protected opinion” and there was “no evidence that Ms. Nazari did not
honestly believe the opinions she set forth”). See also Neonatology Assocs., Ltd. v. Phoenix
Perinatal Assocs. Inc., 164 P.3d 691, 695 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (“A business-driven
motive, in and of itself, is not an improper motive. Indeed, Arizona courts have held that
a business competitor does not act improperly if its purpose at least in part is to advance its
own economic interests.”) (cleaned up).
2. Count One
Wayf contends it is likely to prevail on Count One. (Doc. 15 at 12-15.) In support,
Wayf essentially reiterates the discussion of the nine statutory factors set forth in its
opposition to GEICO’s motion to dismiss. (Id.) Similarly, GEICO’s responsive arguments
largely track its motion-to-dismiss arguments as to the nine statutory factors. (Doc. 18 at
9-13.) In reply, Wayf reiterates its earlier arguments. (Doc. 20 at 6-9.)
Wayf has not established that it is likely to succeed on, or has even established
serious questions going to the merits of, Count One. As discussed in earlier portions of
this order, Wayf has done just enough to avoid dismissal of Count One when all of Wayf’s
well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are
resolved in Wayf’s favor. But the Court need not uncritically accept all of Wayf’s factual
avowals and resolve all inferences in Wayf’s favor when assessing Wayf’s entitlement to
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 25 of 26

- 26 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
a preliminary injunction. And under the standards of review applicable in this context, the
record tips in GEICO’s favor. Wayf registered the Domain Name via a privacy service
that obscured its true identity (the seventh statutory factor) despite lacking any trademark
or other intellectual property rights in the Domain Name (the first statutory factor), despite
lacking any natural connection to the Domain Name (the second statutory factor), and
despite never previously using the Domain Name (the third and fourth statutory factors).
Furthermore, although Wayf’s principals assert that they had never heard of GEICO before
the UDRP proceeding (Doc. 15-3 ¶ 23; Doc. 15-4 ¶ 7), those assertions need not be
accepted at face value for preliminary-injunction purposes and are difficult to reconcile
with the evidence that Wayf has also registered certain other “linguistically innovative
domain names” that overlap with the names of established multi-billion-dollar companies
(the eighth statutory factor) and with the fact that GEICO is a distinctive mark (the ninth
statutory factor). A factfinder not bound by the standards governing the consideration of a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion would likely conclude that the evidence, on balance, undermines
Wayf’s assertion that it acted without a bad faith intent to profit or may otherwise take
advantage of the safe harbor. Cf. Lahoti, 586 F.3d at 1202-03.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Wayf’s request for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 15) is denied.
2. GEICO’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 16) is denied.
Dated this 15th day of October, 2026.
Case 2:26-cv-00703-DWL Document 22 Filed 10/15/26 Page 26 of 26