Turbovets Incorporated v. Patriot Claims LLC et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Turbovets Incorporated,
Plaintiff,
v.
Patriot Claims LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-04733-PHX-JJT
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application for Order to Show Cause and Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (With Notice) and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 13), and
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. 18). For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion
for Preliminary Injunction and grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a Texas corporation, develops technology that assists “military veterans in
managing and submitting disability and benefits claims.” (Doc. 13 at 20 ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s
principal technology operations are in Phoenix, Arizona. (Id. ¶ 5.) While researching and
developing that technology, Plaintiff has operated in “confidential ‘stealth mode’ to protect
its trade secrets, designs, and intellectual property from public disclosure.” (Id. ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff filed a trademark application for the marks “TURBOVETS” and “TURBOVET”
and a copyright registration for its platform user interface. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) While operating
in “stealth mode,” Plaintiff maintains “strict confidentiality with third parties” and “[a]ny
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limited discussions with potential collaborators or partners were conducted under Non-
Disclosure Agreements (NDAs).” (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.)
In October 2025, Plaintiff discovered that Defendant Patriot Claims LLC, a Texas
Corporation, “released a Google Chrome browser extension titled ‘TurboVets by
VetClaims.AI.” (Id. ¶ 15.) The browser extension uses Plaintiff’s mark “TURBOVETS”
and featured a platform user interface like Plaintiff’s. (Id. ¶¶ 17–18.)
Plaintiff sued Defendants asserting claims for, inter alia, trademark and copyright
infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets. (See Doc. 1-1.) Plaintiff now moves
for a primarily injunction to prohibit Defendants from “using Plaintiff’s TURBOVETS
mark . . . [p]ublishing, promoting, or distributing the Chrome extension titled ‘TurboVets
by VetClaims.AI’; [d]isplaying, copying, or using Plaintiff’s copyrighted and proprietary
materials; and [e]ngaging in any act likely to cause confusion as to the affiliation or
sponsorship of Defendants’ product.” (Doc. 13 at 17.)
In response, Defendants argue that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them
and, therefore, lacks authority to issue the requested injunctive relief. (Doc. 19 at 5.)
Defendants separately move to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) under a similar
theory (Doc. 18 at 5–12). Plaintiff opposed Defendant’s Motion, asserting that Defendants
engaged unknown third parties to obtain Plaintiff’s proprietary information through
executing an NDA and targeted Arizona through online advertising. (Doc. 33 at 3–4.) Both
motions have been fully briefed.
The Court held an Evidentiary Hearing on April 7, 2026. The parties presented the
testimony of one witness each by declaration, Mr. Loomis for Plaintiff (Doc. 13 at 20–23;
Doc. 25-1) and Mr. Lukas Simianer, CEO of Patriot Claims LLC, for Defendants (Doc.
18-1). The Court heard the testimony of both Mr. Loomis and Mr. Simianer during cross-
examination and re-direct at the Evidentiary Hearing and, after significantly narrowing the
issues as announced through its findings and conclusions made on the record, took
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction under advisement.
. . .
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After the Evidentiary Hearing, Defendants notified the Court that Plaintiff filed a
substantially similar lawsuit on April 17, 2026, in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas. (See Doc. 51.) According to Defendants, Plaintiff acknowledged
to Defendants that “it intends to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Texas,” but
Defendants contend that venue is improper because Defendants reside within the Western
District of Texas. (Id. at 3.) As of the time of this Order, Plaintiff has not filed a responsive
filing to Defendants’ notice.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show that “(1) [it is]
likely to succeed on the merits, (2) [it is] likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and (4) an injunction is in
the public interest.” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 9 (2008)). As a threshold matter, though,
a district court must have personal jurisdiction over the party against whom an injunction
is sought. Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Ruhrgas AG
v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (“Personal jurisdiction, too, is an essential
element of the jurisdiction of a district court, without which the court is powerless to
proceed to an adjudication.”) (citation modified). The party bringing the action has the
burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction exists in answering a motion to dismiss or
in requesting a preliminary injunction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994); In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716,
741 (9th Cir. 2013).
To establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a plaintiff must
show that the forum state’s long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over the defendant and
that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with constitutional principles of due process.
Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1995). Arizona’s
long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the same extent as the
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United States Constitution and principles of due process. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a);
Cybersell v. Cybersell, 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997).
Due process requires that a nonresident defendant have sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum state so that “maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(citation modified). Personal jurisdiction can be either general or specific. Here, Plaintiff
does not dispute that Defendants are not subject to the general personal jurisdiction of
Arizona (Doc. 25 at 2), so the Court focuses on the specific personal jurisdiction analysis
that “arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state giving rise to the subject
litigation.” Birder v. Jockey’s Guild, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
Whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum turns on three
elements. Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2017). First, the
defendant “must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with
the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself
of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.” Id. Second, “the claim must be one which arises out of or relates
to the defendant’s forum-related activities.” Id. And third, “the exercise of jurisdiction must
comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.” Id. The plaintiff
bears the burden of satisfying the first two elements while the defendant bears the burden
of negating the third. Id. All three elements are required for jurisdiction to lie. Id. The focus
of this analysis is “on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”
Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739, 750 (9th Cir. 2025).
“The burden of proof for establishing personal jurisdiction depends on the ‘mode of
determination’ employed by the district court in deciding the issue.” Carpenter v. Sikorsky
Aircraft Corp., 101 F. Supp. 3d 911, 922 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys.
Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977)). When, as here, a district court
must decide personal jurisdiction after an evidentiary hearing is held, “a plaintiff must
prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
To meet the first element of the minimum effects test, the plaintiff must show the
defendant “either (1) purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities
in the forum, or (2) purposefully directed his activities towards the forum.” Pebble Beach
Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation modified). When, as here, a
plaintiff’s claims sound in tort, courts apply the purposeful direction test. Adobe Sys. Inc.
v. Blue Source Grp., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 945, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (applying effects test
to copyright and trademark infringement claims); see Tracer Rsch. Corp. v. Nat’l Env’t
Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The misappropriation of trade secrets . . .
is a tort claim.”).
To determine whether the defendant’s actions constitute purposeful direction, courts
apply the “effects” test that was developed in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984)
that requires that the nonresident defendant: “(1) committed an intentional act, (2)
expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to
be suffered in the forum state.” Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1206. “The proper question is not
where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s
conduct connects [it] to the forum in a meaningful way.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,
290 (2014). In other words, the relationship between the defendant, the forum state, and
the litigation “must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with the forum
State” and not just “the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Id. at 284.
Plaintiff argues that personal jurisdiction over Defendants exist under three theories:
(1) Defendants provided “direction, encouragement, and orchestration” to unknown agents
who, in turn, negotiated with Plaintiff and caused the execution of an NDA “that contains
a mandatory Arizona forum-selection clause” (Doc. 25 at 2–3); (2) Defendants advertise
and sell the browser extension and other services in Arizona (id. at 3–4); and (3) Defendants
employ six people in Arizona (id. at 5). The Court already set forth its reasons for
determining that the first two theories fail to establish personal jurisdiction at the
Evidentiary Hearing (Hr’g Tr. at 97:4–18), and now turns to the third theory.
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A. Intentional Act
“[A]n intentional act is ‘an external manifestation of the actor’s intent to perform an
actual, physical act in the real world.’” Adobe Sys. Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d at 960 (citing
Wash. Shoe Co. v. A–Z Sporting Goods, Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 2012). Here,
Defendants do not dispute that the act of employing people is an intentional one, so Plaintiff
satisfies the first Calder requirement.
B. Express Aiming Towards Forum State
“The express aiming analysis depends, to a significant degree, on the specific type
of tort or other wrongful conduct at issue.” Id. (citation modified). This inquiry “requires
something more than a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum state.” Id. (citation
modified). “Where a defendant knows—as opposed to being able to foresee—that an
intentional act will impact another state, then the expressly aimed requirement is satisfied.”
Id. at 960–61 (citation modified). Contacts supporting purposeful direction “must be the
defendant’s own choice and not random, isolated, or fortuitous.” Ford Motor Co. v.
Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021).
Here, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ employment of six personnel in Arizona
constitutes “intentional outreach to Arizona.” (Doc. 25 at 5.) Each of these employees work
remotely. (See Docs. 25-2–25-6; H’rg Tr. 65:22–66:5, 73:15–23, 76:1–10, 76:23.) In a
post-COVID pandemic world, the remote-worker business model is increasingly
commonplace. Several district courts have analyzed whether this modern employment
structure establishes minimum contacts through a purposeful availment lens, often in cases
involving an employment-related dispute. Those courts found that an employer’s act of
employing someone who works remotely in a state, without more, does not establish
jurisdiction over the employer there. See Kikendall v. Bid My Listing, Inc., No. C25-1237-
JCC, 2025 WL 3771419, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2025) (“Plaintiff’s home-based
remote work location is not sufficient to trigger personal jurisdiction over an employer’s
board members—not without more.”); Fields v. Sickle Cell Disease Ass’n of Am., Inc., 376
F. Supp. 3d 647, 651 (E.D.N.C. 2018), aff’d, 770 F. App’x 77 (4th Cir. 2019) (no minimum
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contacts with a forum state from where a remote independent contractor chose to work);
Perry v. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders of United States, No. CV TDC-20-0454, 2020 WL
5759766, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2020) (“In remote-work cases, however, a defendant’s
mere knowledge that an employee happens to reside in the forum state and conduct some
work from home does not constitute purposeful availment.”); LoadStop’s Parks v.
LoadStop, Inc., No. CV H-23-4570, 2024 WL 4452946, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2024)
(no minimum contacts where the defendant employed remote residents but did not recruit,
travel to, or sought to have work conducted specifically in the forum state); Waseem v.
Stability AI, Inc., No. 2:24CV36, 2024 WL 4580401, at *6 (E.D. Va. Oct. 10, 2024),
adopted, 2024 WL 5168098 (E.D. Va. Dec. 19, 2024) (no minimum contacts where the
plaintiff’s physical location was irrelevant to recruitment, hiring, and employment terms).
While this Court is presently concerned with the purposeful direction test, these cases are
nonetheless informative of the general trends that courts follow when addressing the
jurisdictional contours of remote employment.
Here, the narrow question before the Court is whether Defendants’ act of employing
people who work remotely from Arizona is an act that was expressly aimed at Arizona. In
this particular case, it is not. Mr. Simianer testified that Defendants do not employ
Arizonans based on their residence here. Rather, Defendants’ employees work remotely in
all fifty states and abroad; their physical location is simply irrelevant. (Hr’g Tr. at 65:22–
66:5, 73:20–23, 76:1–10, 76:23.) Mr. Simianer could not even recall whether the
employees whose LinkedIn profile suggested that they lived in Arizona were still
physically located here at the time of the Evidentiary Hearing. (Hr’g Tr. at 73:15–23, 76:1–
10). Further, Mr. Simianer testified that sales leads are assigned in a “round robin” style
across all sales employees, so the work that an employee may conduct is not location
specific. (Hr’g Tr. at 71:1–18.) While Mr. Simianer acknowledged that Defendants’ sales
personnel may inform veterans of the free browser extension, there is no evidence that the
sales personnel located in Arizona did so, or that sales personnel elsewhere target Arizona-
based veterans to recommend the browser extension. Based on the evidence and testimony,
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the Court finds that Defendants’ contact with Arizona by virtue of employing six remote
employees here is the kind of “random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts [that] are
insufficient to create the requisite connection with the forum.” Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1142.
Plaintiff having failed to satisfy the second Calder requirement, the Court need not
resolve whether the third was met. Plaintiff does not meet its burden to demonstrate that
the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Accordingly, the Court must deny
Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. See Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727.
C. Dismissal
The remaining issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff alleges sufficient
jurisdictional facts to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2). Plaintiff alleges nothing more
than conclusory facts that Defendants engaged an unknown third-party agent to obtain
Plaintiff’s materials and released the browser extension online (see FAC ¶¶ 5–7, 31–33,
51–55), which are insufficient to withstand Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. See, e.g., In re
Boon Glob. Ltd., 923 F.3d 643, 654 (9th Cir. 2019) (Conclusory allegations . . . are
insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. Something more is needed.”). Dismissal for
want of personal jurisdiction is appropriate here.
D. Transfer
While personal jurisdiction does not lie in this Court, it may lie elsewhere. “In an
effort to cure jurisdictional defects, 28 U.S.C. § 1631 allows for the transfer of civil actions
among federal courts.” Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006). Under
Section 1631, a district court that lacks jurisdiction over an action may transfer it “if it is
in the interest of justice . . . to any other such court in which the action or appeal could
have been brought at the time it was filed[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1631. “Because the statute’s
language is mandatory, federal courts should consider transfer without motion by the
parties.” Cruz-Aguilera v. I.N.S., 245 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
Transfer is appropriate “if three conditions are met: (1) the transferring court lacks
jurisdiction; (2) the transferee court could have exercised jurisdiction at the time the action
was filed; and (3) the transfer is in the interest of justice.” Id.
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Personal jurisdiction lies in Texas where both parties are residents, but it is unclear
which district is the proper venue. Defendants contend that the Western district is proper
because they reside there. (Doc. 51 at 3.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Plaintiff, on the other
hand, filed a parallel action in the Eastern district alleging that a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to its claims occurred there. (Doc. 51-1 ¶ 23.) See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(2). Both bases are sufficient to render a venue proper under Section 1391(b).
Because the second element of Section 1631 is not clearly established, the Court declines
to transfer this matter and dismisses it without prejudice.
IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Application for Order to Show Cause and
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (With Notice) and Preliminary Injunction (Doc.
13).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First
Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. 18).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to close this matter.
Dated this 21st day of April, 2026.
Honorable John J. Tuchi
United States District Judge
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