Ocker v. Ocker

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Harold T Ocker,
Appellant,
v.
Elizabeth Ocker,
Appellee.
No. CV-25-04259-PHX-KML
ORDER
After multiple warnings and extensions of time, appellant Harold T. Ocker filed an
untimely opening brief that does not provide any factual background nor develop any
arguments explaining why he believes the bankruptcy court erred. Based on the inadequate
opening brief, this appeal is dismissed.
I. Background
This appeal has a somewhat complicated procedural history. In November 2025,
Ocker filed two notices of appeal related to a bankruptcy proceeding. The notices of appeal
appeared to be from the same ruling, and the court ordered the parties to file statements
explaining whether the two appeals should be consolidated. (Doc. 5.) The court also
ordered Harold to file his opening briefing “within fourteen days of the date the certificate
of readiness is filed on the District Court docket.” (Doc. 5 at 2.) Harold’s statement
regarding consolidation was due December 15, 2025, but he did not file anything. Instead,
on December 17, 2025, Harold sent an email to chambers that included two documents,
one of which indicated Harold was experiencing difficulties in filing documents. Appellee
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Elizabeth Ocker later filed a statement arguing the two appeals “are duplicative as they
both appeal the same order.” (Doc. 7.) Thus, “rather than consolidating the two appeals,”
Elizabeth argued the court “should dismiss the second appeal.” (Doc. 7 at 1.) On December
28, 2025, Ocker sent two additional emails to chambers, apparently believing he could file
documents by doing so.
On January 5, 2026, the bankruptcy court filed the certificate of readiness. (Doc. 8.)
Two days later, the court issued an order consolidating the two appeals into the second-
filed appeal. (Doc. 9.) The court also warned Harold that he was not permitted to send
documents to the court via email. Rather, he was ordered to “arrange for the proper filing
of all documents.” (Doc. 9 at 2.) The court also informed Harold that, despite proceeding
without counsel, he was expected to comply with the same rules of procedure as all other
litigants. The court then reminded Harold “that his opening brief must be received by the
Clerk’s Office within 14 days of January 5, 2026.” (Doc. 9 at 3.) No brief was filed by the
deadline.
On January 22, 2026, the court issued another order that noted “[d]espite being
ordered not to do so, Harold continues to send emails containing substantive information
regarding his appeal to the chambers’ email address.” (Doc. 10 at 1.) Harold was informed
again that he needed to file documents with the Clerk of Court. The order noted Harold had
not filed a brief by the deadline but gave him a final opportunity to file a brief no later than
January 30, 2026. The court’s order closed with the following:
This appeal cannot progress without an opening brief.
Therefore, the court sets a new deadline for Harold’s opening
brief but no additional warnings will be given. If no opening
brief is filed by the deadline, this appeal will be dismissed for
failure to prosecute.
(Doc. 10 at 2.) The January 30 deadline came and went with no brief.
On February 12, 2026, appellee Elizabeth Ocker filed a motion to dismiss arguing
the absence of an opening brief merited dismissal of the appeal. (Doc. 16.) Later that same
day, Harold filed a response arguing dismissal was not appropriate because he had “acted
in good faith while learning appellate formatting requirements.” (Doc. 17 at 1.) Harold
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attached his opening brief to that filing.
Harold’s opening brief consists of barely more than one page and purports to
“challenge[] final orders approving a settlement under Rule 9019 and denying Rule 60(b)
relief.” (Doc. 17 at 2.) The brief identifies four issues for review: 1) “Whether due process
was satisfied”; 2) “Whether mediation irregularties undermined consent”; 3) “Whether
Rule 9019 approval was proper”; and 4) “Whether Rule 60(b) relief should have been
granted.” The brief contains three additional sections, allegedly addressed to “due process,”
“Rule 9019,” and “Rule 60(b).” Those sections, however, do not provide any facts or case-
specific legal arguments. Instead, each one consists of two to four sentences of generic
statements and citations to legal standards.
Elizabeth filed a reply in support of her motion to dismiss, claiming Harold’s brief
“does not remotely satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8014 or 8015” and “is
clearly AI-generated.” (Doc. 18 at 3.) Harold then filed another document arguing
dismissal was not appropriate. According to Harold, his appeal “presents serious, record-
based issues concerning sworn testimony, procedural integrity, voluntariness of mediation,
and the legal authority underlying the order being reviewed.” (Doc. 19 at 2.) But as with
his opening brief, Harold again failed to provide any facts, citations to the record, or
meaningful legal arguments regarding these issues. Instead, he claims unidentified portions
of the record “reflect[] irregularities affecting the factual basis of the court’s ruling.” (Doc.
19 at 2.)
II. Analysis
Harold’s failure to file an opening brief after repeated warnings and a sua sponte
extension of the deadline might alone merit dismissal. But Harold eventually filed an
opening brief so, if possible, the court would prefer to resolve the appeal on its merits.
Unfortunately, Harold’s brief does not provide sufficient information to allow the court to
do so. Dismissal of the appeal is therefore appropriate.
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8014(a) sets out the requirements for an
appellant’s brief. A brief must contain, among other things, “a concise statement of the
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case setting out the facts relevant to the issues submitted for review, describing the relevant
procedural history, and identifying the rulings presented for review, with appropriate
references to the record.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8014(a)(6). The brief also must contain “a
summary of the argument, which must contain a succinct, clear, and accurate statement of
the arguments made in the body of the brief, and which must not merely repeat the
argument headings.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8014(a)(7). And a brief must set out “the argument,
which must contain the appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to
the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. Bankr. P.
8014(a)(8). Harold’s opening brief does not meet any of these requirements.
Harold’s brief contains no procedural history or factual background explaining the
basis for his appeal. In fact, the brief contains no citations to the record whatsoever. It does
identify four “issues” Harold wishes to have reviewed, but those issues are not supported
by a meaningful summary or elaboration of any arguments, or facts from Harold’s case
relevant to any of them. The brief effectively asks the court to review the bankruptcy
record, identify the issues Harold wishes to appeal, and develop arguments on Harold’s
behalf. In other words, Harold “essentially tossed this bankruptcy case in [the court’s] lap[],
leaving it to [the court] to figure out the relevant facts and law.” In re O’Brien, 312 F.3d
1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002). The court cannot do so. Id.
The court “review[s] only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a
party’s opening brief.” Greenwood v. F.A.A., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994). The court
“will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a
claim.” Id. The fact that Harold is proceeding without counsel does not merit a different
result. “[P]ro se litigants in the ordinary civil case should not be treated more favorably
than parties with attorneys of record.” Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir.
1986); see also In re Kleidman, No. 22-55381, 2023 WL 6875313, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 18,
2023) (affirming dismissal of pro se bankruptcy appeal “on the ground that none of the
issues . . . were properly raised before the district court”). The opening brief does not
adequately present any issue “to enable informed review” so “there is little choice but to
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affirm or dismiss.” In re Kyle, 317 B.R. 390, 393 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (simplified).
Harold received multiple warnings to file an appropriate brief, and he ignored
multiple deadlines. When Harold eventually filed his opening brief, it did not present
sufficient facts or arguments to enable the district court to review the bankruptcy court’s
decision. Having ignored the rules and explicit court warnings, there is no indication
Harold would be able to timely file a compliant opening brief even if afforded another
opportunity. In these circumstances, dismissal of the appeal is appropriate. In re O’Brien,
312 F.3d at 1137.
IT IS ORDERED the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Motion to Stay (Doc. 20) is DENIED AS
MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED this appeal is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court
shall enter judgment and close this case. Any request for attorneys’ fees shall be filed within
fourteen days of this order.
Dated this 26th day of February, 2026.
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