Ivanov v. Rivas et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Evgenii Ivanov,
Petitioner,
v.
David R. Rivas, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-25-04160-PHX-SHD (ASB)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE SHARAD H. DESAI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE:
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Evgenii Ivanov’s pro se Amended Petition
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. (Doc. 13)1, filed April 20, 2026. Petitioner is
detained at San Luis Regional Detention Center and seeks release from immigration
detention pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (Id.) For the reasons that
follow, the undersigned recommends the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be
denied and dismissed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Russia who entered the United States on October 7, 2018.
(Docs. 1 at 2; 10 at 1.) Petitioner was ordered removed on January 22, 2020 “by an
Imigration [sic] Judge.” (Doc. 1 at 2); (see also Doc. 10-1 at ¶ 4.) Following an appeal,
Petitioner’s Final Removal Order issued on May 21, 2021. (Docs. 1 at 2; 10-1 at ¶ 9.)
1 Citation to the record indicates documents as they are displayed in the District of Arizona’s
official Court electronic document filing system under Case No. CV-25-04160-PHX-SHD (ASB).
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Petitioner has been in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) since
January 26, 2025. (Docs. 1 at 2; 10-1 at ¶ 10.) In his Petition, Petitioner argues that his
continued detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution because he has been held over six months and “there is no significant
likelihood that he will be removed in the reasonabl[y] forseeable [sic] future.” (Doc. 1 at 2
(quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).)
Respondents, David R. Rivas, Warden of the San Luis Regional Detention Center,
and Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States (collectively, “Respondents”)2
filed a “Response in Opposition to Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction”3 on December 15, 2025. (Doc. 10.) In their Response, Respondents
included a Declaration from ICE Deportation Officer Jorge E. Hernandez (hereinafter,
“Declaration”). (Doc. 10-1 at 1-4.) The Declaration reflected that Petitioner was previously
in ICE custody and granted parole on May 6, 2020 in the Alternatives to Detention (ATD)
program because of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Doc. 10-1 at ¶ 5.) According to the
Declaration, Petitioner was terminated from the ATD program on December 10, 2020 after
being detained in San Diego Central Jail due to a domestic violence charge. (Id. at ¶ 6.)
The Declaration stated Petitioner was re-enrolled in ATD on December 18, 2020 after his
release from county jail and the charges were thereafter dropped. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8.) Finally, as
stated in the Declaration, Petitioner was arrested on January 26, 2025 by Enforcement and
Removal Operations (ERO) and terminated from the ATD program. (Id. at ¶ 10.)
According to the Declaration, on May 13, 2025 Petitioner was booked for an
interview “and to fill out Form I-217, Information for Travel Document or Passport and
the travel document request (entitled Questionnaire) which consists of information required
by the Russian Federation to verify citizenship. Petitioner refused to fill out the I-217 or
provide information for the travel document request[.]” (Doc. 10-1 at ¶ 15.) The
2 Petitioner initially named ICE in addition to the aforementioned Respondents. (Doc. 1.)
ICE was dismissed as a Respondent pursuant to this Court’s Order on November 19, 2025. (See
Doc. 3.)
3 Although the Response was styled as one responding to a motion for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction, the record shows the Petitioner filed only a Petition pursuant to
§ 2241, not a motion for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. (See Docs. 1, 10.)
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Declaration asserted that on three additional occasions from August 2025 to October 2025,
Petitioner was asked and refused to provide information or assist in obtaining travel
documents. (See id. at ¶¶ 17-21.) After the final refusal, according to the Declaration,
Officer Hernandez served Petitioner with a Form I-229(a) – Warning for Failure to Depart
and a Notice of Failure to Comply. (Id. at ¶¶ 21-22.) The Declaration also attested to steps
taken by ICE to secure travel documents for Petitioner, including compiling a Travel
Document Request (TDR) packet to send to the Embassy of Russian Federation for
citizenship verification. (Id. at ¶¶ 23-27.) The Declaration then outlined the subsequent
steps the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) would take to effectuate Petitioner’s
removal to Russia, and asserts that if a travel document is refused by the Russian
Federation, “[Enforcement and Removal Operations] will work with DHS and the U.S.
Department of State to coordinate a Third Country Removal.” (Id. at ¶¶ 27-29.)
On February 19, 2026, undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation
recommending the Petition be denied and dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 11.)
Underpinning that recommendation was undersigned’s conclusion that Petitioner had
failed to meet his burden to show good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. (Id. at 6) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
701). Although leave to amend was not requested, undersigned recommended that leave
be afforded to Petitioner. (Id. at 8.)
On March 23, 2026, the District Judge adopted the Report and Recommendation
and dismissed and denied the Petition without prejudice, and with leave to amend. (Doc.
12.) The District Judge ordered that Petitioner could file an Amended Petition within 30
days and that, “[i]f the Amended Petition fails to cure the defects identified in the Report
and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Doc. 11), … the Court may dismiss without
further leave to amend.” (Id. at 2.)
On April 20, 2026, Petitioner’s Amended Petition was filed. (Doc. 13.) In his
Amended Petition, Petitioner repeats verbatim every sentence of his original Petition, with
a change in the amount of time he has been in detention, and he approximately four new
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sentences to the original Petition’s language. (See id.) Specifically, he adds the following:
[Petitioner] is cooperating with ICE officers and is providing all necessary
information. Previously, as shown in Exhibit A, the government has
previously made multiple attempts to secure travel documents and effectuate
removal, but those efforts have been unsuccessful, demonstrating that
removal is not reasonably foreseeable.[] No changes have occurred since he
began cooperating, either. He has been held in detention for one year and
two months – a significant period of time-and there are currently no
indications that his deportation will take place in the near future.
(Doc. 13 at 2.) To his Amended Petition, Petitioner attaches many of the same documents
he previously provided with his original Petition. (See id. at 13-20.) He also attaches
“Exhibit A,” which consists of pages 3 and 4 of undersigned’s prior Report and
Recommendation. (Id. at 11-12.) Finally, he attaches two ICE documents entitled “Notice
to Alien of File Custody Review” that are dated March 2026, in which ICE purportedly
informs Petitioner his custody status will be reviewed in March 2026 and he should provide
ICE with information and documents that will assist in his removal. (See id. at 5-10.)
For the reasons below, undersigned concludes the Amended Petition fails to meet
the standard set by the District Judge in the prior dismissal Order. Accordingly,
undersigned will recommend the Amended Petition be dismissed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review has not changed since undersigned issued her previous
Report and Recommendation in this case; it is repeated here.
“The writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within
the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art.
I, § 9, cl. 2). Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in federal custody if the
petitioner can demonstrate he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Accordingly, federal courts have
jurisdiction to grant writs of habeas corpus to noncitizens who are being unlawfully
detained under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956 (9th
Cir. 2012) (“The writ of habeas corpus historically provides a remedy to non-citizens
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challenging executive detention.”) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301-303 (2001));
Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[D]istrict courts retain
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to immigration detention
that are sufficiently independent of the merits of the removal order”) (citation omitted).
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1), once a removal order becomes final, the Government
has ninety days to effectuate the individual’s removal from the United States. This
“removal period” generally commences as soon as a removal order becomes
administratively final, and during the “removal period” detention of the alien is mandatory.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)-(2). If an individual is not removed during the removal period, the
individual’s continued detention becomes discretionary. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). However,
that discretion is not unfettered, and “indefinite detention” is not permitted. See 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. The Supreme Court in Zadvydas recognized a six-
month period where detention was “presumptively reasonable.” 533 U.S. at 701. After this
six-month period, “once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government
must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. The presumption,
however, is not dispositive. Id. (“This 6-month presumption, of course, does not mean that
every alien not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may
be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,
594 U.S. 523, 529 (2021) (after the six-month period has elapsed, “if the alien ‘provides
good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future,’ the Government must either rebut that showing or release the alien”)
(quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).
Courts have found that a petitioner may meet his burden of persuasion by alleging
that his country of removal has refused or is unable to issue a travel document. See, e.g.,
Eshaghian v. Howard, No. CV-25-04141-PHX-DWL (ASB), 2026 WL 63451, at *3 (D.
Ariz. Jan. 8, 2026) (finding petitioner met his initial burden by proffering unrebutted
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evidence that he lacks original documents, such as a birth certificate or passport, sufficient
to obtain travel documents from his country of removal); Vaskanyan v. Janecka, No. 25-
CV-01475-MRA-AS, 2025 WL 3050081, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2025) (finding
petitioner demonstrated that ICE was unable to remove him to the countries designated for
removal and thus that petitioner met his burden); Mohammad Hadi Hezardastan v. Kristi
Noem et. al., No. 25-CV-3424-AB-DTB, 2025 WL 3768581, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23,
2025) (holding petitioner who had only been held for four months rebutted the presumption
of reasonableness because he could not be deported to the last country he resided or the
country he was a citizen of). Courts in the Ninth Circuit have found that a petitioner fails
to meet this burden when a petitioner foreseeably remains capable of being removed or
fails to allege sufficient facts that indicate removal is not feasible. See Prieto-Romero v.
Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[Petitioner] foreseeably remains capable of
being removed . . . and so the government retains an interest in ‘assuring [his] presence at
removal.’” (emphasis in original)) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699); Loussaief v. Wolf,
No. CV-21-00042-PHX-JAT-MHB, 2021 WL 214572, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 21, 2021)
(finding petitioner did not allege sufficient facts to support that his country of removal
refused to issue travel documents or otherwise indicate his removal is not feasible).
III. DISCUSSION
Based on the record before this Court, Petitioner has now been in detention for far
longer than the mandatory ninety-day removal period and the six-month presumptive
detention period. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. Petitioner received his Final Removal
Order on May 21, 2021, but due to the ATD program, was not placed in custody until
January 26, 2025. (See Doc. 10-1 at ¶¶ 5-10.) Petitioner has now spent over a year in DHS
custody. (See Docs. 1, 10, 13.) Because Petitioner has been detained with a final removal
order for over the presumptive six-month period, the initial burden falls on Petitioner to
provide good reason to believe that there is no “significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.
In his Amended Petition, Petitioner again asserts that his “continued detention in
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immigration custody violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth [Amendment] to the U.S.
Constitution because there is no significant likelihood that he will be removed in the
[reasonably] forseeable [sic] future.” (Doc. 13 at 2.) Petitioner further claims that “his
detention has deviated from the main purpose of removal” and he is being illegally
detained. (Id. at 3.) Petitioner again supports his Amended Petition with character
references from his pastor, family, and landlord, and he further provides the Court with
ICE documents notifying him that his custody is being reviewed and requesting
information and documents to assist with his removal. (See id. at 5-20.)
Respondents previously argued (in Response to the original Petition) that Petitioner
had not met his burden and had refused to provide information to ICE necessary to
effectuate his removal. (Doc. 10.) Thus, it appears Petitioner attempts in the Amended
Petition to refute that argument by averring that he has been “cooperating” and still has not
been removed. (See Doc. 13 at 2.) He provides no further information to support that bare
assertion. (See id.) Instead, he provides the Court with a copy of ICE documents asking
him for that information and documentation (but no indication of any cooperation in
response to those requests) and this Court’s own Report and Recommendation, in which
the Court summarized Respondents’ assertions that Petitioner had not cooperated with
removal efforts in 2025. (See id. at 5-12.)
Based on review of the record, undersigned again finds Petitioner has failed to meet
his initial burden to provide good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Petitioner
has not alleged any facts that indicate his removal is not feasible. (See Doc. 13); see
Loussaief, 2021 WL 214572, at *2. In short, Petitioner has done little in his Amended
Petition but allege he has “cooperated” but been detained longer than the presumptive
period and therefore his detention is unlawful. (See Doc. 13.) Without any factual support
for Petitioner’s bare assertions, though, the record indicates Petitioner foreseeably remains
capable of being removed in the future. See Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1065; cf., e.g.,
Eshaghian, 2026 WL 63451, at *3 (where petitioner met his burden in part because he pled
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he lacked the original personal documents sufficient to satisfy the country of removal in
order to obtain travel documents).
Because Petitioner’s Amended Petition has “fail[ed] to cure the defects identified in
the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Doc. 11),” (Doc. 12 at 2),
undersigned will recommend that the District Judge deny and dismiss the Amended
Petition. Petitioner has not asked for further leave to amend. (See Doc. 13.) Even without
that request, the Court may consider whether “justice so requires” leave to amend. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a); see also Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. California Collection Serv. Inc.,
911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if
no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could
not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” (applying in a 12(b)(6) context))
(citations omitted). Although “a petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without
leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such
leave granted,” Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971) (citations omitted), futility
of amendment may result in the Court denying further leave to amend. See Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). At this juncture, it appears further amendment may be futile,
but undersigned will defer to the District Judge on that issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Petitioner has been afforded the opportunity to amend his Petition, and he has failed
to remedy the defects identified in the prior Report and Recommendation. Consequently,
undersigned will recommend the Amended Petition be denied and dismissed. Undersigned
defers to the District Judge as to whether to dismiss with prejudice, or to dismiss without
prejudice and with leave to amend.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 13) be DENIED and DISMISSED.
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EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The
parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within
which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a
response to the objections.
Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the
district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,
1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the
Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the
findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
Dated this 22nd day of April, 2026.
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