Davis v. American Airlines, et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Nia Elan Davis,
Plaintiff,
v.
American Airlines, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-01992-PHX-KML
ORDER
Plaintiff Nia Elan Davis has filed at least four complaints (Docs. 1, 26, 30, 32),
requiring her employer, defendant American Airlines, to file three motions to dismiss (Doc.
27, 31, 34.) The operative complaint does not contain sufficient facts to state any claim for
relief and, given the history of this case, additional leave to amend is not appropriate.
BACKGROUND
Davis filed her original complaint on June 9, 2025. (Doc. 1.) A little over one month
later, Davis filed a “Motion to Accept Waiver of Service.” (Doc. 13.) The court denied that
motion after explaining it was not appropriate because it would be up to American Airlines
to object to the adequacy of service. (Doc. 14 at 1.) The court informed Davis that although
she was proceeding pro se, she was required to comply with the same rules of procedures
that apply to all litigants. Davis was also instructed to “ensure her filings compl[ied] with
all applicable rules and procedures.” (Doc. 14 at 1.) Despite those warnings, on July 25,
2025, Davis filed another “Motion to Accept Waiver of Service.” (Doc. 20.) The court
issued a second order denying the motion as “baseless” and reminding Davis she was
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risking sanctions by ignoring court orders. (Doc. 23 at 2.)
On September 8, 2025, the parties filed a joint motion requesting Davis be allowed
to amend her complaint. (Doc. 24.) The court granted that motion and, on September 19,
2025, Davis filed her amended complaint. (Doc. 26.) American Airlines responded to that
complaint by filing its first motion to dismiss. (Doc. 27.) Davis did not oppose that motion
and two weeks after the opposition was due, the court granted the motion with leave to
amend. (Doc. 29.) In the order granting the motion, the court explained American Airlines
had argued Davis did not exhaust her administrative remedies regarding any claim other
than retaliation. (Doc. 29 at 2.) Because Davis had not filed an opposition, the court agreed
“Davis only exhausted her retaliation claim.” (Doc. 29 at 2.) The court also discussed other
problems with the complaint, such as the lack of sufficient factual allegations. (Doc. 29 at
2.) As of that point, Davis was on notice that any future complaint would need significantly
more factual allegations than she had provided up to that time.
On November 12, 2025, Davis filed a second amended complaint. (Doc. 30.) Two
weeks later, American Airlines filed its second motion to dismiss. (Doc. 31.) Before filing
that motion American Airlines had conferred with Davis, but the parties were unable to
reach an agreement that the second amended complaint could be cured by amendment.
(Doc. 31-1 at 1.) Instead of opposing the motion to dismiss, however, Davis filed a third
amended complaint. (Doc. 32.) That filing included two different complaints, so the court
had to clarify the operative complaint was the document found at Doc. 32 and the parties
were to ignore the document found at Doc. 32-1.1 (Doc. 33.) American Airlines filed its
third motion to dismiss asking the court to dismiss the third amended complaint. Davis
responded to this motion and requested leave to amend if her complaint was found
insufficient. (Doc. 35 at 4.) Davis’s opposition also contained a citation to a non-existent
case. (Doc. 35 at 4.) American Airlines’s reply argued the fictitious citation merited
sanctions in the form of dismissal. (Doc. 38 at 10.)
1 The document found at Doc. 32 contains claims for discrimination based on race, color,
sexual orientation, age, and retaliation. (Doc. 32 at 3.) The document found at Doc. 32-1
contains a single claim for retaliation. (Doc. 32-1 at 3.) There is no explanation why Davis
filed documents containing such different claims.
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On January 15, 2026, Davis filed a “Notice of Correction and Request for Leave to
Amend.” (Doc. 39.) In that notice, Davis sought to withdraw the fictitious citation in her
opposition. Davis also requested leave to amend the complaint if the motion to dismiss was
granted. (Doc. 39.) Given that Davis had already made a request for leave to amend, it is
not clear why she made this separate request.
Turning to the substance, the third amended complaint begins by stating Davis “was
subjected to adverse treatment based on race, color, sexual orientation, and age, and later
subject to retaliation for engaging in protected activity.” (Doc. 32 at 1.) The complaint does
not identify Davis’s race, color, sexual orientation, or age. The complaint then includes a
list of vague allegations regarding Davis’s employment.
Davis alleges she has “consistently performed work duties at or above expectations”
but she has been excluded from an unidentified “training program” despite unidentified
“less qualified individuals” being selected for the program. (Doc. 32 at 2.) Davis raised
unspecified “concerns about discrimination and adverse work conditions,” but she offers
no allegations about when this occurred, to whom Davis complained, or any specifics
regarding her “concerns.” (Doc. 32 at 2.) After raising her “concerns,” Davis “suffered
escalating retaliation” that included her managers mentioning “the expiration date of
[Davis’s] Right-To-Sue letter.” (Doc. 32 at 2.) The managers also “falsif[ied]
documentation on [Davis’s] record and more events past and current which will be
available during discovery.” (Doc. 32 at 2.) Although not clear, the documentation Davis
is referencing may be “[f]alsified coaching and disciplinary documentation.” (Doc. 32 at
2.)
Davis then alleged a bullet-point list of additional acts of retaliation:
• Davis received “[t]hreatening messages via Teams Chat” from an
unspecified individual sometime in 2024;
• Unidentified individuals “[m]anipulated stats by controlling the types of
calls coming to plaintiff and others” at unidentified times in 2024 and 2025;
• Davis was “[e]xclu[ded] from advancement opportunities” by unidentified
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individuals at unidentified times;
• Davis was subjected to “[r]epeated verbal hostility” by unidentified
individuals at unidentified times; and
• Unidentified individuals at unidentified times created “[a]dditional
documentation to justify adverse actions after protected activity.”
Based on these allegations, Davis calculates she is owed back-pay damages of
$269,400. (Doc. 32 at 3.) As pointed out by American Airlines, Davis also requests “[f]ront
pay if reinstatement is not feasible,” despite Davis still being employed by American
Airlines. (Doc. 32 at 4.)
ANALYSIS
American Airlines’s motion to dismiss makes two basic arguments. First, Davis did
not exhaust any claim other than retaliation. (Doc. 34 at 5-7.) And second, Davis has not
alleged sufficient facts to state a retaliation claim. (Doc. 34 at 7-13.) Both arguments are
correct.
I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
American Airlines argues Davis only exhausted a retaliation claim with the EEOC
such that all of her non-retaliation claims must be dismissed. American Airlines made this
same argument in an earlier motion to dismiss and, based in large part on Davis’s failure
to file an opposition, the court agreed with American Airlines. (Doc. 27 at 6-8; Doc. 29 at
2.) Although Davis did respond to the latest motion to dismiss, she still does not address
exhaustion. Instead, her opposition might be read as conceding she is only pursuing a
retaliation claim. (Doc. 35 at 1) (allegations in third amended complaint “easily meet the
standard for retaliation”). But regardless of the previous order regarding exhaustion and
the lack of meaningful argument from Davis, American Airlines is correct that Davis only
exhausted a retaliation claim.
Once a plaintiff files a charge with the EEOC and receives a right-to-sue notice, she
may pursue litigation over the claims in the administrative charge alongside additional
claims that “are like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge.”
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B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002) (simplified). In other
words, claims are administratively exhausted if they would “fall within the scope of the . . .
EEOC investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge.” Vasquez
v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2003). When comparing the allegations
in an administrative charge to the claims in a civil complaint, the court may consider “the
alleged basis of the discrimination, dates of discriminatory acts specified within the charge,
perpetrators of discrimination named in the charge, and any locations at which
discrimination is alleged to have occurred.” Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291
F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (simplified).
Davis’s administrative charge focuses on retaliation. That is the sole basis Davis
identified in the section of the form asking for her to identify what the alleged
“discrimination [was] based on.” (Doc. 34-1 at 12.) And although Davis’s factual
allegations in the charge are meandering, they end with “I believed [sic] I have been
retaliated against for filing a previous EEOC Charge.” (Doc. 34-1 at 13.) An investigation
into the retaliation referenced in the charge would not have expanded to cover the
discrimination based on “race, color, sexual orientation, or age” that Davis now alleges in
her third amended complaint. That Davis only intended to make a retaliation claim with
the EEOC is supported by the fact that she had filed an earlier EEOC charge alleging she
had been discriminated against based on her age, color, race, retaliation, and sex. (Doc. 34-
1 at 3.) Thus, Davis knew how to select and describe additional forms of discrimination,
but for the EEOC charge underlying her current suit, she chose to raise only retaliation. All
of her claims except for retaliation are dismissed for failure to exhaust. Sommatino v.
United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 2001).
II. Failure to State a Claim
American Airlines argues Davis has not alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible
claim of retaliation. A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although Rule 8
does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-
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defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id.
A prima facie case of retaliation claim under Title VII requires allegations “(1) [the
plaintiff] was engaging in protected activity, (2) the employer subjected her to an adverse
employment decision, and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and
the employer’s action.” Bergene v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist., 272 F.3d
1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001). The requirement of establishing a prima facie case is an
“evidentiary standard” and not a “pleading requirement[].” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,
534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). Thus, a complaint cannot be dismissed merely because it does
not contain facts establishing all the requirements of a prima facie case. See Austin v. Univ.
of Oregon, 925 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2019). But it is helpful to consider the elements
of a prima facie case when assessing the plausibility of a complaint. See Khalik v. United
Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding a plaintiff is not required to
“establish a prima facie case in her complaint” but “the elements of each alleged cause of
action help to determine whether Plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim”).
The third amended complaint identifies the protected activity as “filing an EEOC
complaint.” (Doc. 32 at 2.) Although it would have been helpful for Davis to identify which
of her two EEOC complaints she is referencing, an EEOC filing complaining of
discrimination undoubtedly is protected activity meeting the first element of a retaliation
claim. The problems come with Davis not sufficiently identifying the adverse actions and
not providing any allegations supporting a link between the EEOC complaint and those
adverse actions.
The complaint alleges a wide variety of conduct that Davis seems to believe
qualified as adverse actions. But Davis does not provide sufficient surrounding factual
allegations to provide American Airlines with fair notice of the conduct at issue. For
example, the allegation that “[t]hreatening messages” were sent “via Teams chat” at some
point in 2024 does not provide adequate notice. Similarly, the allegation that Davis
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experienced “[r]epeated verbal hostility” is too vague. These general allegations are
insufficient because they leave American Airlines largely “in the dark” about the actual
basis for Davis’s claims. Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.
2021).
Beyond vague allegations of adverse actions, there are no allegations establishing a
causal relationship between those actions and Davis’s EEOC complaint. Davis alleges the
actions took place sometime after filing her EEOC complaint, but she does not identify the
actual length of time between the various events (or even specific enough dates to infer the
length). Simple temporal proximity can support a retaliation claim but “[e]ven cases
involving very close temporal proximity have generally featured independent evidence of
discrimination or retaliation.” Kama v. Mayorkas, 107 F.4th 1054, 1060 (9th Cir. 2024).
Without identifying the temporal proximity at issue, and without including any other
allegations indicating a retaliatory intent, Davis has not alleged a plausible causal
connection.
III. Leave to Amend
“The court considers five factors in assessing the propriety of leave to amend—bad
faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the
plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655
F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011). Although there is not sufficient evidence to conclude Davis
has acted in bad faith, the other factors support denying leave to amend.
This case began approximately eight months ago and since that time Davis has filed
four complaints, requiring American Airlines to file three motions to dismiss.2 After
American Airlines filed its first motion to dismiss, Davis did not file an opposition. (Doc.
27.) The court granted the motion but also provided Davis with guidance if she planned to
file an amended complaint. (Doc. 27 at 29 at 2-3.) Unfortunately, the third amended
2 Davis’s second amended complaint included more details and a single claim for
retaliation. (Doc. 30 at 1.) But Davis then voluntarily amended her complaint to remove
the details and assert other claims. Davis “is the master of [her] complaint and responsible
for articulating cognizable claims.” Newtok Vill. v. Patrick, 21 F.4th 608, 616 (9th Cir.
2021). Therefore, the court must accept that Davis intended to remove details and add
claims, even though doing so may have been harmful to her case.
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complaint represents no meaningful improvement as it consists of vague allegations of
events not tied to particular dates or individuals. For whatever reason, Davis appears
incapable of providing meaningful factual allegations.
Overall, Davis’s approach to this litigation has caused undue delay and given the
many amendments she has already made, it would be futile to give her another chance. In
addition, “consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . carries the greatest weight”
when determining whether to allow amendment. Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316
F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). It would be prejudicial to American Airlines to give Davis
endless opportunities to state a claim for relief. Leave to amend is denied.
IT IS ORDERED Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 34) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court
shall enter judgment in favor of defendant and close this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 39) is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Motion to Allow Electronic Filing (Doc. 42) is
DENIED AS MOOT.
Dated this 17th day of February, 2026.
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