Junker v. Bondi et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Joshua Junker,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-25-01471-PHX-DLR (DMF)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES, SENIOR UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE:
I. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
This matter is on referral to the undersigned for further proceedings and a report and
recommendation pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure
(Doc. 6 at 4).1
Self-represented Petitioner Joshua Junker (“Petitioner” and/or “Junker”) filed a
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) and a Memorandum
in Support (Doc. 2) (together, “Petition”). At the time he initiated this matter, Petitioner
was confined in the Federal Correctional Institution-Phoenix (“FCI-Phoenix”) (Docs. 1, 2).
On September 4, 2025, the Court required Respondent Jason Gunther (“Respondent”
1 Citation to the record as “Doc.” indicates documents as displayed in the official Court
electronic document filing system maintained by the District of Arizona under case number
CV-25-01471-PHX-DLR (DMF).
Case 2:25-cv-01471-DLR Document 17 Filed 02/13/26 Page 1 of 10

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
and/or “Gunther”) to answer to the Petition and dismissed the remaining Respondents as
redundant (Doc. 6). On September 26, 2025, Respondent Gunther filed a Return and
Answer to Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Answer”) (Doc.
12), including the Declaration of United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of
Prisons, Legal Assistant at FCI-Phoenix Shaleen Ruelas (“Ruelas Decl.”) with supporting
documents (Doc. 12-1; see also Docs. 15, 16). During these proceedings, Petitioner filed
a change of address reflecting his transfer out of the District of Arizona (Doc. 14).
Nevertheless, Petitioner has not filed a reply in support of the Petition and the time to do
so has expired (see Doc. 6 at 3; Docs. 15, 16).
Upon careful review, it is recommended that the Petition be dismissed without
prejudice and this matter terminated.
II. CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
In a September 4, 2025, Order, the Court construed the Petition as raising three
grounds for relief in the Petition:
(1) the “System” developed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) pursuant to
18 U.S.C. §§ 3631 and 3621 for “[First Step Act] risk and needs assessment
does not comply with the requirements of the statute because it uses static
factors that either will never change or are not likely to change during a term
of imprisonment.”
(2) BOP “does not offer sufficient programming to meaningfully reduce an
inmate[’]s risk of recidivism by assigning each inmate to appropriate
evidence-based recidivism reduction programs which address specific
criminogenic needs” and FCI-Phoenix does not offer any courses that reduce
Petitioner’s “risk points.”
(3) “All prisoners at each risk level do not have a meaningful opportunity to
reduce their classification during their period of incarceration[,] in
accordance with 18 USC § 3632(a)(5)(A).”
(Doc. 6 at 1-2). The Court required Respondent Gunther to answer the Petition, and the
Court dismissed the remaining Respondents as redundant (Id. at 3).
In his September 2025 Answer, Respondent requests that the Court dismiss the
Case 2:25-cv-01471-DLR Document 17 Filed 02/13/26 Page 2 of 10

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Petition or, alternatively, deny the Petition (Doc. 12). Respondent argues that this matter
should be dismissed and/or denied because Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, because this Court lacks jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedures Act,
because this Court cannot compel discretionary agency action, Petitioner does not have a
liberty interest in his “Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs” (or
“PATTERN”) score regarding recidivism risk or in the application of First Step Act
(“FSA”) earned time credits (“ETCs”) toward early release or prerelease custody, and
because Petitioner’s sentence is properly calculated (Id.). Respondent describes Petitioner
as follows, with references in support from the Ruelas Decl.:
Petitioner is serving a 120-month term of imprisonment for a drug
distribution offense in violation of federal law. [Doc. 12-1] at ¶ 15.
Petitioner is projected for release from Bureau custody on November 24,
2026. Id.
Petitioner’s eligibility for FSA ETCs was reviewed on January 13, 2020, and
he was deemed eligible to earn FSA time credits. Id. at ¶ 16. During his
most recent Program Review on June 18, 2025, he was determined to be a
high risk for recidivism. Id. Because of Petitioner’s high risk for recidivism,
he is not eligible to have any ETCs applied toward prerelease custody or his
supervised release term. Id. at ¶ 17. His recidivism risk level will be re-
assessed again in December 2025. Id. at ¶ 18.
(Doc. 12 at 3). Petitioner was sentenced to the 120-month term of imprisonment on June
28, 2018, in the Western District of Texas (Doc. 12-1 at 8, ¶ 15; Doc. 12-1 at 15).
During these proceedings either before the Answer’s filing or shortly thereafter,
Petitioner was transferred to a facility outside the District of Arizona (Docs. 12, 13, 14).
The Answer was properly mailed to Petitioner (Docs. 14, 15, 16). Nevertheless, Petitioner
has not filed a reply and the time to do so has expired (Id.).
III. PROPER DISTRICT
Because Petitioner was confined in the District of Arizona when he filed the
Petition, this habeas matter was properly brought in this district. See Brown v. United
States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990) (§ 2241 petition must be brought in the district
Case 2:25-cv-01471-DLR Document 17 Filed 02/13/26 Page 3 of 10

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
of confinement). This Court may continue to exercise jurisdiction, notwithstanding
Petitioner’s transfer outside of this District. See Johnson v. Gill, 883 F.3d 756, 761 (9th
Cir. 2018); see also Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[J]urisdiction
attaches on the initial filing for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed by a transfer of
the petitioner and the accompanying custodial change.” (quoting Santillanes v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 754 F.2d 887, 888 (10th Cir. 1985))).
IV. FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Petitioner admits that he did not pursue his administrative remedies regarding his
claims and requests in the Petition because Petitioner asserts that the administrative remedy
process in place at the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP” or “FBOP” or “Bureau”) would
be futile (Doc. 1 at 2). Petitioner further asserts that “[i]n researching the caselaw regarding
FSA and it’s applicability it is quite clear that the FBOP obstinately refuses to comply with
ANY part of the statute without being expressly compelled by a court to do so” (Doc. 2 at
8).
Respondent avers that “BOP operates the Administrative Remedy Program, which
is designed to allow an inmate to seek formal review of an issue relating to any aspect of
his or her confinement, including earned time credits (“ETCs”). 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10 &
542.14(d)(2)” (Doc. 12 at 2-3). Respondent explains that “[t]he Administrative Remedy
Program consists of four levels of review, ordinarily commencing with an attempt at
informal resolution (BP-8), a request to the Warden (BP-9), and then appeals to the
Regional Director (BP-10) and the Office of General Counsel (BP-11)” (Id. at 3).
Respondent further details the BOP administrative remedy procedures (Doc. 12-1 at 5-7,
¶¶ 3-9). Respondent reports that while in BOP custody, Petitioner has filed seven
administrative remedies/appeals, which all related to disciplinary matters (Id. at 7-8, ¶¶ 12,
13). Respondent reports that Petitioner has not exercised his administrative remedies
regarding the Petition claims (Id. at 7-8, ¶¶ 10-14).
Respondent argues:
Case 2:25-cv-01471-DLR Document 17 Filed 02/13/26 Page 4 of 10

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
As a prudential matter, courts require a habeas petitioner to exhaust available
administrative remedies before he files a petition for relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. See, e.g., Huang v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004);
Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1991); Ruviwat v. Smith, 701
F.2d 844, 845 (9th Cir. 1983). Administrative exhaustion protects an
agency’s authority, allows it to apply its expertise, and permits it to correct
its own errors. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006). Administrative
exhaustion also promotes efficiency by permitting matters to be handled
administratively, where a resolution often can be reached more quickly than
in the courts, id., and promotes judicial economy by facilitating the
“preparation of a useful record,” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007).
A federal prisoner in Bureau custody exhausts his administrative remedies
through the Bureau’s Administrative Remedy Program. Martinez v. Roberts,
804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986); Fraley v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d
924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993). The Bureau’s Administrative Remedy Program is
designed to allow an inmate to seek formal review of an issue relating to any
aspect of his or her confinement. 28 C.F.R. § 542.10; see also Ex. A at ¶¶ 3-
9 (summary of Administrative Remedy Program). An inmate exhausts his
administrative remedies by pursuing his claim in the Bureau’s four-tier
process as set forth at 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.19.
In the Petition, Petitioner concedes that he did not exhaust his administrative
remedies. Doc. 1 at 2 (Q7: “Did you appeal the decision, file a grievance, or
seek an administrative remedy?” A: “No.”). He argues that “[p]ursuing
administrative remedies would be futile because it would not result in [the
Bureau] changing their policy.” Id. at 2-3 (“No remedy is available, futile to
pursue.”).
The Supreme Court has held that technical compliance with all
administrative requirements for exhaustion is mandatory, and that an inmate
must properly exhaust by complying with the agency’s deadlines and
procedural rules. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-92 (“Proper exhaustion
demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural
rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without
imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”); Fordley
v. Lizarraga, 18 F.4th 344, 351 (9th Cir. 2021) (“To exhaust administrative
remedies, inmates must comply with the prison’s ‘deadlines and other critical
procedural rules.’” (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90)); Derello v. Stickley,
No. 631 F. Supp. 3d 758, 770 (D. Ariz. 2022) (“The prisoner must complete
the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable rules.”
(citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 92)).
Case 2:25-cv-01471-DLR Document 17 Filed 02/13/26 Page 5 of 10

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
The Bureau has not received any administrative remedy requests from
Petitioner during his incarceration on any subject matter in the Petition, see
Ex. A at ¶¶ 11-14, and Petitioner admits he has not filed any, Doc. 1 at 2-3,
5. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to properly exhaust his administrative
remedies regarding his ETCs and sentence computation. The Petition should
be dismissed for this reason alone.
(Doc. 12 at 7-8).
Upon review, the Court agrees with Respondent that the Petition should be
dismissed for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust. By his own admission, Petitioner did not even
attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding the Petition claims.
As a general matter, an inmate must exhaust his administrative remedies before
filing a lawsuit. Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). It is true that
administrative exhaustion is not statutorily required by 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Laing v.
Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004). However, courts generally require that
administrative remedies be exhausted before Section 2241 habeas proceedings because it
is usually more efficient for the administrative process to go forward without interruption
than to permit parties to seek aid from the courts at various intermediate stages. Id.; see
also McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969). As explained by the Ninth Circuit
in Laing:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion, “no one is entitled to judicial relief for a
supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed . . . remedy has been
exhausted.” McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23
L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Exhaustion can be either statutorily or judicially required. If exhaustion is
required by statute, it may be mandatory and jurisdictional, but courts have
discretion to waive a prudential requirement. El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc.
v. Executive Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 742, 746 (9th Cir.1991);
Stratman v. Watt, 656 F.2d 1321, 1325–26 (9th Cir.1981).
Laing, 370 F.3d at 997-98.
Courts may require prudential exhaustion if “(1) agency expertise makes agency
consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2)
Case 2:25-cv-01471-DLR Document 17 Filed 02/13/26 Page 6 of 10

- 7 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative
scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own
mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.” Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335
F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Montes v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir.
1990)). Even when exhaustion is prudential and courts have discretion to waive the
exhaustion requirement, a key consideration in exercising this discretion is whether
waiving the exhaustion requirement encourages the inmate to bypass the administrative
scheme. Laing, 370 F.3d at 1000; Montes, 919 F.2d at 537.
When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies and administrative
remedies remain available, “a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition
without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies,
unless exhaustion is excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted). Exhaustion may be excused if pursuing an administrative remedy
would be futile. Fraley v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993) (per
curiam).
Here, Petitioner’s futility arguments are conclusory and unpersuasive, particularly
given that Petitioner did not make any attempt to engage in BOP’s administrative remedy
process about the Petition claims at any of the levels of the administrative remedy process.
Indeed, while in BOP custody, Petitioner has filed seven administrative remedies/appeals
pertaining to disciplinary matters (Doc. 12-1 at 7, ¶¶ 12-13; see id. at 18-22). Further,
BOP’s administrative remedy process does not appear futile based on the record before the
Court, particularly in light of amendments to BOP’s FSA earned time credits
implementation program statement in the period since the program statement’s
promulgation (see Doc. 12-1 at 27-50). Moreover, it is more efficient to allow opportunity
for the BOP to correct any errors through the multilevel administrative remedy process it
has established. Importantly, the Court would benefit from a well-developed agency record
made during the administrative remedy process regarding factual matters and reasoning
supporting Petitioner’s and Respondent’s positions. Furthermore, allowing Petitioner to
Case 2:25-cv-01471-DLR Document 17 Filed 02/13/26 Page 7 of 10

- 8 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
raise the Petition’s issues and claims with the Court before properly following and
completing the BOP administrative remedy process would encourage Petitioner and other
inmates to deliberately bypass some or all of the BOP administrative remedy process
regarding FSA earned time credits. Indeed, there have been numerous other section 2241
habeas proceedings regarding FSA ETCs recently filed in this District wherein the
petitioner did not attempt to exhaust BOP administrative remedies; many of them are
remarkably similar to each other and were later resolved against the petitioners.2
On this record, where Petitioner has previously pursued for other matters the very
process that he now alleges is futile, this Court does not have a basis to conclude that the
administrative remedy process is futile. Further, as a matter of efficiency and judicial
economy, Petitioner should have afforded the BOP the opportunity to correct any errors
through its well-established administrative remedy process rather than Petitioner ignoring
that process. See Mejia v. Hudson, No. CV-24-00306-TUC-JCH (JR), 2024 WL 5078007,
at *5-6 (D. Ariz. Nov. 8, 2024) (recommending dismissal for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies where petitioner alleged the BOP improperly calculated his FSA
time credits), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 5077214 (D. Ariz. Dec. 11,
2024); see also Watts v. Gunther, No. CV-24-03135-PHX-JAT (DMF), 2025 WL 756514
(D. Ariz. Jan. 28, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 755506 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 10 2025); Collier v. Gunther, No. CV-24-2365-PHX-JJT (DMF), 2025 WL 1520590
2 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Wilborn v. Gunther, No. CV-24-02062-
PHX-SRB (MTM) (D. Ariz. Aug. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1; Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Palermi v. Gunther, No. CV-24-02195-PHX-KML (MTM) (D. Ariz. Aug. 26,
2024), ECF No. 1; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Love v. Gunther, No. CV-24-02355-
PHX-GMS (DMF) (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2024), ECF No. 1; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
McLeighey v. Gunther, No. CV-24-02364-PHX-JJT (DMF) (D. Ariz. Sept. 9, 2024), ECF
No. 1; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Sanchez v. Gunther, CV-24-02363-PHX-ROS
(ESW) (D. Ariz. Sept. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Velasquez
v. Gunther, CV-24-02446-PHX-JAT (ASB) (D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 2024), ECF No. 1; Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Calvillo v. Gunther, No. CV-24-02578-PHX-DJH (MTM) (D.
Ariz. Sept. 26, 2024), ECF No. 1; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Farris v. Gunther,
No. CV-24-02836-PHX-GMS (DMF) (D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 2024), ECF No. 1; Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, Mendez v. Gunther, No. CV-24-03050-PHX-SHD (ASB) (D. Ariz.
Nov. 4, 2024), ECF. No. 1. Importantly, this is far from an exhaustive list for even 2024
and numerous similar habeas matters were filed in 2025.
Case 2:25-cv-01471-DLR Document 17 Filed 02/13/26 Page 8 of 10

- 9 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1519188 (D.
Ariz. May 28, 2025).
Thus, it is recommended that Petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies
warrants dismissal of the Petition without prejudice and termination of this matter.
V. CONLUSION
For the reasons above, it is recommended that the Petition be dismissed without
prejudice and this matter terminated. Because the recommended dismissal is based on the
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court does not reach the remainder of the
defenses raised by Respondent.
Accordingly,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Docs. 1, 2) be dismissed without
prejudice and this matter terminated.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s
judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this
recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which
to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and
Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-
Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual
determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to
appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. In addition, LRCiv 7.2(e)(3)
///
///
///
Case 2:25-cv-01471-DLR Document 17 Filed 02/13/26 Page 9 of 10

- 10 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
provides that “[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and
Recommendation issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.”
Dated this 13th day of February, 2026.
Case 2:25-cv-01471-DLR Document 17 Filed 02/13/26 Page 10 of 10