Crews v. Travel Club Enterprises LCC et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jason Crews,
Plaintiff,
v.
Travel Club Enterprises LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-00024-PHX-KML
ORDER
Plaintiff Jason Crews seeks default judgment against defendants Travel Club
Enterprises LLC (“TCE”) and Alexandara Olson. Crews filed an amended complaint on
July 9, 2025 (Doc. 22), and filed proofs of service on February 8, 2026 (Docs. 34, 35.)
Defendants did not respond and their defaults were entered on March 23, 2026. (Doc. 39.)
In his motion for default judgment, Crews seeks an award of $5,055. (Doc. 43.)
The court must consider seven factors when deciding whether to enter default
judgment. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The seven factors are:
(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s
substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money
at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material
facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong
policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on
the merits.
Id. These factors establish default judgment is appropriate, but not in the amount that Crews
seeks.
Case 2:25-cv-00024-KML Document 44 Filed 05/06/26 Page 1 of 6

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1. Possibility of Prejudice
The first factor regarding the prejudice to Crews weighs in favor of default judgment
because if “default judgment is not granted, [Crews] will likely be without other recourse
for recovery.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal.
2002).
2. Merits of the Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint
The second and third factors require assessing the merits of Crews’s claims and the
sufficiency of his complaint. These factors “are often analyzed together and require courts
to consider whether a plaintiff has state[d] a claim on which [he] may recover.” Vietnam
Reform Party v. Viet Tan - Vietnam Reform Party, 416 F. Supp. 3d 948, 962 (N.D. Cal.
2019).
The operative complaint alleges TCE “is in the business of selling travel club
memberships to the public.” (Doc. 22 at 2.) Olson is the “owner and manager of TCE.”
(Doc. 22 at 2.) As of July 2024, Crews had “no prior business relationship with
Defendants.” (Doc. 22 at 6.) On July 26, 2024, Crews received a call on his cell phone
inviting him to an open house at TCE’s “newest Travel Reservation Center.” (Doc. 22 at
7.) That call was placed using an Automated Telephone Dialing System (“ATDS”). (Doc.
22 at 6.) Crews did not consent to receiving that call, his number is not associated with any
business, and his number had been placed on the Do-Not-Call Registry more than 31 days
before the first call. (Doc. 22 at 2, 6.)
Crews received two additional calls from TCE, one on November 6, 2024, and the
other on January 6, 2025. (Doc. 22 at 8.) Olson “directed and authorized the illegal calls”
at issue (Doc. 22 at 2), and she was “intimately involved in all decision-making and legal
activities of [TCE]” such that she either had “ultimate control over every aspect of [TCE’s]
wrongful conduct . . . and/or directly controlled and authorized this conduct” (Doc. 22 at
11).
Based on these facts, Crews asserts two claims under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act. (Doc. 22 at 17-18.) The first claim is that TCE and Olson placed calls to
Case 2:25-cv-00024-KML Document 44 Filed 05/06/26 Page 2 of 6

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
his cellular phone using an ATDS system. The second claim is that TCE and Olson placed
telemarketing calls to his number that was on the Do-Not-Call Registry.
The elements necessary for Crews’s first claim involving use of an ATDS are “(1)
the defendant called a cellular telephone number; (2) using an [ATDS]; (3) without the
recipient’s prior express consent.” Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d
1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012). The complaint contains sufficient allegations establishing these
elements. Accepting those allegations as true, Crews has stated a claim for relief based on
use of an ATDS.
The elements necessary for Crews’s second claim are “(1) for each call, plaintiff
received more than one other telephone call within any 12-month period; (2) the calls were
made by or on behalf of the same entity; and (3) the calls were made in violation of the
regulations prescribed under [42 U.S.C.] § 227(c).” Aussieker v. TSHB, LLC, No. 2:22-
CV-01886-DAD-CKD (PS), 2024 WL 379394, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 222CV01886DADCKDPS, 2024 WL 870449 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 29, 2024). To satisfy the third element, Crews argues the applicable regulations
prohibit calls to any “number that has been registered on the National Do-Not-Call Registry
for more than thirty-one days, with limited exceptions for established business
relationships and express written consent.” (Doc. 30 at 8.)
The complaint alleges Crews received three calls in less than a 12-month period, all
the calls were made by defendants, and the calls were placed after Crews’s number had
been on the Do-Not-Call Registry for more than 31 days. Accepting those factual
allegations as true, Crews has stated a claim for relief based on a Do-Not-Call list violation.
The factors regarding the sufficiency of the complaint and the merits of Crews’s
claims support entry of default judgment.
3. Amount in Controversy
The fourth default judgment factor “requires that the court assess whether the
recovery sought is proportional to the harm caused by defendant’s conduct.” Landstar
Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enterprises, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 916, 921 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
Case 2:25-cv-00024-KML Document 44 Filed 05/06/26 Page 3 of 6

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Assuming Crews is actually seeking to recover $5,055, that amount represents a
straightforward calculation of trebled statutory damages plus the filing fee and service
costs. This amount is proportional to the harm and supports entry of default judgment.
Barton v. Real Innovation Inc., 792 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1209 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (statutory
damages under TCPA reflects a congressional “judgment[] about the harms of unwanted
telemarketing calls to society and the appropriate measure of damages for those calls”).
4. Dispute Over Material Facts
The fifth factor is whether there are any disputes over material facts. Defendants’
decision to not participate means there is no indication of such disputes. This factor weighs
in favor of default judgment.
5. Excusable Neglect
There is no evidence showing defendants’ failure to respond to the complaint was
due to excusable neglect. See Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp.
2d 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (defendants’ failure to respond to complaint could not “be
attributable to excusable neglect” because “[a]ll were properly served with the Complaint,
the notice of entry of default, as well as the papers in support of the instant motion.”). This
factor supports default judgment.
6. Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits
The seventh factor recognizes a preference for resolving matters on their merits.
This factor, as always, weighs against entry of default judgment. “However, the mere
existence of Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b) indicates that this preference, standing alone, is not
dispositive.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
7. Default Judgment is Merited
Weighed together, the factors establish default judgment is appropriate.
8. Damages
It is Crews’s burden to prove the amount of his damages. Blumenthal Distrib., Inc.
v. Comoch Inc., 652 F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2023). Unfortunately, the motion
for default judgment presents a variety of contradictory positions regarding damages and
Case 2:25-cv-00024-KML Document 44 Filed 05/06/26 Page 4 of 6

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
the allegations supporting them. Crews’s motion states he “received two calls” and claims
“[t]he sum of statutory damages . . . totals $500.” (Doc. 43 at 9.) Without supporting the
figure, the conclusion of the motion seeks $9.725, as does the proposed order. (Docs. 43 at
10; 43-1 at 1.) To the extent the court can decipher Crews’s actual positions, there are three
calls at issue and he is seeking a total award of $5,055.
The TCPA allows a plaintiff to recover $500 per violation. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5)(b)
(allowing “an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive
$500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater”). That $500 “may be trebled
if the defendant willfully or knowingly violated the [TCPA].” Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 156 (2016) (simplified). Based on the three calls, and alleging each
call constituted a willful or knowing violation of the TCPA, Crews requests damages in
the amount of $4,500 ($500 per call, trebled). Crews is entitled to the $500 per call but he
has not adequately supported his request for treble damages.
“To determine whether to impose enhanced statutory damages, courts look to the
nature of defendants’ conduct, defendants’ prior TCPA violations and whether non-trebled
damages would sufficiently deter future TCPA violations.” Aussieker, 2024 WL 379394,
at *5. Crews has not provided any meaningful information to establish an entitlement to
enhanced damages. Crews’s allegations in this case are similar to those he made in other
cases where the court refused to award treble damages. See Crews v. Sun Sols. AZ LLC,
No. CV-23-01589-PHX-DWL, 2024 WL 2923709, at *7 (D. Ariz. June 10, 2024); Crews
v. Blackrock Debt Relief Corp., No. CV-25-00025-PHX-JAT, 2025 WL 2107627, at *4
(D. Ariz. July 28, 2025). Those courts noted Crews had “not put forth evidence that
[Defendants have] previously violated the TCPA or that non-trebled damages are
insufficient to deter future TCPA violations.” Crews, 2024 WL 2923709, at *7; Crews,
2025 WL 2107627, at *4. That same analysis applies here, and Crews is not entitled to
treble damages.
Crews’s own damages calculations assumed a total of $500 dollars for each of the
three calls, trebled. In other words, Crews did not request the court stack the statutory
Case 2:25-cv-00024-KML Document 44 Filed 05/06/26 Page 5 of 6

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
damages for each call based on that call representing violations of separate statutory
provisions. See Charvat v. NMP, LLC, 656 F.3d 440, 449 (6th Cir. 2011) (allowing
statutory damages under different legal theories “even if both violations occurred in the
same telephone call”). Having determined treble damages are not appropriate, Crews is
awarded $500 per call, for a total judgment of $1,500. Although Crews also requests an
award of taxable costs in his motion, he should apply for taxable costs as contemplated by
Local Rule 54.1
IT IS ORDERED the Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 30) is GRANTED. The
Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants Travel Club
Enterprise LLC and Alexandra Olson, jointly and severally, in the amount of $1,500.
Dated this 5th day of May, 2026.
Case 2:25-cv-00024-KML Document 44 Filed 05/06/26 Page 6 of 6