McGhee v. J.E.T. Limousines & Transportation LLC et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
William McGhee, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
J.E.T. Limousines & Transportation LLC, et
al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-24-03394-PHX-SMB
ORDER
The Court now considers Defendant J.E.T. Limousines & Transportation, LLC’s
(JET) Motion to Disqualify Counsel (Doc. 196). The Motion is fully briefed. Oral
argument was scheduled for June 2, 2026. However, after review of the pleadings, the
Court finds that oral argument would not be helpful and the hearing will be vacated. For
the following reasons, the Court denies the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This case involves drivers asserting wage claims against transportation service
companies, including JET. (See generally Doc. 59.) JET seeks to disqualify Plaintiffs’
counsel Michael Licata, Daniel Bonnet, and their firm, Martin & Bonnett PLLC
(collectively, “Counsel”), based on their interactions with FASTRAK Technologies
(“FT”), a witness in this case. (Doc. 196 at 1.) FT provides software JET uses to track the
work of its drivers, invoice its customers, and pay its drivers. (Doc. 196 at 1.) JET avers
that Licata communicated with FT under the false pretense that he was interested in
purchasing FT’s software and services. (Id. at 3.) JET contends as follows.
Case 2:24-cv-03394-DJH Document 255 Filed 05/15/26 Page 1 of 6

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
In September 2025, Licata emailed FT asking: “Can the trip records be exported to
include per trip compensation?” (Id. at 4; Doc. 196-1 at 12.) Jessi, an FT customer service
representative, responded by asking: “What company are you with and what report are you
trying to run?” (Doc. 196 at 4; Doc. 196-1 at 12.) Licata responded: “Hi, trying to figure
out if the compensation reports exportable from Fasstrack [sic] can be linked up to the trip
record associated with the trip. I am doing research on reservation systems.” (Doc. 196
at 4; Doc. 196-1 at 13.) Licata sent a separate follow-up email stating: “I know this
functionality exists for Santa Cruz, wondering if this is also feasible in Fasstrak [sic].”
(Doc. 196 at 4; Doc. 196-1 at 12.) Santa Cruz is a competitor to FT. (Doc. 196 at 4.) Jessi
responded by sending an example of a certain analysis report and a link to book a virtual
meeting. (Id.; Doc. 196-1 at 11.) Licata used his personal email for this exchange and did
not otherwise inform Jessi that he was an attorney or was connected to this case. (Doc.
196 at 4.)
Licata followed up in December, asking to schedule a call to discuss FT’s
capabilities. (Doc. 196 at 5; Doc. 196-1 at 16.) Jessi set up a virtual meeting which took
place a few days later. (Doc. 196 at 5.) Licata informed Jessi that he was a lawyer at the
beginning of the meeting and invited Bonnet to join the meeting. (Id.) During the meeting
Jessi demoed FT under the impression Licata and Bonnet were starting a limo company.
(Id.). At the end of the meeting, Licata and Bonnet requested a copy of the video, telling
Jessi that they were “in litigation with one of your customers.” (Id.) Thereafter, Counsel
made various discovery demands of JET based on the information obtained about FT.
(Doc. 196 at 5.)
Based on the foregoing, JET argues that Counsel should be disqualified.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court applies Arizona law in evaluating motions to disqualify. See In re City
of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2000). Disqualification is “an extreme remedy”
and such “motions are subjected to strict scrutiny.” Enriquez v. Gemini Motor Transp. LP,
No. CV-19-04759-PHX-GMS, 2021 WL 3565731, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 12, 2021) (citation
Case 2:24-cv-03394-DJH Document 255 Filed 05/15/26 Page 2 of 6

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
modified). “The burden is on the party seeking to disqualify opposing counsel to
demonstrate that disqualification is necessary.” Id. (citation modified). “The moving party
must show sufficient reason for the attorney to be disqualified.” Id. (citation modified). In
most cases, violating an ethical rule, without more, does not warrant disqualification. See
id. “Indeed, the Preamble to the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct states that a
violation of an ethical rule ‘does not necessarily warrant any other non-disciplinary
remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation.’” Id. (quoting Ariz. R.
Sup. Ct. 42, pmbl. at 20). “In general, the rules of professional responsibility are for ethical
enforcement and are not designed to be used as a means to disqualify counsel.” Id. (citation
modified).
Courts consider the following factors in determining whether disqualification is
appropriate:
(1) whether the motion is being made for the purposes of harassing the
defendant, (2) whether the party bringing the motion will be damaged in
some way if the motion is not granted, (3) whether there are any alternative
solutions, or is the proposed solution the least damaging possible under the
circumstances, and (4) whether the possibility of public suspicion will
outweigh any benefits that might accrue due to continued representation.
Gomez v. Superior Court, 717 P.2d 902, 905 (Ariz. 1986). “The central question in any
disqualification inquiry is whether there will be harm, going forward in a case, from an
attorney’s representation of a client.” D. Stadtler Tr. 2015 Tr. v. Gorrie, No.
CV-22-00314-PHX-DWL, 2023 WL 355887, at *12 (D. Ariz. Jan. 23, 2023) (citation
modified).
III. DISCUSSION
JET contends that Counsel violated Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rule”)
4.1, 4.3, 7.1, and 8.4. These rules provide as follows:
Rule 4.1: Prohibits attorneys from “mak[ing] a false statement of material
fact or law to a third person.”
Rule 4.3: Provides that “[i]n dealing on behalf of a client with a person who
is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer
is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the
Case 2:24-cv-03394-DJH Document 255 Filed 05/15/26 Page 3 of 6

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.”
Rule 7.1: Prohibits lawyers from making false or misleading statements
about themselves or their services. The Rule provides that a “communication
is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or
law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole
not materially misleading.”
Rule 8.4: Provides that it “is professional misconduct for a lawyer to” violate
the Rules or “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.”
Even assuming Counsel violated these Rules, disqualification is not appropriate here. As
indicated, disqualification is only appropriate where “there will be harm going forward.”
Gorrie, 2023 WL 355887, at *12. JET fails to establish that it will be subject to “substantial
and irreparable harm” moving forward justifying disqualification. See id. (citation
modified).
JET contends that is has been damaged based on Counsel’s conduct because it
“required that Defendants expend billable hours (i) determining the extent and details of
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s conduct in connection with FASTTRAK; (ii) consulting with
FASTTRAK to correct misstatements in Plaintiffs’ counsel’s demands related to invoices
and trip records; and (iii) bringing this matter to the attention of the Court.” (Doc. 196
at 13.) JET also asks this court to “consider the disadvantage JET will labor under going
forward”; namely, that “Counsel will undoubtedly support a motion to compel by a
declaration from Counsel—a declaration based on conversations with [Jessi] that occurred
under false pretenses and outside the presence of JET’s counsel.” (Id. at 14.) Even if true,
JET fails to establish the “extreme circumstances” necessary to disqualify counsel. See
State v. Creel, 583 P.3d 438, 441 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025).
At a general level, the Court is not convinced that JET expending billable hours to
respond to Counsel’s conduct is the type of harm indicating an extreme circumstance
warranting disqualification. Resources are expended any time a motion is filed, and thus,
cannot amount to an extreme circumstance justifying disqualification.
Moreover, the Court questions the extent to which JET had to incur additional
Case 2:24-cv-03394-DJH Document 255 Filed 05/15/26 Page 4 of 6

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
billable hours to respond to Counsel’s conduct. At face value, the information Counsel
obtained through FT is relatively benign. The alleged deceit aside, the September and
December emails culminated in FT sending Counsel an example report, noting that if a
company has “Driver Pay and other items in the trip upon close, it will appear in the
appropriate column,” and proposing to meet virtually. (Doc. 196-1 at 11–15.) In the
meeting, Jessi testifies that she did a “demo” for Counsel and showed them “sample
reports.” (Id. at 8–9.) At bottom, it appears that Counsel’s alleged subterfuge only yielded
general information regarding FT that is readily given out. Nevertheless, the foregoing
should not be understood as this Court condoning Counsel’s conduct. Instead, the Court
is not persuaded that Counsel’s conduct demanded an overwhelming response from JET.
The Court recognizes that Counsel’s conduct required JET to expend billable hours
to “determine[e] the extent and details Plaintiffs’ counsel’s conduct in connection with
FASTTRAK.” (Doc. 196 at 14.) However, Counsel’s interactions with FT are limited,
including less than 10 short emails and a product demonstration meeting. As can be seen
in the email excerpts, only one of the emails included substantive information about FT.
(See Doc. 196-1 at 11.) The Court is not convinced that these interactions imposed on JET
a burden justifying the extreme sanction of disqualification. Additionally, given that
evidence related to FT “is of central importance to this case,” (Doc. 196 at 2), one would
presume that JET would otherwise have to expend significant resources to address these
issues raised by Counsel. Indeed, it appears that Counsel raised similar challenges to the
FT even before their interactions with Jessi. (See id. at 2–3.) Accordingly, JET fails to
demonstrate that Counsel obtaining readily available and general information about FT
exacerbated issues related to FT.
Then there is JET’s concern that “Counsel will undoubtedly support a motion to
compel by a declaration from Counsel—a declaration based on conversations with [Jessi]
that occurred under false pretenses and outside the presence of JET’s counsel.” (Id. at 14.)
This concern is speculative. Even still, it’s unclear that this can be fairly categorized as a
“damage” justifying disqualification. Construed broadly, JET avers that Counsel’s conduct
Case 2:24-cv-03394-DJH Document 255 Filed 05/15/26 Page 5 of 6

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
taints evidentiary issues related to the FT software. However, JET has not demonstrated
how ordinary litigation tools such as discovery and other evidentiary mechanisms are
ineffective to remedy any injury caused by Counsel in this matter. Instead, Counsel
obtained general information about FT, which Counsel is seemingly using to color its
discovery requests.
To be clear, the Court does not condone Counsel’s behavior as an ethical matter.
But not every ethical violation can serve as a basis for disqualification. See Robbins v.
United States, No. CIV03-1224PCT-JAT, 2006 WL 359948, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 2006).
However, the Court must view JET’s Motion “with suspicion,” in search of an “extreme
circumstance” justifying disqualification. Id. For the reasons stated, JET fails to meet this
exacting standard. The ethical issues at play in this case are better left to the State Bar of
Arizona. At bottom, “[i]t is not this Court’s role to impose sanctions for the ethical
obligations imposed by, and policed by, the State Bar of Arizona.” Id.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED denying JET’s Motion to Disqualify Counsel (Doc. 196) and
vacating oral argument scheduled for June 2, 2026.
Dated this 14th day of May, 2026.
Case 2:24-cv-03394-DJH Document 255 Filed 05/15/26 Page 6 of 6