Ruiz v. Magellan Financial & Insurance Services

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Michael L Ruiz,
Plaintiff,
v.
Magellan Financial & Insurance Services,
Defendant.
No. CV-23-02090-PHX-DWL
ORDER
In this action under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Plaintiff Michael Ruiz
(“Plaintiff”) is suing his former employer, Defendant Magellan Financial & Insurance
Services (“Defendant”), under the theory that his alleged demotion and subsequent
termination were due to his race and national origin and that he was also subjected to a
hostile work environment. Now pending is Defendant’s motion to amend the Final Pretrial
Order to include Amanda Grote as a witness. (Doc. 101.) For the reasons that follow, the
motion is denied.
I. Legal Standard
Rule 16(e) provides that a court may modify a final pretrial order “only to prevent
manifest injustice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e). Under this “manifest injustice” standard, a
pretrial order “is not an inexorable decree and may, under proper circumstances, be
modified.” Jeffries v. United States, 477 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. 1973). “Nevertheless,
‘manifest injustice’ is a high standard, and requires more than good cause for amendment.”
Nash-Perry v. City of Bakersfield, 2023 WL 24215, *4 (E.D. Cal. 2023).
The party seeking to amend a final pretrial order has “the burden of showing that an
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amendment to the pretrial order [is] necessary to prevent ‘manifest injustice.’” Galdamez
v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2005). “In evaluating a motion to amend the
pretrial order, a district court should consider four factors: (1) the degree of prejudice or
surprise to the [non-moving party] if the order is modified; (2) the ability of the [non-
moving party] to cure the prejudice; (3) any impact of modification on the orderly and
efficient conduct of the trial; and (4) any willfulness or bad faith by the party seeking
modification.” Id. “The language in Galdamez . . . focus[es] primarily on prejudice to the
party opposing the amendment.” McBroom v. Ethicon, Inc., 341 F.R.D. 40, 43 (D. Ariz.
2022). See also id. at 42-45 (identifying five reasons why Galdamez “misapplied the
‘manifest injustice’ test in Rule 16(e),” explaining why “the Rule 16(e) standard [should]
recognize that the initial focus should be on the party seeking the amendment and whether
that party, in light of all relevant facts, faces manifest injustice,” but acknowledging that
“[t]he Court of course is bound by Ninth Circuit precedent”).
II. The Parties’ Arguments
Defendant’s one-paragraph motion does not address Rule 16(e) or the factors
identified in Galdamez. (Doc. 101.) The motion simply states that “Amanda Grote was
initially disclosed as a witness by [Defendant] on February 14, 2024, in its Initial
Disclosure Statement,” but “[i]n preparing for trial, [Defendant] found that it had
inadvertently omitted Ms. Grote from the witness list.” (Id.)
Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion. (Doc. 102.) First, Plaintiff argues that
“amendment would result in clear prejudice and surprise to Plaintiff. Amanda Grote was
not listed as a trial witness in the Final Pretrial Order despite extensive pretrial proceedings
and despite the parties participating in a lengthy pretrial conference before the Court.” (Id.
at 2.) Plaintiff argues that he “prepared for trial based upon the witnesses actually disclosed
in the operative Final Pretrial Order” and that “[t]he prejudice is self-evident.” (Id.)
Second, Plaintiff argues that “there is no meaningful ability to cure the prejudice without
disrupting trial preparation and the orderly conduct of the proceedings” because “[t]rial is
imminent” and “[r]eopening preparation regarding a witness omitted from the Final Pretrial
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Order would undermine the very purpose of Rule 16(e).” (Id.) Third, Plaintiff argues that
“amendment would adversely impact the orderly and efficient conduct of trial” because
“[t]he timing strongly suggests Defendant is attempting to reconfigure its witness
presentation after the Court foreclosed remote testimony from Mr. Mortach.” (Id. at 2-3.)
Fourth, Plaintiff argues that “the circumstances support a finding of bad faith or, at a
minimum, a lack of diligence.” (Id.)
In reply, Defendant argues that “Plaintiff cannot show prejudice.” (Doc. 108 at 2.)
Defendant emphasizes that “Ms. Grote . . . has been disclosed since [Defendant]’s initial
voluntary disclosures in February 2024” and thus contends that “[t]here is no risk of
surprise to Plaintiff,” who “has always had the opportunity to seek discovery related to and
prepare for Ms. Grote’s expected testimony.” (Id.) Defendant also “provid[es] further
specifics . . . regarding Ms. Grote’s expected testimony to aid Plaintiff in his preparation.”
(Id. at 3.) Defendant asserts that “Ms. Grote is expected to be a relatively less time-
intensive witness, providing information about her interactions with Plaintiff while he was
employed at Magellan, including interactions in California at Mr. Rice’s home and
potentially during a cruise hosted by Magellan for its employees.” (Id.) Next, Defendant
argues that “allowing Ms. Grote to testify will not interfere with the orderly administration
of trial” because “Mr. Monarch will appear and testify in-person” and “Ms. Grote testifying
is wholly unrelated to the question of whether Mr. Mortach will testify in-person or
remotely.” (Id.) Finally, Defendant argues “there is no ‘bad faith’” because “[t]he reality
is that [Defendant] just realized it inadvertently had not included Ms. Grote in its witness
list . . . .” (Id.)
III. Analysis
Two of the relevant considerations under Galdamez are the degree of prejudice to
Plaintiff should the Final Pretrial Order be amended to allow Ms. Grote to testify and
Plaintiff’s ability to cure that prejudice. Galdamez, 415 F.3d at 1020. In a nutshell,
Defendant’s argument as to those considerations is that because Plaintiff has always
known—by virtue of Defendant’s initial disclosures, provided years ago—that Ms. Grote
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was a potential witness, Plaintiff would not be unfairly prejudiced by the addition of Ms.
Grote to the witness list on the eve of trial.
The Court respectfully disagrees and concludes that this argument overlooks the
realities of trial preparation. The days leading up to trial are a busy and stressful time.
Counsel must put the finishing touches on witness outlines and opening statements, making
nuanced strategic choices about which topics to address and which themes to emphasize.
The Final Pretrial Order provides the roadmap for making those choices. Similarly, the
days leading up to trial are often consumed with witness preparation activities. The Final
Pretrial Order, once again, provides the roadmap for deciding which topics need to be
addressed, and which topics can be ignored, during those sessions.
It follows that the belated addition of a new witness to the witness list on the eve of
trial can be quite prejudicial to the opposing party even if, as here, that person’s status as a
potential witness (and the anticipated subject matter of that person’s potential testimony)
was properly disclosed during discovery. Accordingly, courts have not hesitated to reject
last-minute requests to amend the final pretrial order to add a new witness or exhibit. See,
e.g., Cawley v. Am. Fin. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 2026 WL 799690, *4 (D. Ariz. 2026)
(“Plaintiffs’ proposed modification would add new . . . witnesses . . . . Plaintiffs moved
for these modifications less than one month before trial is set to begin. To allow the
amendments, when Defendant has not had the opportunity to prepare their presentation
based on them, would be highly prejudicial at this very late stage in the case.”); Yphantides
v. Cnty. of San Diego, 2023 WL 7006798, *3 (S.D. Cal. 2023) (“The Court agrees with the
County that it will be prejudiced by Plaintiff’s request on the eve of trial.”); Heath v. Tristar
Prods., Inc., 2021 WL 3288595, *2 (D. Nev. 2021) (“Here, the degree of prejudice to
Defendants is significant because Defendants relied on the [joint pretrial order]—which
does not include the witnesses under Plaintiff’s expected witnesses—in preparation for
trial.”); Lologo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2016 WL 4162631, *6 (D. Nev. 2016) (“The
degree of prejudice to Defendants is simply too high to justify amending the Joint Pretrial
Order to add exhibits from 2015. Defendants have ‘relied on the pretrial order and [have]
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prepared for the claims and evidence outlined therein.’ Given that Plaintiffs’ Motion was
filed a mere ten days before trial, the Court finds that amendment at this late stage would
cause a ‘substantial injury’ to Defendants.”) (citation omitted). For similar reasons, the
first two Galdamez factors weigh against amendment here.
Defendant relies on Murphy v. Schaible, Russo & Co., C.P.A.’s, LLP, 2022 WL
204602 (D. Colo. 2022), to argue that “Plaintiff’s long knowledge of Ms. Grote as a
disclosed witness ‘weighs heavily’ [against prejudice] in the analysis under Rule 16(e).”
(Doc. 108 at 2.) But Murphy simply granted a request to amend the final pretrial order to
add the English-language translations of certain documents where the movant did not
receive the translations until after the final pretrial order was entered, the Spanish-language
versions of the documents were identified in the original version of the final pretrial order,
and the trial was still four and a half months away at the time of amendment. Id. at *4.
Under those circumstances, the court was “confident that [the plaintiff] still ha[d] ample
time to prepare for trial.” Id. Here, in contrast, trial begins tomorrow and Plaintiff has
expressed that he prepared for trial based upon the expectation Ms. Grote would not be
testifying.
The next relevant consideration under Galdamez is the impact of modification on
the orderly and efficient conduct of the trial. Galdamez, 415 F.3d at 1020. That
consideration, standing alone, is neutral or favors amendment here. This is not a situation
in which discovery would need to be reopened should Ms. Grote be added as a witness—
because Defendant properly disclosed Ms. Grote as a potential witness during discovery,
Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to depose her.
The final consideration under Galdamez is any willfulness or bad faith by the party
seeking modification. Id. On the one hand, there is no bad faith here. The Court accepts
Defendant’s explanation that the failure to list Ms. Grote as a witness was a product of
simple inadvertence. On the other hand, courts have persuasively suggested that the Rule
16(e) calculus should include consideration of “whether the party seeking the amendment
was diligent in preparing for trial as Rule 16 contemplates.” McBroom, 341 F.R.D. at 43.
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See also id. at 44-45 (citing “some cases in this Circuit [that] do consider the moving
party’s diligence or lack thereof when applying Rule 16(e)”). An omission based on
inadvertence is inconsistent with diligence. Assurance Co. of Am. v. Nat’l Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 595 F. App’x 670, 672 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that “[t]he district court
properly denied Zurich’s motion to amend its exhibit list” where “[t]he only reason Zurich
provided for its late request was inadvertence”).
Finally, to the extent the Rule 16(e) calculus also includes (seemingly contrary to
Galdamez) consideration of the degree of prejudice to the moving party should the
proposed amendment be disallowed, see McBroom, 341 F.R.D. at 42-45, Defendant has
not persuasively explained why manifest injustice would flow from the denial of its
amendment request. It appears, based on the current version of the Final Pretrial Order,
that Defendant already intends to call an array of witnesses to testify regarding Plaintiff’s
job performance and behavior at work. (Doc. 99 at 6-7.) Ms. Grote’s anticipated testimony
appears to cover the same topics. (Doc. 108 at 3 [“Ms. Grote is expected to be a relatively
less time-intensive witness, providing information about her interactions with Plaintiff
while he was employed at Magellan, including interactions in California at Mr. Rice’s
home and potentially during a cruise hosted by Magellan for its employees.”].)
Having weighed the relevant considerations, the Court concludes that Defendant’s
amendment request should be denied. Amendment is not necessary to prevent manifest
injustice.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to amend (Doc. 101) is denied.
Dated this 18th day of May, 2026.
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