Soto v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Carmen Lucia Soto,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
No. CV-22-01811-PHX-JJT
ORDER
At issue is Ms. Emily Tedone’s Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s
Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 27.) Plaintiff has received an award of past-due
benefits from Defendant. (Doc. 27-3.) Ms. Tedone now seeks an order authorizing payment
of $28,361.501 for her representation of Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406. (Doc. 27 at
1.) Ms. Tedone argues that the nature of the contingency fee agreement and its terms are
reasonable given her expertise and the time she expended, that the representation was
ultimately successful, and that the attorney fees are based only on past-due benefits of the
Plaintiff and not future benefits. (Doc. 27-1 at 6–8.) Defendant does not oppose the attorney
fee request. (Doc. 29 at 2.) No reply was filed, and the time to do so has passed. LRCiv
7.2.
Section 406 establishes “the exclusive regime for obtaining fees for successful
representation of Social Security benefits claimants.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789,
1 Ms. Tedone advises that “Plaintiff’s past-due benefits will also include those payable to
her dependents, but SSA has not yet calculated the Notice of Award for those benefits.”
(Doc. 27-1 at 2 n.1.) Therefore, Ms. Tedone’s current fee request is based only on those
past-due benefits that have been calculated, which total $113,446. (Id. at 1.)
Case 2:22-cv-01811-JJT Document 30 Filed 11/21/25 Page 1 of 3

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795-96 (2002). “Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was
represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of
its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the
total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such
judgment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).
In Gisbrecht, the United States Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the term
“reasonable fee” in § 406(b) and reached the following conclusion:
. . . § 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the
primary means by which fees are set for successfully
representing Social Security benefits claimants in court.
Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as
an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable
results in particular cases. Congress has provided one boundary
line: Agreements are unenforceable to the extent that they
provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past-due benefits.
Within the 25 percent boundary, as petitioners in this case
acknowledge, the attorney for the successful claimant must
show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.
535 U.S. at 807. Factors that support the reasonableness of a contingent-fee agreement
include the character of the representation, results achieved, whether the attorney was
responsible for any delay, or whether the award would result in a windfall to the attorney
in comparison to the hours they expended on the case. Id. at 808. Additionally, the attorney
must refund smaller attorney fee awards received pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice
Act (EAJA) to the claimant. Id. at 796. This can be accomplished by offsetting those earlier
EAJA fee awards from the total past-due benefits the claimant will receive. Id.
Here, the fee agreement between Ms. Tedone and Plaintiff provided for a 25 percent
contingency fee of the past-due benefits awarded to Plaintiff. Ms. Tedone represents that
Plaintiff was awarded $113,446 in past-due benefits, so Ms. Tedone’s contingency fee
equals $28,361.50. (Doc. 27-1 at 1.) Ms. Tedone achieved a favorable outcome for Plaintiff
and spent 41.6 hours on this matter. (Docs. 27-4, 27-5.) Neither the amount spent by
Ms. Tedone nor the total amount she will receive as a contingency fee are unreasonable. In
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fact, when dividing the contingency fee by the time Ms. Tedone spent in this matter, her
hourly rate equals $681.77. This rate is reasonable given Ms. Tedone’s 18 years of legal
experience, and the risks involved in contingent fee litigation. (Doc. 27-1 at 6, 9.)
Having considered the reasonableness factors set forth in Gisbrecht, the Court
concludes that a contingency fee of $28,361.50, equal to 25% of the past-due benefits
Plaintiff received, is reasonable. The Court will award Ms. Tedone $28,361.50 as and for
attorney fees. This amount must be offset by the lesser EAJA attorney fee awards received
earlier in this matter—$5,626 and $3,800 (Doc. 27-1 at 2). After offset, Ms. Tedone is
entitled to $18,935.50 as and for attorney fees to be paid directly to Ms. Tedone from the
sums currently withheld by Defendant from Plaintiff’s past-due benefits. Should there be
an additional award of past-due benefits to Plaintiff in this matter, Ms. Tedone may apply
for an additional attorney fee award.
IT IS ORDERED granting the Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Motion for Award of
Attorney’s Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 27). Ms. Tedone is awarded $18,935.50 to
be paid from the sums withheld by Defendant from Plaintiff’s past-due benefits. Should
there be an additional award of past-due benefits to Plaintiff in this matter, Ms. Tedone
may apply for an additional attorney fee award.
Dated this 20th day of November, 2025.
Honorable John J. Tuchi
United States District Judge
Case 2:22-cv-01811-JJT Document 30 Filed 11/21/25 Page 3 of 3