USA v. Turner

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Steven A. Turner,
Defendant.
No. CR-21-00056-001-PHX-JAT
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Steven A. Turner’s Amended Motion for Early
Termination of Supervised Release (Doc. 47). The Government filed a Response opposing
early termination of supervised release (Doc. 48). Additionally, the Court has received
input from the probation officer, who also objects to an early termination.1 Turner filed a
Reply (Doc. 49). For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Turner’s request for early
termination of supervised release.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 28, 2021, Turner pleaded guilty to one count of securities fraud. (Doc.
29). In his Plea Agreement, Turner agreed to pay full restitution to his victims. (Doc. 29).
The Court subsequently sentenced him to 60 months imprisonment followed by 36 months
1 The probation officer further requests that Defendant’s monthly restitution be increased.
The contents of this Order address Defendant’s Motion for Early Termination of
Supervised Release. Any proposed changes to the conditions of Defendant’s supervised
released must be raised in a separate motion. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(c)
requires that “[b]efore modifying the conditions of probation or supervised release, the
court must hold a hearing” unless the person waives the hearing, or the relief sought is
favorable to the person and the government does not object.

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of supervised release, and ordered restitution in the amount of $14,022,424.00, to be paid
in monthly installments of $250.00. (Doc. 30). On April 14, 2023, the Court reduced
Turner’s sentence to 48 months imprisonment because of changed circumstances, which
he has completed. (Doc. 39; Doc. 40). As of this date, Turner has completed 19 of 36
months of his supervised release and has 17 months remaining. (See Doc. 39; Doc. 47).
Turner has paid over $1 million in restitution and still owes more than $12 million. (Doc.
48 at 2; Doc. 49 at 2).
On October 20, 2025, Turner filed his Amended Motion for Early Termination of
Supervised Release. (Doc. 47). On November 4, the Probation Office for the District of
Arizona issued a memorandum recommending that Turner’s request for early termination
of supervised release be denied. On December 2, the Government filed its Response
opposing early termination of supervised release. (Doc. 48). On December 9, Turner filed
his Reply. (Doc. 49).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“The correct legal standard for deciding a motion to terminate supervised release is
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).” United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir.
2014). “The statute provides that, after considering a subset of the sentencing factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a court may terminate a term of supervised release ‘if it is
satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the
interest of justice.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)). The Court “enjoys discretion to
consider a wide range of circumstances when determining whether to grant early
termination.” Id.
The factors the Court must consider are:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant; (2) deterrence; (3)
protection of the public; (4) the need to provide the defendant
with educational, vocational training, medical care or other
rehabilitation; (5) the sentence and sentencing range
established for the category of defendant; (6) any pertinent
policy statement by the Sentencing Commission; (7) the need
to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct; and (8) the need to provide restitution to any victims

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of the offense.
United States v. Smith, 219 F. App’x 666, 667 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D),(a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7)); see also
Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 195 (2025).
The Supreme Court has emphasized that supervised release “is not a punishment in
lieu of incarceration.” Esteras, 606 U.S. at 196 (quoting United States v. Granderson, 511
U.S. 39, 50 (1994)). “Rather, it ‘fulfills rehabilitative ends’ and ‘provides individuals with
postconfinement assistance.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 5960
(2000)). Thus, regarding supervised release, courts are to consider “the forward-looking
ends of sentencing (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider
the backward-looking purpose of retribution.” Id. The defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating that early termination is justified. See United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552,
559 n.9 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Oak, 398 F. App’x 274, 275 (9th Cir. 2010).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court has considered all of the § 3553(a) factors. One of the factors the Court
must consider is “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(7). Given that Turner still owes more than $12 million in restitution to numerous
victims, the Court will not terminate Turner’s supervised release. See Oak, 398 F. App’x
at 274–75 (“The district court properly based its decision [refusing to grant an early
termination of the defendant’s supervised release] upon the finding that [the defendant]
still owes more than $200,000 in restitution.”); United States v. Morris, No. CR-20-50242-
PHX-SPL, 2022 WL 4124946, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 19, 2022) (“Given that Defendant still
owes more than $1.3 million in restitution, the Court will not terminate Defendant’s
supervised release.”).
Turner argues that in addition to the $250.00 per month that he is required to pay
towards restitution, 15% of his social security benefit is automatically deducted every
month as restitution—which the Court has calculated to be $439.95 per month based on
Turner’s stated monthly benefit—and therefore supervision is no longer necessary to

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ensure restitution payments. (Doc. 49 at 2). However, supervised release serves additional
purposes than simply ensuring continued payments towards restitution. Special conditions
of Turner’s supervised release include giving his Probation Officer access to financial
information, prohibiting him from “making major purchases, incurring new financial
obligations, or entering into any financial contracts” without the Probation Officer’s prior
approval, and prohibiting him from contacting his victims. (Doc. 39 at 4). In addition to
ensuring the continued payment of restitution, this financial accountability protects the
public and Turner’s victims by allowing the Probation Officer to assess Turner’s ability to
pay restitution to his victims. The Court finds this supervision appropriate given the
financial nature of the offense and the substantial amount of restitution still owed.
Turner argues that he is entitled to early termination because he has demonstrated
successful rehabilitation and reintegration through his employment stability and
compliance with the requirements of his supervision. (Doc. 47 at 2–4). He argues that the
purpose of supervision has been met, and further supervision would work against
reintegration rather than help promote it. (Id. at 4). While the Court commends Turner’s
compliance with the terms of his supervision and his contributions and achievements while
incarcerated, Turner’s good behavior does not justify early termination of supervised
release. See United States v. Bauer, No. 5:09-cr-00980 EJD, 2012 WL 1259251, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2012) (“[C]ompliance with release conditions, resumption of
employment and engagement of family life are expected milestones rather than a change
of circumstances rendering continued supervision no longer appropriate.”); United States
v. Sine, No. CR-S-02-079 KJM, 2012 WL 1901298, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 24, 2012)
(“[M]odel prison conduct and full compliance with the terms of supervised release is what
is expected of . . . [those] serving terms of supervised release and does not warrant early
termination.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Turner further argues that his “several chronic health conditions” justify early
termination of supervised release. (Doc. 47 at 3). Specifically, Turner argues that his
medical conditions “require frequent appointments, medical testing, and continuous

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treatment adjustments,” and the requirement of getting permission for travel creates
“barriers and delays that increase stress and affect both his health and employment.” (Doc.
49 at 3).
One of the standard conditions of Turner’s supervision is that he “must not
knowingly leave the federal judicial district where [he is] authorized to reside without first
getting permission from the court or the probation officer.” (Doc. 39 at 2). However, Turner
does not indicate how often he is required to travel outside his authorized federal judicial
district for health or employment reasons, and he does not indicate whether he attempted
to address these concerns with his Probation Officer. The Probation Officer indicates that
Turner’s supervision is “minimally invasive,” requiring Turner to “report monthly through
written or electronic means” with in-person contact only as needed. The Court finds that
Turner has not established that this travel restriction impacts his medical treatment or
employment such that it would justify early termination of supervised release.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Early Termination of Supervised
Release (Doc. 47) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall provide a copy of this
Order to U.S. Probation Officer Rene Rivera.
Dated this 14th day of January, 2026.
cc: Dft.