Corley v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
REBECCA CORLEY 	PLAINTIFF
vs. 	Civil No. 6:25-cv-06076
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 	DEFENDANT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Rebecca Corley (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social
Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI ”) under Titles II and XVI of
the Act.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey
referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a report and recommendation. In
accordance with that referral, and after reviewing the arguments in this case, this Court recommends
Plaintiff’s case be AFFIRMED.
1. 	Background:
Plaintiff filed her disability applications on May 24, 2022. (Tr. 21).0F
1 In her applications,
Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome (“PTSD”) anxiety,
depression neuro cardio syncope, chronic pain, and hip pain. (Tr. 356). Plaintiff alleged an onset
1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___.” The transcript
pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.” and refer to the document filed at ECF
No. 7. 	These references are to the page number of the transcript itself not the ECF page number.
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date of January 20, 2022. 	(Tr. 21). 	Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and again upon
reconsideration. Id.
Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her denied applications, and this hearing
request was granted. (Tr. 178-220). This hearing was held on March 26, 2024. (Tr. 70-94). At
this hearing, Plaintiff was present and represented by Mickey Stevens. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational
Expert (“VE”) Charles Turner testified at the hearing. Id.
The ALJ entered an unfavorable decision on May 28, 2024. (Tr. 21-41). In this decision,
the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured status of the Act through March 31, 2027. 	(Tr. 24,
Finding 1). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
(“SGA”) since January 20, 2022. (Tr. 24, Finding 2).
The ALJ determined Plaintiff had severe impairments of cardiac dysrhythmia, other
arthropathies, and mood disorder with anxiety. (Tr. 24, Finding 3). Despite being severe, the ALJ
determined those impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the
Listings of Impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“Listings”). (Tr. 24, Finding
4).
The ALJ indicated he considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her RFC.
(Tr. 30-39). The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found the claimed limitations
were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. Id. The
ALJ also determined Plaintiff retained the RFC to light work, except she must avoid concentrated
(or constant) exposure to workplace hazards such as working at unprotected heights, around moving
or dangerous machinery, or driving a vehicle; she can perform detailed tasks involving three to four
variables; she can understand, remember and carry out job instructions; she is able to exercise
independent judgment and requires little or no supervision; she is able to interact with supervisors,
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co-workers and the public on a frequent basis; and she is able to adjust (adapt) to changes in the
workplace. Id.
The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 39, Finding 6). The
ALJ determined Plaintiff was capable of performing her PRW as a customer service representative.
Id. Based upon this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been disabled under the Act from
January 20, 2022, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 40, Finding 7).
On August 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 2. Both Parties have filed
appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 11, 13, and 14. This case is now ready for decision.
2. 	Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, the Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001).
If, after reviewing the record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the
evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must
be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000). It is well-established that a
claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his or her disability by
establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one year and that prevents him or her
from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A);
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Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998). The Act defines a “physical or mental
impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her disability,
not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities;
(3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling
impairment listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education,
and work experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to
perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that
the claimant can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder
only considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the
final stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3. 	Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability decision is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. ECF No. 11. In making this claim, Plaintiff’s only argument for
reversal is that the ALJ erred by failing to include any adaptation limitations in the RFC assessment.
ECF No. 11, 14.
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Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is required
to determine a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). This RFC determination must
be based on medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. See
Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2004). The ALJ should consider “‘all the evidence
in the record’ in determining the RFC, including ‘the medical records, observations of treating
physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of his limitations.’” Stormo v. Barnhart,
377 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019 (8th Cir. 2002)).
The Plaintiff has the burden of producing documents and evidence to support his or her claimed
RFC. 	See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206. 	The mere fact a
claimant has a long list of medical conditions does not demonstrate that person is disabled; instead,
the RFC determination is a function-by-function analysis. See SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 (July
2, 1996). 	“The RFC assessment considers only functional limitations and restrictions that result
from an individual’s medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, including
the impact of any related symptoms.” Id.
The ALJ, however, bears the primary responsibility for making the RFC determination and
for ensuring there is “some medical evidence” regarding the claimant’s “ability to function in the
workplace” that supports the RFC determination. Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 703-04 (8th Cir.
2001). 	Furthermore, this Court is required to affirm the ALJ’s RFC determination if that
determination is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See McKinney v. Apfel,
228 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2000).
In this matter, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC to light work, except she must
avoid concentrated (or constant) exposure to workplace hazards such as working at unprotected
heights, around moving or dangerous machinery, or driving a vehicle; she can perform detailed tasks
involving three to four variables; she can understand, remember and carry out job instructions; she
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is able to exercise independent judgment and requires little or no supervision; she is able to interact
with supervisors, co-workers and the public on a frequent basis; and she is able to adjust (adapt) to
changes in the workplace. (Tr. 30, Finding 5).
Plaintiff argues the ALJ's decision should be reversed because the ALJ found Plaintiff had a
moderate limitation in adapting and managing herself but did not include this limitation in the RFC
finding. However, including such a limitation is not required. Hosch v. Colvin, No. C15-2014-
CJW, 2016 WL 1261229, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 30, 2016) (“The ALJ was not required to include
specific, moderate limitations on concentration, persistence, or pace in his RFC assessment or
hypothetical question to the Vocational Expert (VE), simply because he found plaintiff had these
limitations in his ‘paragraph B’ criteria analysis at Step Three.”).
The limitations identified in the “paragraph B” criteria are not a residual functional capacity
assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental impairments at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential
evaluation process. The Eighth Circuit has stated “the different steps serve distinct purposes, the
degrees of precision required at each step differ, and our deferential standard of review precludes us
from labeling findings as inconsistent if they can be harmonized.” Chismarich v. Berryhill, 888
F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir, 2018); West-Viotay v. Saul, 829 F. App’x 149, 150 (8th Cir. 2020) (“While
the RFC findings did not specify work-related limitations based on some moderate functional-area
limitations that the ALJ found under the ‘paragraph B’ criteria, the two findings serve distinct
purposes at the separate steps of the sequential evaluation process.”).
Based upon this standard and a review of Plaintiff’s records and allegations in this case, the
Court cannot find Plaintiff has demonstrated having any greater limitations than those found by the
ALJ. 	The ALJ provided a thorough summary of Plaintiff’s medical records and subjective
complaints in this matter. In this opinion, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s alleged impairments and
discounted those that were found to be not credible. (Tr. 30-39). The ALJ considered the results of
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objective diagnostic tests and examination findings and discussed these in the decision. 	Id. 	The
ALJ also considered the findings of medical consultants and considered Plaintiff’s testimony and
function reports in assessing her RFC. Id.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination. 	Plaintiff has the burden of
establishing her claimed RFC. 	See Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590 (8th Cir. 2004)). Because Plaintiff has not met this
burden in this case and because the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by sufficient medical
evidence, this Court finds the ALJ’s RFC determination should be affirmed.
4. 	Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
to Plaintiff, is supported by substantial evidence and recommends it be AFFIRMED.
The Parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The Parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990).
ENTERED this 2nd day of March 2026.
/s/ Spencer G. Singleton
HONORABLE SPENCER G. SINGLETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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