USA v. Guzman

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
UNITED STATES PLAINTIFF
V. CASE NO. 5:25-CR-50080
LUIS GUZMAN DEFENDANT
OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant Luis Guzman filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27) on the ground that the
speedy trial time limit has elapsed. The Government filed its response (Doc. 30), and the
Court now takes up the Motion.

The Speedy Trial Act requires a defendant be brought to trial within 70 days of the
information, indictment, or arraignment, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c). This 70-
day time limit, however, is subject to certain exclusions under § 3161(h). Mr. Guzman
asserts that, at the time he filed the Motion to Dismiss, 194 days had elapsed since his
arraignment on September 3, 2025, and only 114 of these were excludable, which would
mean the 70-day time limit was surpassed by 10 days. Much of this delay is attributable
to the Court's failure to resolve Mr. Guzman’s previously filed motion to dismiss Count 2
of the Indictment on First Amendment grounds (Doc. 22) within 30 days of it being fully
briefed. See § 3161(h)(1)(H) (allowing exclusion of “delay reasonably attributable to any
period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant
is actually under advisement by the court” (emphasis added)).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2), “[i]f a defendant is not brought to trial within the time
limit required by section 3161(c) as extended by section 3161(h), the information or

indictment shail be dismissed on motion of the defendant.” (emphasis added). The Eighth

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT.
INFORMATION

GPO

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Circuit has held that such dismissal is mandatory. United States v. Koory, 20 F.3d 844,
846 (8th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The Government concedes that more than 70 days
have elapsed but asks the Court to find sua sponte that an ends-of-justice continuance
under § 3161(h)(7)(A) was proper and thereby exclude the time that the Court had the
previous motion to dismiss under advisement beyond the 30 days provided by
§ 3161(h)(1)(H). (Doc. 30, pp. 2-3).

To the Government's point, § 3161(h)(7)(A) does allow a judge to grant an
excludable continuance “on his own motion” if he makes certain findings on the record.
Some courts have recognized that such a continuance is appropriate for “difficult
motions.” United States v. Meniz, 840 F.2d 315, 326 n.22 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Bufalino, 683 F.2d 639, 645 (2d Cir. 1982). While the Government has provided some
case law that suggests courts may issue ends-of-justice continuances after
§ 3161(h)(1)(H)'s 30-day exclusion has passed,‘ it has not provided any authority to
support the notion that courts may retroactively grant an ends-of-justice continuance after
the 70-day limit for bringing a defendant to trial has run.

Indeed, multiple circuit courts have explicitly rejected continuances under these
circumstances. E.g., United States v. Carey, 746 F.2d 228, 230 (4th Cir. 1984) (“Recent
cases uniformly hold that nunc pro tunc or retroactive continuances that are made after

the expiration of the time within which the defendant should have been tried for reasons

1 In United States v. Ellison, 739 F. Supp. 3d 564, 588 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 2024), the court
granted an ends-of-justice continuance sua sponte under § 3161(h)(7)(A) after the 30-
day period for considering a motion had run. But in Ellison, unlike here, neither party had
raised speedy trial concerns or moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Moreover,
courts do not agree on this point. The Third Circuit has stated that a district court may
“invoke § 3161(h)(7)(A)” sua sponte “before the thirty days have elapsed.” United States
v. Felton, 811 F.2d 190, 197 n.7 (3d Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).

2

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the judge did not consider before lapse of the allowable time are inconsistent with the
Act.”). “When a violation of the time limits of the Act is shown to have occurred, dismissal
is mandatory on motion of the defendant.” Koory, 20 F.3d at 846 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). If courts that are confronted with speedy trial
violations can retroactively exclude any excess time sua sponte, it would undermine the
mandatory nature of dismissal in these cases. Accordingly, Mr. Guzman’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 27) is GRANTED.

The Court may exercise discretion in deciding whether to dismiss the case with or
without prejudice. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). In so deciding, the Court should consider:
(1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) the facts and circumstances which led to the
dismissal, and (3) the impact of reprosecution on administration of the Act and justice in
general. /d. The Government argues for dismissal without prejudice, and Defendant
defers to the Court on this issue. For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss without
prejudice.

Seriousness of the offense. Here, Mr. Guzman has been indicted for two counts of
transportation of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) and (b)(1).
These offenses carry a maximum sentence of 20 years, a maximum fine of $250,000,
restitution to the victims, and an additional special assessment of up to $35,000. The
Court deems these to be serious offenses, so this factor weighs in favor of dismissal
without prejudice.

Facts and circumstances of dismissal. This dismissal results from the Court's
consideration of Mr. Guzman’s motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds; the

Government was not responsible for this delay. See Koory, 20 F.3d at 848 (looking to

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whether the government's negligence in complying with the speedy trial time limits was
to gain a tactical advantage or was part of a recurring pattern). Further, “[w]here the crime
charged is serious, the court should dismiss [with prejudice] only for a correspondingly
severe delay.” /d. (quoting Russo, 741 F.2d at 1267). Here, there was only a 10-day period
beyond the 70-day limit; such a short delay is far outweighed by the severity of the offense
in this case. This factor weighs in favor of dismissal without prejudice.

Impact of reprosecution. “Reprosecution always involves some element of
increased burden on the administration of justice and hinders the Act’s goal of swift
prosecution, yet the Act does not mandate that every dismissal be with prejudice.” Koory,
20 F.3d at 849 (citation omitted). And, when balanced against the severity of the offense
and the minimal delay, the Court finds that the impact of reprosecution does not weigh
against dismissal without prejudice.

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr. Guzman's
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27) is GRANTED and the two-count indictment against him (Doc.
1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED on this a day of April, 2