Ralston v. Rex

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
JONATHAN WAYNE RALSTON 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 5:24-cv-05075-PKH-MEF
SHERIFF JAY CANTRELL,
Washington County, Arkansas;
FORMER SHERIFF TIM HELDER; and
PATROL OFFICER REX 	DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff, Jonathan W. Ralston, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Plaintiff maintains Defendant Rex
subjected him to an illegal search and seizure on two separate occasions.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable P. K. Holmes,
III, Senior United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of
making a Report and Recommendation. 	The case is before the Court for preservice screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1 Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen any complaint in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this case on April 2, 2024. (ECF No. 1). He was granted IFP status the same
day. (ECF No. 3). In Claim One of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on November 19, 2019,
Defendant Rex illegally searched him, arrested him, and took him to the Washington County
1 Enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).
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Detention Center (“WCDC”), where he remained for 18 months because of charges added to the
ones already pending against him. (ECF No. 1 at 4). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Helder “was
over” Defendant Rex. Id.
In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges that on May 15, 2022, Defendant Rex again illegally
searched and arrested him. (ECF No. 1 at 6). Plaintiff states he has served 16 months so far due
to the illegal search and seizure. Id. Plaintiff indicates Defendant Helder “was over” Defendant
Rex on May 15, 2022, but that Sheriff Cantrell is now “over” Defendant Rex. Id.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. 	(ECF No. 1 at 9).
Specifically, Plaintiff is seeking an award of $ 5 million. Id. Plaintiff also requests that Defendant
Rex lose his badge and no longer be allowed to serve in law enforcement. Id. at 10.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under § 1915A, the Court is obliged to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or
it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to
vindicate a cognizable right. 	Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987); In re
Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is
discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe
the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework.” 	Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). 	However, the complaint must still allege
specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Claim One
Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitation. Instead, causes of action under
§ 1983 are governed by “the most appropriate or analogous state statute of limitations.” 	Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985). In Arkansas, this is the three-year personal injury statute of
limitations, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105(3). See Mountain Home Flight Serv., Inc. v. Baxter Cty.,
Ark., 758 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir. 2014).
The search and seizure in Claim One occurred on November 19, 2019. 	The three-year
statute of limitations would have expired on November 19, 2022. 	The Complaint was not filed
until April 24, 2024. The statute of limitation bars Claim One.
B. 	Claim Two
In Claim Two, Plaintiff names Defendant Helder because he was “over” Defendant Rex at
the time of the incident. Plaintiff names Defendant Cantrell because he is currently over Defendant
Rex.
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A claim of deprivation of a constitutional right cannot be based on a respondeat superior
theory of liability. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 654, 694 (1978). “[A]
supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional
activity.” White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d
1309, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997) (“general responsibility for supervising the operations of a prison is
insufficient to establish the personal involvement required to support liability”). “Liability under
section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights. To
establish personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [Plaintiff] must allege specific facts of
personal 	involvement 	in, 	or 	direct 	responsibility 	for, 	a 	deprivation 	of 	his 	constitutional
rights.” 	Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mayorga v.
Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006)).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged no personal involvement on the part of Defendants Helder and
Cantrell. Instead, he seeks to hold them liable solely because of their supervisory responsibility
over Defendant Rex. Section 1983 does not allow for such liability.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), it is recommended that:
(1) 	All claims concerning the November 19, 2019, arrest and search of the Plaintiff or
his belongings be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitation; and
(2) 	All claims against Defendants Helder and Cantrell be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.
This leaves for later resolution Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Rex violated his federal
constitutional rights on May 15, 2022. 	By separate order the Complaint will be served on
Defendant Rex.
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Status 	of 	Referral: 	This 	case 	should 	remain 	referred 	for 	all 	matters 	not
recommended for dismissal in this Report and Recommendation.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
Dated this 1st day of May 2024.
/s/
Mark E. Ford
HON. MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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