Smith v. Bi Haven Investments

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
TORIN SMITH 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 4:24-cv-04105-SOH-BAB
BI HAVEN INVESTMENTS 	DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Torin Smith , filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Plaintiff proceeds
pro se and in forma pauperis. 	The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate
Judge. 	However, because not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the
undersigned, and Plaintiff’s claims require dismissal, the Court enters its findings as a Report and
Recommendation, and the case will automatically be reassigned to Chief United States District
Judge Susan O. Hickey. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
General Order 2024-02.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a). 	Pursuant to § 1915A(a), the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which
a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity. 	Based on this review, for the reasons outlined below, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s
Complaint be dismissed with prejudice as barred by res judicata.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff originally filed his Complaint and Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP Motion”) in the Eastern District of Arkansas on August 30, 2024. 	(ECF No. 1, 2). 	The
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Eastern District Court transferred the case to this Court on October 8, 2024. 	(ECF No. 3). 	The
Court directed Plaintiff to file a completed IFP Motion and he did so on December 5, 2024. 	(ECF
No. 8). 	The Court granted Plaintiff’s IFP Motion on January 10, 2025 	(ECF No. 11). 	Plaintiff
is currently incarcerated at the Arkansas Division of Corrections – Ester Unit in Pine Bluff,
Arkansas. 	(ECF No. 2). 	However, his claims relate to employment before Plaintiff was
incarcerated.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims Defendant “Bi Haven Investments” employed him
without pay for approximately one year. 	(ECF No. 2). 	Plaintiff goes on to explain he has already
filed a lawsuit on this matter against the same defendant and received a settlement in that lawsuit.
See Smith v. Patel and Bhavin Investments, Inc. Civil No. 4:21-cv-04035-SOH (W.D. Ark Apr.
21, 2021, ECF No. 2) (hereinafter “Smith I”). 	Plaintiff complains that the attorney representing
him in this previous lawsuit took more than half of his settlement. 	However, Plaintiff does not
name the attorney as a defendant in his Complaint. 	Instead, he seeks pain and suffering and his
attorney fees from the named Defendant, Bi Haven Investments. 	(ECF No. 2).
Plaintiff filed a supplement to his Complaint on December 19, 2024. 	(ECF No. 10). 	In
his Supplement, Plaintiff explains a default judgment was entered against Defendant, Bi Haven
Investments, in Plaintiff’s favor for $42,000 in his “first case.” 	Id. at 1. 	Plaintiff goes on to
explain that Mr. Patel, the owner of Bi Haven Investments, admitted to employing Plaintiff for one
year, at the Super 8 Motel in Texarkana, Arkansas, without compensation in violation of Plaintiff’s
civil rights and “fair labor law.” 	Id. at 2. 	Plaintiff seeks $103,000.00 in compensation for the
amount he spent on food, rent, car notes, and loans while he was working for Defendant. 	Id.
Plaintiff then specifically explains regarding Smith I:
The Court granted me $42,000.00 in back wages. 	The Court say that my attorney Fee’s
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will be considered at a later date which came out to be $17,000.00 out of the $42,000.00
and left me $25,000.00. 	Im suing for my Lawyers Fee’s and my saving I used to live on
when I should have been getting paid for all the work Bi Haven Investment had me do 24
hours a day 7 days a week for a year with no pay . . ..
Id. at 2-3 (errors in original).
In this previous litigation, Smith I, Plaintiff named Rajan Patel and Bhavin Investments,
Inc. as defendants. 	Mr. Patel being the owner and operator of Bi Haven Investments, Inc. 	In that
case Plaintiff’s alleges, these defendants owe him wages from work he did at the Super 8 Motel in
Texarkana, Arkansas. 	Smith I, at ECF No. 2. 	Plaintiff specifically sues for violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wages Act. 	Id.
In this previous litigation, Chief United States District Judge, Susan O. Hickey, first entered
a Judgment of Default against Bhavin Investment, Inc. 	Smith I, at ECF No. 12. 	Later, Judge
Hickey entered an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, with prejudice, upon Plaintiff’s Notice
requesting such dismissal. 	Smith I, ECF No. 24. 	In Plaintiff’s Notice, he states he settled the
matter with the defendants and provided notice of dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule Civil
Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). 	Smith I, ECF No. 22. 	Plaintiff was represented by counsel through the
initial filing and closure of Smith I. 	However, subsequent to the dismissal of the case, Plaintiff
began filing pro se filings seeking to reopen the case, and appealing Judge Hickey’s rulings.
Judge Hickey denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen, and he appealed. 	Smith I , ECF Nos. 40, 41.
On January 10, 2025, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Hickey’s denial of
Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen. 	Smith I, at ECF No. 47.
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II. 	APPLICABLE STANDARD
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be
false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather
than to vindicate a cognizable right. 	In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer
v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“In evaluating whether a pro
se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”
Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007)). 	However, even a pro se Plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim.
Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s claims here are clearly barred by the legal doctrine of res judicata. 	Under the
doctrine of res judicata, “a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their
privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” 	Yankton Sioux
Tribe v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 533 F.3d 634, 639 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Allen
v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). 	To establish that a claim is barred by res judicata, a party
must show: “(1) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (2) the first suit was based
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on proper jurisdiction; (3) both suits involved the same parties (or those in privity with them); and
(4) both suits are based upon the same claims or causes of action.” 	Id. (quoting Costner v. URS
Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 1998)).
As enumerated in the background section, Plaintiff’s claims are exactly the same as those
asserted in Smith I. 	Furthermore, Plaintiff received a final judgment, based on proper jurisdiction
against the same defendant as named here. 	Smith I, at ECF No. 24. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and should be dismissed.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is recommended:
(1) the case be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted;
(2) Plaintiff be warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted as a strike for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and thus, the Clerk be directed to place a § 1915(g) strike
flag on the case for future judicial consideration; and
(3) the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this dismissal
would not be taken in good faith.
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Status Referral: The referral in this matter should be terminated.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
DATED this 15th day of January 2025.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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