Smith v. McClean et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
CURTIS WAYNE SMITH, JR 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 4:24-cv-04051-SOH-BAB
DOCTOR JOAN MCCLEAN;
TODD TALLANT; DOE BADGE
NUMBER 11-6; and
JANA TALLANT 	DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Curtis Wayne Smith, Jr., currently an inmate of the Arkansas Division of
Corrections North Central Unit, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Plaintiff proceeds
pro se and in forma pauperis. 	Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the
Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District Judge, referred this case to the
undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a). 	Pursuant to § 1915A(a), the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which
a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on April 26, 2024. 	(ECF No. 1). 	The Court
provisionally filed Plaintiff’s Complaint and ordered him to submit a completed Application for
Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”). 	(ECF No. 2). 	Plaintiff filed his IFP
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Application on June 11, 2024 and the Court granted it on June 12, 2024. 	(ECF No. 5). 	Plaintiff
was a convicted inmate housed in the Howard County Detention Center (“HCDC”) at all times
relevant to his claims. 	(ECF No. 1).
In his Complaint Plaintiff lists three claims against the four Defendants, however, all three
of these claims are simply different iterations of the same set of facts and allegations. 	Plaintiff
claims the Defendants denied him medical care and exposed him to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement in violation of his constitutional rights. 	Specifically, Plaintiff alleges he was
involved in an altercation with another inmate in September 2023 in which he hurt his hand and
got the other inmate’s blood in his mouth. 	(ECF No. 1, pp. 4-8). 	Plaintiff claims he requested
medical care in the form of x-rays and blood tests. 	Id. at 6-7. 	However, Plaintiff did not receive
his blood test for one week. 	Id. at 7. 	Plaintiff makes no allegations he suffered any injury from
this one-week delay. 	Instead, Plaintiff states “even though I didn’t get a blood virus/or disease it
was a possibility . . .” 	Id. at 9. 	Plaintiff makes no allegations regarding his hand other than
stating he requested an x-ray. 	He does not claim any actual injury to his hand. 	(ECF No. 1).
Plaintiff also makes an official capacity claim but only reasserts his individual capacity
claims, and alleges the Defendants failed to follow the policy of the HCDC. 	Specifically, Plaintiff
claims it was against policy to not provide him with medical care immediately and to require him
to submit a medical request, and that it was against policy for Defendant Tallant and Doe officer
to wear their sidearms inside the jail. 	(ECF No. 1).
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and for all of his fines to be satisfied. 	Id.
at 9.
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II. 	APPLICABLE STANDARD
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court must dismiss a
complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be
false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather
than to vindicate a cognizable right. 	In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer
v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that the Defendants acted
under color of state law, and that the actor violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution. 	West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009
(8th Cir. 1999). 	Furthermore, the deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not
suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under Section 1983. 	Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). 	Lastly, Defendants
must have been personally involved and caused the violation alleged. 	“Liability under section
1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights. 	To establish
personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [Plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal
involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights.” 	Clemmons
v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128,
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1132 (8th Cir. 2006)). 	Plaintiff’s claims shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears
beyond a doubt the Plaintiff’s complaint can prove no set of facts to support the plaintiff’s
purported cause of action. 	See Schaller Tel. Co. v. Golden Sky Sys., Inc., 298 F.3d 736, 740 (8th
Cir. 2001).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). 	However, even a pro se Plaintiff must allege specific
facts sufficient to support a claim. 	Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
In prisoner litigation, courts in the Eighth Circuit analyze denial of medical care claims for
pretrial detainees and convicted inmates both under the deliberate indifference standard of the
Eighth Amendment. 	See e.g., Morris v. Cradduck, 954 F.3d 1055 (8th Cir. 2020) (pretrial
detainee has the same rights to medical care under the Due Process Clause as an inmate has under
the Eighth Amendment).
To succeed on this type of claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he had an objectively
serious medical need, and (2) that the Defendants actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded,
that serious medical need. 	See Ivey v. Audrain Cty., Mo., 968 F.3d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 2020). 	“A
serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one
that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” 	Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted).
“To demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, a serious medical
need, the plaintiff must establish a mental state akin to criminal recklessness: disregarding a known
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risk to the [detainee’s] health.” 	Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). 	The Eighth Circuit has stated that this “onerous standard
requires a showing more than negligence, more than even gross negligence, but less than
purposefully causing or knowingly bringing about a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate.”
Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Deliberate indifference may also be manifested by “prison guards in intentionally denying
or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976). 	However, the “Constitution does not require
jailers to handle every medical complaint as quickly as each inmate might wish.” 	Jenkins v. Cty.
of Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009). 	“A prisoner alleging a delay in treatment
must present verifying medical evidence that the prison officials ignored an acute or escalating
situation or that these delays adversely affected his prognosis[,]” Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336,
342 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted), unless the need for medical attention is obvious
to a layperson, in which case the plaintiff need not submit verifying medical evidence to show the
detrimental effects of delay. 	See Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 919 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing
Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 1999)); see also Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966,
969 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding a three-week delay, “coupled with knowledge of inmate-patient’s
suffering, can support a finding of an Eighth Amendment violation”).
Here, Plaintiff states he did in fact receive medical care one week after requesting it. 	(ECF
No. 1, pp. 5, 7). 	Accordingly, his claim is for a delay of medical care rather than a denial of
medical care. 	However, Plaintiff has failed to present any verifying medical evidence that the
one-week delay in receiving care negatively impacted his prognosis in any way. 	Instead, Plaintiff
states he did not contract any disease or illness from the other inmate’s blood in his mouth, and he
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does not allege any negative prognosis regarding his hand. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to
state a cognizable claim for delay of medical care.
Next, while Plaintiff lists the term “conditions of confinement” in his Complaint, he does
not allege any facts to support such a claim.
Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Doe and Todd Tallant wore their sidearm into the
HCDC and such action was against HCDC policy. 	This assertion also fails to state a cognizable
constitutional violation claim. 	It is well settled that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to
enforce compliance with internal prison rules or regulations. 	See Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844,
847 (8th Cir. 2003) (“there is no federal constitutional liberty interest in having ... prison officials
follow prison regulations”); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997) (“there is no §
1983 liability for violating prison policy”).
Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to allege any injury from either his denial of medical care
claim or his purported conditions of confinement claim. 	The Prison Litigation Reform Act
“PLRA” provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner …
for mental or emotional injury … without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(e). 	In Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2004), the Eighth Circuit concluded
that Congress intended this provision of the PLRA to “limit [] recovery for mental or emotional
injury in all federal actions brought by prisoners.”
Lastly, all official capacity claims asserted by Plaintiff must fail as a matter of law.
Without a cognizable constitutional violation alleged, there can be no official capacity claim
against the employer. 	See Morris v. Cradduck, 954 F.3d 1055, 1060 (8th Cir. 2020); Sanders v.
City of Minneapolis, Minn., 474 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller,
475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is recommended: this case be dismissed, without prejudice, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
DATED this 10th day of July 2024.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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