Dudley v. Meadows et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
KARANYA MARQUIS DUDLEY 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 4:24-cv-04038-SOH
STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE TROOPER
JACOB MEADOWS; STATE OF ARKANSAS
HEADQUARTERS TROOP G;
AMY FREEDMAN; STATE POLICE TROOP G;
MILLER COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE;
SUPERVISOR OF HEADQUARTERS;
and BOOKING OFFICER # 0829 	DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Karanya Marquis Dudley, a non-prisoner, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. 	Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. 	Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District Judge, referred
Plaintiff’s Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”) and Motion for Service
to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation. 	(ECF No. 3). 	The
Court previously granted Plaintiff’s IFP Motion, (ECF No. 5), and now the Motion for Service
(ECF No. 3) and Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint are currently before the Court for preservice
screening under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her original Complaint and Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP Application”) on May 10, 2024. 	(ECF Nos. 2, 3). 	The Court granted Plaintiff IFP status
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on May 13, 2024. 	(ECF No. 5). 	In this same Order, the Court directed Plaintiff to file an
Amended Complaint. 	Id. 	Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint on June 10, 2024. 	(ECF No.
6). 	Upon review, the Court determined it was still unable to adequately discern Plaintiff’s claims
and ordered Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint. 	(ECF No. 7). 	Plaintiff filed her
Second Amended Complaint on July 12, 2024. 	(ECF No. 8).
While her Second Amended Complaint is still difficult to interpret, the Court has
determined Plaintiff named eight Defendants: the State of Arkansas; State Trooper Jacob
Meadows; State of Arkansas Headquarters Troop G; Amy Freedman; State Police Troop G; Miller
County Sheriff’s Office; Supervisor of Headquarters; and Booking Officer # 0829. 	(ECF No. 8).
Plaintiff makes multiple assertions against these Defendants under the heading of three
claims. 	In Claim One Plaintiff states, Defendants Meadows, the State of Arkansas, and
Headquarters Troop G violated her constitutional rights on March 24, 2024 in the following ways:
I’m disabled, I was physically injured due to the crash, which caused my body more
aches/pain. 	My blood pressure was high. 	Trooper Meadows pit maneuver my car
causing me to crash into a ditch. 	I’m diagnosed with more problems & still seeking
medical attention neck, back, spine shortness of breath, joints, tissues (muscles, tendons,
nerves) Trooper Meadows pit maneuver my car caused me to crash into a ditch, took my
Identity (phot RealID & DNA) unlawful arrest, unreasonable search & seizure I was
accused of fleeing by car once incarcerated I was injured due to car crash – accused me of
fleeing! 	Trooper Meadows NEVER responded to my question of traffic violation ?
DENIED car crash report! 	NOTE: Trooper Meadows NEVER put his siren & lights on
after immediately turning around! 	And followed me for several miles.
(ECF No. 8, pp. 4-5) (errors in original). 	Plaintiff claims these factual allegations violated her (1)
Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless search; (2) Fifth Amendment rights to due process;
and (3) Eighth Amendment rights against excessive bail. 	(ECF No. 8, p. 4). 	Further, Plaintiff
claims these allegations show Defendants Meadows, the State of Arkansas, and Headquarters
Troop G (1) racially profiled her; (2) unlawfully arrested her; (3) falsely imprisoned her; (4)
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harassed her; (5) disabled her; (6) deprived and coerced her; (7) discriminated against her; and (8)
abused their authority. 	Id.
For her official capacity component of Claim One, Plaintiff claims: (1) Racial profiling;
(2) harassment; (3) unlawful arrest; (4) false imprisonment; (5) discrimination (6) fraud; (7)
interference with public health & welfare; (8) defamation; (9) conspiracy; and (10) abuse of
authority. 	Id. at 5.
In Claim Two Plaintiff claims, Defendant Booking Officer #BR 0829 (“Booking Officer”)
violated her constitutional rights on March 24, 2024 when she stole Plaintiff’s DNA in violation
of Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment due process rights. 	(ECF No. 8, p. 6). 	In addition, Plaintiff
claims Defendant Booking Officer also coerced Plaintiff to sign something stating she was a felon.
Id. 	Next, Plaintiff claims Defendant Booking Officer abused her authority and committed a
conspiracy. 	Id.
When prompted by the Court’s Complaint Form to list the factual allegations that support
Claim Two, Plaintiff wrote:
I was deprived & coerced to give up my DNA without due process of law.
Booking Officer # BR 0829 stated that I had a felony & told me that it was ma[n]datory to
take my DNA
My Identity was stolen by coerced!
(ECF No. 8, p. 6) (errors in original). 	For her official capacity component of Claim Two, Plaintiff
claims: (1) discrimination, (2) fraud, (3) defamation; (4) interference with public health and
welfare; and (5) conspiracy. 	Id. at 7.
In Claim Three Plaintiff alleges Defendant Freedman and the State of Arkansas are
currently violating her constitutional rights by:
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Accused of Fleeing (with car) by Amy Freedman (Deputy Prosecuting Attorney) and trying
to take away my freedom, enjoyment of life while interfering with my public health &
welfare (disabilities) Amy Freedman also Trying to give me 3yrs in prison without due
process of law 	Never had hearing for plea!
(ECF No. 8, p. 8). 	Plaintiff claims these actions: (1) violated her Fifth Amendment due process
rights; (2) falsely imprisoned her; (3) harassed her; (4) deprived & coerced her; (5) discriminated
against her; (6) caused medical issues for her; (7) abused the authority of Defendants Freedman
and the State of Arkansas; and (8) violated her Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual
punishment. 	(ECF No. 8, p. 7).
As with Claims One and Two, Plaintiff’s official capacity claim in Claim Three is simply
a listing of alleged violations: (1) racial profiling, (2) harassment, (3) discrimination, (4) fraud, (5)
unlawful arrest, (6) false imprisonment, (7) defamation, (8) conspiracy, and (9) abuse of authority.
Id. at 8-9.
For relief Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for her disability and medical issues
caused by the March 24, 2024 incident. 	(ECF No. 8, p. 9).
II. 	APPLICABLE STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court has the obligation to dismiss any claims
proceeding in forma pauperis that (i) are frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 	See Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Carter v.
Schafer, 273 Fed. App’x 581, 582 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“[C]ontrary to plaintiffs’
arguments on appeal, the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply to all persons proceeding IFP
and are not limited to prisoner suits, and the provisions allow dismissal without service.”).
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A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” 	Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or it is
undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to
vindicate a cognizable right. 	In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer v.
Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that the Defendants acted
under color of state law, and that the actor violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution. 	West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009
(8th Cir. 1999). 	Furthermore, the deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not
suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under Section 1983. 	Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). 	Lastly, Defendants
must have been personally involved and caused the violation alleged. 	“Liability under section
1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights. 	To establish
personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [Plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal
involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights.” 	Clemmons
v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128,
1132 (8th Cir. 2006)). 	Plaintiff’s claims shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears
beyond a doubt the Plaintiff’s complaint can prove no set of facts to support the plaintiff’s
purported cause of action. 	See Schaller Tel. Co. v. Golden Sky Sys., Inc., 298 F.3d 736, 740 (8th
Cir. 2001).
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“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). 	However, even a pro se Plaintiff must allege specific
facts sufficient to support a claim. 	Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
First, the Court must address whether the Defendants named by Plaintiff are proper
Defendants. 	Many are immune from suit or not considered persons under Section 1983. 	The
Court will then address Plaintiff’s claims that are not yet ripe for consideration by this Court and
must be stayed pursuant to the Younger doctrine.
A. 	Improper Defendants
Plaintiff names the State of Arkansas, State of Arkansas Headquarters Troop G, Amy
Freedman, State Police Troop G, State Trooper Meadows in his official capacity, Supervisor of
Headquarters, and Miller County Sheriff’s Office as Defendants in this matter. 	These Defendants
are improper Defendants in this matter and should be dismissed at this time.
1. 	Sovereign Immunity
First, Plaintiff cannot sue the State of Arkansas or its employees in their official capacities
for compensatory damages. 	All of Plaintiff’s claims against the State of Arkansas, State of
Arkansas Headquarters Troop G, State Police Troop G, and Defendant Meadows in his official
capacity are essentially claims against the State of Arkansas. 	“The Eleventh Amendment bars
suits against a State by citizens of that same State in federal court.” 	Williams v. Missouri, 973
F.2d 599, 599 -600 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276, 106 S. Ct. 2932,
2939, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986)). 	“This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.”
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Id. (quoting Papasan, 478 U.S. at 276). 	“Congress did not abrogate constitutional sovereign
immunity when enacting the law that was to become section 1983.” 	Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489,
493 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing 	Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342(1979)). 	The State of Arkansas
and its agencies have not consented to suit in federal court. 	Because Plaintiff requests only
monetary 	damages, 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	the 	State 	of 	Arkansas, 	State 	of 	Arkansas
Headquarters Troop G, State Police Troop G, and State Trooper Meadows in his official capacity
are all barred by sovereign immunity. 	Moreover, the State of Arkansas and its agencies are not
persons under Section 1983. 	See Zar v. S.D. Bd. of Exam'rs of Psychologists, 976 F.2d 459, 464
(8th Cir. 1992) (state departments not “persons” under Section 1983).
2. 	Legal Entities Subject to Suit
Next, the Miller County Sheriff’s Office, the State of Arkansas Headquarters Troop G, and
the State Police Troop G are not a person or a legal entity subject to suit under Section 1983. 	See
Owens v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (jails are not legal entities amenable
to suit); see also Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating
that “departments or subdivisions” of local government are not “juridical entities suable as such”);
De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cty. Jail, 18 F. App’x 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court
dismissal of county jail and sheriff’s department as parties because they are not suable entities).
Accordingly, these Defendants should be dismissed on this basis as well.
3. 	Prosecutorial Immunity
Defendant Freedman is also immune from suit in her role as prosecuting attorney for Miller
County, Arkansas. 	The Supreme Court established the absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a
civil suit for damages under Section 1983 “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s
case.” 	Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). 	This immunity extends to all acts that are
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“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” 	Id. at 430. 	Furthermore,
immunity is not defeated by “[a]llegations of unethical conduct and improper motive in the
performance of prosecutorial functions.” 	Sample v. City of Woodbury, 836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th
Cir. 2016). 	“[A] prosecutor is immune from suit even if he knowingly presented false,
misleading, or perjured testimony . . . or withheld or suppressed exculpatory evidence.”
Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1089 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege any conduct, against Defendant Freedman, other than
the prosecutorial functions of charging Plaintiff with a crime, having her arrested, and incarcerated.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Freedman fail as a matter of law. 	See Brodnicki
v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1996) (county prosecutors acting as advocate for the state
in a criminal prosecution were entitled to absolute immunity from suit).
4. 	Respondeat Superior
Lastly, Plaintiff has failed to allege any allegations against Defendant Supervisor of
Headquarters. 	Plaintiff listed Defendant Supervisor of Headquarters in the section of her Second
Amended Complaint requesting the names and address of the Defendants, (ECF No. 8, p. 3),
however, she made no allegations against the Defendant Supervisor of Headquarters. 	Merely
listing a Defendant in a complaint is insufficient to support a claim against the Defendant. 	Krych
v. Hass, 83 Fed. Appx. 854, 855 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (“court properly dismissed pro se complaint that was silent as to defendant
except for his name appearing in caption)).
Furthermore, a claim of deprivation of a constitutional right cannot be based on a
respondeat superior theory of liability. 	See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 654,
694 (1978). 	“[A] supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee’s
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unconstitutional activity.” 	White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Whitson
v. Stone County Jail, 602 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir. 2010) (“In a § 1983 case, an official is only liable
for his own misconduct and is not accountable for the misdeeds of his agents under a theory such
as respondeat superior or supervisor liability.”) (internal quotations omitted); Keeper v. King, 130
F.3d 1309, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997) (general responsibility for supervising the operations of a prison
is insufficient to establish the personal involvement required to support liability).
“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the
deprivation of rights. 	To establish personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [Plaintiff]
must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of
his constitutional rights.” 	Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006)). 	Therefore, if Plaintiff’s inclusion of
Defendant Supervisor of Headquarters was solely based on their supervisory role, the claim also
fails as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the State of Arkansas, State of Arkansas Headquarters Troop G, State Police
Troop G, Miller County Sheriff’s Office, Defendant Meadows in his official capacity only,
Defendant Freedman, and Defendant Supervisor of Headquarters should be dismissed from this
matter along with all claims asserted against them.0F
1
B. 	Remaining Defendants
1 The Court notes all individual and official capacity claims against the State of Arkansas, State
of Arkansas Headquarters Troop G, State Police Troop G, Miller County Sheriff’s Office, Amy
Freedman, and Supervisor of Headquarters are recommended for dismissal while only the official
capacity claims against Defendant Meadows are recommended for dismissal. 	f
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This leaves Defendant Meadows in his individual capacity and the Defendant Booking
Officer as the only remaining Defendants. 	The Court will address Plaintiff’s claims against each
below.
1. 	Defendant Meadows
In Plaintiff’s Claim One, she claims Defendant Meadows violated her Fourth, Fifth, and
Eighth Amendment rights through her arrest on March 24, 2024. 	Specifically, Plaintiff claims
Defendant Meadows (1) disabled her with his “pit maneuver;” (2) took her identity; (3) unlawfully
arrested her; (4) unreasonably searched and seized her; (5) racially profiled her (6) falsely
imprisoned her; (7) harassed her; (8) deprived and coerced her; (8) discriminated against her; and
(9) abused his authority.
First, the Court notes it interprets Plaintiff’s references of identity theft, deprivation, and
coercion to be related to her due process claim over her DNA sample. 	As shown in the
background section herein, Plaintiff explained her DNA was taken once she was booked into the
Miller County Detention Center (“MCDC”). 	(ECF No. 8, p. 5). 	Accordingly, all these
allegations will fall under Plaintiff’s due process claim relating to the DNA sample taken from
Plaintiff.
Next, the Court interprets Plaintiff’s reference regarding Defendant Meadows’s “pit
maneuver,” harassment, and abuse of authority to all relate to her unreasonable search and seizure
claim against Defendant Meadows as Plaintiff did not assert any claims of excessive force.
All Plaintiff’s claims related to her arrest, search, seizure, booking, and incarceration
surrounding the March 24, 2024 events are not yet ripe for consideration by this Court. 	Plaintiff’s
state criminal charges of fleeing—resulting from the March 24, 2024 arrest, booking, and
incarceration—are still pending before the Miller County Circuit Court. 	State v. Dudley, 46CR-
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24-283, 	Miller 	County 	Circuit 	Court 	Eighth 	Circuit 	Division,
https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad/case/46CR-24-283 (last visited Aug. 21, 2024).
Pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts are required to abstain
from hearing cases when “(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding which (2) implicates
important state interests, and when (3) that proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise the
federal questions presented.” 	Norwood v. Dickey, 409 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal
citation omitted). 	Ongoing state criminal proceedings implicate the important state interest of
enforcing state criminal law, and constitutional claims relating to that state proceeding should be
raised there. 	Meador v. Paulson, 385 F. App’x 613, 2010 WL 2793555, at *1 (8th Cir. 2010); see
also Gillette v. N. Dakota Disc. Bd. Counsel, 610 F.3d 1045, 1046 (8th Cir. 2010). 	“If all three
questions are answered affirmatively, a federal court should abstain unless it detects ‘bad faith,
harassment, or some extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.’”
Night Clubs, Inc. v. City of Ft. Smith, Ark., 163 F.3d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Middlesex
Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982)).
When only equitable relief is sought, Younger “contemplates the outright dismissal of the
federal suit, and the presentation of all claims, both state and federal to the state courts.” 	Gibson
v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973) (a Section 1983 case involving only injunctive relief, and
not damages). 	In cases where damages are sought, the Eighth Circuit has noted that the Supreme
Court instructs that traditional abstention principles generally require a stay as the appropriate
mode of abstention rather than a dismissal. 	Night Clubs, Inc., 163 F. 3d at 481. 	In Quackenbush
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730 (1996), the Court said:
In those cases in which we have applied traditional abstention principles to damages
actions, we have only permitted a federal court to withhold action until the state
proceedings have concluded, that is, we have permitted federal courts applying
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abstention principles in damages actions to enter a stay, but we have not permitted
them to dismiss the action altogether.
Here, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for her due process, unreasonable search and
seizure, unlawful arrest and incarceration, and racial profiling and discrimination claims against
Defendant Meadows. 	As these claims all arose during Plaintiff’s arrest by Defendant Meadows—
Arkansas State Trooper—and the criminal charges stemming from this arrest are still pending in
Miller County, Arkansas, the Court finds the State of Arkansas has an important state interest in
addressing all of Plaintiff’s claims. 	Furthermore, Plaintiff has not presented any reason why she
cannot present these claims first to the Miller County Circuit Court. 	Accordingly, it is
appropriate, pursuant to the Younger doctrine, to stay Plaintiff’s remaining claims against
Defendant Meadows until her state criminal case concludes.
2. 	Defendant Booking Officer #BR0829
In Claim Two Plaintiff claims, Defendant Booking Officer violated her due process rights
when she stole her DNA on March 24, 2024. 	Plaintiff also alleges an official capacity claim
against Defendant Booking Officer alleging (1) discrimination, (2) fraud, (3) defamation, (4)
interference with public health and welfare, and (5) conspiracy.1F
2
As with Plaintiff’s Claim One against Defendant Meadows, Plaintiff’s Claim Three stems
from her arrest and booking on March 24, 2024. 	Additionally, the State of Arkansas has a state
statute governing the procurement of DNA samples of arrestees. 	See Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-
1006. 	Accordingly, the Court finds, applying the same Younger analysis here as it did with
Defendant Meadows, that the State of Arkansas has an important interest in Plaintiff’s asserted
2 The official capacity claims against Defendant Booking Officer survive sovereign immunity as
the Court understands the Booking Officer to be an employe of the MCDC.
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claims, Plaintiff has a pending criminal matter before the Miller County Circuit Court, and Plaintiff
has not shown why she cannot present this due process claim in that proceeding. 	Accordingly, it
is appropriate, pursuant to the Younger doctrine, to stay Plaintiff’s Claim Three regarding her DNA
until her state criminal case concludes.
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff’s official capacity claims of fraud, defamation,
interference with public health and welfare, and conspiracy assert state law claims against
Defendant Booking Officer, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over them at this time. 	See
Franklin v. Zain, 152 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 1998) (explaining a federal court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a pendent state claim if it has dismissed all claims over
which it had original jurisdiction under. 	28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is recommended Plaintiff’s Motion for Service (ECF No. 3) be
DENIED. 	Specifically, Plaintiff’s claims against the State of Arkansas, State of Arkansas
Headquarters Troop G, State Police Troop G, Miller County Sheriff’s Office, Defendant Meadows
in his official capacity only, Defendant Freedman, and Defendant Supervisor of Headquarters
should be DISMISSED without prejudice as the State of Arkansas, State of Arkansas
Headquarters Troop G, State Police Troop G, Defendant Meadows in his official capacity, and
Defendant Freedman are all immune from suit and Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted against Miller County Sheriff’s Office and Defendant Supervisor of
Headquarter.
Furthermore, it is recommended that all remaining claims against Defendants Meadows in
his individual capacity and Booking Officer be administratively stayed until such time Plaintiff
can show the Court her criminal case has been resolved in Miller County Circuit Court. 	Further,
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it is recommended Plaintiff be provided thirty (30) days from the resolution of her criminal case
in Miller County to notify this Court if she desires to reopen this matter.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
DATED this 4th day of September 2024.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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