Smith v. Tallant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
CURTIS WAYNE DALE SMITH, JR. 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 4:24-cv-04018-SOH-BAB
JAIL ADMINISTRATOR JANA TALLANT 	DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Curtis Wayne Dale Smith Jr., filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. 	Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District Judge, referred
this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.
Currently before the Court is Defendant Tallant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the
limited issue of exhaustion. 	(ECF No. 11). 	Plaintiff responded. 	(ECF No. 15). 	This matter is
now ripe for consideration.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint and Application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)
on February 27, 2024. 	(ECF Nos. 1-2). 	The Court granted Plaintiff IFP status on the same day.
(ECF No. 3).
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Hidden Creek Re-Entry in Little Rock, Arkansas, but
he was incarcerated in the Howard County Detention Center (“HCDC”) during the time in issue
here. 	Plaintiff indicates he was both a pretrial detainee and convicted inmate at the times in issue.
(ECF No. 1, p. 2). 	In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Tallant denied him mental and
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medical health care starting in June 2023 and continuing through the rest of his incarceration in
HCDC, 	and she exposed him to improper conditions of confinement by denying him his
medication. 	Id. at 4. 	Plaintiff specifically alleges:
I know for a fact she denied me medical/mental health care when I specifically asked to
see mental health at Southwest Arkansas Mental health in Nashville, Arkansas 71852 her
only Reply was That LaShanda hadn’t got back to her Jana Tallant Jail administrator with
an appointment but I asked multiple times after 2023-03-03-09:17am but on that date when
I was messaging her on the digital Faculty forms letting her know of one being a threat to
everybody but myself and needed to be placed alone she left me around other inmates with
no Regard for either of our lives and She had no excuse of not knowing to let the Sherriff
know of these same things in the messages and with messages of this sort and magnitude
they should have had a mental health professional on stand by or most Definitely when I
ask specifically on the faculty forms to see mental health and then refused for months even
had a mental health referral I believe twice from Pafford Medical Clinic Joan Mclean and
She put me in for a mental health referral I know for sure once and was both warned that
my bipolar (ANGER) was getting worse and I needed to see mental health ASAP As soon
as possible to get my medicine started again and was refused multiple times to get me in
for proper mental/medical care and that was not or still has not done in a timely or
professional manner and when the Doctor/Prescriber was let know I should have been seen
the same day by either a Mental health provider coming to the facility or I should have
been took their by appointment in a timely and professional manner.
(ECF No. 1. pp. 4-5) (errors in original). 	Plaintiff makes this claim against Defendant Tallant in
her individual and official capacity, but he makes no further allegations regarding the official
capacity claim. 	Id. at 5. 	Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as his
criminal history expunged. 	Id. at 9.
In her Motion and supporting documents, Defendant Tallant argues Plaintiff has failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act because he:
(1) did not file proper grievances; (2) he failed to appeal Defendant Tallant’s responses to his
request and grievances; and (3) he did not specifically direct his requests and grievances regarding
his mental health at Defendant Tallant. 	(ECF No. 12, p. 5).
Plaintiff responded arguing he did file request and grievances regarding his mental health
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requests and conditions of confinement, and these satisfy the HCDC procedures. 	(ECF No. 15).
Plaintiff also argues the HCDC Grievance procedure says he may appeal not that he must appeal.
Id.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record "shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R.
C IV. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
"Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with
the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a
genuine issue of material fact exists.” 	Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602,
607 (8th Cir. 1999).
The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts." 	Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. 	"They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." 	Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607. 	"A case founded
on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment." 	Id. at 610.
“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts
for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” 	Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007).
Under § 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his personal capacity, or in his official
capacity, or claims may be stated against a defendant in both his personal and his official
capacities. 	The type of conduct that is actionable and the type of defense available depend on
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whether the claim is asserted against a defendant in his official or individual capacity. 	See
Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). 	“Claims against
individuals in their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the entity for which they
work; they require proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff’s rights, and the
only type of immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself.” 	Id. 	Personal capacity
claims “are those which allege personal liability for individual actions by officials in the course of
their duties; these claims do not require proof of any policy and qualified immunity may be raised
as a defense” to these individual capacity claims. 	Id. 	To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law, and that the actor violated a
right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution. 	West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.1999).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The PLRA mandates exhaustion of available administrative remedies before an inmate files
suit. 	Section 1997e(a) of the PLRA provides: “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under Section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” 	42 U.S. C. § 1997e(a) (held unconstitutional on other grounds). 	Exhaustion is
mandatory. 	Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). 	In Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199
(2007), the Supreme Court explained that “to properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners
must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural
rules.” 	Id. at 218 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 	The Jones Court stated that
the “level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary
from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA,
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that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” 	Id. 	Finally, in the Eighth Circuit, exhaustion
is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has the burden of pleading and proving the failure to
exhaust. 	See Nerness v. Johnson, 401 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir.2005).
The parties here do not dispute the HCDC has a grievance procedure, and Plaintiff used
this grievance procedure throughout his incarceration at the HCDC. 	Defendants produced the
written HCDC grievance procedure which reads:
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(ECF No. 13-4, pp. 1-2) (hereinafter “Grievance Procedure”). 	However, neither party disputes
the fact that the HCDC has a custom of accepting electronically submitted grievances, despite this
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written procedure, and this is the method by which Plaintiff submitted his grievances and inmate
requests at issue here. 	(ECF Nos. 12; 13-3; 15).
First, Defendant Tallant argues Plaintiff failed to appeal his grievances, thus failing to
exhaust the HCDC Grievance Procedure. 	(ECF No. 12). 	In order to satisfy the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement, a prisoner must pursue the grievance procedure process to its final stage.
See Hammett v. Cofield, 681 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir. 2012); see also King v. Iowa Dep’t of Corrs.,
598 F.3d 1051, 1053 (8th Cir. 2010).
The HCDC Grievance Procedure clearly gives an avenue for appeals to the Sheriff.
However, the language of the HCDC Grievance Procedure indicates the appeal is optional as it
states Plaintiff “may” appeal not that he “shall” appeal. 	(ECF No. 13-4). 	Plaintiff raises this
point in his Response. 	(ECF No. 15, p. 9). 	There is no indication in the HCDC Grievance
Procedure submitted by Defendant that an appeal is necessary to complete, or exhaust said
procedure. 	Id. 	Accordingly, the Court finds genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
HCDC Grievance Procedure requires an appeal to the Sheriff in order to exhaust.
Next, Defendant Tallant argues none of Plaintiff’s requests or grievances are directed
specifically at Defendant Tallant or mention the specific facts of which he complins in his
Complaint. 	Therefore, they do not satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement. 	(ECF No. 12).
Defendant Tallant relies on an Eastern District of Arkansas case, Jackson v. Ryals, No. 4:17-CV-
00769-BRW/JTR, 2019 WL 923748, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 31, 2019), in support of this contention.
The Court is unconvinced by Jackson. 	In that case the Plaintiff admitted he wholly failed to
submit any relevant grievances and claimed the jail’s grievance procedure was unavailable to him.
Id. 	The facts of Jackson are not analogous to the facts presented here.
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Instead, the Court notes the HCDC Grievance Procedure submitted by Defendant Tallant
does not require Plaintiff specifically direct his grievance or request to the party he later sues.
(ECF No. 13-4). 	Nor does it require Plaintiff list the interested parties by name on the grievance.
Id. 	The only requirements, as to the form of the grievance, listed in the HCDC Grievance
Procedure is that it be “written,” “signed by the inmate,” and on the “appropriate grievance form.”
Id. 	Defendant Tallant did not attach an example “grievance form” so the Court has no information
as to what information such form may require. 	Furthermore, the HCDC accepted Plaintiff’s
electronically submitted grievances and requests even though the Grievance Procedure clearly
requires a written grievance, signed by the Plaintiff, and on the approved form. 	(ECF No. 13-3).
As stated above, it is the jail’s requirements in their grievance procedure that establishes
the level of detail necessary to satisfy PLRA exhaustion. 	Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 218. 	There
is no indication on this record, that the HCDC Grievance Procedure requires the level of detail
argued by Defendant Tallant. 	Moreover, based on this record it is very unclear what the HCDC’s
grievance procedure actually requires. 	The written Grievance Procedure states one set of
requirements, but the custom is clearly to accept grievances that do not comply with the written
procedure, i.e. the electronically submitted unsigned grievances. 	Defendant fails to offer any
explanation as to the custom of accepting electronic grievances in the place of written and signed
grievances on the approved grievance form as required by the HCDC Grievance Procedure
submitted on this record. 	Furthermore, there is no explanation on the record of what is required
regarding the electronically submitted grievances.
Finally, the Court notes, while there are electronically submitted “grievances” on the record
regarding issues Plaintiff did not include in his Complaint, Plaintiff did not electronically submit
any “grievances” regarding his denial of medical and mental health care. 	Plaintiff argues;
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however, his electronically submitted inmate requests and complaints satisfy the HCDC grievance
procedure. 	(ECF No. 15). 	Plaintiff filed multiple inmate requests on this issue—June 19, 2023;
June 26, 2023; June 27, 2023; and October 2, 2023—in which he complains about not receiving a
mental health appointment and medication for his anger problems. 	(ECF No. 13-3, pp. 1, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12). 	Again, it is the HCDC procedures which defines the requirements of proper
exhaustion here. 	Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 218. 	As stated above, it is unclear, based on the
present record, what is actually required and accepted by the HCDC grievance procedures.
Further confounding the issue is Defendant Tallant’s arguments regarding Plaintiff’s
failure to appeal his grievances or failure to specifically name Defendant Tallant in his grievances
when there is no document titled “grievance” in the record regarding Plaintiff’s mental health care
claim or related conditions of confinement claim.0F
1 	These arguments seem to indicate Defendant
Tallant considers Plaintiff’s inmate requests as grievances under the customs of the HCDC
grievance procedure.
Accordingly, the Court finds genuine issue of material fact exist, based on the current
record, as to whether Plaintiff adequately exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to the
PLRA regarding his denial of mental and medical care and conditions of confinement claims.1F
2
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is recommended Defendant Tallant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
1 The Court notes Plaintiff filed multiple electronically submitted grievances regarding the issue
of housing him with known enemies, however, this issue is not alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
(ECF Nos. 1; 13-3, pp. 2,3,5).
2 The Court construes Plaintiff’s condition of confinement claim to be one related to the unsafe
environment created by his untreated anger issues. 	A fact and claim he raises in both his
Complaint and his inmate requests related to his mental health care requests. 	(ECF Nos. 1, 13-3,
p. 13-3, p.11).
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on the limited issue of exhaustion (ECF No. 11) should be DENIED.
REFERRAL STATUS: This case should remain referred.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
DATED this 22nd day of November 2024.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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