Ray v. (Last Name Unknown)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
RONNIE LYNN RAY, JR. 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 2:25-cv-02026-TLB-MEF
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MOLLY (Last Name Unknown)
(Logan County Detention Center) 	DEFENDANT
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was directly assigned
to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to General Order 2024-02, but not all parties to the
action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Accordingly,
for the purpose of preservice review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the case will automatically
be reassigned to United States District Judge Timothy L. Brooks and referred to the undersigned
for a report and recommendation pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3).
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 13, 2025. (ECF No. 1). He is currently incarcerated
in the Logan County Detention Center and identifies himself as a pretrial detainee. (Id. at 1-2).
He alleges his federal constitutional rights were violated by Defendant Officer Molly on March 1,
2025. Specifically, he alleges Officer Molly came into the pod and inquired as to the ownership
of a tray (presumably a food tray). (Id. at 4). Plaintiff replied that it was his and said, “sorry.”
(Id.). Officer Molly told him to come to the door and hold out his hand. (Id.). Plaintiff did so,
and she slapped his hand and poked him in the stomach. (Id.). She told him that the next time she
would use a metal spoon. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that her actions “left [a] red mark.” (Id. at 5).
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Plaintiff did not specify the location of the red mark, but the Court will infer that it was on his
hand. Plaintiff characterizes this claim as one for “excessive force, threatening.” (Id. at 4).
Plaintiff proceeds against Officer Molly in both her official and individual capacities. (Id.).
He seeks compensatory, punitive and other damages. (Id. at 9). As his non-monetary damages,
he seeks an injunction to prevent Office Molly from acting in the same manner in the future. (Id.).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under § 1915A, the Court is obliged to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or
it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to
vindicate a cognizable right. 	Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987); In re
Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is
discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe
the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal
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framework.” 	Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). 	However, the complaint must still allege
specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiff fails to state a plausible constitutional claim based on his allegation that Officer
Molly slapped his hand, poked his stomach, and “threatened” him after he failed to obey facility
rules.
As a pretrial detainee, this Court analyzes Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Stearns v. Inmate Services Corporation,
957 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 525 n.16 (1979)). In
articulating the standard governing pretrial detainees’ claims related to conditions of confinement,
the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) held that the government may detain
defendants prior to trial and “may subject them to the restrictions and conditions of a detention
facility so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise
violate the Constitution.” Id. at 536-37. There are two ways to determine whether conditions of
confinement rise to the level of punishment. First, “a plaintiff could show that the conditions were
intentionally punitive.” Id. at 538. Alternatively, “if there is no expressly demonstrated intent to
punish, the plaintiff could also show that the conditions were not reasonably related to a legitimate
government purpose or were excessive in relation to that purpose.” Stearns, 957 F.3d at 907
(quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39).
“[N]ot every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts to punishment in the
constitutional sense.” Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996). “There is a de minimis
level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned.” 	Id. 	The Eighth Circuit has
made it clear that “a de minimis quantum of force is not actionable under the Due Process Clause.”
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Jackson v. Buckman, 756 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n. 21).
For example, in Jackson, a nurse hit a pretrial detainee’s nose incident to administering medical
treatment. The detainee characterized this as a “karate hit.” Jackson, 756 F.3d at 1067-68. The
Eighth Circuit held this was a de minimis use of force not actionable under the Due Process Clause
because Plaintiff never saw medical staff for his nose, his nose did not bleed, and the blow did not
“leave a bruise, a cut, or even a scratch.” 	(Id.). 	In short, there was “no objectively verifiable
injury.” (Id.). See also, Hutchison v. Smith, No. 420CV00779LPRJJV, 2022 WL 4089457, at *3
(E.D. Ark. June 16, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:20-CV-779-LPR, 2022 WL
4087644 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 6, 2022) (guard who threw a shirt into the face of a sleeping pretrial
detainee after finding that shirt covering the cell light in violation of facility rules, “while offensive
and probably unwarranted,” was not sufficiently severe to sustain a constitutional violation.).
Here, Plaintiff suffered no objectively verifiable injury from the alleged hand slap and
finger poke other than a “red mark” on his hand, for which he did not seek medical care. At the
absolute most, he suffered a de minimis injury which did not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. 	Further, Plaintiff’s allegations indicate he was acting in violation of facility rules
concerning the food tray left in the pod. Officer Molly’s actions were taken for the legitimate non-
punitive purpose of maintaining order and discipline in the facility and were, therefore, objectively
reasonable. Perhaps Plaintiff believes he is exempt from any form of inmate disciplinary action
because he is a pretrial detainee. Such a belief would be misplaced. “[T]here exists no basis in the
Due Process Clause or elsewhere in the Constitution for requiring that discipline not be imposed
upon a pretrial detainee for violations of institutional discipline ….” Swearengin v. Chamberlain,
No. 4:22-CV-403 SRW, 2022 WL 16527241, at *13 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2022) (quoting Smith, 892
F. Supp. at 1233). 	Only when a condition or restriction of pretrial confinement is “arbitrary or
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purposeless” is the action a punishment that violates Due Process if inflicted upon pretrial
detainees. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.
Nor does Plaintiff’s allegation that Officer Molly threatened to use a metal spoon to slap
his hand next time state a plausible constitutional claim. 	In general, “[v]erbal threats do not
constitute a constitutional violation.” 	Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1339 (8th Cir.
1985). Similarly, taunts, name calling, and the use of offensive language does not state a claim of
constitutional dimension. McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (inmate’s claims
of general harassment and of verbal harassment were not actionable under § 1983); see also Doe
v. Gooden, 214 F.3d 952, 955 (8th Cir. 2000) (abusive language or verbal harassment is not, by
itself, unconstitutional and will not support a civil rights cause of action). 	It appears to the
undersigned that Plaintiff has taken a light moment of teasing about the tray much too seriously.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that: (1) the case be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (2)
Plaintiff/Petitioner is warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted as a strike for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and, thus, the Clerk is directed to place a § 1915(g) strike flag on
the case for future judicial consideration; and (3) the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith.
Referral Status: This case should not remain referred because all matters have been
recommended for dismissal in this Report and Recommendation.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
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reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 31st day of March 2025.
/s/
Mark E. Ford
HON. MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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