Stafford v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION
CANDACE A. STAFFORD 	PLAINTIFF
vs. 	Civil No. 1:24-cv-01026
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 	DEFENDANT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Candace A. Stafford (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the
Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her
application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3) (2009), the Honorable Susan O.
Hickey referred this case to this Court for the purpose of making a report and recommendation. In
accordance with that referral, and after reviewing the arguments in this case, this Court recommends
Plaintiff’s case be AFFIRMED.
1. 	Background:
Plaintiff filed her disability application on September 7, 2021. (Tr. 17).0F
1 In her application,
Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to diabetes mellitus type 2, rheumatoid arthritis, hypertension,
gastroesophageal 	reflux 	disorder, 	major 	depressive 	disorder, 	spinal 	stenosis, 	mitral 	valve
regurgitation, and microscopic colitis. (Tr. 186). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of February 1, 2017,
1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___.” The
transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.” and refer to the document
filed at ECF No. 5. 	These references are to the page number of the transcript itself not the ECF
page number.
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which was amended to October 7, 2019. (Tr. 17). Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and
again upon reconsideration. Id.
Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her denied application, and this hearing
request was granted. (Tr. 97-154). This hearing was held on May 16, 2023. (Tr. 32-63). At this
hearing, Plaintiff was present, and represented by Andrew Youngman. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational
Expert (“VE”) Donald Rue testified at the hearings. Id.
The ALJ entered an unfavorable decision on August 8, 2023. (Tr. 17-26). In this decision,
the ALJ determined Plaintiff last met the insured status of the Act on March 31, 2022. 	(Tr. 20,
Finding 1). 	The ALJ also determined Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
(“SGA”) from October 7, 2019, through March 31, 2022. (Tr. 20, Finding 2).
The ALJ then determined Plaintiff had severe impairments of type II diabetes mellitus,
degenerative disc disease, rheumatoid arthritis, osteoarthritis, and obesity. 	(Tr. 20, Finding 3).
Despite being severe, the ALJ determined those impairments did not meet or medically equal the
requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1
(“Listings”). (Tr. 22, Finding 4).
The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her RFC. (Tr. 22-25,
Finding 5). The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found the claimed limitations
were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. Id. The
ALJ also determined Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform the full range of light work. Id.
The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 26, Finding 6). The
ALJ determined Plaintiff was capable of performing her PRW as a dental assistant and vocational
training instructor. Id. Based upon this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been disabled
under the Act from October 7, 2019, through March 31, 2022. (Tr. 26, Finding 7).
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On April 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. Both Parties have filed
appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 7, 9. The Plaintiff also field a reply brief. ECF No. 10. This case is now
ready for decision.
2. 	Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, the Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
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his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his or
her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3. 	Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability decision is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. ECF No. 9. In making this claim, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred
in the evaluation of her subjective allegations in the assessment of her RFC. Id.
Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is required
to determine a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). This RFC determination must
be based on medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. See
Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2004). The ALJ should consider “‘all the evidence
in the record’ in determining the RFC, including ‘the medical records, observations of treating
physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of his limitations.’” Stormo v. Barnhart,
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377 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019 (8th Cir. 2002)).
The Plaintiff has the burden of producing documents and evidence to support his or her claimed
RFC. 	See Cox, 160 F.3d at1206; 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). 	The mere fact a
claimant has a long list of medical conditions does not demonstrate that person is disabled; instead,
the RFC determination is a function-by-function analysis. See SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 (July
2, 1996). 	“The RFC assessment considers only functional limitations and restrictions that result
from an individual’s medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, including
the impact of any related symptoms.” Id.
The ALJ, however, bears the primary responsibility for making the RFC determination and
for ensuring there is “some medical evidence” regarding the claimant’s “ability to function in the
workplace” that supports the RFC determination. Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 703-04 (8th Cir.
2001). 	Furthermore, this Court is required to affirm the ALJ’s RFC determination if that
determination is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See McKinney v. Apfel,
228 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in evaluating her subjective allegations of disability. ECF No.
9. In assessing the subjective allegations of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply
the five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529
and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.1F
2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider
are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the
2 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis
of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for
relief of your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your
pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping
on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required
the analysis of these additional factors. 	See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this
Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.
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pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. 	See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective allegations
of pain. 	See id. 	The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor if the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective allegations.
See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). 	If the ALJ properly applies these five
factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective allegations are not
entirely valid, the ALJ’s determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d
902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). 	The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s subjective allegations
“solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective
complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
“The ALJ may disbelieve subjective complaints if there are inconsistencies in the evidence
as a whole.” McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 614 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). A court will
“defer to the ALJ’s credibility finding if the ALJ ‘explicitly discredits a claimant’s testimony and
gives a good reason for doing so.’” Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 558.
In the present action, the ALJ fully complied with Polaski in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s
subjective allegations. 	(Tr. 22-25). 	Indeed, the ALJ opinion outlined Plaintiff’s subjective
allegations and noted inconsistencies between those allegations and the record. Id. The ALJ also
noted her daily activities and set forth reasons for finding them not as limiting as described by
Plaintiff. Id. Furthermore, the ALJ carefully summarized Plaintiff’s medical records and noted how
she was receiving treatment and medication for her impairments that appeared to be effective. Id.
Based upon the Court’s review, there is no basis for reversal on this issue. 	See, e.g.,
Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005) (recognizing an ALJ may discount a
“claimant’s subjective complaints . . . if there are inconsistencies in the record as a whole”). The
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ALJ made no legal error in weighing Plaintiff’s subjective allegations of her functional limitations
and formulated an RFC at Step Four that is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
4. 	Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
to Plaintiff, is supported by substantial evidence and recommends it be AFFIRMED.
The Parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The Parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990).
ENTERED this 7th day of April 2025.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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