Fargis, Jr v. Mitcham

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION
JOHN ALVIN FARGIS, JR., 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 1:23-CV-01016-SOH-SGS
CAPTAIN RICHARD MITCHAM, Jail Administrator,
Union County Detention Center (UCDC) 	DEFENDANT.
MAGISTRATE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff John Alvin Fargis, Jr., commenced the above-captioned civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, generally alleging that Defendant Captain Richard Mitcham
retaliated against him, failed to provide him with constitutionally adequate medical care, and
detained him for 81 days in violation of his constitutional rights when he was in the custody of the
Union County Detention Center (“UCDC”) from August through November 2021, and from
March through June 2022.1 	(ECF No. 14). 	Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis
(“IFP”). 	See (ECF No. 6). 	Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the
Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States District Court Judge, referred this case to the
undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation on Defendant Mitcham’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 58). 	Plaintiff has filed a response. 	(ECF No. 65).
Defendant Mitcham has not filed a reply and his opportunity to do so has passed. 	This Motion is
therefore now ripe for the Court’s consideration. 	For the reasons outlined below, this Court
recommends that Defendant Mitcham’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 58), be
1 	The court docket reflects that Plaintiff has been in-and-out of custody throughout the pendency
of these proceedings; his most recent change of address reflects that he is currently not
incarcerated. 	(ECF No. 66).
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GRANTED, and that this matter therefore be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts three claims for relief against Defendant Mitcham
stemming from his incarceration at the UCDC from August to November 2021 and from March
through June 2022. 	See Amend. Compl. (ECF No. 14). 	During these time periods, Plaintiff says
he was both a pretrial detainee and a convicted prisoner. 	Id. 	First, Plaintiff says that in
September he asked Defendant Mitcham to move him to a different housing location because
threats were being made against him. 	Defendant Mitcham placed him in B-6, but when Defendant
Mitcham moved Danny Sapps out of B-5 and into general population, Plaintiff asked Defendant
Mitcham to move him to general population, as well. 	Amend. Compl. at 3. 	Plaintiff asserts that
in response, Defendant Mitcham told him that he was going to keep Plaintiff in lockdown because
Plaintiff’s sister was calling complaining about Plaintiff not receiving adequate medical care for
his broken jaw. 	Id. 	Plaintiff then “got mad” and “cussed him out,” prompting Defendant
Mitcham to retaliate by allowing inmate Wesley Jackson, an inmate who had tested positive for
COVID-19, out of his cell immediately before letting Plaintiff out of his cell, thereby intentionally
exposing him to COVID-19. 	Id. 	Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff also tested positive for COVID-19.
Id.
Second, 	Plaintiff 	contends 	that 	Defendant 	Mitcham 	failed 	to 	provide 	him 	with
constitutionally adequate medical care for an injury to his jaw that he sustained when he slipped
and fell in the bathroom. 	Id. at 4. 	Finally, Plaintiff says that he was incarcerated for 81 days in
2 This section does not endeavor to describe every docket entry, only those relevant to the Court’s
consideration of the pending motion for summary judgment.
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2022, because Defendant Mitcham failed to apply the proper jail credit to his sentence. 	Plaintiff
claims that the state trial court judge told him it was a “clerical error” and released him in June
2022. 	Id. 	Plaintiff names Captain Mitcham as a defendant in his individual and official
capacities and requests compensatory and punitive damages. 	Id. at 5.
The parties have conducted discovery on these claims, and Defendant Mitcham has filed
the Motion for Summary Judgment presently before the Court. 	See (ECF No. 58-56). 	Defendant
Mitcham contends that there is no dispute of material fact that would preclude summary judgment
in this case. 	See (ECF No. 59). 	Moreover, he claims that Plaintiff is no longer pursuing claim
two related to Defendant Mitcham’s alleged failure to provide him with constitutionally adequate
medical care for his jaw injury. 	Id. 	In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Mitcham knew
that Wesley Jackson had been diagnosed with COVID-19 when he let him out of his cell and that
Defendant Mitcham let him out of his cell immediately after Mr. Jackson because he wanted him
to contract COVID-19 and, in fact, he was diagnosed with COVID-19 shortly thereafter. 	(ECF
No. 65).3
3 Plaintiff’s response also requests appointment of counsel because he lost his legal paperwork
following his most recent arrest. 	(See Resp. (ECF No. 65)). 	Plaintiff says that a lawyer would
help him obtain copies of his paperwork from defense counsel. 	This Court is not convinced.
First, Plaintiff does not explain why he could not request these copies from defense counsel
directly. 	Second, and more to the point, the documentation Plaintiff requests is already a part of
the summary judgment record. 	For example, Plaintiff’s response discusses a statement Defendant
Mitcham evidently made during discovery saying that he did not intentionally expose Plaintiff to
COVID-19, documentation that Wesley Jackson had been quarantined, Plaintiff’s COVID-19 test
results, and Plaintiff’s medical records related to his jaw injury. 	Id. 	Defendant Mitcham
included this documentation in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment. 	See (ECF No. 60-
7) (Defendant Mitcham’s affidavit); (ECF No. 60-6) (Wesley Jackson’s movement log); (ECF No.
60-5) (Plaintiff’s medical records, including his COVID-19 test results). 	This Court, therefore,
finds no grounds to appoint Plaintiff counsel for Plaintiff to obtain documentation that has already
been submitted for the Court’s consideration, nor does the Court find any basis to continue this
matter so that Plaintiff can obtain additional copies of this information on his own.
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LEGAL STANDARD
The Court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). 	“A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for either party.” 	Ward v. Olson, 939 F. Supp. 2d 956, 961 (D. Minn. 2013)
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). 	A fact is material only when
its resolution would affect the outcome of a case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Further, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying “those portions of the
record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 	Jackson v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 643 F.3d 1081, 1085 (8th Cir. 2001). 	In response, the nonmoving party
“may not rest upon mere denials or allegations, but must instead set forth specific facts sufficient
to raise a genuine issue for trial.” 	Forrest v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 285 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2002).
In considering a summary judgment motion, the court views all the evidence and inferences in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 	Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
FACTS
In July 2021, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Union County Detention Center (“UCDC”)
on a warrant for non-payment of fines and for possession of narcotics.4 	(Dep. at 27 (ECF No. 60-
4 Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is neither sworn under
penalty of perjury, nor notarized. 	See (ECF No. 65). 	This Court, therefore, considers Plaintiff’s
response as argument, not evidence. 	But “[a] plaintiff’s verified complaint is the equivalent of an
affidavit for the purposes of summary judgment, and a complaint signed and dated as true under
penalty of perjury satisfies the requirements of a verified complaint.” Roberson v. Hayti Police
Dept., 241 F.3d 992, 994-95 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 	Plaintiff
signed the Amended Complaint under penalty of perjury. 	(ECF No. 14). 	Accordingly, this Court
treats the Amended Complaint as an affidavit for summary judgment purposes. 	Roberson, 241
F.3d at 995.
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1)). 	On September 13, 2021, Plaintiff asked Defendant Mitcham to move him out of general
population because he feared for his safety. 	(ECF No. 60-6 at 2); see also (Dep. at 33 (ECF No.
60-1)). 	According to Plaintiff, a group of inmates associated with his ex-wife’s daughter
suspected that he had something to do with his ex-wife’s death. 	(Dep. at 33). 	Plaintiff believed
that they would assault him if given the opportunity. 	(Id.) 	Defendant Mitcham granted
Plaintiff’s request and moved him to B-Pod, which is restrictive housing. 	(Aff. Mitcham ¶ 6 (ECF
No. 60-7)); see also (ECF No. 60-6 at 2).
On September 17, 2021, Plaintiff fell in the shower, injuring his jaw. (ECF No. 60-5 at 2).
After the fall, medical personnel examined his jaw, observed that he could move his mouth to talk
without issue, did not observe any redness or bruising, and advised him to follow up if he continued
to experience pain. 	(ECF No. 60-5, p. 2). 	Plaintiff, dissatisfied with these recommendations,
filed multiple grievances regarding his care, specifically requesting an x-ray. 	(ECF No. 60-5 at
7-8, 13-14). 	While he was seen by medical personnel at least two more times for his jaw pain,
(ECF No. 60-5 at 3-6, 7, 9-12), he did not receive an x-ray, as requested.5
At some later point, Plaintiff again requested to move housing units. 	(Dep. at 38 (ECF
No. 60-1)). 	Defendant Mitcham denied this request, citing the safety concerns that Plaintiff (and
Plaintiff’s sister) had expressed. 	(Id.); (Aff. ¶ 5 (ECF No. 60-7)). 	Plaintiff did not take the news
5 Defendant submitted sixteen pages of Plaintiff’s medical records in support of his Motion for
Summary Judgment. 	(ECF No. 60-5). 	These records have not been authenticated. 	See Fed. R.
Evid. 901. 	Furthermore, while Plaintiff’s statements in these records may qualify as nonhearsay,
see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d), Defendant offers no basis for the Court to consider any other statements
contained in these documents as substantive evidence. 	That said, Plaintiff does not challenge the
admissibility of these documents, or the statements contained therein, and he does not dispute any
of the facts related to his medical care. 	See (ECF No. 65). 	The Court, therefore, deems these
facts undisputed for the purposes of Defendant Mitcham’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
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well: Plaintiff swore at Defendant Mitcham, called him vulgar names, and threatened him. 	See
(Dep. at 39-42). 	The parties dispute what happened next. Plaintiff says that Defendant Mitcham
retaliated against him for calling him names by intentionally exposing him to COVID-19. 	(Id.)
at 49. 	According to Plaintiff, he was housed in the same unit as Wesley Jackson, who had tested
positive for COVID-19; Defendant Mitcham, knowing that Wesley Jackson had been diagnosed
with COVID-19, allowed Mr. Jackson out of his cell for two hours, put him back in his cell, and
then let Plaintiff out of his cell for two hours without first cleaning the common areas, causing him
to also contract COVID-19. 	(Id.) 	Defendant Mitcham, by contrast, asserts that he never placed
an inmate, namely Wesley Jackson, in a cell with Plaintiff who was positive for COVID-19 and
that he never placed another inmate in the same pod as Plaintiff with the intention of exposing
Plaintiff to COVID-19. 	(Aff. ¶ 7 (ECF No. 60-7)). 	Records show that Plaintiff tested negative
for COVID-19 on October 9, 2021, (ECF No. 60-5 at 15), but tested positive on October 15, 2021,
(ECF No. 60-5 at 16). 	While these records have not been authenticated and Defendant has offered
no basis for the Court to consider the hearsay contained in these documents as substantive
evidence, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff tested positive for COVID-19 sometime after he
shared the same housing pod as Mr. Wesley. 	The inmate tracking report from the Union County
Sheriff on Wesley Jackson shows that he was placed in B5 on October 4, 2021, and then transferred
to “1” on October 8, 2021, four days later. 	See (ECF No. 60-6). 	Plaintiff does not dispute these
facts, either.
Publicly accessible state court records show that on November 2, 2021,6 Plaintiff pleaded
6 The court “may take judicial notice of judicial opinions and public records.” 	Stutzka v.
McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005).
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guilty to possession of controlled substances, a felony, and was sentenced to probation for 60
months. 	(ECF No. 60-4 at 1); see also State of Arkansas v. Fargis, Case No. 70CR-2021-546-1
(Ark. Cir. Crt.) (ARCourts), available at https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad (last accessed Nov. 24,
2025).7 	A petition to revoke his probation was filed on April 11, 2022, alleging that he committed
new crimes (failure to appear and possession of controlled substances) and that he failed to pay
$3,345 in court costs/fines in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation. 	See (ECF
No. 60-3); see also Fargis, Case No. 70CR-2021-546-1 (Rev. Pet.) (filed April 11, 2022). 	The
petition to revoke was dismissed on June 2, 2022. Id.
State court records also show that on March 10, 2022, police stopped Plaintiff and
ultimately arrested him on a warrant for “failure to appear/enforcement of fines.” See State of
Arkansas v. John Fargis, Jr., Case No. 70CR-22-163 (Ark. Cir. Crt.) (ARCourts), available at
https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad/case/70CR-22-163 (last accessed Nov. 24, 2025). 	Following a
search incident to arrest, he was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession
of drug paraphernalia, both felonies. 	Id. 	His first appearance on those charges was held the very
next day, and the circuit court set bond. 	Id. 	Those charges were dismissed on June 2, 2022. 	Id.
Plaintiff challenges the validity of the warrant for failure to pay fines. (Dep. at 103-04 (ECF
No. 60-1)). 	He says that the circuit court judge told him that “it”—presumably the warrant—was
a “clerical error,” and when he was discharged from treatment, the clerk gave him a receipt
showing that his fines had been paid in full. 	Id.
7 Circuit Court Judge Hamilton Singleton—no relation to the undersigned—signed the sentencing
order. 	See (ECF No. 60-4 at 2).
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ANALYSIS
As noted above, Plaintiff asserts three claims 	for relief under 42 	U.S.C. § 1983:
(1) Defendant Mitcham retaliated against him by intentionally exposing him to COVID-19;
(2) Defendant Mitcham failed to provide him with constitutionally adequate medical care for his
broken jaw; and (3) Defendant Mitcham failed to give him “jail credit” towards the payment of his
court costs and fines, resulting in the issuance of a warrant for his arrest for failure to pay fines.
See (ECF No. 14). 	He identifies Defendant Mitcham in his personal and official capacities. 	Id.
In response, Defendant Mitcham contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to
the individual capacity claims and that he is entitled to summary judgment with respect to the
official capacity claims, as well. 	(ECF No. 59). 	This Court agrees.
I. 	Individual Capacity Claims
Starting with the individual capacity claims, in determining whether Defendant Mitcham
is entitled to qualified immunity, the court considers two questions: “(1) whether the facts shown
by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional . . . right, and (2) whether that right was
clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” 	Brown v. City of Golden
Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009). 	The court may consider these questions in any order.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 	But a plaintiff can defeat a claim of qualified
immunity only if the answer to both questions is yes. 	Id. 	Plaintiff’s claims do not pass the first
question: the summary judgment record establishes no violation of his constitutional rights.
Defendant Mitcham is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
A. 	Retaliation
To establish a claim for First Amendment retaliation, Plaintiff must prove: “(1) he engaged
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in a protected activity, (2) [Defendant Mitcham] took adverse action against him that would chill
a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was
motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity.” 	Spencer v. Jackson Cty., 738
F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2013).
As a threshold matter, the alleged act of retaliation was Defendant Mitcham intentionally
exposing Plaintiff to COVID-19 after Plaintiff called him names. See (Amend. Compl. at 4 (ECF
No. 14)); (Dep. at 40 (ECF No. 60-1)). 	The summary judgment record shows that Plaintiff made
the following statements to (and about) Defendant Mitcham following the news that he would not
be transferred back to general population:
“Mrs. Bitch-ass faggot-boy coward-ass Mitcham. I love it in lockdown. Why do
you keep thinking keep pissing you off, you stupid-ass bitch.”
(Dep. at 37-38).
“You better be glad I love the Lord, or you would be one dead son of a bitch…the
minute I got free, you coward-ass bitch. 	Only a fucking coward would do the shit
you’re doing or a fucking faggot or both, you bitch.”
(Id. at 39).
“Misses Richard faggot-ass Mitcham, just to inform you, I’m pleading not guilty to
my case . . . And you are going to be stuck with me a while you coward-ass bitch.”
(Id.)
Plaintiff admits he made these statements and asserts that Defendant Mitcham developed
the motive to intentionally expose him to COVID-19 after Plaintiff told Defendant Mitcham that
he (Defendant Mitcham) could not charge him with the criminal offense of threatening an officer
because he had prefaced his threatening comment with: “[i]f I didn’t love the good Lord, and [he]
love[s] the good Lord.” (Dep. at 39-40 (ECF No. 60-1)). 	In other words, in Plaintiff’s view, it
was not a “true threat” because he “loves the good Lord.” 	The Court assumes, without conceding,
that these statements—albeit profane—qualify as protected speech under the First Amendment.
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See Thurairajah v. City of Ft. Smith, Ark., 925 F.3d 979, 985 (8th Cir. 2019) (discussing that
criticism of police officers, even with profanity, is protected speech absent limited exceptions)
(listing cases).
With respect to the second element, Plaintiff alleges that the “adverse action” that
Defendant Mitcham took against him was intentionally exposing him to COVID-19. 	Defendant
Mitcham submitted an affidavit asserting that he did not place an inmate in a cell with Plaintiff
who was positive for COVID and that he did not “place another inmate in the same pod as
[Plaintiff] with any intent that [Plaintiff] would be exposed to or contract COVID-19.” (Aff. ¶ 7
(ECF No. 60-7)). 	Plaintiff says that Defendant Mitcham is lying. 	See (ECF No. 65). 	In
Plaintiff’s view, Defendant Mitcham allowed Wesley Jackson, an inmate with COVID-19, out of
his cell immediately prior to allowing Plaintiff out of his cell—an assertion Defendant Mitcham
does not dispute—thereby intentionally exposing him to COVID-19. 	(ECF No. 14). 	But a court
deciding 	a 	summary 	judgment 	motion 	“does 	not 	weigh 	evidence 	nor 	make 	credibility
determinations.” Harrington v. Wilber, 670 F.Supp.2d 958, 963 (S.D. Iowa 2009). 	Rather, the
court considers whether there are any disputed facts and, if so whether those issues are genuine
and material. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
Turning to those facts, the following are undisputed: Defendant Mitcham followed State
and Federal guidelines during the COVID-19 pandemic to the best of his ability as a Union County
employee and the jail administrator; (Aff. ¶ 11 (ECF No. 60-7)); Plaintiff was housed alone,
without a cellmate; inmates in Plaintiff’s housing unit were allowed out of their cells on “rotation,”
(Dep. at 94 (ECF No. 60-1)); Plaintiff was the last inmate to be allowed out on this “rotation,” id.;
Wesley Jackson was allowed out of his cell immediately prior to Plaintiff; Wesley Jackson had
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COVID-19 at the time, (ECF No. 14); and Plaintiff tested positive for COVID-19 about a week
later. 	Considering these facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the record
shows that Defendant Mitcham allowed inmates out of their respective cells according to their
place in the “rotation” while following all State and Federal COVID-19 guidelines. 	These facts
establish that Defendant Mitcham allowed Plaintiff out of his cell after Wesley Jackson because
he was “next in the rotation”—not because he was taking adverse action against Plaintiff because
Plaintiff swore at him. 	Put differently, the undisputed facts show that Defendant Mitcham did not
take an adverse action against Plaintiff after he swore at him and called him vulgar names, he
simply allowed the inmates out of their cells in accordance with the established rotation.
In any event, the undisputed material facts establish that Defendant Mitcham’s alleged
retaliatory motive was not the “but for” cause of Plaintiff’s COVID-19 diagnosis. It is undisputed
that Mr. Jackson did not share the same cell as Plaintiff and that they did not share the common
areas together at the same time. 	See (Dep. at 91-94). 	Plaintiff asserts no facts suggesting that he
would not ordinarily have been let out of his cell immediately after Mr. Jackson but for Defendant
Mitcham’s retaliatory intent—by contrast, Plaintiff suggests that he was let out of his cell after Mr.
Jackson as a matter of course because Plaintiff was next (and last) in the “rotation.” (Dep. at 94).
Put differently, Plaintiff asserts no facts suggesting that on that day, the inmates were let out of their
respective cells “out of order” or that ordinarily he would have been let out of his cell before Mr.
Jackson but for Defendant Mitcham’s intent to retaliate against him. 	Notably, moreover, the
undisputed summary judgment record shows that Mr. Jackson was transferred to quarantine on
October 8, 2021, (ECF No. 60-6), and that Plaintiff tested negative for COVID-19 on October 9,
2021, (ECF No. 60-5). 	Indeed, Plaintiff did not test positive for COVID-19 until October 16, 2021,
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a week later. 	(ECF No. 60-5). 	Plaintiff assumes he would not have been exposed to COVID-19
but for Defendant Mitcham’s decision to allow him out of his cell after Mr. Jackson was allowed
time out of his cell, (Dep. at 100 (ECF No. 60-1)), but he presents no facts establishing, for example,
that he could not have contracted COVID-19 from someone else. 	Defendant Mitcham, therefore,
should be entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim (claim one).
One final matter requires some discussion: 	In Plaintiff’s deposition, the parties discuss
Defendant Mitcham’s motivations for denying Plaintiff’s request to be transferred back to general
population—Plaintiff says that Defendant Mitcham did not grant his request because he and his
sister were complaining about the quality of medical care he was receiving for his injured jaw but
then seemingly agrees that it was for his own safety, i.e. to protect his jaw from further injury. 	See
(Dep. at 7-8, 35-37 (ECF No. 60-1)). 	The Amended Complaint does not specifically identify a
retaliation claim against Defendant Mitcham for denying Plaintiff’s request to be transferred back
to general population. 	See (ECF No. 14). 	The Court nevertheless addresses whether a material
fact dispute precludes summary judgment on such a claim because both parties discuss it in
summary judgment record.
Generally, “prison officials may transfer a prisoner for whatever reason or for no reason at
all.” 	Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238,
250 (1983)). 	But “a prisoner cannot be transferred in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional
right.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff (and his sister) engaged in a protected activity when he filed grievances about
the medical care he was receiving for his jaw. 	See Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir.
2007) (“The filing of a prison grievance, like the filing of an inmate lawsuit, is protected First
Amendment activity.”). 	But there are no facts—disputed or otherwise—establishing that
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Defendant Mitcham would have transferred him back to general population but for Plaintiff’s
grievances about his medical care. 	Goff, 7 F.3d at 738 (explaining that “the burden is on the
prisoner to prove that but for an unconstitutional, retaliatory motive the transfer would not have
occurred”). 	By contrast, as noted above, Plaintiff seemingly admits that Defendant Mitcham did
not transfer him back to general population for his own safety. (Dep. at 35-37 (ECF No. 60-1)).
Defendant Mitcham, therefore, should be entitled to summary judgment on this retaliation claim,
as well.
B. 	Medical Care (Claim Two)
The Court applies the Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference” standard to Plaintiff’s
medical care claim regardless of whether he was a convicted prisoner serving a sentence or a
pretrial detainee at the time of the events giving rise to his claim. 	Jackson v. Buckman, 756 F.3d
1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 2014). 	This standard involves objective and subjective components. 	Id.
“[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he suffered from objectively serious medical needs and
(2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those needs.” Dulany v.
Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997). 	To be objectively serious, “a medical need must
have been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or must be so obvious that even a
layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Jackson, 756 F.3d at 1065
(quoting Scott v. Benson, 742 F.3d 335, 339-40 (8th Cir. 2014)). 	“Under the subjective prong,
[the inmate] must show that an official actually knew of but deliberately disregarded his serious
medical need.” 	Id. (internal quotation omitted). 	“This showing requires a mental state akin to
criminal recklessness.” 	Id.
Plaintiff does not assert any specific facts supporting a finding that there is a genuine issue
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of material fact on whether he received constitutionally adequate medical care for his jaw (claim
two). 	He does not challenge the admissibility of the facts presented by the Defendant, and he
does not present any of his own facts. 	Indeed, he says that he no long wishes to prosecute this
claim. 	(Dep. at 6-7 (ECF No. 60-1)). 	Accordingly, the Court deems the facts presented by
Defendant Mitcham as undisputed. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 	These facts establish that
Plaintiff received medical care for his jaw multiple times. 	They also establish that Plaintiff did
not agree with the medical professional’s treatment recommendations. 	But “a prisoner’s mere
difference of opinion over matters of expert medical judgment or a course of medical treatment
fails to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 449 (8th
Cir. 2010). 	Because the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiff’s right to constitutionally
adequate medical care was not violated, Defendant Mitcham should be granted summary judgment
with respect to this claim, as well.8
C. 	Warrant for Failure to Pay Fines
Turning to Plaintiff’s third claim, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Mitcham held him in
custody for 81 days in 2022 on a “clerical error” because Defendant Mitcham failed to give him
the proper jail credit for his “fines.” 	See (Amend. Compl. at 4 (ECF No. 14)).
“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the
deprivation of rights.” 	Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting
8 Notably, moreover, section 1983 liability is personal. This means that in section 1983 suits, “a
plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). 	The
undisputed material facts show that Defendant Mitcham was not directly involved in Plaintiff’s
medical care. 	See generally (ECF No. 60-5). Accordingly, Defendant Mitcham is entitled to
summary judgment as to claim two for this reason, as well.
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Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990)). 	It is undisputed that Plaintiff was
arrested on March 10, 2022, on a warrant for failure to pay fines. 	See Fargis, Case No. 70CR-
22-163. 	Approximately one month later, a petition to revoke his probation was filed alleging that
he failed to pay his court fines and was charged with a new offense, in violation of the terms of his
probation. 	See Fargis, Case No. 70CR-2021-546-1. 	Both the new case and the petition to
revoke were dismissed in June 2022. 	It is further undisputed that Defendant Mitcham did not
participate in the drafting or execution of the warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest for failure to pay fines,
see (Dep. at 10 (ECF No. 60-1)), and that he did not sign the petition to revoke Plaintiff’s probation,
see (ECF No. 60-3). 	While Plaintiff argues that Defendant Mitcham did not relay the correct
information to whomever drafted the warrant for failure to pay fines, see (ECF No. 65), he asserts
no facts establishing that the information in the warrant came from Defendant Mitcham or the jail.
See Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 2004) (“In resisting a
properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff has an affirmative burden ‘to
designate specific facts creating a triable controversy.”) (quoting Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., 173
1076, 1085 (8th Cir. 1999)). 	Accordingly, there is no material fact dispute regarding Defendant
Mitcham’s (lack of) participation in the preparation and execution of Plaintiff’s warrant for failure
to pay fines, and Defendant Mitcham should therefore be entitled to qualified immunity as to this
claim (claim three).9
9 Defendant Mitcham argues that this claim is barred by the favorable termination rule articulated
by the Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 	Pursuant to Heck, “to recover
damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence” has been reversed or vacated by some other vehicle. 	Id. at
486-87. 	As the Court understands it, Plaintiff was convicted of a DWI in 2010, and his sentence
included a requirement to pay fines. 	See (Dep. at 15 (ECF No. 60-1)). 	But Plaintiff does not
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II. 	Official Capacity Claims
Turning now to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Mitcham in his official capacity, a
“suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather
is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989). 	Accordingly, a suit against Defendant Mitcham in his official capacity is the same as a
suit against Union County.
Generally, “‘a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely
by its employees or agents’ on a respondeat superior theory of liability.” Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d
993, 997 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Monnell v. New York Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978)). Rather, “[a] municipality may be liable for a constitutional violation resulting from (1) an
official policy; (2) an unofficial custom; or (3) a failure to train or supervise.” 	Robbins v. City of
Des Moines, 984 F.3d 673, 681-82 (8th Cir. 2021).
Here, as described in detail above, the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights were not violated with respect to claims one and two. 	Put differently, it is
undisputed that he was not retaliated against in violation of the First Amendment (claim one) and
that he did not receive constitutionally inadequate medical care (claim two). 	Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendant Mitcham with respect to these claims should
also be dismissed. See Patridge v. City of Benton, Ark., 157 F.4th 970, 973-74 (8th Cir. 2025)
dispute that his sentence required him to pay fines, he asserts that the warrant that was issued
claiming that he still owed fines was unlawful because he had already paid his fines by serving jail
time. 	In other words, he claims that the arrest warrant lacked probable cause. 	In any event, the
Court does not squarely address whether Heck bars this claim because, as described above, it is
undisputed that Defendant Mitcham was not personally involved in drafting or executing that
warrant.
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(municipal “liability may not be imposed where no municipal official or employee committed a
constitutional violation”).
Claim three requires some additional discussion. 	As described above, Defendant
Mitcham should be granted qualified immunity with respect to this claim because it is undisputed
that Defendant Mitcham was not personally involved in drafting or executing Plaintiff’s warrant
for failure to pay fines. 	But Union County is not entitled to summary judgment merely because
Defendant Mitcham is immune from suit. 	See Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 486
(8th Cir. 2018) (“[E]ven if . . . officials all enjoy immunity from suit, it hardly follows that they
did not engage in any unlawful acts or that the [municipality] is thereby immune as well.”).
Accordingly, the Court considers whether Union County itself caused the alleged constitutional
violation. 	See Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986-87 (8th Cir. 2006).
In this case, the Amended Complaint asserts that Union County should change its policy
on how it applies jail credit towards unpaid fines. (Amend. Compl. at 4 (ECF No. 14)). 	The Court
therefore determines if a material fact dispute precludes summary judgment on the issue of whether
Union County has implemented an unconstitutional policy on applying jail credit towards fines.
“A local government is liable under § 1983 for its policies that cause constitutional torts. 	These
policies may be set by the government’s lawmakers, or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly
be said to represent official policy.” 	McMillian v. Monroe Cty., 520 U.S. 781, 784 (1997). 	Here,
Plaintiff asserts no facts describing Union County’s policy at the time of the events giving rise to
his claims, let alone any facts giving rise to a fact dispute on whether that policy was constitutional.
See (ECF No. 14). 	Union County—i.e. Defendant Mitcham in his official capacity—is therefore
entitled to summary judgment with respect to claim three, as well.
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CONCLUSION
In sum and for all the reasons outlined above, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Defendant
Mitcham’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 58), be GRANTED. 	This matter should
therefore be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in
which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
STATUS OF REFERRAL: No longer referred.
DATED this 1st day of December 2025.
s/ Spencer G. Singleton
HON. SPENCER G. SINGLETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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