Parker v. Gibson et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
SAMMIE H. PARKER 	PLAINTIFF
ADC #176076
V. 	Case No. 4:24-CV-00176-DPM-BBM
JAMES GIBSON, Warden, Varner Unit 	DEFENDANT
RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to
United States District Judge D.P. Marshall Jr. You may file written objections to all or part
of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the
factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court
within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Recommendation. If you do not file objections,
Judge Marshall may adopt this Recommendation without independently reviewing all of
the evidence in the record. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions
of fact.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On February 27, 2024, Plaintiff Sammie H. Parker (“Parker”), a prisoner in the
Varner Unit of the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”), filed a pro se Complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights.
(Doc. 2). After the Court screened Parker’s Complaint in accordance with the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Parker was allowed to proceed with an Eighth
Amendment 	conditions-of-confinement 	claim 	against 	Defendant 	James 	Gibson
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(“Gibson”), Warden of Varner Unit, in his individual capacity. (Doc. 4 at 11–12; Doc. 5).
All other claims and parties were dismissed. (Doc. 5).
On April 7, 2025, Gibson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a Brief in Support,
and a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, arguing that Parker failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. (Docs. 16–18). Even though he was advised of his right to do so,
(Doc. 19), Parker failed to file a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment or dispute
any facts in Gibson’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. Accordingly, all material
facts in the Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, (Doc. 18), are deemed admitted. Local
Rule 56.1(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Viewing all evidence in a light most favorable to Parker, the non-movant, and
drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Court recommends that Gibson’s Motion
for Summary Judgment be granted. 1
II. 	ALLEGATIONS
For his remaining claim, Parker alleges that he was housed in a flooded cell from
January 7, 2024, to February 20, 2024. (Doc. 2 at 3, 6). The dripping water woke him from
his sleep, and he fell and was injured while getting down from his top bunk. Id. at 3, 6.
1 Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrates that “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–
50 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of
material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Thereafter, the nonmoving party must present specific facts
demonstrating that there is a material dispute for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Torgerson v. City of
Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “Courts must construe the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party.” Brand v.
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 934 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Young v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 216 (2015)).
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Parker was given a mop head to try to get the water up from the floor, but there was “simply
to[o] much water.” Id. at 4.
After more than a month in the flooded cell, Gibson moved Parker to a different cell
that had a broken window, and, when it rained, water ran down the wall and onto Parker,
causing Parker to be cold and wet. (Doc. 2 at 7). On the day that Parker was moved to a
different cell, Gibson brought Parker to his office and said that “he didn’t care,” and Parker
needed to “man up[.]” Id. at 6–7. Parker claims that Gibson knew about the conditions in
his cell and still forced him to remain in that cell, even after he was supposed to go back to
general population. Id. at 3. Thus, Parker proceeds on a conditions-of-confinement claim,
alleging that Gibson was aware that Parker’s cell was flooded for more than a month but
deliberately disregarded the problem.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	The PLRA’s Exhaustion Requirement
The PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust all available administrative remedies prior
to filing a § 1983 action. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006);
Muhammad v. Mayfield, 933 F.3d 993, 1000 (8th Cir. 2019). In order to do so, prisoners
must fully and properly exhaust their available administrative remedies as to each claim
that is later raised in a § 1983 action and complete the exhaustion process before initiating
the § 1983 action. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211, 219–20, 223–24 (2007); Woodford,
548 U.S. at 93–95; Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136, 1141–42 (8th Cir. 2014). Importantly,
“it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper
exhaustion.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218; see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. Thus, to satisfy
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the PLRA, a prisoner must comply with the exhaustion requirements of the incarcerating
facility before he can properly bring a claim in a § 1983 action. Although exhaustion is
mandatory under the PLRA, exhaustion is an affirmative defense that must be pled and
proved by the Defendants. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216.
Prisoners are only required, however, to exhaust “‘available’” administrative
remedies. Townsend v. Murphy, 898 F.3d 780, 783 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a)). 	Thus, 	before 	grappling 	with 	whether 	Parker 	exhausted 	administrative
remedies, the Court must determine if the ADC grievance procedure was even “available”
to him. Smith v. Andrews, 75 F.4th 805, 808–09 (8th Cir. 2023). For a remedy to be
available, it must be capable of use to obtain some relief. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642
(2016). An administrative remedy is not capable of use where: (1) “it operates as a simple
dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved
inmates”; (2) “some mechanism exists to provide relief, but no ordinary prisoner can
discern or navigate it”; or (3) “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage
of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at
643–44. This is an objective determination; an inmate’s subjective beliefs regarding
exhaustion are irrelevant in determining whether administrative procedures are available.
See Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2000).
B. 	ADC Administrative Directive 19-34
The ADC provides a three-step grievance procedure for prisoners to exhaust their
administrative remedies, Administrative Directive 19-34 (“AD 19-34”). (Doc. 16-2). First,
the prisoner must file a “Step One” informal resolution within fifteen days of each incident.
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AD 19-34 at § IV(E). The prisoner may only raise one issue in the Step One informal
resolution and must be “specific as to the substance of the issue or complaint to include the
date, place, personnel involved or witnesses.” AD 19-34 at § IV(D)(2), (E). The prisoner
should receive a response within three working days but, if no response is received, the
prisoner may proceed directly to Step Two. Id. at § IV(E)(11).
At “Step Two,” the prisoner submits a formal unit-level grievance. Id. at § IV(F).
The Step Two grievance must contain “an explanation [of] why the inmate considers the
informal resolution unsuccessful.” Id. at § IV(F)(1). Notably, the prisoner may not raise
new issues in his formal grievance, and issues not raised in Step One will not be considered
at Step Two. Id. at § IV(F)(2). If the prisoner does not receive a response to their Step Two
grievance within five working days, the prisoner may move to Step Three. Id. at § IV(F)(4),
(9).
Finally, the prisoner must file a “Step Three” appeal to the appropriate ADC Chief
Deputy/Deputy/Assistant Director within five working days of the Step Two decision. Id.
at § IV(G). At Step Three, the prisoner must “state a reason for the appeal.” Id. at
§ IV(G)(2). The grievance procedure cautions prisoners that they should “not list additional
issues, requests, or names which were not part of the original grievance, as those issues
will not be addressed.” Id. Once the prisoner receives the Step Three appeal response,
which usually occurs within thirty days, the grievance procedure is complete. Id. at
IV(G)(6). The grievance procedure explicitly warns that the prisoner “must exhaust [his]
administrative remedies as to all defendants at all levels of the grievance procedure before
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filing a Section 1983 lawsuit…If this is not done, the lawsuit or claim may be summarily
dismissed.” Id. at IV(N).
C. 	Availability of Administrative Remedies
Before discussing the substance of Gibson’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Court must analyze whether the grievance process was available to Parker. Smith, 75 F.4th
at 808–09. On this record, it was. In his Complaint, Parker claims that the officers did not
like to sign grievances, and the officers denied some of his grievances as untimely. (Doc.
2 at 6–7). But Parker does not provide examples or discuss which grievances guards refused
to sign. Parker also does not claim any “untimely” grievance was wrongfully rejected.
While in one of the grievances in question—VSM24-00188—Parker mentions a failure to
process grievances and certain dates that grievances went unanswered, as the Warden
pointed out in his grievance response, Parker successfully filed at least two previous
grievances about the conditions of his cell. (Doc. 16-6 at 1). Without more, the Court finds
that the administrative process was available to Parker. Thus, the remaining question is
whether Parker successfully exhausted his available administrative remedies.
D. 	Gibson’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 16)
In support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, Gibson attaches the Declaration
of Terri Grigsby-Brown (“Grigsby-Brown”), the ADC’s Inmate Grievance Supervisor.
(Doc. 16-1). According to Grigsby-Brown, she searched Parker’s file for any exhausted
non-medical grievances filed from January 7, 2024, through the date Parker filed this
lawsuit, February 27, 2024, pertaining to the claims in this lawsuit. (Doc. 16-1 at 6, ¶ 33).
Grigsby-Brown also searched for any grievances filed from January 7, 2024, through
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February 27, 2024, that named or referred to Gibson. Id. at 7, ¶ 34. Grigsby-Brown found
four 	non-medical 	grievances: 	VSM24-00147, 	VSM24-00187, 	VSM24-00188, 	and
VSM24-00994. Id. at 7, ¶ 35.
Gibson also attached the declaration of Brandy Johnson, the ADC’s Medical
Grievance Coordinator. (Doc. 16-8). According to Johnson, she searched Parker’s file for
any exhausted medical grievances filed from January 7, 2024, through February 27, 2024,
pertaining to this lawsuit. Id. at 6, ¶ 34. Johnson also searched for any medical grievances
filed from January 7, 2024, through February 27, 2024, that named or referred to Gibson.
Id. at 7, ¶ 35. Johnson found a single medical grievance: VSM24-00562. Id. at 7, ¶ 36.
1. 	Grievance VSM24-00147
Parker initiated grievance VSM24-00147 on January 12, 2024. (Doc. 16-4 at 4; Doc.
18 at 8, ¶ 43). Parker grieved about his assignment to an isolation cell that floods from the
rain. Id. Parker further grieved that a maintenance member came to the cell and that the
guards knew about the water in Parker’s cell. Id. At Step Two, this grievance was rejected
as untimely. (Doc. 16-4 at 3; Doc. 18 at 8, ¶ 44). Parker did not appeal the rejection of this
grievance to Step Three. (Doc. 18 at 8, ¶ 45).
Because Parker did not pursue this grievance through all three steps of the grievance
process as required, this grievance does not exhaust Parker’s administrative remedies with
respect to his remaining claim. The ADC’s grievance procedure and Eighth Circuit case law
unequivocally state that, to fully and properly exhaust a claim, that claim must be raised at
all levels of the grievance procedure, and the prisoner must receive a response on the merits
of that claim. AD 19-34 at IV(N); Hammett v. Cofield, 681 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir. 2012)
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(holding that exhaustion under the PLRA means “using all steps that the agency holds out,
and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)”) (cleaned up).
Parker failed to comply with the ADC’s grievance procedure by not appealing
VSM24-00147 to the third and final level, Step Three. Accordingly, this grievance does not
serve to exhaust Parker’s claim against Gibson.
2. 	Grievance VSM24-00187
Parker initiated grievance VSM24-00187 on January 22, 2024. (Doc. 16-5 at 2; Doc.
18 at 8, ¶ 46). Parker grieved about not being allowed showers, not receiving soap, and
developing a boil due to water leaking on his bed. Id. Parker further grieved that
“maintenance” came to the cell and said there was nothing “he can do.” Id. He cites cases
and constitutional amendments as support for the proposition that his rights were violated.
Id. At the second level of review, the warden found that this grievance had merit but was
resolved; Parker did not appeal this response to Step Three. (Doc. 15-5 at 3; Doc. 18 at 9, ¶
47).
“[E]ven grievances found to have merit must be appealed to be exhausted.”
Fairchild v. Wade, No. 4:24-CV-01096-LPR-JTK, 2025 WL 2496551, at *3 (E.D. Ark.
Apr. 17, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2495601 (E.D. Ark. Aug.
29, 2025) (citing Jones v. Huff, 2019 WL 3956131, at *2 (E.D. Ark. July 1, 2019), report
and recommendation adopted, Jones v. Huff, 2019 WL 3973936, *1 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 21,
2019)). Because Parker did not complete all three levels of review for VSM24-00187, he
cannot rely on this grievance to show he exhausted his administrative remedies.
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Moreover, Parker did not name Gibson in grievance VSM24-00187 or identify any
actions that Gibson took (or did not take) in relation to Parker’s conditions of confinement.
In order to pursue his conditions-of-confinement claim against Gibson, Parker was required
to fully and properly comply with the ADC grievance policy. Hammett, 681 F.3d at 947;
Burns, 752 F.3d at 1141. Thus, Parker was required to name Gibson in a grievance, AD 19-
34 at § IV(C)(4), (E)(2); state the specific basis for his claim against Gibson, id. at (E)(2);
and pursue that claim through all three steps of the grievance procedure, id. at IV(N).
Because Parker did not complete all three levels of review or identify Gibson in
VSM24-00187, Parker cannot rely on this grievance to show he exhausted his conditions-
of-confinement claim against Gibson.
3. 	Grievance VSM24-00188
Parker initiated grievance VSM24-00188 on January 26, 2024. (Doc. 16-6 at 3; Doc.
18 at 9, ¶ 48). Parker grieved about: (1) attempting to get his grievance signed for four days
without a response; and (2) the conditions of his cell, including flooding. Id. Parker also
grieved about water leaking onto his bed; falling; and back, shoulder, and neck pain. Id.
The warden found grievance VSM24-00188 to be without merit because there was no
evidence of a violation regarding Parker’s grievances. (Doc. 16-6 at 3; Doc. 18 at 9, ¶ 48).
The warden also mentioned that he would not address the issues regarding the condition of
Parker’s cell or assignment to isolation. (Doc. 16-6 at 1). Parker did not appeal this decision
to Step Three as required by AD 19-34. (Doc. 18 at 9, ¶ 52).
This grievance fails to exhaust Parker’s administrative remedies for the same
reasons mentioned above: Parker did not complete all three levels of review and did not
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identify Gibson as being involved in the conduct. See Hammett, 681 F.3d at 947; Fairchild,
2025 WL 2496551, at *3; Burns, 752 F.3d at 1141.
4. 	Grievance VSM24-00994
Parker initiated grievance VSM24-00994 on July 31, 2024. (Doc. 16-7 at 3; Doc. 18
at 9, ¶ 50). Parker grieved about sexual harassment from a correctional officer and asserted
his request for PREA review. Id. After the warden forwarded Parker’s grievance to Internal
Affairs for additional investigation, Parker appealed. (Doc. 16-7 at 4; Doc. 18 at 9, ¶ 51). In
his appeal, Parker referenced Gibson. Id. At the final level of review, Parker’s grievance
was found to be without merit. (Doc. 16-7 at 6; Doc. 18 at 9, ¶ 52).
This grievance does not appear related, in any way, to Parker’s conditions-of-
confinement claim against Gibson. Moreover, because Parker did not complete the
exhaustion process for—or even initiate—this grievance prior to filing this lawsuit on
February 27, 2024, this grievance does not exhaust Parker’s administrative remedies for his
remaining claim in this case. See Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2003)
(holding that “[i]f exhaustion was not completed at the time of filing, dismissal is
mandatory”).
5. 	Grievance VSM24-00562
Parker initiated grievance VSM24-00562 on April 13, 2024. (Doc. 16-9 at 1; Doc.
18 at 10, ¶ 57). Parker grieved about falling out of his top-bunk bed due to rain-induced
flooding in his cell. Id. He further grieved about officials failing to photograph his alleged
injuries or take him to see a licensed physician. Id. Parker does not specifically mention
Gibson in the grievance. Id. Officials rejected grievance VSM24-00562 at the unit level as
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untimely. (Doc. 16-9 at 2; Doc. 18 at 10, ¶ 58). Parker subsequently appealed the rejection
of grievance VSM24-00562 to the Deputy/Assistant Director. (Doc. 16-9 at 3; Doc. 18 at
10, ¶ 59). The Deputy Director returned Plaintiff’s grievance appeal to him without
addressing the merits because the time for appeal had expired. (Doc. 16-9 at 3; Doc. 18 at
10, ¶ 60).
As with VSM24-00994, Parker did not initiate this grievance until after this lawsuit
was filed. Parker also did not identify Gibson or complete all three levels of the grievance
process. As such, this grievance fails to exhaust Parker’s administrative remedies for his
remaining claim. See Johnson, 340 F.3d at 627; Fairchild, 2025 WL 2496551, at *3; Burns,
752 F.3d at 1141.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Parker, he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies with respect to his conditions-of-confinement claim against
Gibson. Accordingly, Gibson’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 16), should be
granted.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Gibson’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 16), be GRANTED.
2. 	Parker’s conditions-of-confinement claim against Gibson be DISMISSED
without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
3. 	Judgment be entered accordingly.2
2 All other claims were previously dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief.
(Doc. 5).
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DATED this 3rd day of November, 2025.
____________________________________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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