Charles v. Cole et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
NORTHERN DIVISION
DAVID W. CHARLES 	PLAINTIFF
#112850
V. 	NO. 3:25-cv-00073-LPR-ERE
RONNIE COLE, et al. 	DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Davd W. Charles has moved to amend his complaint to add
Jail Administrator Candy Fry as a party Defendant.1 For the following reasons, his
motion to amend is denied.2
Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court should
“freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(3).
However, a litigant does not have an absolute right to amend pleadings. Sherman v.
Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir.2 008) (citation omitted). A
district court may deny leave to amend if “there are compelling reasons such as
undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility
1 In his motion, Mr. Charles also asks to dismiss his claims against Defendants
Darrell Elkin and Hope Burns. That request is addressed in a separate Recommendation.
2 Motions to amend are nondispositive pretrial motions, appropriately decided by a
United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). See Daley v.
Marriott Int’l, Inc., 415 F.3d 889, 893 n.9 (8th Cir. 2005) (designating magistrate judge’s
denial of motion to amend as an “order denying [a] nondispositive pretrial motion”).
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of the amendment.” Id. (quoting Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software
Sys., Inc., 406 F.3d 1052, 1065 (8th Cir. 2005)).
In his original complaint, Mr. Charles claims that he received inadequate
medical care during his incarceration at the Clay Detention Center. He alleges that
several people, including the detention center administrator, who he identifies as
Hope Burns, “provide[] medicine and medication attention to those who are sick or
injured.” Doc. 2 at 5. However, Mr. Charles alleges no specific conduct on the part
of the jail administrator.
In his motion to amend, Mr. Charles states that “the jail administrator needs
to be changed to Candy Fry,” but he again fails to include any actual allegations
regarding conduct on Ms. Fry’s part that contributed to his injury. “Liability under
section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation
of rights.” Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007). Occupying
a supervisory position, standing alone, is not a basis for imposing § 1983 liability.
See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676 (holding that “vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . .
§ 1983 suits”); Saylor v. Nebraska, 812 F.3d 637, 644-45 (8th Cir. 2016) (because a
supervisor cannot be held vicariously liable for the constitutional violations of a
subordinate, prisoner must “show that the supervisor personally participated in or
had direct responsibility for the alleged violations” or “that the supervisor actually
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knew 	of, 	and 	was 	deliberately 	indifferent 	to 	or 	tacitly 	authorized, 	the
unconstitutional acts”).
Because Mr. Charles’ proposed amendment fails to allege facts to state a
plausible constitutional claim for relief against Ms. Fry, it would be futile to grant
his motion to amend.3 See Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir.
2008) (holding that a court may deny a plaintiff=s motion to amend the complaint
when such amendment would be futile).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Mr. Charles’ motion to amend (Doc. 43) is DENIED.
2. 	Mr. Charles may file a new motion asking to either replace his current
complaint with an amended complaint or to supplement it.4
3 To state a plausible claim for medical deliberate indifference against Ms. Fry, Mr.
Charles must allege facts that, taken as true, support a reasonable inference that: (1) he had
“objectively serious medical needs”; and (2) Ms. Fry “actually knew of but deliberately
disregarded those needs.” Hamner v. Burls, 937 F.3d 1171, 1177 (8th Cir. 2019); see also
Saylor v. Nebraska, 812 F.3d 637, 644 (8th Cir. 2016). Mr. Charles’ motion contains no
facts to show: (1) what objectively serious medical need he suffered from; (2) how Ms. Fry
was aware of his need for medical treatment; (3) how Ms. Fry denied his requests for
medical treatment; and (4) how he was harmed as a result of medical treatment being
delayed or denied.
4 Mr. Charles may file a proposed amended complaint that details all his proposed
claims in this lawsuit, in which case the amended complaint will replace the original
complaint (Doc. 2). In re Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 209 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 2000) (An
amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, rendering the original complaint
without legal effect). Alternatively, he may ask to file a supplement to his original
complaint detailing only new allegations, which together with the original complaint, will
serve as his operative pleading. See Kiir v. North Dakota Public Health, 651 F. App’x 567,
568 (8th Cir. 2016) (amendment “intended to supplement, rather than to supplant, the
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SO ORDERED 22 October 2025.
___________________________________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
original 	complaint,” 	should 	be 	read 	together 	with 	original 	complaint 	as 	plaintiff's
complaint).
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