Davis v. The City of Selma et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
ERIK DAVIS, 	*
*
Plaintiff, 	*
*
vs. 	* CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-00101-KD-B
*
THE CITY OF SELMA, et al., 	*
*
Defendants. 	*
ORDER
Plaintiff Erik Davis (“Plaintiff”), who is proceeding without
an 	attorney 	(pro 	se), 	filed 	a 	civil 	complaint1 	and 	a 	motion 	to
proceed 	without 	prepayment 	of 	fees 	in 	the 	United 	States 	District
Court 	for 	the 	Middle 	District 	of 	Alabama. 	(Docs. 	1, 	2). 	This
action was subsequently transferred to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama and was referred to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge for appropriate action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(S). 	(Docs. 4, 5).
Upon 	review 	of 	the 	record, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	Plaintiff’s
complaint 	is 	an 	impermissible 	shotgun 	pleading 	that 	fails 	to
provide 	adequate 	notice 	of 	his 	claims 	and 	the 	factual 	grounds 	on
which 	they 	rest, 	and 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	to 	proceed 	without
prepayment of fees is deficient.
1 Plaintiff labeled his complaint as a petition. 	(Doc. 1 at 1).
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I. 	COMPLAINT
A. 	Legal Standards
A complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 	This means that “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a 	claim 	to 	relief 	that 	is 	plausible 	on 	its 	face.’” 	Ashcroft 	v.
Iqbal, 	556 	U.S. 	662, 	678 	(2009) 	(quoting 	Bell 	Atl. 	Corp. 	v.
Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	544, 	570 	(2007)). 	The 	purpose 	of 	this 	rule 	is
to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and
the 	grounds 	upon 	which 	it 	rests.” 	Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	at 	555
(quotation 	omitted). 	Each 	allegation 	in 	a 	complaint 	“must 	be
simple, concise, and direct.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). 	Relatedly,
Rule 	10(b) 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	mandates 	that
a 	complaint 	“state 	its 	claims 	. 	. 	. 	in 	numbered 	paragraphs, 	each
limited 	as 	far 	as 	practicable 	to 	a 	single 	set 	of 	circumstances,”
and 	that 	“each 	claim 	founded 	on 	a 	separate 	transaction 	or
occurrence . . . be stated in a separate count” to the extent doing
so “would promote clarity.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
These rules “work together to require the pleader to present
his 	claims 	discretely 	and 	succinctly, 	so 	that 	his 	adversary 	can
discern what he is claiming and frame a responsive pleading, [and
so 	that 	a] 	court 	can 	determine 	which 	facts 	support 	which 	claims
and whether the plaintiff has stated any claims upon which relief
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can be granted.” 	Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1082 (11th
Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted).
Complaints 	that 	violate 	these 	rules 	are 	“disparagingly
referred 	to 	as 	‘shotgun 	pleadings.’” 	Weiland 	v. 	Palm 	Beach 	Cty.
Sheriff’s 	Office, 	792 	F.3d 	1313, 	1320 	(11th 	Cir. 	2015). 	The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has identified four general types
or categories of shotgun pleadings: (1) those in which “each count
adopts 	the 	allegations 	of 	all 	preceding 	counts, 	causing 	each
successive count to carry all that came before and the last count
to 	be 	a 	combination 	of 	the 	entire 	complaint;” 	(2) 	those 	that 	are
“replete 	with 	conclusory, 	vague, 	and 	immaterial 	facts 	not
obviously connected to any particular cause of action;” (3) those
that do not separate each cause of action or claim for relief into
a 	different 	count; 	and 	(4) 	those 	that 	assert 	“multiple 	claims
against 	multiple 	defendants 	without 	specifying 	which 	of 	the
defendants 	are 	responsible 	for 	which 	acts 	or 	omissions, 	or 	which
of the defendants the claim is brought against.” 	Id. at 1321-23.
The unifying characteristic of all shotgun pleadings is that they
“fail 	. 	. 	. 	to 	give 	the 	defendants 	adequate 	notice 	of 	the 	claims
against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” 	Id. at
1323.2
2 Although courts must liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold
them to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam),
(Continued)
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B. 	Analysis
Having 	reviewed 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that
it 	is 	a 	deficient 	shotgun 	pleading 	that 	fails 	to 	comply 	with 	the
basic 	pleading 	standards 	outlined 	above 	and 	fails 	to 	provide 	the
Court and the Defendants with adequate notice of Plaintiff’s claims
and the factual grounds on which they rest.
Most 	obviously, 	the 	complaint 	falls 	into 	the 	third 	shotgun
pleading category and violates Rule 10(b) because it does not make
clear 	what 	claims 	for 	relief 	or 	causes 	of 	action 	Plaintiff 	is
asserting, 	it 	does 	not 	separate 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	for 	relief 	or
causes 	of 	action 	into 	different 	counts, 	and 	it 	does 	not 	specify
which 	facts 	are 	intended 	to 	support 	which 	claims 	for 	relief 	or
causes 	of 	action. 	See 	Weiland, 	792 	F.3d 	at 	1322-23 	(“The 	third
type 	of 	shotgun 	pleading 	is 	one 	that 	commits 	the 	sin 	of 	not
separating 	into 	a 	different 	count 	each 	cause 	of 	action 	or 	claim
for relief.”).
The 	complaint 	also 	falls 	squarely 	into 	the 	fourth 	shotgun
pleading 	category 	because 	Plaintiff 	apparently 	seeks 	to 	raise
multiple 	claims 	against 	multiple 	defendants, 	but 	he 	does 	not
specify 	which 	of 	the 	defendants 	each 	of 	his 	claims 	is 	brought
this 	does 	not 	give 	a 	court 	license 	to 	act 	as 	counsel 	for 	a 	party
or rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an
action. 	Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th
Cir. 	2014). 	Even 	a 	pro 	se 	litigant 	is 	“subject 	to 	the 	relevant
law 	and 	rules 	of 	court, 	including 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil
Procedure.” 	Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).
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against, 	nor 	does 	he 	specify 	which 	defendants’ 	acts 	or 	omissions
form the basis for which claims. 	See id. at 1323 (noting that the
fourth 	type 	of 	shotgun 	pleading 	asserts 	“multiple 	claims 	against
multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are
responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants
the claim is brought against”).
Less 	importantly, 	the 	complaint 	arguably 	falls 	into 	the
second 	shotgun 	pleading 	category, 	since 	it 	contains 	a 	number 	of
“immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause
of action.” 	See id. at 1322. 	For example, in paragraph 10 of his
complaint, Plaintiff lists the “Selma Police Department’s Mission
Statement,” which is immaterial to his claims, and he then engages
in a bizarre and irrelevant discussion relating to evidence allowed
at a trial. 	(See Doc. 1 at 7-8).
In 	the 	“Statement 	of 	Claim” 	section 	of 	his 	complaint,
Plaintiff 	cites 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	and 	various 	provisions 	of 	the
United States Constitution, thus suggesting that he is attempting
to 	assert 	claims 	under 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983. 	(See 	id. 	at 	7-9).
However, 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	separate 	his 	putative 	§ 	1983 	claims
into different counts as required, nor does he specify the factual
basis for each § 1983 claim or make clear which § 1983 claims are
asserted 	against 	which 	defendants. 	See 	Sunbridge 	Healthcare 	LLC
v. Azar, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107795, at *13, 2015 WL 4937505, at
*5 	(M.D. 	Ala. 	Aug. 	17, 	2015) 	(“The 	Plaintiffs’ 	Second 	Amended
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Complaint 	refers 	to 	various 	provisions 	of 	the 	United 	States
Constitution, and refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but does not set out
separate counts for relief. 	Instead the references are within the
‘Claim for Relief’ and the ‘Prayer for Relief.’ 	Where a plaintiff
asserts 	multiple 	claims 	for 	relief 	the 	Plaintiff 	should 	separate
those claims into separate counts.”).
Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	also 	violates 	the 	rule 	prohibiting
fictitious-party 	pleading 	in 	federal 	court. 	See 	Richardson 	v.
Johnson, 	598 	F.3d 	734, 	738 	(11th 	Cir. 	2010) 	(per 	curiam). 	The
Eleventh Circuit recognizes a limited exception to this rule when
the 	plaintiff’s 	description 	of 	the 	defendant 	“is, 	‘at 	the 	very
worst, 	surplusage’ 	because 	the 	plaintiff’s 	description 	of 	the
defendant 	is 	‘sufficiently 	clear 	to 	allow 	service 	of 	process.’”
Vielma 	v. 	Gruler, 	808 	F. 	App’x 	872, 	880 	(11th 	Cir. 	2020) 	(per
curiam) (citing Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 & n.6 (11th
Cir. 	1992)); 	see 	also 	Gibbons 	v. 	McBride, 	124 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	1342,
1358 	(S.D. 	Ga. 	2015) 	(“A 	limited 	exception 	to 	[the 	rule 	against
fictitious-party pleading] exists when the plaintiff’s description
of 	the 	defendant 	is 	so 	specific 	as 	to 	be 	at 	the 	very 	worst,
surplusage, 	and 	thus 	discovery 	would 	uncover 	the 	unnamed
defendant’s 	identity.”) 	(quotations 	omitted). 	But 	if 	the
plaintiff’s 	description 	of 	a 	defendant 	“leaves 	the 	reader 	unable
to 	identify 	the 	particular 	individual 	described,” 	it 	will 	fall
outside the narrow exception to the rule against fictitious-party
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pleading. 	Huffman v. Dunn, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115112, at *25,
2021 WL 2533024, at *9 (N.D. Ala. June 21, 2021) (explaining that
“cases 	discussing 	the 	exception 	seem 	to 	turn 	on 	whether 	the
description 	of 	the 	fictitious 	defendant 	(a) 	allows 	the 	reader 	to
point to a specific individual or (b) leaves the reader wondering
which 	person(s) 	out 	of 	a 	group 	fits 	the 	bill. 	The 	former 	is
allowed; 	the 	latter 	is 	not.”). 	Here, 	to 	the 	extent 	Plaintiff
intends to name a “fictitious party” as a defendant (see Doc. 1 at
2), his description of the fictitious defendant does not identify
a particular individual and thus falls outside the narrow exception
to the rule against fictitious-party pleading.
Finally, the Court notes that the Selma Police Department is
not a proper defendant because an Alabama “city’s police department
is not a suable entity or a proper party under state law or for §
1983 purposes.” 	Blunt v. Tomlinson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28187,
at *11, 2009 WL 921093, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 2009).
C. 	Order to File Amended Complaint
The pleading deficiencies described above hinder this Court’s
ability 	to 	screen 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	for 	the 	purpose 	of
determining whether his claims are subject to sua sponte dismissal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).3 	When presented with a deficient
3 	“When 	a 	plaintiff 	in 	a 	federal 	suit 	moves 	for 	leave 	to 	proceed
IFP, the district court must ‘screen’ his complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 	1915(e). 	The 	district 	court 	shall 	dismiss 	an 	IFP 	complaint 	at
(Continued)
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shotgun 	pleading 	such 	as 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	in 	this 	case, 	a
district court should take the initiative to dismiss or strike the
pleading and give the plaintiff an opportunity to replead his case.
Weiland, 	792 	F.3d 	at 	1321 	n.10. 	When 	a 	plaintiff 	fails 	to 	make
meaningful 	modifications 	to 	his 	shotgun 	complaint 	after 	being
ordered 	to 	do 	so, 	the 	court 	may 	dismiss 	the 	case 	under 	the
authority 	of 	either 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	41(b) 	or 	the
court’s inherent power to manage its docket. 	Id.4
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) is STRICKEN as an
impermissible 	shotgun 	pleading. 	Plaintiff 	is 	GRANTED 	LEAVE 	to
file an amended complaint on or before April 17, 2025. 	In drafting
his amended complaint, Plaintiff must plead his claims with enough
specificity 	to 	conform 	to 	Rules 	8 	and 	10 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of
Civil 	Procedure 	and 	must 	address 	and 	correct 	the 	deficiencies
outlined 	in 	this 	order. 	This 	includes: 	(1) 	identifying 	his
pleading as an amended complaint; (2) naming only proper defendants
and 	omitting 	purely 	fictitious 	defendants; 	(3) 	stating 	his
any 	time 	if 	it 	determines 	that 	the 	action 	or 	appeal: 	(i) 	is
frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who 	is 	immune 	from 	such 	relief.” 	Brennan 	v. 	Aldazabal, 	772 	F.
App’x 	852 	(11th 	Cir. 	2019) 	(per 	curiam) 	(citing 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
1915(e)(2)(B)).
4 	A 	pro 	se 	plaintiff 	must 	generally 	be 	given 	at 	least 	one 	chance
to 	remedy 	his 	complaint’s 	deficiencies 	before 	his 	action 	can 	be
dismissed 	sua 	sponte 	on 	shotgun 	pleading 	grounds. 	Nezbeda 	v.
Liberty 	Mut. 	Ins. 	Corp., 	789 	F. 	App’x 	180, 	183 	(11th 	Cir. 	2019)
(per curiam).
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allegations 	in 	numbered 	paragraphs, 	each 	limited 	as 	far 	as
practicable 	to 	a 	single 	set 	of 	circumstances; 	(4) 	stating 	each
cause 	of 	action 	or 	claim 	for 	relief 	in 	a 	separate 	count, 	and
specifically identifying the legal basis for each cause of action
or claim for relief asserted;5 (5) providing the specific factual
grounds 	upon 	which 	each 	cause 	of 	action 	or 	claim 	for 	relief 	is
based, and clearly indicating which facts are intended to support
which causes of action or claims for relief; (6) specifying which
claims 	for 	relief 	or 	causes 	of 	action 	are 	asserted 	against 	which
defendants, 	and 	specifying 	the 	conduct 	that 	each 	defendant 	is
alleged to have engaged in with respect to each cause of action or
claim for relief asserted against that defendant; and (7) stating
the relief he seeks.
Plaintiff is hereby informed that a complaint in federal court
must 	contain 	sufficient 	factual 	matter 	to 	state 	a 	facially
plausible claim for relief. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	“A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows 	the 	court 	to 	draw 	the 	reasonable 	inference 	that 	the
defendant 	is 	liable 	for 	the 	misconduct 	alleged.” 	Id. 	This
necessarily requires that a plaintiff include factual allegations
that 	plausibly 	support 	each 	essential 	element 	of 	his 	claim.
5 To the extent Plaintiff is asserting claims for relief under 42
U.S.C. 	§ 	1983, 	he 	must 	allege 	separate 	counts 	for 	each 	claimed
constitutional violation.
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Randall 	v. 	Scott, 	610 	F.3d 	701, 	708 	n.2 	(11th 	Cir. 	2010). 	A
complaint 	does 	not 	need 	detailed 	factual 	allegations, 	but 	it
“requires 	more 	than 	labels 	and 	conclusions, 	and 	a 	formulaic
recitation 	of 	the 	elements 	of 	a 	cause 	of 	action 	will 	not 	do.”
Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	at 	555. 	“Nor 	does 	a 	complaint 	suffice 	if 	it
tenders 	‘naked 	assertion[s]’ 	devoid 	of 	‘further 	factual
enhancement.’” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 557).
Plaintiff is further informed that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “is merely
a 	vehicle” 	by 	which 	to 	sue 	those 	acting 	under 	color 	of 	state 	law
for violations of federal constitutional and statutory provisions;
“it does not create any substantive federal rights.” 	Williams v.
Bd. 	of 	Regents 	of 	Univ. 	Sys. 	of 	Ga., 	477 	F.3d 	1282, 	1299 	(11th
Cir. 2007). 	To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege facts showing that a person acting under color of state
law 	violated 	a 	specific 	federal 	constitutional 	right 	or 	federal
statutory 	provision. 	Doe 	v. 	Sch. 	Bd. 	of 	Broward 	Cty., 	Fla., 	604
F.3d 	1248, 	1265 	(11th 	Cir. 	2010); 	see 	also 	Harvey 	v. 	Harvey, 	949
F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A successful section 1983 action
requires a showing that the conduct complained of (1) was committed
by 	a 	person 	acting 	under 	color 	of 	state 	law 	and 	(2) 	deprived 	the
complainant 	of 	rights, 	privileges, 	or 	immunities 	secured 	by 	the
Constitution or laws of the United States.”).
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There 	is 	no 	“vicarious 	liability, 	including 	respondeat
superior, 	in 	§ 	1983 	actions.” 	Goebert 	v. 	Lee 	County, 	510 	F.3d
1312, 	1331 	(11th 	Cir. 	2007). 	Thus, 	a 	defendant 	“may 	not 	be 	sued
under 	Section 	1983 	for 	the 	acts 	of 	others 	but, 	rather, 	only 	for
its own acts.” 	Hamilton v. City of Jackson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1045,
1056 	(S.D. 	Ala. 	2007), 	aff’d, 	261 	F. 	App’x 	182 	(11th 	Cir. 	2008).
Accordingly, a plaintiff asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
must 	show 	a 	causal 	connection 	between 	each 	defendant’s 	actions,
orders, 	customs, 	or 	policies 	and 	the 	alleged 	violation 	of 	the
plaintiff’s rights. 	Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th
Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380
(11th Cir. 1982).6
Plaintiff’s 	amended 	complaint 	will 	replace 	his 	original
complaint. 	Therefore, 	the 	amended 	complaint 	shall 	not 	reference
or 	seek 	to 	incorporate 	by 	reference 	the 	original 	complaint. 	See
Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V Olympia Voyager, 463 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th
Cir. 	2006) 	(stating 	that 	the 	original 	complaint 	is 	considered
6 Similarly, a municipality such as the City of Selma “may not be
sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees
or agents. 	Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy
or 	custom 	. 	. 	. 	inflicts 	the 	injury 	that 	the 	government 	as 	an
entity 	is 	responsible 	under 	§ 	1983.” 	Monell 	v. 	Dep’t 	of 	Soc.
Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 	Therefore,
“to 	impose 	§ 	1983 	liability 	on 	a 	municipality, 	a 	plaintiff 	must
show: 	(1) 	that 	his 	constitutional 	rights 	were 	violated; 	(2) 	that
the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate
indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy
or custom caused the violation.” 	McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283,
1289 (11th Cir. 2004).
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abandoned 	and 	is 	no 	longer 	a 	part 	of 	the 	pleader’s 	allegations
against his adversary when an amended complaint is filed).
Plaintiff 	is 	hereby 	cautioned 	that 	if 	he 	does 	not 	file 	an
amended 	complaint 	within 	the 	ordered 	time, 	or 	if 	he 	files 	an
amended 	complaint 	that 	fails 	to 	address 	and 	correct 	the
deficiencies in the original complaint that are described in this
order, 	the 	undersigned 	will 	recommend 	that 	this 	action 	be
dismissed.
II. 	MOTION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF FEES
After careful review of Plaintiff’s motion to proceed without
prepayment 	of 	fees 	(Doc. 	2), 	the 	undersigned 	finds 	that 	it 	does
not 	provide 	enough 	information 	to 	allow 	the 	Court 	to 	determine
whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis
in 	this 	action. 	In 	the 	motion, 	Plaintiff 	states 	that 	he 	is
unemployed but has received income in the past twelve months from
“lawn work.” 	(Doc. 2-1 at 1). 	Plaintiff states that when he does
yard 	work, 	he 	is 	limited 	by 	health 	issues 	and 	only 	makes 	about
$300 a month. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff also notes that he didn’t work in
January 	and 	February 	2025 	because 	of 	“cold 	weather” 	and 	“pain.”
(Id.). 	Plaintiff 	indicates 	that 	he 	has 	absolutely 	no 	money 	in
cash or in a checking or savings account, and that he owns nothing
of 	value. 	(Id. 	at 	2). 	Nevertheless, 	Plaintiff 	reports 	that 	he
has 	regular 	monthly 	expenses 	totaling 	$460 	and 	also 	owes 	$38,000
in child support to his ex-wife, with whom he has an agreement for
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child 	support. 	(Id.). 	However, 	despite 	reporting 	no 	assets 	or
current income along with regular monthly expenses that well exceed
his 	reported 	(and 	irregular) 	monthly 	income, 	Plaintiff 	does 	not
explain 	how 	he 	provides 	for 	his 	basic 	living 	needs 	such 	as 	food,
clothing, 	and 	shelter. 	Therefore, 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	to 	proceed
without prepayment of fees is deficient because it does not convey
a complete and accurate depiction of Plaintiff’s present financial
situation.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed without prepayment
of fees (Doc. 2) is DENIED without prejudice. 	Plaintiff is ORDERED
to file an amended motion to proceed without prepayment of fees on
or 	before 	April 	17, 	2025, 	using 	this 	Court’s 	standard 	form 	for 	a
motion to proceed without prepayment of fees. 	Plaintiff must make
a 	good 	faith 	effort 	to 	carefully 	and 	completely 	respond 	to 	each
question in the motion form so as to aid the Court in determining
whether 	he 	should 	be 	permitted 	to 	proceed 	without 	prepayment 	of
fees. 	Plaintiff must include information that explains how he is
providing for life’s basic necessities, including food, clothing,
and shelter. 	To the extent he is receiving assistance in meeting
the 	basic 	necessities, 	Plaintiff 	must 	detail 	the 	type 	and 	amount
of such assistance and identify each individual, group, or entity
providing such assistance. 	Plaintiff’s amended motion to proceed
without 	prepayment 	of 	fees 	must 	convey 	a 	complete 	and 	accurate
picture 	of 	his 	entire 	financial 	situation. 	In 	lieu 	of 	filing 	an
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amended 	motion 	to 	proceed 	without 	prepayment 	of 	fees, 	Plaintiff
may 	pay 	the 	$405.00 	filing 	and 	administrative 	fees 	for 	a 	civil
action on or before April 17, 2025.
Plaintiff is cautioned that if he fails to fully comply with
this order within the required time, or if he fails to immediately
notify 	the 	Court 	of 	any 	change 	in 	his 	address, 	the 	undersigned
will 	recommend 	that 	this 	action 	be 	dismissed 	for 	failure 	to
prosecute and failure to obey the Court’s order.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff copies of his original
complaint and motion to proceed without prepayment of fees (Docs.
1, 2) for his reference, a copy of this Court’s standard form for
a motion to proceed without prepayment of fees for his use, and a
copy 	of 	this 	Court’s 	Pro 	Se 	Litigant 	Handbook 	for 	his 	review.
Plaintiff 	is 	encouraged 	to 	review 	the 	handbook 	carefully 	and
utilize 	it 	in 	drafting 	his 	amended 	complaint, 	so 	as 	to 	avoid
repetition of the pleading deficiencies identified herein.
DONE this 17th day of March, 2025.
/S/ SONJA F. BIVINS 	_
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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