McCrary v. Godwin

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
FRANKIE McCRARY, AIS # 257888 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
vs. 	) 	CIV. A. NO. 2:23-00334-TFM-N
)
NURSE STEPHANIE GODWIN, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Frankie McCrary, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding without a lawyer, filed a
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Nurse Stephanie Godwin alleging “rude and cruel
unusual punishment,” “unfair health care treatment,” and “discrimination of race and pain and
suffering and violation of rights and giving me a hard time.” (Doc. 1 at 10). The Court construes
these allegations, and the facts provided in Plaintiff’s verified complaint, as claims that Nurse
Godwin was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief, a transfer to the Northern District of Alabama, and
removal of Defendant’s nursing license. (Doc. 1 at 12).
Defendant Godwin has answered the complaint and filed a special report, along with
supporting evidentiary materials, denying the claims asserted against her. (Docs. 24, 26). After
review of Defendant’s filings, the Court converted Defendant’s answer, special report, and
attached affidavit and medical records into a motion for summary judgment. (See Doc. 28). The
Court directed Plaintiff to respond to the motion with affidavits, sworn or verified declarations, or
statements made under penalty of perjury, and other evidentiary materials. (Id.). To date, however,
Plaintiff has filed no response.
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This action has been referred to the undersigned for appropriate action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(R). And Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is now before the Court. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends
the motion be GRANTED.
I. 	Summary Judgment Standard.
Summary judgment is proper if the party asking for summary judgment “shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The “substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court does not “weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter” on summary judgment. Id. at 249. Rather, the Court
“determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 250. “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence” supporting the nonmoving party is not sufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgement. Id. at 252.
Because Defendant is asking for summary judgment, she must demonstrate, by identifying
evidence in the record, the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact or show that the
nonmoving party, Plaintiff, does not have evidence in support of some element of his case on
which he bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-
24 (1986). If Defendant carries her burden, then Plaintiff is required to “‘go beyond the pleadings,’
and by [his] own affidavits, or by ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White
Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
“[I]f the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,”
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then a genuine issue of material fact exists. Hickson Corp. v. Northern Crossarm Co., Inc., 357
F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, courts are required to “view the evidence,
draw all reasonable factual inferences, and resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the non-
movant.” Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1253 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Stryker v. City of
Homewood, 978 F.3d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 2020)). This requirement extends only “to the extent
supportable by the record.” Id. (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007). Where
“opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so
that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
II. 	Complaint Allegations and Summary Judgment Facts.1
Plaintiff alleges that he had surgery in 2020 to remove bone fragments from his big toes,
calluses, and plantar warts, but the problem returned. (Doc. 1 at 4). He contends while incarcerated
at Camden Community Based Facility and Work Center (“Camden”) in 2023, he saw Nurse
Godwin for the issue. He claims he informed Nurse Godwin about the pain being so intense that
he could not walk without a crutch and could not put on shoes. He claims Nurse Godwin “gave
him a hard time because of his race” and told him she could not send him to a foot specialist
because he had to get approved. (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff alleges that Godwin ordered Ibuprofen, foot
soaks, and a rock to scrape his feet, but it did not work. (Id. at 5-6). Plaintiff also alleges that he
got overheated and dehydrated and told Godwin his fingers were numb and requested an x-ray,
1 	Because Plaintiff's complaint was signed under penalty of perjury (see Doc. 1 at 12), the
Court will consider the factual allegations in the complaint in ruling on the motion for summary
judgment. See Perry v. Thompson, 786 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). The
undersigned notes, however, the “facts, as accepted at the summary judgment stage of the
proceedings, may not be the actual facts of the case.” Priester v. City of Riveria Beach, 208 F.3d
919, 925 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000).
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but he did not get it. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff also alleges that he saw Nurse Godwin on August 24, 2023
and she told him she tried to get him approved to see a podiatrist, but the request was denied. (Id.
at 8). Plaintiff claims, as of August 2023, the provided treatments are not working, he is still in
pain, and has not worn shoes in three months. (Id. at 9).
Nurse Godwin, a Certified Registered Nurse Practitioner (CRNP) licensed in the State of
Alabama, previously worked as a CRNP, at Camden. (Doc. 26-1). She asserts she never denied
Plaintiff treatment based or race or for any reason. (Doc. 26-1). As a CRNP at Camden, she
provided treatment to Plaintiff for his foot calluses, plantar warts (and other complaints), and
requested an offsite podiatry referral, but it was denied by the Utilization Management department.
In support of her denial, Nurse Godwin cites to relevant medical records of Plaintiff, including his
sick call requests, evaluation notes, and diagnostic scans. (See Doc. 26-2). The relevant medical
records are summarized as follows:
On January 10, 2023, while incarcerated at Loxley Community Work Center, Plaintiff was
seen by CRNP Brittany Murry for a follow-up on bilateral hip and right foot pain. Examination
revealed a callus to the right outer side of the sole of Plaintiff’s foot and another to the outer side
of the right great toe with no open lesions or drainage. She discontinued Cymbalta and started
Plaintiff on Ibuprofen 800mg three times a day (TID), Vitamin A&D ointment, muscle rub, and
benzoyl peroxide. She also shaved down the calluses. (Doc. 26-2 at 1).
On May 12, 2023, Plaintiff was evaluated by CRNP Murray for right side and pain in both
feet, reporting a prior surgery in 2018 where he had bone fragments removed from his feet. A
plantar wart was observed to the lateral side of the right foot near the fifth toe; Plaintiff ambulated
with a steady gait, and CRNP Murry ordered x-rays of both feet, Ibuprofen, and analgesic balm.
She also removed the plantar wart with a punch biopsy. (Doc. 26-2 at 7). The x-rays were
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performed the same day. The results confirmed the left foot was normal and, while the right had
no acute fracture, dislocation, soft tissue swelling, or osteomyelitis, a small well-corticated osseous
density at the distal fibula was noted (presumed to be a remote injury). (Doc. 26-2 at 9).
On May 30, 2023, Plaintiff was transferred from Loxley Work Release to Camden Work
Release. (Doc. 26-2 at 11).
On June 27, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a sick call request complaining of bump on his arm
that itches, something in his left eye, and a plantar wart on his feet that needed treatment. When
evaluated by LPN Adrien Pettway, Plaintiff was noted to have a callus area to the right foot
(removed in the past) and dry skin on his arms. (Doc. 26-2 at 12-13).
On June 29, 2023, Plaintiff was seen by Nurse Godwin for calluses and foot pain, which
he complained he had been dealing with for years. Upon examination, Nurse Godwin noted his
recent foot x-rays, that his feet had no swelling or open wounds, but calluses and a plantar wart
were observed. Plaintiff refused foot soaks and a pumice stone. Nurse Godwin ordered Mediplast
salicylic acid pads to apply to the calluses and wart every three days and continued Ibuprofen for
pain. She also ordered gel insoles because Plaintiff was wearing shoes without insoles. (Doc. 26-
2 at 14).
On July 11, 2023, Plaintiff signed a receipt for a basin for foot soaks. (Doc. 26-2 at 15).
On July 24, 2023, Plaintiff went to the emergency department for complaints of left side
numbness and headache. He returned from the hospital, stating they gave him some fluids and did
some blood work, and he felt better. (Doc. 26-2 at 16-18).
On July 25, 2023, Plaintiff signed a receipt for insoles. (Doc. 26-2 at 19).
On July 27, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a sick call request stating he could not grip with his
hands and needed to follow-up on his feet. He stated he had been soaking his feet and using
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Mediplast but it was not working because his feet were in pain and he could not stand for anything
to touch them. (Doc. 26-2 at 20). He was examined by RN Tonya Gleeson for his complaints.
Plaintiff was given Motrin to take over 3-5 days and would follow-up with the NP for his feet and
from his hospitalization for heat exposure. (Doc. 26-2 at 21).
On August 3, 2023, Nurse Godwin saw Plaintiff for follow-up. He reported that a “spider”
bit him the previous night on his right side, but there was no redness or bite. He also complained
of ongoing foot pain and his hands hurting at times. He reported he was soaking his feet and using
Mediplast as ordered but it hurt to walk on his feet. Examination revealed calluses on the bottom
of both feet without redness, swelling, or signs or symptoms of infection and a plantar wart on the
right foot. Athlete’s foot was observed between the second and third toes on the left foot. Nurse
Godwin ordered continued foot soaks, Ibuprofen 400 mg TID, and tolnaflate cream for 14 days
for athlete’s foot. (Doc. 26-2 at 22-23). She also wrote a slides profile for one year and an order
for labs to help indicate increased inflammatory activity in the body to evaluate whether Plaintiff’s
pain and reported inability to grasp was due to rheumatoid arthritis or inflammation. (Doc. 26-2 at
24). The labs were negative. (Doc. 26-1 at 8).
On August 11, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a sick call request for a follow-up on his feet and
stating he never got his right ear flushed. (Doc. 26-2 at 25). He was seen by Nurse Godwin on
August 17, 2023, and reported soaking his feet with no relief and also complained of right shoulder
and hand pain. Examination revealed he was neurologically intact with no deficits and no swelling
in his hands or feet. Multiple calluses were observed to the bottom of his feet, as well as a plantar
wart on his right foot. Nurse Godwin ordered x-rays of his right shoulder and hand, prescribed
Mobile 7.5 mg to reduce pain and inflammation, and planned to submit a podiatry consult for
Plaintiff’s continued complaints of foot pain.
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On August 18, 2023, Nurse Godwin submitted a consultation request for Plaintiff to see a
podiatrist. She noted that Plaintiff had multiple calluses on the bottom of his feet and a plantar
wart on the right foot, explained his history and current treatments (including that he had no relief
with Mediplast and foot soaks), and that he complained his pain was affecting activities of daily
living. (Doc. 26-2 at 27). On August 21, 2023, the UM physician denied the podiatry consult,
providing that treatment of cutaneous warts is not always necessary and spontaneous resolution
can occur, and if it was determined that treatment was needed, there were multiple topical therapies
that could be used onsite. The UM physician added that calluses can also be managed onsite with
debulking and salicylic acid. (Doc. 26-2 at 28-29).
On August 22, 203, Plaintiff had x-rays of his right hand and shoulder, which showed no
acute osseous abnormalities. (Doc. 26-2 at 30).
On August 24, 2023, Nurse Godwin saw Plaintiff to follow-up on his feet issues. Plaintiff
again requested to see a podiatrist. Examination revealed no swelling or redness to his feet. Pedal
pulses were positive, and capillary refills were under 3 seconds, indicating blood flow to his feet
was normal. Plaintiff’s skin was dry, with multiple calluses on the bottom of the feet and a plantar
wart to the right foot. Nurse Godwin noted the denial of the podiatry referral and ordered Plaintiff
to continue foot soaks, Mediplast, and use a pumice stone (to exfoliate skin and soften calluses),
for which he signed a receipt. Nurse Godwin also continued Mobic and educated Plaintiff on
wearing proper fitting shoes. She further ordered a uric acid level to test for gout, urine screening,
and fentanyl screen. (Doc. 26-2 at 31-32).
On September 7, 2023, Nurse Godwin saw Plaintiff for a scrotal boil, for which she
prescribed Bactrim (antibiotic ointment) and warm compresses. (Doc. 26-2 at 33). On September
13, 2023, Nurse Godwin saw him for a follow-up regarding the scrotal boil, which had improved.
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Plaintiff also reported right hand/fourth digit pain. He denied injury and stated he had the pain for
a few months. Nurse Godwin noted that his hand x-rays were unremarkable, no redness or swelling
was observed, and he moved the hand well. Nurse Godwin continued Bactrim and discussed the
need for a possible irrigation and drainage of the boil if it did not resolve. She ordered continued
foot soaks and using the pumice stone, continuing Mobic, and applying an ace wrap to the right
hand. This was Nurse Godwin’s last visit with Plaintiff, and she had no further involvement in his
care. (Doc. 26-2 at 33-34).
On September 21, 2023, Plaintiff was scheduled for a follow-up with Nurse Godwin, but
he refused and wrote that he was “tired of dealing with Nurse provider Ms. Godwin.” (Doc. 26-2
at 35).
On September 26, 2023, Plaintiff was transferred from Camden to Frank Lee Work Release.
He reported doing okay and had a steady gait and full range of motion. Plaintiff stated he had no
further issues with the boil. (Doc. 26-2 at 36).
On November 1, 2023, Plaintiff refused an annual physical examination. (Doc. 26-2 at 37).
On November 6, 2023, Plaintiff saw PA-C Donald McArthur for dry skin and acne. He
also had tinea pedis interdigit and multiple plantar callouses. PA-C McArthur assessed acne/focal
folliculitis and ordered benzyl peroxide, doxycycline for the pustule, tolnaftate cream for the tinea
pedis, Mediplast for the chronic plantar calluses, and Vaseline for dry skin. (Doc. 26-2 at 34).
On November 21, 2023, Plaintiff saw RN K. Smith for calluses. His gait was steady, and
he had full range of motion. On November 27, 2023, he had a follow-up for the foot calluses with
PA-C McArthur. Plaintiff reported he never received the Mediplast and complained of daily
plantar arch pain into the great toes. He reported that Naproxen had helped in the past. PA-C
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McArthur assessed possible fasciitis, provided a stretches handout, and prescribed Naproxen. (Doc.
26-2 at 39-40).
On December 11, 2023, Plaintiff saw PA-C McArthur regarding his ears and heartburn.
On January 3, 2024, Plaintiff transferred from Frank Lee Work Release to Red Eagle Work
Center. (Doc. 26-2 at 41).
On January 17, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a sick call request stating he needed to get his
slide profile updated and he could not stand to put on any shoes or boots. (Doc. 26-2 at 42). He
then saw a medical provider and stated his calluses and plantar warts made it hard for him to wear
his boots. He also requested an order for foot soaks. Upon examination, Plaintiff had calluses to
the right foot with no edema, redness, or any other visible abnormality except for mild protrusion
of the proximal phalanx of the right great toe. (Doc. 26-2 at 43).
January 18, 2024, Plaintiff saw RN S. Williams and stated his feet hurt and he could not
stand. Plaintiff left the exam mid-visit to use the restroom, upon return he denied pain, but stated
he couldn’t stand on his feet but could not describe why. Eventually, Plaintiff stated, “I feel like
they will give out.” Upon examination, Plaintiff had athlete’s foot, which was being treated. No
edema or deformity was noted, as was a positive range of motion bilateral. That same day, Plaintiff
transferred from Red Eagle Work Center to Kilby Correctional Facility (“Kilby”). He was noted
to be in a wheelchair, skin intact, no trauma noted. (Doc. 26-2 at 44-45).
On January 22, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a sick call request stating his feet “are back good.”
He wrote the state boots were the cause of the problem and requested insoles for the boots. (Doc.
26-2 at 46). Plaintiff submitted another sick call request that day stating that he came to Kilby on
January 19, 2024 for his feet and being unable to stand and put pressure on them and was in a
wheelchair, but since then, Plaintiff stated he soaked his feet each day and can now stand and put
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pressure on both feet and did not need a wheelchair. Plaintiff wrote he was ready to go back to his
camp as the state boots caused this problem. (Doc. 26-2 at 47).
On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff was examined by RN L. Standbern and requested to back to
his camp and for shoe insoles due to foot calluses. He was informed that shoe insoles could not be
ordered at that time and that a physician would have to medically clear him to return to work
release. Plaintiff stated that his feet were much better now and he was able to walk properly after
foot soaks. (Doc. 26-2 at 48).
On January 24, 2024, Plaintiff submitted another sick call request stating his “feet are good.”
(Doc. 26-2 at 49).
On January 26, 2024, Plaintiff saw CRNP M. Kilpatrick for an evaluation. CRNP
Kilpatrick noted Plaintiff had been seen at Red Eagle on January 18, 2024 for bilateral foot pain
and stated he “can’t stand.” Nursing staff contacted Dr. Rahming and Plaintiff’s health code was
changed to HC-4. Plaintiff stated, “It was all a misunderstanding, I am fine, my feet don’t hurt at
all. It was from the boots I was wearing.” He denied any pain or complaints. Plaintiff was
ambulatory with a steady gait and coordinated movements, in no acute distress. No swelling,
erythema, edema, ecchymosis, excessive warmth, tenderness, wounds, or obvious deformity of the
toes/feet/lower extremities, with full range of motions and no limitations. The plantar soles had
scattered, mild callus formation but no significant abnormalities or open areas were observed.
Plaintiff was assessed as having resolved foot pain and continued the previous treatment as
prescribed. Plaintiff’s health code was changed from HC-4 back to HC-1 and it was ordered that
Plaintiff could return to his camp of origin. (Doc. 26-2 at 51-52).
On February 14, 2024, Plaintiff was transferred from Kilby back to Red Eagle Work Center.
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On February 23, 2024, Plaintiff saw RN S. Williams and stated he needed his medications
renewed for his foot pain and a basin for soaking his feet. (Doc. 26-2 at 54).
On March 5, 2024, Plaintiff refused a sick call follow-up for foot pain. And he again
refused to see the provider on May 6, 2024. (Doc. 26-2 at 55).
On May 6, 2024, Plaintiff transferred from Red Eagle Work Center to Kilby. And on May
14, 2024, Plaintiff transferred from Kilby to North Alabama Community Work Center, where he
remains. (Doc. 26-2 at 57-58).
III. 	Discussion.
The Eighth Amendment provides that, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. “The
Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishments prohibits prison officials from
exhibiting deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs.” Campbell v. Sikes, 169
F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). 	Such a
claim “is said to have two components, an objective component, which inquires whether the
alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation, and a
subjective component, which inquires whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state
of mind. Sims v. Mashburn, 25 F.3d 980, 983 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 8 (1992)).
To meet the objective element required to demonstrate a denial of medical care in violation
of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff first must demonstrate the existence of an “objectively
serious medical need.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). A serious medical
need is “‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Id.
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(quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994), overruled in
part on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 n. 9 (2002)). “In either of these
situations, the medical need must be one that, if left unattended, pos[es] a substantial risk of serious
harm.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In order to meet the subjective requirement of an Eighth Amendment denial of medical
care claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate “deliberate indifference” to a serious medical need. Farrow,
320 F.3d at 1243. “Deliberate indifference” entails more than negligence. Estelle, 429 U.S. at
106; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has clarified that
to establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted with
“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,” Id. at 839. This requires that a plaintiff
“show that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a
substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if the defendant
‘actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety,’ he ‘cannot be found liable under
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause’ if he ‘responded reasonably to the risk.’” Wade v.
McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844–45).
“Delay in access to medical attention can violate the Eighth Amendment . . . when it is
tantamount to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187 (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). “Cases stating a constitutional claim for immediate or emergency
medical attention have concerned medical needs that are obvious even to a layperson because they
involve life-threatening conditions or situations where it is apparent that delay would detrimentally
exacerbate the medical problem.” Id.
An inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional
violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the
detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment to succeed.” Further, we have held
that “[t]he tolerable length of delay in providing medical attention depends on the
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nature of the medical need and the reason for the delay.” Consequently, delay in
medical treatment must be interpreted in the context of the seriousness of the
medical need, deciding whether the delay worsened the medical condition, and
considering the reason for delay.
Id. at 1188-89 (internal citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to establish his claim on every level. That is, Plaintiff has not
shown that he suffered an objectively serious medical need. He has not shown that Nurse Godwin
was deliberately indifferent to his medical need(s). Nor has he shown that any delay in care
worsened his symptoms or caused damage to his health.
1. 	Objective Component
Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of an objectively serious medical
need. See Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 744 F.2d 1567, 1567, 1576 (11th Cir. 1985). In his complaint,
he alleges Nurse Godwin was deliberately indifferent in treating him for foot calluses and plantar
warts. These conditions are not objectively serious medical needs. Based on the record before the
Court, Plaintiff never presented with foot swelling, redness, or signs or symptoms of infection.
Testing confirmed blood flow to Plaintiff’s feet was normal. He repeatedly refused follow-up
appointments for care. While Plaintiff’s medical condition likely caused discomfort, his foot
calluses and plantar wart(s) are not “extreme” conditions nor did they pose an “unreasonable risk
of serious damage to his future health” if left unchecked, as to rise to a constitutional level.
Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2004).
Notably, other courts have found calluses alone do not constitute a serious medical need.
See Maday v. Dooley, No. 4:17-cv-04168-KES, 2019 WL 4747058, at *8 (D.S.D. Sept. 30,
2019) (unpublished) (citing Stevens v. City of New York, 2013 WL 81327, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8,
2013) (finding calluses allegedly caused by prison-issued footwear was not a serious medical
need); Wagle v. Skutt, 2011 WL 6004344, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2011) (same); Liverman v.
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Gubernik, 2010 WL 3703314, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2010) (same); Grear v. Gelabert, 2009
WL 607407, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2009) (holding plaintiff’s calluses were not a serious
medical need because there was no infection and did not require medical treatment)).
Even if Plaintiff had carried his burden of showing an objectively serious medical need,
he has failed to establish that Nurse Godwin was deliberately indifferent to his medical need(s).
2. 	Subjective Component.
Plaintiff’s allegation that Nurse Godwin was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs
is belied by the record and falls drastically short of a constitutional violation. The record confirms
that Nurse Godwin repeatedly examined Plaintiff for complaints related to calluses and plantar
warts. She reviewed x-rays and medical records and conducted independent examinations of
Plaintiff before prescribing him foot soaks, Mediplast salicylic acid pads, a pumice stone, slide
profile, and ibuprofen for pain. She also attempted to send him to a podiatrist, per his request,
though it was refused by the UM physician. Accordingly, it is clear that Plaintiff received treatment
for his foot issues, though he disagrees with the course of treatment provided.
While the Eighth Amendment requires the government to “provide medical care for those
whom it is punishing by incarceration,” it does not provide inmates a right to any particular or
specific type of medical treatment, including procedures or medications. Estelle, at 103-106. And
courts have consistently found that differences of opinion between an inmate and the prison
medical staff over the specific treatment or medication to be provided does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. See Id. at 106. Generally, “[w]hen a prison inmate has received medical care,
courts hesitate to find an Eighth Amendment violation,” Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1035
(11th Cir. 1989), and clearly the record shows that Plaintiff received medical care while at Camden
(and all Alabama prisons) – as every sick call request resulted in an appointment, scans were
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obtained, and prescriptions were given. Plaintiff also received treatment for athlete’s foot, lab tests
for rheumatoid arthritis, inflammation, gout, or other conditions that could have been causing his
foot pain and alleged inability to grasp with his hands. Because the record confirms Plaintiff
received treatment for his medical condition, his claim is more appropriately characterized as a
dispute to the medical judgment of Nurse Godwin. Such a claim does not rise to a constitutional
level. See Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976) (“Where a prisoner has received
some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are
generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound
in state tort law.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff has utterly failed to show that Nurse Godwin was
deliberately indifferent to his medical need(s).
3. 	Delay in Medical Treatment.
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to claim Nurse Godwin delayed him medical treatment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, his claim also fails.
The law is clear, mere delays in receipt of medical care do not rise to a constitutional
violation. Cf., Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs., 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.
1985) (noting that where there is a “’mere delay in surgery,’ a prisoner can make ‘no claim for
deliberate medical indifference unless the denial was harmful.’”) (citation omitted). However,
delays in medical treatment for non-medical reasons, Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176
(11th Cir. 2011) (“A defendant who delays necessary treatment for non-medical reasons may
exhibit deliberate indifference.”), and delays which worsen a medical condition may establish a
constitutional violation. Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Ctr., 40 F.3d at 1188-89.
Here, Plaintiff has placed no evidence before the Court that his condition worsened over
time or that any delay in treatment caused him harm. In fact, the record reflects that after Plaintiff
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was transferred from work release centers to Kilby Correctional Facility, his feet were almost
immediately “back good.” (Doc. 26-2 at 46). Plaintiff explained that since arriving at Kilby in a
wheelchair, unable to stand and put pressure on his feet, he had been soaking his feet each day (as
Nurse Godwin previously prescribed), and he could now stand and put pressure on both feet and
did not need a wheelchair. (Doc. 26-2 at 47). According to Plaintiff, the state issued boots were
the problem, and he was ready to return to a work release camp. (Id.). Thereafter, the record
contains no further complaints of foot pain, and Plaintiff has not alleged any.
Thus, the record confirms that his medical condition improved over time, not worsened.
IV. 	Conclusion.
For these reasons, the undersigned concludes that there are no genuine issues of material
fact, and that Defendant Nurse Godwin is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims and
causes of action interposed by Plaintiff McCrary. Therefore, it is recommended that Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment be GRANTED on all counts and that Plaintiff McCrary’s action
against Defendant Nurse Godwin be DISMISSED with prejudice.
The instructions that follow the undersigned’s signature contain important information
regarding objections to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner
provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within
fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with
the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); S.D. Ala. Gen.LR 72(c).
The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a
magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in
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accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal
the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was
informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In
the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if
necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must
identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for
the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation where
the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers
to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.
DONE this 6th day of December 2024.
/s/ KATHERINE P. NELSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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