Mosley v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DONALD RICHARD MOSLEY, 	*
*
Plaintiff, 	*
*
vs. 	* CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-00259-KD-B
*
T-MOBILE USA, INC., et al., 	*
*
Defendants. 	*
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This action is before the Court on review.1 	On June 27, 2025,
Plaintiff 	Donald 	Richard 	Mosley 	(“Mosley”), 	proceeding 	pro 	se,
commenced this civil action by filing a complaint and a motion to
proceed without prepayment of fees. 	(Docs. 1, 2).
In his complaint, Mosley alleged that he purchased a T-Mobile
phone based on a promotional offer that allowed him to prepay for
monthly cell phone service, but there was never a contract between
Mosley and T-Mobile that obligated him to pay T-Mobile for service.
(Doc. 	1 	at 	8-9). 	Shortly 	after 	he 	purchased 	the 	phone, 	Mosley
went 	to 	prison. 	(Id. 	at 	8). 	After 	Mosley 	was 	transferred 	from
prison 	to 	a 	halfway 	house, 	he 	called 	his 	father, 	who 	accused 	him
of 	trying 	to 	open 	accounts 	in 	his 	name 	and 	hung 	up 	on 	him. 	(Id.
at 	9). 	According 	to 	Mosley, 	he 	eventually 	determined 	that 	his
1 This case has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge
for appropriate action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and S.D.
Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(S).
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father’s 	anger 	stemmed 	from 	actions 	taken 	by 	T-Mobile 	to 	collect
alleged 	debts 	from 	Mosley 	during 	his 	incarceration. 	(Id.).
Specifically, Mosley alleged that T-Mobile had falsely claimed he
owed 	it 	money 	and 	forwarded 	his 	account 	to 	a 	collection 	agency,
which 	had 	called 	and 	harassed 	his 	father 	for 	payment 	because 	he
had 	a 	similar 	name. 	(Id.). 	After 	learning 	what 	had 	happened,
Mosley called his father back and explained the situation to him.
(Id.). 	According 	to 	Mosley, 	this 	was 	his 	last 	conversation 	with
his 	father 	before 	his 	father’s 	death, 	meaning 	that 	Mosley’s 	last
two conversations with his father were “about T-Mobile’s mistakes,
harassment, 	violations.” 	(Id.). 	Mosley 	alleged 	that 	T-Mobile’s
actions 	caused 	his 	father 	to 	disown 	him 	and 	exclude 	him 	from
receiving any inheritance, and also caused other family members to
treat him harshly. 	(Id. at 9-10).
Mosley’s 	complaint 	named 	T-Mobile 	USA, 	Inc. 	and 	numerous 	T-
Mobile 	executives 	and 	board 	members 	as 	defendants. 	(Id. 	at 	1-3,
7). 	Mosley 	invoked 	federal 	question 	jurisdiction 	based 	on 	the
fact that he purported to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Bivens 	v. 	Six 	Unknown 	Named 	Agents 	of 	Fed. 	Bureau 	of 	Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (“Bivens”). 	(Id. at 3). 	In particular, Mosley
purported 	to 	raise 	§ 	1983 	and/or 	Bivens 	claims 	for 	“slander,
defamation, 	libel 	etc.” 	and 	“violations 	of 	constitutional 	rights
and 	much 	more.” 	(Id.). 	Mosley 	stated 	that 	he 	did 	not 	“know
exactly 	what 	all 	rights 	and 	violations 	that 	T-Mobile’s 	actions
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fall 	under 	but 	they 	are 	wrong.” 	(Id. 	at 	10). 	Mosley 	requested
compensatory 	damages, 	punitive 	damages, 	declaratory 	relief, 	and
injunctive relief. 	(Id. at 5, 10).
In 	an 	order 	dated 	July 	2, 	2025, 	the 	Court 	granted 	Mosley’s
motion 	for 	leave 	to 	proceed 	without 	prepayment 	of 	fees 	but 	found
that Mosley’s complaint failed to allege a valid basis for federal
subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	and 	was 	an 	impermissible 	shotgun
pleading. 	(Doc. 	3 	at 	1). 	The 	Court 	noted 	that 	claims 	asserted
under 	§ 	1983 	or 	Bivens 	such 	as 	Mosley’s 	would 	ordinarily 	qualify
for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 	(Id. at
10). 	However, the Court found that Mosley’s complaint provided no
basis to conclude that any defendant acted under color of state or
federal law or violated Mosley’s federal rights, and that Mosley’s
§ 	1983 	and 	Bivens 	claims 	were 	therefore 	“so 	frivolous 	and
insubstantial 	that 	they 	[did] 	not 	confer 	federal 	question
jurisdiction 	in 	this 	action.” 	(Id. 	at 	10-11). 	The 	Court 	also
noted 	that 	Mosley 	failed 	to 	allege 	the 	existence 	of 	diversity
jurisdiction 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1332 	because 	his 	allegations 	did
not 	establish 	complete 	diversity 	of 	citizenship 	between 	the
parties. 	(Id. at 12). 	The Court concluded: “Because it does not
present 	a 	colorable 	federal 	question 	and 	fails 	to 	establish
complete 	diversity 	of 	citizenship, 	Mosley’s 	complaint, 	as
currently drafted, fails to allege a valid basis for this Court to
exercise 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	over 	this 	matter.” 	(Id. 	at
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12-13).
The 	Court 	further 	explained 	that 	Mosley’s 	complaint 	was 	a
deficient 	shotgun 	pleading 	that 	failed 	to 	comply 	with 	federal
pleading 	standards. 	(Id. 	at 	13-14). 	In 	particular, 	the 	Court
noted 	that 	Mosley’s 	complaint 	violated 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil
Procedure 	10(b) 	and 	the 	prohibition 	against 	shotgun 	pleadings
because 	it 	did 	not 	separate 	his 	claims 	for 	relief 	or 	causes 	of
action 	into 	different 	counts 	and 	did 	not 	specify 	which 	factual
allegations 	were 	intended 	to 	support 	which 	claims. 	(Id. 	at 	13).
Relatedly, 	the 	Court 	observed 	that 	Mosley’s 	complaint 	failed 	to
make 	clear 	what 	specific 	legal 	claims 	he 	was 	raising. 	(Id.).
Finally, 	the 	Court 	noted 	that 	Mosley’s 	complaint 	was 	“guilty 	of
the 	shotgun 	pleading 	‘sin 	of 	asserting 	multiple 	claims 	against
multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are
responsible 	for 	which 	acts 	or 	omissions.’” 	(Id. 	at 	14 	(citation
omitted)).
The 	Court 	found 	that 	the 	foregoing 	pleading 	deficiencies
hindered its “ability to screen Mosley’s complaint for the purpose
of 	determining 	whether 	his 	claims 	are 	subject 	to 	sua 	sponte
dismissal 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1915(e).” 	(Id.). 	Thus, 	the
Court 	struck 	Mosley’s 	complaint 	and 	granted 	Mosley 	leave 	to 	file
an 	amended 	complaint 	on 	or 	before 	August 	1, 	2025, 	which 	stated 	a
valid basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction and corrected
the 	shotgun 	pleading 	deficiencies 	outlined 	in 	the 	Court’s 	order.
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(Id. 	at 	15). 	The 	Court 	cautioned 	Mosley 	that 	if 	he 	did 	not 	file
an 	amended 	complaint 	by 	the 	August 	1, 	2025 	deadline, 	the
undersigned 	would 	recommend 	that 	this 	action 	be 	dismissed. 	(Id.
at 17). 	The Court directed the Clerk to send Mosley a copy of his
original 	complaint 	for 	his 	reference, 	along 	with 	a 	copy 	of 	this
Court’s 	Pro 	Se 	Litigant 	Handbook. 	(Id.). 	The 	Court 	encouraged
Mosley to review the Pro Se Litigant Handbook carefully and utilize
it 	in 	drafting 	an 	amended 	complaint 	so 	as 	to 	avoid 	repetition 	of
his pleading errors. 	(Id. at 17-18).
The Court’s July 2, 2025 order and the documents accompanying
it 	were 	mailed 	to 	Mosley 	at 	his 	address 	of 	record, 	and 	they 	have
not been returned as undeliverable. 	However, Mosley has not filed
an 	amended 	complaint 	to 	date, 	despite 	being 	ordered 	to 	do 	so 	no
later 	than 	August 	1, 	2025. 	Mosley 	has 	not 	requested 	additional
time 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	Court’s 	order, 	he 	has 	not 	indicated 	that
he is unable to comply with the Court’s order, and he has provided
no explanation for his failure to timely file an amended complaint
as ordered.
A court “may sua sponte dismiss an action pursuant to Federal
Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	41(b) 	if 	the 	plaintiff 	fails 	to 	comply
with court rules or a court order.” 	Smith v. Bruster, 424 F. App’x
912, 	914 	(11th 	Cir. 	2011) 	(per 	curiam) 	(citing 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P.
41(b); 	Betty 	K 	Agencies, 	Ltd. 	v. 	M/V 	Monada, 	432 	F.3d 	1333, 	1337
(11th Cir. 2005)). 	“In addition to its power under Rule 41(b), a
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court also has the inherent ability to dismiss a claim in light of
its authority to enforce its orders and provide for the efficient
disposition of litigation.” 	Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483
(11th 	Cir. 	2006) 	(citing 	Link 	v. 	Wabash 	R.R., 	370 	U.S. 	626, 	630–
31 	(1962)). 	To 	dismiss 	an 	action 	with 	prejudice 	for 	failure 	to
prosecute, 	comply 	with 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure, 	or
follow a court order, the court must find “a clear record of delay
or 	willful 	conduct 	and 	that 	lesser 	sanctions 	are 	inadequate 	to
correct such conduct.” 	Betty K Agencies, 432 F.3d at 1339. 	“While
dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, dismissal upon disregard of
an 	order, 	especially 	where 	the 	litigant 	has 	been 	forewarned,
generally 	is 	not 	an 	abuse 	of 	discretion.” 	Moon 	v. 	Newsome, 	863
F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).
As 	noted 	previously, 	Mosley 	has 	made 	no 	apparent 	attempt 	to
comply 	with 	the 	Court’s 	order 	directing 	him 	to 	file 	an 	amended
complaint 	by 	August 	1, 	2025, 	despite 	the 	undersigned’s 	clear
warning that his failure to file an amended complaint within that
time 	would 	result 	in 	a 	recommendation 	that 	this 	action 	be
dismissed. 	Mosley’s 	failure 	to 	comply 	with 	or 	respond 	to 	the
Court’s 	order 	to 	file 	an 	amended 	complaint 	suggests 	that 	he 	has
abandoned 	the 	prosecution 	of 	this 	action. 	In 	light 	of 	Mosley’s
failure 	to 	prosecute 	this 	action, 	and 	his 	apparently 	willful
failure 	to 	obey 	this 	Court’s 	order 	by 	timely 	filing 	an 	amended
complaint 	as 	directed, 	it 	is 	recommended 	that 	this 	action 	be
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DISMISSED without prejudice, as it appears no lesser sanction will
suffice to induce his compliance with the Court’s directives.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS
A 	copy 	of 	this 	report 	and 	recommendation 	shall 	be 	served 	on
all parties in the manner provided by law. 	Any party who objects
to 	this 	recommendation 	or 	anything 	in 	it 	must, 	within 	fourteen
(14) 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	service 	of 	this 	document, 	file 	specific
written objections with the Clerk of this Court. 	See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b); 	S.D. 	Ala. 	GenLR 	72(c). 	The
parties 	should 	note 	that 	under 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	Rule 	3-1, 	“[a]
party 	failing 	to 	object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations 	contained 	in 	a 	report 	and 	recommendation 	in
accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the
right 	to 	challenge 	on 	appeal 	the 	district 	court’s 	order 	based 	on
unobjected-to 	factual 	and 	legal 	conclusions 	if 	the 	party 	was
informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on
appeal 	for 	failing 	to 	object. 	In 	the 	absence 	of 	a 	proper
objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error
if necessary in the interests of justice.” 	11th Cir. R. 3-1.
In 	order 	to 	be 	specific, 	an 	objection 	must 	identify 	the
specific 	finding 	or 	recommendation 	to 	which 	objection 	is 	made,
state 	the 	basis 	for 	the 	objection, 	and 	specify 	the 	place 	in 	the
Magistrate 	Judge’s 	report 	and 	recommendation 	where 	the 	disputed
determination is found. 	An objection that merely incorporates by
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reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is
not specific.
DONE this 18th day of August, 2025.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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