Dallas v. City of Mobile, Alabama

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTINE DALLAS, etc., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CIV. A. NO. 23-0466-KD-MU
)
CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of Mobile’s (“the City”) Partial
Motion to Dismiss in which it seeks dismissal of part of the Fourth Claim for Relief set
out in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 25), which is the operative complaint,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 30). Plaintiff
has filed a response in opposition to the City’s motion (Doc. 32), and the City has filed a
reply brief in support of its motion (Doc. 33). This motion has been referred to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge for entry of a report and recommendation, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and S.D. Ala. Gen LR 72(a)(2)(S). Upon consideration of all
relevant filings in this case and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends that
Defendant City of Mobile’s Partial Motion to Dismiss a portion of the Fourth Claim be
GRANTED, as set forth herein.
I. RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS1
1 The Court recognizes that the City may dispute many of these alleged facts; however,
for consideration of this motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s factual allegations must be
accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See McElmurray v.
Consol. Gov’t of Augusta-Richmond Cty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007).
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On September 18, 2024, Plaintiff Christine Dallas, as the Administrator for the
Estate of Jawan Lee McGee Dallas, filed her Amended Complaint, which is now the
operative complaint in this action, against the City of Mobile, Alabama, Jarred Hutto,
and Christian Davila. (Doc. 25). On July 2, 2023, City of Mobile police officers Hutto and
Davila were directed to respond to a 911 call of a potential burglary at Lot 33 on 5413
Carol Plantation Road. (Id.; PageID. 199-200). While in route to Lot 33, Hutto and
Davila stopped at Lot 27 and approached Jawan Dallas (“Jawan”), who was seated in
the driver’s seat of his vehicle, and an unidentified white male who was standing in a
yard inside a fence. (Id.; PageID. 200). They immediately began to question Jawan and
the white male about a burglary and ordered Jawan and the white male to produce their
identification cards, which the white male did. (Id.). Jawan began to look around in his
vehicle and told Hutto and Davila that they were violating his rights. (Id.; PageID. 200-
01).
After a brief exchange, Jawan was told to exit his vehicle, he complied, and
Davila guided him to the rear of his vehicle. (Id.; PageID. 201). Jawan then attempted to
flee from Hutto and Davila; however, he was immediately tackled to the ground by
Davila. (Id.). According to an eyewitness, Jawan, who was not resisting, was tased
several times by Hutto and Davila. (Id). The eyewitness also observed and heard Jawan
cry out for help as he was being assaulted by Hutto and Davila. (Id.). The 911 caller, who
lived at Lot 33, and his companion also observed the use of force towards Jawan by
Hutto and Davila. (Id.; PageID. 202). They told other responding officers on the night of
the incident that the beating and tasing of Jawan was excessive and unnecessary. (Id.).
They stated that they saw Hutto and Davila striking Jawan several times as he pleaded
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for them to stop. (Id.). The 911 caller and his companion also confirmed that Jawan
was not the person who was on their property. (Id.).
After being assaulted by Hutto and Davila, Jawan was placed in handcuffs and
made to lay on his back. (Id.). While on his back, Jawan begged Hutto and Davila for
help, telling them that he could not breathe because of his asthma. (Id.). In response
to his plea for help, Davila told Jawan to shut the f*ck up repeatedly. (Id.). However,
Jawan continued to beg for help saying that he could not breathe. (Id.). Davila then told
Jawan that “if he doesn’t shut the fuck up, he was going to punch him in the stomach.”
(Id.). Jawan then said, “I can't breathe.... I don't want to be George Floyd.” (Id.; PageID.
203).
After an African-American MPD officer arrived at the scene, he lifted Jawan off
his back so that Jawan could breathe. (Id.). However, Jawan still labored to breathe
and asked if he could lay on his back again, so that officer allowed him to do so. (Id.). At
some point thereafter, another officer arrived on the scene and ordered that Jawan be
placed on his stomach. (Id.). After Jawan was placed on his stomach, he told the
officer that he could not breathe on his stomach. (Id.). Eventually, Jawan was lifted up
and placed in the backseat of a patrol car. (Id.).
EMTs responded to the scene to assist Jawan. (Id.). During Jawan’s
interaction with the EMTs, he continually cried out that he could not breathe and that
his arm was hurting. (Id.). However, his plea for help was not taken seriously by the
EMTs as they seemed as though they were more concerned about their safety from
Jawan, who was in handcuffs, surrounded by law enforcement, and in clear physical
distress, than providing medical aid to Jawan. (Id.; PageID. 203-04). While being
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accessed by the EMTs, Jawan lost consciousness in the backseat of the patrol car.
(Id.; PageID. 204). He was then pulled out of the patrol car and administered chest
compressions. (Id.). Jawan never regained consciousness and, according to the EMS
records, he died on scene. (Id.).
In the Fourth Claim for Relief, Plaintiff alleges that “the unconstitutional actions
and/or omissions of the City of Mobile, were pursuant to the following customs, policies,
practices, and/or procedures of [the] Mobile Police Department and [the] City of
Mobile, which were directed, encouraged, allowed, and/or ratified by policy makers for
the City of Mobile, Alabama.” (Id.; PageID. 219). Plaintiff then lists these customs,
policies, practices, and procedures:
a. To use or tolerate the use of excessive and/or unjustified
force;
b. To create unnecessary danger and risk of serious harm or
death, with deliberate indifference, to an unarmed non
threaten person;
c. To cover-up violations of constitutional rights by failing to
properly investigate and/or evaluate officer involved use of
force and by ignoring and/or failing to properly and
adequately investigate and discipline unconstitutional or
unlawful activity by their officers;
d. To allow, tolerate, and/or encourage a "code of silence"
among their officers, whereby an officer does not provide
adverse information against a fellow officer;
e. To use or tolerate inadequate, deficient, and improper
procedures for handling, investigating, and reviewing
complaints of law enforcement officer misconduct; and
f. To allow their police officers to demand identification
cards/driver’s license of individuals who are not suspected of
any criminal activity in violation of the U.S. Constitution and
Alabama Law.
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g. In such other ways as may be learned during discovery in
this case.
(Id.).
Plaintiff further alleges that the City “failed to properly hire, train, instruct,
monitor, supervise, evaluate, investigate, and discipline officers of the Mobile Police
Department with deliberate indifference to Jawan’s constitutional rights, which were
violated” by Hutto and Davila. (Id.; PageID. 220). Plaintiff avers that the City’s “customs,
policies, practices, and procedures, the failures to properly and adequately hire, train,
instruct, monitor, supervise, evaluate, investigate, and discipline, as well as the
unconstitutional orders, approvals, ratification and toleration of wrongful conduct by
Defendants Hutto and Davilla, were a moving force and/or a proximate cause of the
deprivations of Jawan’s clearly established and well-settled constitutional rights in
violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983,” as set forth in preceding allegations. (Id.). The
preceding paragraphs set forth claims against Hutto and/or Davila for violation of
Jawan’s Fourth Amendment rights (excessive force and unlawful seizure) and his First
Amendment rights (retaliation for protected speech). (Id.; PageID. 206-17).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a
plaintiff must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
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plausible on its face.’” (citation omitted)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.... [This standard] asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. That is, “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and
must be a “‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 (second brackets in original).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In determining whether a claim is
stated, the factual allegations are accepted as true, except for conclusory assertions or
a recitation of a cause of action’s elements, and the allegations must be considered in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id.; Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490
(11th Cir. 1997).
In addition, “[a] complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim ‘when
its allegations, on their face, show that an affirmative defense bars recovery on the
claim,’” Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Cottone v.
Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003)), or “when, on the basis of a dispositive
issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action,”
Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir.
1993).
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
In the Fourth Claim for Relief, Plaintiff seeks redress for alleged constitutional
deprivations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the City
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violated Jawan’s First and Fourth Amendment rights. The City seeks partial dismissal of
the Fourth Claim on the grounds that the Second and Third Claims set forth in the
complaint against Hutto and Davila, and thus upon which its liability is partially based in
the Fourth Claim, did not survive Jawan’s death. (Doc. 30, PageID. 240).
In its Report and Recommendation granting the partial motions to dismiss filed by
Defendants Hutto and Davila, the Court found that the Second and Third Claims were
due to be dismissed because Plaintiff did not allege that the constitutional violations
alleged therein proximately caused Juwan’s death and, therefore, they did not survive
his death. Thus, these claims cannot be the basis for municipal liability against the City.
See Land v. Sheriff of Jackson Cty Fla., 85 F.4th 1121, 1129 (11th Cir. 2023) (“A Monell
claim is derivative of – and so requires- an actual constitutional violation by an officer.”)
(citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)).
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the City of Mobile’s motion to
dismiss any claims for municipal liability based on unlawful customs, policies, practices,
or procedures relating to police officers demanding identification be produced by
individuals not suspected of illegal activity or those otherwise connected to the
violations asserted against Hutto and Davila in the Second and Third Claims for Relief
be GRANTED and any such claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint against the City be
DISMISSED.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it
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must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific
written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b); S.D. Ala. Gen. LR 72(c)(1) & (2). The parties should note that under Eleventh
Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district
court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was
informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to
object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal
for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. To be specific, an
objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s
report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection
that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate
Judge is not specific.
DONE this the 5th day of June, 2025.
s/P. BRADLEY MURRAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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