Jones v. The Whirlpool Corporation, et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JARVIS JONES, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CIVIL ACTION No. 22-00475-KD-N
)
THE WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, )
Defendant. )
ORDER
This action is before the Court on the motion for leave to file third-party complaint against
Electrical Components International, Inc. (“ECI”), (Doc. 129), filed by Defendant Whirlpool
Corporation (“Whirlpool”). Upon consideration, and for the reasons below, the motion is
DENIED.
I. Relevant Background
This action stems from an incident involving a Whirlpool Glass Top Range, which occurred
on March 17, 2022, in Mobile County, Alabama. (Doc. 1-2). On October 31, 2022, Plaintiff Jarvis
Jones brought a five-count action in the Circuit Court of Mobile County. (Doc. 1-2). Whirlpool
removed the case to this Court based on federal diversity subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 1).
Plaintiff contends that the incident resulted from a grease fire caused by the spontaneous ignition
of the right front burner of the Glass Top Range while its control knob was in the OFF position.
(Doc. 23 at 3). Plaintiff provides that “[m]ultiple inspections [of the Glass Top Range] revealed
burning, melting, and electrical arching in the internal control for that knob and burner—an
‘infinite switch’ manufactured by a Whirlpool supplier, Robertshaw.” (Doc. 131 at 2).
Whirlpool requests leave to join ECI into this action as a third-party defendant pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14. (Doc. 129). Whirlpool references Plaintiff’s Designation of
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Experts, which contends the “likely cause(s) of this condition is poor rivet forming or a defective
rivet, both of which would be considered manufacturing defects.” (Doc. 115 at 3; Doc. 129-2 at
27). Whirlpool denies Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the cause of the incident but points out that
ECI manufactured the rivet and wiring alleged to be defective. (Doc. 129 at 2). Whirlpool provides
the relevant parts of the 2014 Purchase Agreement, which states that ECI agrees to indemnify and
defend Whirlpool from personal injury or property damage caused by a defect in a part supplied
by ECI. (Doc. 129 at 2; Doc. 129-1 at 4). Whirlpool argues that it demanded that ECI indemnify
and defend it pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, but ECI refused and denied Whirlpool’s tender
request on March 26, 2025. (Doc. 129 at 2). Whirlpool seeks to add ECI as a third-party defendant
and argues that it just learned that ECI may be liable for all or part of the claim against Whirlpool
when Plaintiff served his expert disclosures on January 8, 2025. (Doc. 129 at 3).
Plaintiff responds by arguing that it “has long known ECI as the manufacturer of the Glass Top
Range’s electrical wiring system or ‘wiring harness’ that formed the circuitry of the Glass Top
Range.” (Doc. 131 at 2). Plaintiff’s original Complaint, filed on October 31, 2022, did not name
ECI as a defendant. (Doc. 1-2). But Plaintiff argues that that “Complaint implicated ECI by
alleging that the ‘right front burner of the Glass Top Range was controlled by an internal switch
that had a bad electrical connection between the wire harness and the internal switch which
ultimately led to failure of the switch.’” (Doc. 131 at 2) (quoting Doc. 1-2 at 12).
Plaintiff outlines history relevant to Whirlpool’s claim against ECI, which he believes
undermines Whirlpool’s third-party claim. On February 17, 2023, the parties’ third joint inspection
of the Glass Top Range was held with legal counsel and engineering experts in attendance for
Whirlpool and ECI. (Doc. 131-1). This inspection involved the first destructive test on the Glass
Top Range and its components. (Doc. 131 at 3). ECI attended the first joint inspection—although
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ECI had not been named a defendant—because Whirlpool demanded that ECI defend and
indemnify Whirlpool before Plaintiff filed his suit. (Doc. 131-2 at 5) (explaining that Whirlpool
sent ECI a letter requesting indemnification and defense on August 19, 2022). ECI initially
accepted Whirlpool’s tender pursuant to its Purchase Agreement’s indemnity provision. (Doc. 131-
2 at 3). Later, Plaintiff dropped any allegations related to the ECI wiring harness and instead
narrowed his claims to the Robertshaw infinite switch by filing an Amended Complaint on April
19, 2023. (Compare Doc. 1-2 at 12 with Doc. 23 at 3, 6).
As a result of the Amended Complaint, ECI counsel emailed Whirlpool counsel on May 9,
2023, stating that “ECI no longer has a duty to defend Whirlpool” in this case. (Doc. 131-2 at 2).
Three days later, Whirlpool tendered its defense of this lawsuit to Robertshaw. (Doc. 131 at 8).
Plaintiff and Whirlpool held additional joint inspections of the Glass Top Range and components
on November 20–21, 2024, and the protocol for the final inspection was drafted by Whirlpool.
(Doc. 119-1 at 1).
Plaintiff explains that ECI remained on the periphery of this litigation and produced a wealth
of technical documents in response to Plaintiff’s non-party subpoena. (Doc. 131 at 4). But Plaintiff
contends that Whirlpool was less forthcoming with its discovery responses, which required
Plaintiff to file two motions to compel. (Doc 131 at 4). Plaintiff also notes the three Joint
Stipulations for Amended Scheduling Orders, which cite “Whirlpool’s resistance to discovery or
related delays as grounds for revising” the deadlines. (Doc. 131 at 4). Plaintiff highlights the fact
that Whirlpool never requested additional time to name third-party defendants in the joint
stipulations to amend the scheduling order and the fact that the original scheduling order deadline
to file motions to join third parties has passed. (Doc. 131 at 4) (citing Doc. 13 at 4) (“Any motion
to . . . join other parties must be filed and served no later than July 3, 2023.”)).
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II. Law and Procedure
Under Rule 14(a)(1), a defendant may “serve a summons and complaint on a nonparty who is
or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1). “Impleader,
or third party practice, is only available when the third party defendant’s liability is secondary to,
or a derivative of, the original defendant’s liability on the original plaintiff’s claim.” Faser v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 674 F.2d 856, 860 (11th Cir. 1982). “Classically, actions for subrogation,
indemnification, or contribution meet this test.” 1 Steven S. Gensler, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rules and Commentary Rule 14 (2024).
Rule 14, however, “does not create any substantive rights to relief.” Id. In other words, “a third-
party action is proper only when a right to relief exists under the applicable substantive law.” Id.
“The impleading party need not establish that he will win, just that there is some recognized theory
by which the putative third-party defendant ‘may be liable’ to him derivatively.” Id.
“In those jurisdictions that follow the common-law rule and do not recognize a right of
contribution between joint tortfeasors, impleader for contribution will not be allowed.” 6 Charles
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1448 (3d ed. 2024). “It is well
settled that Alabama law does not permit contribution among joint tortfeasors and that, subject to
limited exceptions, joint tortfeasors are not entitled to indemnity from one another.” Harris v.
Dubai Truck Lines, Inc., 347 So. 3d 1231, 1233–34 (Ala. 2021).
Trial courts have discretion in deciding whether to permit a third-party complaint. Wright &
Miller, supra, at § 1443; see also S. Ry. Co. v. Fox, 339 F.2d 560, 563 (5th Cir. 1964) (“The trial
court has wide discretion in determining whether to permit such third-party procedure to be
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resorted to.”).1 In exercising discretion, courts should consider whether the claim “obviously lacks
merit.” Wright & Miller, supra, at § 1443. Courts should also consider whether the movant
unreasonably delayed in seeking impleader, the risk of prejudice to the new or the non-moving
party, and the risk of delay or unduly complicating the action. Id.; Gensler, supra; DeRubeis v.
Witten Techs., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 682 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
When a party seeks to join a third party after the scheduling order’s deadline has passed, the
party is in effect seeking to modify the scheduling order deadline. Gensler, supra (citing Auto-
Owners Ins. Co. v. Ace Elec. Serv., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1375 (M.D. Fla. 2009)). A party
seeking to modify the scheduling order’s deadline must demonstrate good cause under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b). See Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1419 (11th Cir.
1998). “This good cause standard precludes modification unless the schedule cannot ‘be met
despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’” Id. at 1418.
III. Analysis
Whirlpool essentially provides two arguments for its motion. First, Whirlpool contends that it
“just learned that ECI may be liable for all or part of the claim against Whirlpool when Plaintiff
served his expert disclosures on January 8, 2025.” (Doc. 129 at 3). Second, Whirlpool argues that
its “contractual indemnity claim against ECI is permissible under Alabama law.” (Id.). Whirlpool’s
arguments are insufficient to prove that its third-party claim should be allowed.
1. Whirlpool’s proposed impleader claim may have merit.
Whirlpool states that ECI may be liable for all or part of the claim against Whirlpool. (Doc.
129 at 3). Generally, this permits impleader against ECI under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
1 Fifth Circuit decisions rendered prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981 are binding
precedent on this Court. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).
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14(a)(1). But Rule 14 does not create substantive rights to relief. Gensler, supra. And subject to
limited exceptions, Alabama law does not permit contribution or indemnity among joint
tortfeasors. Harris v. Dubai Truck Lines, Inc., 347 So. 3d 1231, 1233–34 (Ala. 2021).
Whirlpool does, however, provide the court with a single sentence, which shows that its
proposed claim may have merit: “The province of a third party claim is therefore limited to
instances of contractual indemnification from a claim or the indemnification that flows from
circumstances where the defending party is entitled to stand in the shoes of claimant if the
defending party is liable to the claimant.” Ex parte Stenum Hosp., 81 So. 3d 314, 318–19 (Ala.
2011) (quoting 1 C. Lyons, Jr., and A. Howell, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated §
14.1 (4th ed. 2004)). Here, Whirlpool and ECI entered a contract where ECI agreed to indemnify
Whirlpool from personal injury or property damage caused by a defect in a part supplied by ECI.
(Doc. 129 at 2; Doc. 129-1 at 4). Thus, it appears that Whirlpool’s proposed impleader claim may
be legally viable.
Because it is not obvious that the claim lacks merit, the Court considers the remaining factors
for granting an impleader motion, and whether Whirlpool has shown good cause for allowing the
motion after the Rule 16(b) deadline.
2. The record shows that Whirlpool unreasonably delayed in bringing its claim against
ECI.
Whirlpool provides one reason for its delay—it “just learned that ECI may be liable for all or
part of the claim against Whirlpool when Plaintiff served his expert disclosures on January 8,
2025.” (Doc. 131 at 3). But the record cuts against this statement.
The record shows that Whirlpool first learned that ECI may be liable to Whirlpool before this
lawsuit was filed. In fact, Whirlpool demanded that ECI defend and indemnify Whirlpool three
months before the Complaint. (Doc. 131-2 at 5). ECI initially accepted Whirlpool’s tender but
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withdrew the acceptance after Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on April 19, 2023, which
dropped any allegations related to ECI. (Compare Doc. 1-2 at 12 with Doc. 23 at 3, 6). In the words
of ECI counsel from an email on May 9, 2023, “ECI no longer ha[d] a duty to defend Whirlpool”
in this case. (Doc. 131-2 at 2).
About twenty months after this email, Plaintiff served his expert disclosures on January 8,
2025. (Doc. 129 at 3). Whirlpool provides that this date is when it learned that ECI maybe liable.
(Id.). But it took Whirlpool more than three months after this date for Whirlpool to file a motion
for leave to implead ECI.
In sum, Whirlpool first learned that ECI may be liable well before the service of the expert
disclosures. On August 19, 2022, Whirlpool requested ECI to defend and indemnify Whirlpool in
Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Whirlpool’s excuse for the delay in impleading ECI is that it “just learned that
ECI may be liable . . . when Plaintiff served his expert disclosures on January 8, 2025.” (Doc. 129
at 3). This excuse is not reasonable. The next consideration is whether this delay causes prejudice
to Plaintiff or ECI.
3. Granting Whirlpool’s motion despite its delay would cause prejudice.
Whirlpool provides no analysis on whether its delay would cause prejudice to Plaintiff or ECI.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, does. Plaintiff explains that his ability to efficiently prosecute his
claims has been impeded by “Whirlpool’s repeated refusal to engage in discovery . . . causing
protracted motion practice and numerous amendments to the scheduling order.” (Doc. 131 at 8).
Plaintiff also notes that ECI will also be prejudiced by having to play catch-up on more than two
years of discovery and litigation to defend against Whirlpool’s claims. (Id.).
The record supports Plaintiff’s position. Plaintiff has filed two motions to compel, (Doc. 68,
81), and the scheduling order has been amended three times. (Docs. 51, 66, 104). More recently,
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Whirlpool filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against Plaintiff’s mother, (Doc.
115), which obviously lacked merit. (Doc. 127). Furthermore, ECI made clear almost two years
ago that it believed it had no duty to defend Whirlpool in this action. (Doc. 131-2 at 2). Thus,
granting Whirlpool’s motion despite its delay would appear to prejudice the new and non-moving
party. See DeRubeis v. Witten Techs., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 683 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (explaining that
the new and non-moving party would be prejudiced by “allowing Plaintiffs to implead” because it
“would expand the scope of, and create more uncertainty in, an already contentious discovery
process”).
4. Allowing impleader would delay or unduly complicate the action.
Whirlpool provides no analysis on whether allowing its impleader would delay or complicate
this action. Plaintiff argues that allowing Whirlpool’s claim “would undoubtedly complicate the
legal issues in this case and delay the upcoming trial.” (Doc. 131 at 7). The Court agrees.
Regarding delay, discovery is set to close on April 30, 2025. (Doc. 128). As explained by
Plaintiff, allowing Whirlpool’s impleader would likely require the reopening of discovery and the
delay of trial. (Doc. 131 at 7). Regarding complication of the action, “Whirlpool’s proposed Third-
Party Complaint would inject a host of ancillary contract law issues into what is already a technical
and complex product liability action.” (Doc. 131 at 7).
In DeRubeis, the district court explained that permitting an impleader “would unnecessarily
complicate the issues in [the] case as well as delay their resolution.” DeRubeis v. Witten Techs.,
Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 683 (N.D. Ga. 2007). The court reasoned that the docket showed that the
case had “not been a model of speedy and efficient litigation” and that “[a]dding another party to
the lawsuit will only increase the opportunity for excessive motions practice and overly-litigious
conduct to proliferate.” Id. The court also explained that the fact that the case had been pending
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for almost three years added to its determination that allowing the impleader “would further delay”
the proceedings. Id.
Like the docket in DuReis, the docket here shows that allowing the impleader “will only
increase the opportunity for excessive motions practice and overly-litigious conduct to
proliferate.” Id. Furthermore, this case has been pending for nearly two-and-a-half years. Thus, the
Court is certain that permitting Whirlpool’s impleader would delay or unduly complicate the
action.
5. Whirlpool has failed to show good cause for amending the scheduling order.
Finally, Whirlpool provides no analysis on whether there is good cause for amending the
scheduling order. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that “Whirlpool’s inexcusable lack of
diligence is fatal to its request to untimely implead ECI under both Rule 14 and Rule 16.” (Doc.
131 at 6). Again, the record supports Plaintiff’s position.
Whirlpool claims it first learned that ECI may be liable to it on January 8, 2025. (Doc. 129 at
3). But Whirlpool learned that ECI may be liable to it before the lawsuit was filed on October 31,
2022. (Doc. 1-2). (Doc. 131-2 at 5) (explaining that Whirlpool sent ECI a letter requesting
indemnification and defense on August 19, 2022). And Whirlpool never requested additional time
to add third parties. In short, Whirlpool has failed to demonstrate good cause for modifying the
scheduling order’s deadline to add ECI as a third party. Thus, the Court cannot grant Whirlpool’s
motion.
IV. Conclusion
Trial courts have discretion in deciding whether to permit a third-party complaint. Courts
should consider whether the movant unreasonably delayed in seeking impleader, the risk of
prejudice to the new or the non-moving party, and the risk of delay or unduly complicating the
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action. Moreover, a party seeking to join a third party after the scheduling order’s deadline has
passed must demonstrate good cause. Here, the record shows that Whirlpool’s delay in seeking
impleader was unreasonable. The record also shows a risk of prejudice to the new and non-moving
party and a risk of delay and unduly complicating the action. Apart from these concerns, Whirlpool
has failed to demonstrate good cause for modifying the scheduling order’s deadline to implead.
Therefore, Whirlpool’s motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against ECI, (Doc. 129), is
DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of April 2025.
/s/ Kristi K. DuBose
KRISTI K. DuBOSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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