Drazen v. Godaddy.com,LLC

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SUSAN DRAZEN, on behalf of herself and 	)
others similarly situated 	)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
vs. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION: 1:19-00563-KD-B
)
GODADDY.COM, LLC, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court sua sponte on a review of the record.
The court has an independent duty to examine its own jurisdiction. Alabama Power Co. v.
U.S. Dept. of Energy, 307 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir. 2002). See e.g., Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d
1173, 1179 (11th Cir. 2004) (“federal courts ‘are obligated to inquire into subject-matter
jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.’”) (quoting Galindo-Del Valle v. Attorney
General, 213 F. 3d 594, 599 (11th Cir. 2000)). Additionally, “any analysis of class certification
must begin with the issue of standing.” Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir. 1987).
“Article III vests the judicial power in the federal courts and extends that power to ‘Cases’
and ‘Controversies.’ U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1-2. One tool for determining that the matters before
[courts] are truly cases and controversies, as understood by Article III, is the doctrine of standing.”
See Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1172 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). “Standing …developed in our case law to ensure that federal courts do
not exceed their authority as it has been traditionally understood.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136
S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). This “irreducible constitutional minimum” consists of three elements: 1)
the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact; 2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct

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of the defendant; and 3) that is likely to be redressed by favorable judicial decision. Lujan, 504
U.S. at 559-560. These are “not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of
each plaintiff’s case.” Id. at 561. Moreover, “Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing
requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue, [as is the case with the TCPA,] to a plaintiff
who would not otherwise have standing.” Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1547-48 (citing Raines v. Byrd,
521 U.S. 811, 820, n.3 (1997)). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing these elements.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
To satisfy the first constitutional element of standing – injury in fact – “a plaintiff must
show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and
particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjecture or hypothetical.’” Id. at 560. Notably, the
Eleventh Circuit recently held in Salcedo v. Hanna that an individual’s receipt of a single text
message was “not a basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts” because the plaintiff’s
allegations did “not state a concrete harm that meets the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.”
936 F.3d at 1172.
In Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the class settlement and
preliminary approval of class certification, Plaintiff proposes three named plaintiffs as class
representatives: Susan Drazen (Drazen), Jason Bennett (Bennett), and John Herrick (Herrick).
(Doc. 20 at 7). The Court’s review of these motions indicates a mix of unsolicited text messages
and phone calls from GoDaddy to these individuals for purposes of TCPA class certification and
settlement. Namely, Drazen alleges she received unsolicited text messages and phone calls from
GoDaddy (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 27 at 1). Bennett alleges he received unsolicited calls from GoDaddy
(Doc. 20 at 9). Herrick alleges “he received text message advertising on his cellular telephone from
GoDaddy…” (Doc. 20 at 9, 11). It is unclear from the record how many text messages Herrick

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received. Moreover, the proposed class definition extends to “[a]ll persons within the United States
who received a call or text message to his or her cellular phone from Defendant…” (Doc. 20 at
13). This definition purportedly includes individuals who received a single text message from
GoDaddy during the relevant period.
As such, it is ORDERED that the parties shall file,1 on or before March 6, 2020, briefs
explaining how this case is distinguishable from Salcedo v. Hanna, the basis for standing and
whether the proposed class includes text message only recipients.
DONE and ORDERED this the 21st day of February 2020.
/s/ Kristi K. DuBose
KRISTI K. DuBOSE
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1 The Court understands that this may impact the parties amended settlement class definition.