Myers v. Maniilaq Association

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ALASKA
Thomas Myers, )
)
Plaintiff, ) 2:17-CV-00002 JWS
)
vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION
)
Maniilaq Association, ) [Re: Motions at Dockets 40, 44]
)
Defendant. )
)
I. MOTION PRESENTED
At docket 40 Defendant Maniilaq Association (“Maniilaq”) moves pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for summary judgment on all claims brought by
Plaintiff Thomas Myers (“Myers”). Maniilaq supports the motion with a memorandum of
points and authorities at docket 41 and af fidavits at dockets 42 and 43. Maniilaq
additionally moves at docket 44 for summary judgment on Myers’ claim that Maniilaq
breached the implied covenant of good fath and fair dealing. Maniilaq supports that
summary judgment motion with a memorandum at docket 45 and affidavits at
-1-
Case 2:17-cv-00002-JWS Document 57 Filed 09/17/18 Page 1 of 6

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
dockets 46 and 47.1 Myers did not file an opposition to either motion. Oral argument
was not requested and would not assist the court.
II. BACKGROUND
On December 10, 2013, Maniilaq’s then-President/Chief Executive Officer
Patrick Anderson hired Myers as a “Senior Lean Sensei,” tasked with implementing
Anderson’s preferred “Lean Management System.”2 Five days after Maniilaq
terminated Anderson, Maniilaq also terminated Myers by memorandum hand-delivered
to Myers on January 29, 2014.3 Myers left Maniilaq that day and did not return to work
after that date.4 Myers filed the instant suit in this Court on January 31, 2017.5 Maniilaq
now moves for summary judgment on all claims in Myers’ wrongful discharge complaint
as time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.6 Maniilaq additionally moves for
summary judgment on the merits of Myer’s claim that Maniilaq breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.7
1The affidavits at dockets 46 and 47 are identical to the filings at dockets 42 and 43.
2Doc. 42 at 2 ¶ 5; Doc. 43 at 2 ¶ 4; Doc. 43-2; Doc. 43-3; Doc. 43-4.
3Doc. 42 at 3 ¶¶ 7-10; Doc. 42-2; Doc. 42-3; Doc. 45 at 3.
4Doc. 42 at 3 ¶ 10.
5Doc. 1.
6Doc. 40; Doc. 41.
7Doc. 44; Doc. 45.
-2-
Case 2:17-cv-00002-JWS Document 57 Filed 09/17/18 Page 2 of 6

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”8 The
materiality requirement ensures that “only disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.”9 Ultimately, “summary judgment will not lie if the . . . evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”10 However, summary
judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”11
The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact.12 Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial
on a dispositive issue, the moving party need not present evidence to show that
summary judgment is warranted; it need only point out the lack of any genuine dispute
as to material fact.13 Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party
must set forth evidence of specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for
8Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
9Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
10Id.
11Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
12Id. at 323.
13Id. at 323-25.
-3-
Case 2:17-cv-00002-JWS Document 57 Filed 09/17/18 Page 3 of 6

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
trial.14 All evidence presented by the non-movant must be believed for purposes of
summary judgment and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the
non-movant.15 However, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or
denials but must show that there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual
dispute to require a fact-finder to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at
trial.16
The Court cannot grant summary judgment based solely on the fact that no
opposition was filed in this case. The Local Civil Rules for the United States District
Court for the District of Alaska state that “[n]o unopposed motion for summary judgment
will be granted unless the court is satisfied that there are no disputed issues of material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to the decision as a matter of law.”17 In other
words, summary judgment motions are not governed by the usual default judgment
principles; rather, a court must determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law even if the motion is unopposed.18 A court must consider the merits of
the motion and ensure that the motion is supported by sufficient evidentiary materials.19
14Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.
15Id. at 255.
16Id. at 248-49.
17D. Ak. L.R. 7.1(d)(2).
18Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004).
19United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami,
Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101-1102 (11th Cir. 2004).
-4-
Case 2:17-cv-00002-JWS Document 57 Filed 09/17/18 Page 4 of 6

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Motion at Docket 40
Maniilaq first moves for summary judgment on the ground that Myers failed to
commence this action in the time allowed by law. In a federal diversity action brought
under state law, “the state statute of limitations controls.”20 Under Alaska law, tort
actions not arising from a contract are governed by AS 09.10.070(a), which provides a
two-year statute of limitations.21 Breach of contract claims must be brought within three
years pursuant to AS 09.10.053.22
Myers’ amended complaint raises wrongful discharge and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims. In his complaint, Myers avers that, “[i]n
early February 2014, [he] was given notice that he was . . . being discharged from his
job with Maniilaq Association.”23 In support of its summary judgment motions, however,
Maniilaq has provided uncontroverted evidence that Myers was terminated on
January 29, 2014.24 Myers’ initial complaint was not filed until January 31, 2017,25 three
20Bancorp Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Augusta Aviation Corp., 813 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir.
1987); see also Harvey’s Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. Van Blitter, 959 F.2d 153, 157 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“Statutes of limitations, which dictate the life of state causes of action, are too intimately
connected with the substance of the state-created right to be disregarded by the federal courts.”
(citations and internal quotations omitted)).
21Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 1181, 1185 (Alaska 1987); see
AS 09.10.070(a).
22McDonnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 299 P.3d 715, 725 (Alaska 2013); see
AS 09.10.053.
23Doc. 12 at 4 ¶ 17.
24Doc. 42 at 3 ¶¶ 7-10; Doc. 42-2; Doc. 42-3.
25Doc. 1.
-5-
Case 2:17-cv-00002-JWS Document 57 Filed 09/17/18 Page 5 of 6

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
years and two days after Myers was terminated. Myers asserts no basis for tolling, and
none is apparent from the record. Thus, Myers’ claims are untimely under either the
two-year or three-year statute of limitations, and summary judgment is granted as to all
claims.
B. Motion at Docket 44
Maniilaq additionally moves for summary judgment on Myers’ breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim on the grounds that Myers was
terminated during his 90-day probationary period, and he cannot establish any legally
cognizable damages from the alleged breach. But, because this Court has already
determined that the claim is time-barred, it need not determine whether any other
ground independently supports granting summary judgment on that claim. The motion
for summary judgment at docket 44 is therefore denied as moot.26
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the motion for summary judgment at docket 40 is
GRANTED, and the motion for summary judgment at docket 44 is DENIED as moot.
The Clerk will please enter judgment for the defendant.
DATED this 17th day of September 2018.
/s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK
SENIOR JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
26Maniilaq filed two separate motions for summary judgment in contravention of this
Court’s local rules, which provide that summary judgment should be sought in a “[s]ingle
[m]otion” that “contain[s] all the grounds upon which the moving party relies and address[es] all
causes of action or affirmative defenses raised in the pleading challenged.” D. Ak. L.R. 56.1(a).
Because the Court has denied the second summary judgment motion as moot, the Court finds
that Maniilaq’s failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1(a) is immaterial.
-6-
Case 2:17-cv-00002-JWS Document 57 Filed 09/17/18 Page 6 of 6