Kendal Lawrence v. State

FOURTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, P. J.,
WATKINS and PADGETT, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

May 15, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A0555. LAWRENCE v. THE STATE.

MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

After a jury trial, Kendal Lawrence was convicted of rape and other offenses.

He appeals, challenging the exclusion of certain evidence and the effectiveness of his

trial counsel. But he has failed to show that the exclusion of evidence was reversible

error or that his counsel’s performance was both deficient and prejudicial. So we

affirm.

1. Facts and procedural posture

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), the evidence presented at trial showed

that Lawrence and the victim lived together. On the date in question, Lawrence
dragged the victim by her hair, slapped her face with his hands, choked her, threw her

to the ground, beat her head on the floor, detained her with handcuffs, yanked off her

pants, and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina without her consent. A medical

examination of the victim revealed injuries consistent with the reported sexual assault.

When Lawrence was later arrested, police found methamphetamine on his person.

The jury found Lawrence guilty of the charged offenses of rape, false

imprisonment, aggravated assault, family violence battery, and possession of

methamphetamine. The trial court imposed a life sentence, with 30 years to be served

in confinement and the remainder on probation. Lawrence moved for a new trial,

challenging, among other things, the effectiveness of his trial counsel and the

exclusion of evidence about prior sexual relations between Lawrence and the victim.

After a hearing at which Lawrence’s trial counsel testified, the trial court denied the

motion for new trial. This appeal followed.

2. OCGA § 24-4-412 (b) (2)

Lawrence enumerates that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of

prior “rough sex” between him and the victim that was admissible under OCGA § 24-

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4-412 (b) (2). But Lawrence failed to comply with the mandatory procedure for

seeking to introduce such evidence.

Under Georgia’s rape-shield statute, OCGA § 24-4-412, “evidence of a

complaining witness’s past sexual behavior may not be introduced by any party at a

trial involving a prosecution for certain sexual crimes unless such evidence falls under

[a] specific exception contained in the statute itself.” White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 115

(1) (823 SE2d 794) (2019). OCGA § 24-4-412 (b) (2) contains such an exception,

“provid[ing] that the trial court may admit evidence of the victim’s prior sexual

conduct with the defendant if this evidence supports an inference that the defendant

could have reasonably believed that the victim consented [to the conduct alleged in

the prosecution].” Alvarez v. State, 378 Ga. App. 235, 243 (2) (925 SE2d 210) (2026)

(punctuation omitted). Such evidence may be admitted by “following the procedure

described in subsection (c) of [the rape-shield statute.]” OCGA § 24-4-412 (b). Under

the procedure set forth in subsection (c), if a party intends to offer such evidence,

“the party must: (A) File a motion that specifically describes the evidence and states

the purpose for which it is to be offered; and (B) Do so at least three days before trial

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unless the court, for good cause, sets a different date[.]” OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) (1)

(emphasis supplied).

Lawrence has not claimed, let alone shown by the record, that he ever filed such

a motion specifically describing the evidence and stating its purpose. And although it

is not our role to cull the record on behalf of a party, a review of the record has not

revealed that such a motion was filed. Lawrence has thus failed to show that he

complied with the mandatory procedure under OCGA § 21-4-412 (c) for invoking

OCGA § 24-4-412 (b) (2)’s exception to the rape-shield statute’s exclusion of

evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior. See Gallegos-Munoz v. State, 319 Ga.

803, 811 (2) (b) (906 SE2d 711) (2024) (“the focus of Georgia’s rape-shield statute

continues to be the exclusion of evidence concerning the past sexual behavior of the

complaining witness”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Indeed, as Lawrence

concedes in his brief, OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) prescribes a clear procedure for admitting

evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct and his failure to file such a motion

“forfeited review[.]”

Moreover, we note that in his appellate brief, Lawrence has not described any

specific evidence or anticipated testimony that was excluded, and instead has simply

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made a general reference to evidence of rough sex. See Hicks v. State, 337 Ga. App.

567, 569 (1) (788 SE2d 502) (2016) (appellant claiming error regarding prior

statements did not show reversible error where he failed to identify any such specific

statements in his appellate brief); Bearfield v. State, 305 Ga. App. 37, 41 (2) (699 SE2d

363) (2010) (this court cannot determine the propriety of the trial court’s ruling

without a proffer of a definite sort of the excluded evidence or testimony). For the

foregoing reasons, Lawrence has failed to show reversible error.

3. Ineffective assistance of counsel

Lawrence claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a

continuance to investigate a prior allegation of sexual assault made by the victim and

in failing to follow the procedure of OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) to introduce evidence of

that prior allegation. To succeed on these claims, Lawrence “must show both that his

counsel’s performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced his defense.”

Huber v. State, 319 Ga. 78, 84 (2) (901 SE2d 149) (2024). If he “fails to make a

sufficient showing on either the deficiency or the prejudice prong, we need not

address the other prong.” Id. “To show prejudice, [Lawrence] must demonstrate that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s [alleged] deficiency, the

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result of the trial would have been different. The likelihood of a different result must

be substantial, not just conceivable.” McNeal v. State, 363 Ga. App. 417, 422 (4) (867

SE2d 824) (2022) (citations and punctuation omitted). Because Lawrence has failed

to show that either of trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies was prejudicial to his defense,

his ineffective assistance claims fail.

(a) Failure to seek continuance

Lawrence claims that trial counsel should have sought a continuance in order

to contact the person accused of the prior sexual assault and to develop evidence

showing that the allegation was false. But Lawrence has not identified any such

testimony or additional evidence that an investigation would have uncovered; and he

likewise failed to make such a showing at the motion for new trial hearing. See

Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 483-484 (IV) (b) (807 SE2d 350) (2017) (rejecting

ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failure to seek a continuance to

interview a witness where defendant failed to show what evidence further

investigation would have uncovered). Indeed, at the hearing, Lawrence proffered no

possible testimony or evidence that might have been discovered with a continuance;

he did not question trial counsel about any such evidence; and instead, trial counsel

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testified that he did not know what the response of the man accused of the prior

assault would have been.

Lawrence therefore has not made “any proffer whatever to show that the

testimony of such witness[] would have been relevant and favorable, and, thus, would

have resulted in a [reasonable probability of a] different verdict. Accordingly, even

assuming counsel’s deficiency in failing to request a continuance, there was no

showing of any resulting prejudice.” Wells v. State, 281 Ga. 253, 255 (2) (a) (637 SE2d

8) (2006) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Walker v. State, 288 Ga. 174,

180 (3) (b) (702 SE2d 415) (2010) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim for failure to

request a continuance to investigate where appellant presented no evidence of a

reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different

if counsel had sought a continuance).

(b) Failure to follow OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) procedure

Lawrence contends that his trial counsel should have followed the procedure

under OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) by filing a motion to seek admission of evidence of the

prior sexual assault allegation. But once again, Lawrence has made no showing of

precisely what evidence counsel should have sought to introduce in such a motion.

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While he refers to a police report of the incident, he has not cited any specific

statements or evidence in the report that would have been admissible and he has not

pointed to such evidence in the appellate record. Likewise, at the motion for new trial

hearing, Lawrence made no proffer of any specific parts of the report that might have

been admissible, did not ask trial counsel about any specific parts of the report that he

could have sought to admit in an OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) motion, and never even asked

counsel to explain why he did not file such a motion regarding the report. Without a

definite proffer of such evidence, Lawrence has failed to show prejudice from

counsel’s failure to file such a motion and instead relies on mere speculation about

whether there is a reasonable probability that there exists some relevant and admissible

evidence which, had counsel filed a motion, the trial court would have admitted.

“[S]uch speculation is insufficient to support a claim of ineffective assistance.” Reyes-

Castro v. State, 352 Ga. App. 48, 62 (1) (b) (833 SE2d 735) (2019). See also Lawson v.

State, 280 Ga. App. 870, 873-874 (2) (f) (635 SE2d 259) (2006) (claim of ineffective

assistance for failure to discover purported evidence was based on “rank

speculation”); Dye v. State, 266 Ga. App. 825, 827 (2) (a) (598 SE2d 95)

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(2004)(speculation that raises no more than a mere possibility is legally insufficient

to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).

Moreover, we note that at the outset of the trial, counsel actually sought to

introduce the report as evidence of a prior accusation by the victim while arguing

against the state’s request to exclude it under the rape-shield statute. See Gallegos-

Munoz, supra at 812 (2) (c) (“the rape-shield statute, OCGA § 24-4-412 . . ., does not

categorically bar prior-accusation evidence”). The trial court granted the state’s

request to exclude the report, but Lawrence has not set forth an enumeration of error

regarding this ruling on appeal. Instead, Lawrence posits that counsel was ineffective

because the court would have ruled differently if counsel had filed a motion under

OCGA § 24-4-412 (c). But he has not shown a reasonable probability of such a

different outcome, having failed at the new trial hearing to ask trial counsel what he

would have argued differently to the court in such a motion. Thus, Lawrence’s

conclusion that the trial court likely would have made a different ruling if counsel had

complied with OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) is mere speculation. See Reyes-Castro, supra.

(c) Cumulative prejudice

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We also consider whether Lawrence is entitled to a new trial based on

cumulative prejudice. See Woods v. State, 312 Ga. 405, 411 (3) (a) (862 SE2d 526)

(2021) (it is the prejudice arising from counsel’s errors that is constitutionally

relevant, not each individual error considered in a vacuum). “Here, the cumulative

prejudice from any assumed deficiencies discussed [above] is insufficient to show a

reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding would have been different in

the absence of the alleged deficiencies.” Bates v. State, 313 Ga. 57, 69 (3) (867 SE2d

140) (2022).

Judgment affirmed. Watkins and Padgett, JJ., concur.

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