McDaniel v. State

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Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0290
Darrian McDaniel
v.
The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Fulton County
No. 17SC154106

Decided: June 16, 2026

LAND, Justice.
Darrian McDaniel challenges his 2022 convictions for mal-
ice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting
death of Thomas Entrekin. 1 McDaniel argues that his rights pur-
suant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966), were violated

1 Entrekin was killed on or about January 9, 2016. On August 29, 2017,
a Fulton County grand jury indicted McDaniel for murder (Count 1), felony
murder predicated on armed robbery (Count 2), felony murder predicated on
hijacking a motor vehicle (Count 3), felony murder predicated on aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon (Count 4), felony murder predicated on posses-
sion of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 5), armed robbery (Count 6), hi-
jacking a motor vehicle (Count 7), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
(Count 8), concealing the death of another (Count 9), possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (Count 10), and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon (Count 11).
At a trial from November 7 to 10, 2022, the jury found McDaniel guilty
of all charges in the indictment. The trial court sentenced McDaniel to serve
life in prison without the possibility of parole for Count 1, life in prison for
Count 6 (to run concurrently with Count 1), 10 years to serve in prison for
Count 7 (to run consecutive to Count 1), 10 years to serve in prison for Count
when he was questioned by officers on March 10, 2016, and that
the trial court violated the rule of completeness by allowing only
a portion of this interview to be played for the jury. For the rea-
sons that follow, we affirm.
1. The evidence presented at trial showed as follows. On or
about January 8, 2016, Entrekin, who lived in Blakely, purchased
a tan Ford F-150 pickup truck and told friends that he was going
to Atlanta to work on a home he owned in East Point. In late Jan-
uary, Entrekin’s friends contacted police after repeatedly and un-
successfully trying to get in touch with him. Police issued a BOLO
(“be on the lookout”) order for Entrekin and listed him as a miss-
ing person.
Meanwhile, in mid-January, McDaniel’s family and friends
saw him using a pickup truck in the Atlanta area. On or about
January 9, McDaniel drove to a friend’s house in a tan F-150
pickup truck. McDaniel “hand[ed] money out” to “several people”
and gave the friend a credit card belonging to Entrekin. On the
evening of January 9, the friend attempted to use Entrekin’s
credit card, but the purchase was declined and the friend left the

9 (to run consecutive to Count 1), 5 years to serve in prison for Count 10 (to
run concurrently with Count 9), and 5 years to serve in prison Count 11 (to run
concurrently with Count 10). The felony murder charges (Counts 2-5) were va-
cated by operation of law, and Count 8 merged with Count 1 for sentencing
purposes.
On November 21, 2022, McDaniel filed a motion for new trial, which
was amended by new counsel on December 20, 2024. The trial court held an
evidentiary hearing on April 9, 2025, and entered a written order denying
McDaniel’s motion for new trial as amended on April 21, 2025. On April 22,
2025, McDaniel filed a notice of appeal directed to the Court of Appeals, which
was amended on July 7, 2025. The Court of Appeals transferred the appeal to
this Court on September 25, 2025. The case was docketed to this Court’s term
beginning in December 2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2
card at the store.
On the morning of February 5, 2016, Conyers police and
Rockdale County officers responded to a call about a burglary at
an apartment complex and a tan F-150 pickup truck that had left
the area. An officer testified at trial that, on his way to the scene,
he passed a tan F-150 pickup truck and determined that the
pickup was registered to Entrekin. After the officer saw the per-
son driving the truck commit a traffic infraction, he activated his
patrol lights and attempted to make a traffic stop; the driver did
not pull over and instead led the officer on a high-speed chase.
Officers later found Entrekin’s pickup truck crashed and unoccu-
pied. They found McDaniel and the other occupants of the truck,
Demetric Lawson and Damario Julian, nearby, arrested them for
burglary, and brought them in for questioning.
McDaniel gave permission to officers to search his phone.
That search revealed pictures and videos of McDaniel in Entre-
kin’s pickup truck dating back to January 15, 2016. Officers also
found bloodstains and a .45-caliber shell casing in the pickup
truck.
On February 5, Captain Michael Vaughn with the Conyers
Police Department interviewed McDaniel after he was arrested
in connection with the Conyers burglary. Captain Vaughn pro-
vided McDaniel with Miranda warnings, and McDaniel acknowl-
edged his rights and agreed to speak with Captain Vaughn. A
copy of McDaniel’s Miranda waiver from the February 5 inter-
view was admitted into evidence at trial. Captain Vaughn testi-
fied that at the time of the interview, “the only thing that [he]
knew about Mr. Entrekin was that the vehicle that was being
driven [by McDaniel] during the police pursuit … was registered”
to Entrekin. Shortly after the interview, investigators learned
that Entrekin was listed as a missing person.

3
Police also interviewed Julian. A Conyers police officer tes-
tified that, during that interview, Julian gave information that
indicated Entrekin had been murdered. Based on this infor-
mation, officers took Julian to look for Entrekin’s body on the
evening of February 5, but did not find it.
While McDaniel was in custody at the Rockdale County
jail, he told his cellmate that he was walking in Atlanta when he
came upon a man outside of his truck, held him at gunpoint, “un-
loaded on him” and “emptied the clip” into him. McDaniel told the
cellmate that he then left the man’s body at a car wash, took his
pickup truck and drove it for several hours, and returned to the
car wash and placed the man’s body in the truck’s backseat.
McDaniel told the cellmate that he took the man’s money and
credit cards, initially dumped the body in the woods, and then
moved it again and hid it under a pile of trash. The inmate passed
this information on to investigators, who discovered Entrekin’s
body outside a Fulton County residence in early March 2016.
After finding Entrekin’s body, Captain Vaughn inter-
viewed McDaniel again on March 10, 2016. GBI Agent Jastacia
Cheeks joined the interview and reminded McDaniel of his Mi-
randa rights approximately six minutes into the interview, and
McDaniel agreed to speak with Agent Cheeks. 2 During the three
hour interview, portions of which were played for the jury at trial,
McDaniel initially told Cheeks and Vaughn that he found Entre-
kin’s pickup truck idling at a gas station and stole it, but eventu-
ally admitted to holding Entrekin at gunpoint, shooting him re-
peatedly, and hiding his body.
The forensic pathologist who conducted Entrekin’s autopsy

2 It does not appear from the record that McDaniel signed a second
waiver of his Miranda rights.

4
testified that Entrekin suffered eight gunshot wounds and died
from those wounds. The forensic pathologist retrieved one of the
bullets from Entrekin’s body, and an expert in firearms with the
GBI testified that the same firearm fired the shell casing recov-
ered from Entrekin’s pickup truck and the bullet recovered from
his body.
2. McDaniel argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress his March 10, 2016, custodial interview be-
cause his Miranda rights were violated. Specifically, McDaniel
argues that he “stated that he did not want to talk to law enforce-
ment,” at which point “any questioning should have immediately
ceased, the Defendant advised of his Miranda rights, and counsel
provided as requested.” We disagree.
On July 3, 2021, McDaniel filed a motion to suppress “all
of his statements given to police” on the ground that he did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights “on all of
the occasions he was interrogated by police.” During the hearing
on his motion to suppress, however, McDaniel conceded that the
only statement at issue was the March 10, 2016, interview and
focused on the first six minutes of that interview, which he argued
was an interrogation in violation of his Miranda rights because
he did not receive additional Miranda warnings.
When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a
motion to suppress, “an appellate court must construe the eviden-
tiary record in the light most favorable to the factual findings and
judgment of the trial court.” Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746
(2015). When “some or all of the material facts are undisputed,
we properly may take notice of the undisputed facts — even if the
trial court did not — without interfering with the prerogative of
the trial court to resolve disputes of material fact.” State v. Frank-
lin, 318 Ga. 39, 39 (2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).

5
“Such undisputed facts include, among other things, those which
definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evi-
dence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credi-
bility.” Id. at 39 n.1 (cleaned up). Viewed in this way, the evidence
presented at the hearing on McDaniel’s motion to suppress, which
consisted of the testimony of Captain Vaughn, Agent Cheeks, and
the video-recordings of McDaniel’s March 10, 2016, interview,
shows the following.
On March 10, 2016, McDaniel was interviewed by Captain
Vaughn, joined by Agent Cheeks. Upon entering the interview
room, Agent Cheeks introduced himself, and Captain Vaughn be-
gan to explain why Agent Cheeks was there:
CAPTAIN VAUGHN: Hey, Darrian, what’s up. Man,
we brought these guys in, since this investigation’s
led us all over the place. You live in Atlanta, we’re
in Conyers, that truck you were in came from south
Georgia. So, he can kinda cover all that territory, do
it better than we can do it. We appreciate you coming
in to talk to us today. I know that getting you out of
the normal environment—might be a little bit of a
break.

MCDANIEL: I really don’t feel like talking to them.

CAPTAIN VAUGHN: Well.

AGENT CHEEKS: Well, let me say this. You may
not want to talk, but you may want to hear—

MCDANIEL: I don’t want to hear, talk with you. If
anything happened, I get charged with murder or
whatever. I’m going through a lot right now. I really

6
don’t need—y’all gonna do what y’all gonna do.

CAPTAIN VAUGHN: What you going through?

MCDANIEL: It’s just, my problems with me and my
folks and stuff. You feel me. I don’t even want to talk
about it now. Here and now talk about it now. I want
[indecipherable] I want a lawyer with me or some-
thing. I need to call my folks and get my lawyer to
come with me and then, you know what I’m saying,
we’ll talk.

AGENT CHEEKS: Okay.

MCDANIEL: Whatever, whatever, whatever hap-
pened, however it happened, I ain’t got no choice but
to go down because, you know what I’m saying?
Whatever, whatever everybody’s telling y’all, like
y’all told me last time, I ain’t got no choice but to go
down, stuff like that, that’s how it’s gonna be.

AGENT CHEEKS: Well, here’s the thing. Nobody’s
told me anything. That’s why I’m sitting here talking
to you—

MCDANIEL: I’m talking about him, I’m talking
about him.

AGENT CHEEKS: Okay, but I’m not talking about
him, I’m talking about you. Okay, like he said, they
got me involved because of where the truck was
from, it being up here, and wherever else in between.
Okay, so that’s why I’m here, alright? So, you, what-
ever, you may be under whatever impression, you

7
know all I have is what I’ve been provided, which is
why they brought you over. So we can, for the most
part, at least I thought, kinda sorta iron this out, or
at least so I can get a better understanding as to
where the truck came from. How did, you know, it
come into your possession or whatever.

MCDANIEL: Mmhmm.

AGENT CHEEKS: So, but I understand you have
some reservations or whatever, I’m obviously not go-
ing to force you to talk to me. You have every right
not to, but I would probably say that you should
probably reconsider.

MCDANIEL: [indecipherable]

AGENT CHEEKS: But again, that’s your decision.
So, if you’re telling me right now that you have noth-
ing to say and you want to talk to an attorney, is that
what you’re saying? Okay.

MCDANIEL: I really don’t want to talk to no attor-
ney, man, whatever happened, happened, man.

AGENT CHEEKS: That doesn’t make sense
though—

CAPTAIN VAUGHN: Let me ask you this—

MCDANIEL: I got a lot going on, I don’t really know
what’s going on and stuff, you know what I’m say-
ing?

8
CAPTAIN VAUGHN: If you don’t want to talk to an
attorney, and you’ve said everything to me you want
to say, would you be more comfortable just talking
to him?

MCDANIEL: Man, it don’t matter who, it don’t mat-
ter, I don’t want to talk. Y’all didn’t have no recorder
in that last room?

CAPTAIN VAUGHN: No, I didn’t bring a recorder in
with me—

AGENT CHEEKS: Which is why, that’s why I’m
here.

MCDANIEL: Alright. I’m really tired of talking
about it over and over, like. It’s crazy man, crazy. I
don’t really know what to say because y’all ain’t
gonna believe me, no way.

AGENT CHEEKS: Why don’t you try? Why don’t you
try me and see who I believe—

MCDANIEL: Read me my rights, man, I’m gonna
talk to you.

AGENT CHEEKS: You’re sure?

MCDANIEL: I’m gonna talk to you. [indecipherable]

Agent Cheeks then verbally provided McDaniel with Mi-
randa warnings and asked him whether he “want[ed] to talk to
[him] about this truck that [he] w[as] in?” to which McDaniel re-
sponded, “What if I tell y’all I wasn’t in no truck?”

9
During the hearing, Agent Cheeks testified that, at the
time of McDaniel’s March 10 interview, he was in custody and
under arrest on charges unrelated to Entrekin’s murder. Agent
Cheeks testified that he walked in and introduced himself, that
McDaniel “started out by saying he didn’t want to talk” but then
became “agitated” and stated, “just send me up the road if I got to
go down.” Agent Cheeks testified that he attempted to “get clari-
fication” from McDaniel that “he did, in fact want an attorney”
but that McDaniel clarified that he wanted to speak. 3 After
McDaniel clarified that he wanted to talk, Agent Cheeks verbally
provided Miranda warnings to McDaniel and testified that
McDaniel nodded to indicate his understanding of each warning.4
Agent Cheeks testified that McDaniel then agreed to talk and ex-
plained how he had stolen Entrekin’s pickup truck. Captain
Vaughn testified that McDaniel was provided with Miranda
warnings at each of his three interviews, and that Agent Cheeks
conducted the March 10 interview because it was “clear [McDan-
iel] did not want to talk to me.”
The trial court denied McDaniel’s motion to suppress on
May 13, 2022. In its order, the trial court found that McDaniel’s
March 10, 2016, custodial interview was the only interview “im-
plicated by the motion.” The trial court further found that alt-
hough McDaniel “initially stated that he did not want to talk and
wanted his attorney to come with him, he then reinitiated the
conversation with police by continuing to talk about the case, ul-
timately confirming that he did want to talk and did not need his
attorney.” As a result, the trial court found that McDaniel failed

3 McDaniel’s trial counsel conceded at the motion to suppress hearing
that McDaniel’s request for a lawyer during the interview was “not clear.”
4 The trial court made no specific finding on this point and it is not
clear from our review of the video recording whether McDaniel nodded.

10
to unequivocally invoke his right to counsel. The trial court also
found that McDaniel’s counsel acknowledged the lack of clarity in
McDaniel’s reference to counsel and that McDaniel knowingly
and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The trial court fur-
ther found that McDaniel’s “continuing to speak and give infor-
mation regarding Entrekin’s death” operated as a waiver of his
rights against self-incrimination because “[h]e could have stopped
talking and re-invoked his rights at any time.”
“A person in the custody of law enforcement officers has a
constitutional right to remain silent in response to their ques-
tions, regardless of whether he fully understands that right or has
been advised of it under Miranda.” Davidson v. State, 304 Ga.
460, 468 (2018). “The law is clear that, when a person in the cus-
tody of law enforcement officers unambiguously and unequivo-
cally invokes his right to remain silent in connection with their
interrogation, the interrogation must cease immediately.” Id. at
468–69. “[I]nterrogation is defined as express questioning by law
enforcement officers’ or its functional equivalent—any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally at-
tendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the sus-
pect.” State v. Pauldo, 309 Ga. 130, 134 (2020) (cleaned up).
“Whether an invocation is unambiguous and unequivocal depends
on whether the accused articulated a desire to cut off questioning
with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the cir-
cumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of
the right to remain silent.” Davidson, 304 Ga. at 469 (citation and
punctuation omitted). “Such clarity is absent when a suspect
makes an ambiguous statement in the midst of his plain acquies-
cence to continued questioning.” Goodman v. State, 313 Ga. 762,
769 (2022). Thus, “if a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal
reference to the right to remain silent, the police do not have a

11
duty to clarify the suspect’s intent, and the interrogation may con-
tinue.” State v. Moon, 285 Ga. 55, 56 (2009).
Here, McDaniel had the opportunity to invoke his right to
remain silent prior to being reminded of his Miranda rights.
Thus, the question in this case is whether McDaniel clearly as-
serted his desire to remain silent and, if so, whether officers hon-
ored that assertion. See Davidson, 304 Ga. at 469. In the first few
minutes of the March 10 interview, McDaniel made several state-
ments, considered only in isolation, that would indicate his un-
willingness to talk. Yet, he continued to talk. The first statement,
“I really don’t feel like talking to them” was immediately followed
by Agent Cheeks’ statement “You may not want to talk, but you
may want to hear—.” This statement was cut off midsentence by
McDaniel’s further statements, “I don’t want to hear, talk with
you. If anything happened, I get charged with murder or what-
ever. I’m going through a lot right now. I really don’t need—y’all
gonna do what y’all gonna do.” “Although the first half of the
statement … might appear unequivocal in isolation,” see Young
v. State, 309 Ga. 529, 536 (2020), it was immediately followed by
McDaniel’s continuing to talk about how he was “going through a
lot right now,” rendering his statements ambiguous and equivo-
cal. See id. (although defendant told investigators, “I'm done talk-
ing to you,” his comments following that statement “render[ed]
the whole statement equivocal”). Accordingly, the record sup-
ported the trial court’s finding that McDaniel waived his right to
remain silent. See Goodman, 313 Ga. at 769 (defendant’s state-
ments that “[he] d[id not] want to talk” to police were not unam-
biguous assertions of right to remain silent because context
showed that, despite his statements, the defendant “continued
talking without prompting” from the police); Turner v. State, 287
Ga. 793, 795 (2010) (affirming trial court’s conclusion that appel-
lant’s custodial statements were admissible because appellant’s

12
statement, “‘if y’all are going to try to do me like that, I don’t want
to talk no more,’ was only an equivocal invocation of his right to
remain silent, and thus the interrogating officers had no obliga-
tion to stop questioning him”). This claim therefore fails.
To the extent McDaniel argues that investigators also vio-
lated his right to counsel, that claim also fails. “[A] suspect who
asks for a lawyer at any time during a custodial interrogation may
not be subjected to further questioning by law enforcement until
an attorney has been made available or until the suspect reiniti-
ates the conversation.” Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 133 (citation and punc-
tuation omitted). “If the police continue to interview a suspect
who has made a clear and unequivocal request for counsel, any
resulting statements made by the suspect are inadmissible in the
State’s case-in-chief.” Burns v. State, 323 Ga. 402, 410 (2026) (ci-
tation and punctuation omitted). “However, a suspect’s request
for a lawyer must be clear and unambiguous such that a reason-
able police officer in the circumstances would understand the
statement to be a request for an attorney.” Id. at 411 (cleaned up).
In other words, “If the defendant makes reference to an attorney
that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light
of the circumstances would have understood only that the sus-
pect might be invoking the right to counsel, cessation of the ques-
tioning is not required.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, after McDaniel stated that he “want[ed] a lawyer
with [him] or something,” he immediately continued to speak with
investigators, stating “whatever happened, however it happened,
I ain’t got no choice but to go down because … whatever every-
body’s telling y’all, like y’all told me last time, I ain’t got no choice
but to go down, stuff like that, that’s how it’s gonna be.” And when
asked by Agent Cheeks whether he “want[ed] to talk to an attor-
ney,” McDaniel confirmed that he did not “want to talk to [an]

13
attorney.” Accordingly, there was no unequivocal invocation of his
right to counsel and this claim fails. See Burns, 323 Ga. at 412
(defendant’s statement “I’ll just wait on a lawyer or something or
whatever” was not an unequivocal request for an attorney, “espe-
cially where Burns did not stop talking”).
3. McDaniel argues that the trial court erred in denying his
objection to the State’s playing of only portions of his March 10,
2016, custodial interview on the ground that it violated the rule
of completeness. This claim fails.
At trial, the recording of McDaniel’s March 10, 2016, inter-
view was admitted as State’s Exhibit 85. When the State re-
quested to publish State’s Exhibit 85, the trial court asked
whether it was “going to publish a three-hour videotape?” The
State responded that it would be playing “from about the 35-mi-
nute mark of video 2 of [McDaniel’s] statement since it’s a three-
hour interview.” McDaniel’s counsel then objected, arguing that
“based on the rule of completion … the State should submit the
entire DVD.” During a bench conference outside the presence of
the jury, the trial court stated the following:
TRIAL COURT: So I don’t think they’re required to
play three hours. The rule of inclusion, it’s been ad-
mitted. To the extent they want to play portions of
it, I believe they’re entitled to. If y’all want to do a
brief, I can get a legal brief.

TRIAL COUNSEL: That’s fine. I mean, I can play it
in my case.

TRIAL COURT: Okay. If you’d like. All right.

The video portions identified by the State were then played for
the jury.

14
Later that day, outside the presence of the jury, the trial
court noted that “both of you, either one of you can play all three”
parts of McDaniel’s March 10 interview and asked whether the
State intended to play any more of the interview on the second
day of trial. The State responded that it intended to play “approx-
imately 25 minutes” of the interview, and the trial court reiter-
ated that “the court agree[d] to the extent the defense wishes to
present the full three-hour tape, the defense to the extent they
put on a case in chief is entitled to do so for the record.” McDaniel
did not play the full interview during his case in chief.
OCGA § 24-1-106 provides that
When a writing or recorded statement or part
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party
may require the introduction at that time of any
other part or any other writing or recorded state-
ment which, in fairness, should be considered con-
temporaneously with the writing or recorded state-
ment.

Similarly, OCGA § 24-8-822 provides that “[w]hen an admission
is given in evidence by one party, it shall be the right of the other
party to have the whole admission and all the conversation con-
nected therewith admitted into evidence.” “The rule of complete-
ness prevents parties from misleading the jury by presenting por-
tions of statements out of context, but it does not make admissible
parts of a statement that are irrelevant to the parts of the state-
ment introduced into evidence by the opposing party.” Thompson
v. State, 304 Ga. 146, 152 (2018) (cleaned up).
Here, the trial court did not make a definitive ruling on
McDaniel’s objection, stating that “If y’all want to do a brief, I can
get a legal brief,” to which McDaniel’s trial counsel responded,

15
“That’s fine. I mean, I can play it in my case,” and then did not
play the remainder of the interview. Accordingly, we review this
claim for plain error. See Wilson v. State, 301 Ga. 83, 87 (2017)
(applying plain error review where “record makes plain that the
trial court did not make a ‘definitive ruling’ on the admissibility”
of evidence “as contemplated in OCGA § 24-1-103(a)”). To estab-
lish plain error, McDaniel “must point to an error that was not
affirmatively waived, and that error must have been clear and not
open to reasonable dispute, must have affected [his] substantial
rights, and must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Middlebrooks v. State,
315 Ga. 671, 687 (2023) (cleaned up).
McDaniel has failed to carry his burden of showing plain
error because he does not explain how the trial court clearly erred.
Although McDaniel argues that the trial court violated the rule of
completeness and that “there were minutes that the Defendant
was questioned before he was ‘Mirandized,’” McDaniel has not
cited to any on-point controlling authority holding that the trial
court was required to order the State to play the entire interview.
In addition, McDaniel does not explain how what was said in the
portions of the interview that were not played would have made
any difference in the outcome of the case. McDaniel does not even
argue that he was harmed by the trial court’s alleged error. Ac-
cordingly, this enumeration fails. See Thompson, 304 Ga. at 152
(appellant failed to carry his burden of showing plain error where
he did “not identif[y] any … specific statements in the portions of
the recording that the State played for the jury which needed to
be explained by playing the rest” of the witness’s interview).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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