CourtListener 10846051

Testo completo

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 21, 2026

S25Y0888. IN THE MATTER OF MYLEE MCKINNEY.

PER CURIAM.

The current disciplinary matter is before the Court on the

report of a Special Master who referred part of a Notice of Discipline

that was originally filed in March 2025 back to this Court. As

relevant here, the Notice of Discipline initially sought to disbar

Mylee McKinney (State Bar No. 122143) based on her misconduct in

the representation, and ultimate abandonment, of nine clients,

whom she represented primarily in child custody and divorce

matters.1 Although McKinney attempted to reject the Notice of

Discipline within the time required by the Rules of Professional

Conduct, the Bar argued that her efforts were inadequate and

1 These nine client matters are referenced herein as State Disciplinary

Board (“SDB”) Docket Nos. 7996, 7997, 7998, 7999, 8000, 8001, 8002, 8003,
and 8004.
insufficient and requested that this Court disbar her without

additional process because McKinney failed to timely provide a

sworn response. See Bar Rule 4-208.1(b) (“Unless the Notice of

Discipline is rejected by the respondent as provided in Rule 4-208.3,

(1) the respondent shall be in default; (2) the respondent shall have

no right to any evidentiary hearing; and (3) the respondent shall be

subject to such discipline and further proceedings as may be

determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia.”); Bar Rule 4-208.3(b)

(“In accordance with Rule 4-204.3 if the respondent has not

previously filed a sworn response to the Notice of Investigation the

rejection must also include a sworn response in order to be

considered valid.)

In May 2025, the Court referred this matter to Special Master

Patrick E. Longan to determine whether McKinney ought to be

deemed to be in default because her otherwise timely rejection of the

Notice of Discipline failed to include a sworn response to the

underlying Notices of Investigation as required by Bar Rule 4-

208.3(b). See Case No. S25Y0888 (May 6, 2025). Upon referral, the

2
Special Master held a hearing and issued a report in which he

determined that McKinney was not in default with respect to two

client matters for which she had previously filed sworn responses2 –

those being SDB Docket Nos. 7997 and 8001; that she was in default

with respect to allegations in the remaining seven cases that she

violated Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a)(1)–(4), 1.5(a), 1.16(d), and 3.2; and

that the allegations in those seven cases that she violated Rule

8.4(a)(4) should be re-opened and referred to the State Bar to file a

formal complaint. However, given the posture of this case and this

Court’s “strong preference for deciding cases on their merits,” In the

Matter of Bonnell, S25Y0965, slip. op. at 12 (Ga. Sept. 16, 2025)

(2025 WL 2646140), the Court hereby rejects the Special Master’s

report and remands the matter to the State Bar to file a formal

complaint to pursue the allegations that the Special Master

2 After the State Bar filed a formal complaint as to the two clients,
McKinney acknowledged service but thereafter did not file an answer or
otherwise respond. Accordingly, the Special Master entered an order granting
the State Bar’s motion for default. That matter is now back again before this
Court on the report and recommendation of the Special Master to disbar
McKinney and remains pending. See Case No. 26Y0581.

3
determined had been admitted by default based on not including

sworn responses.

1. Procedural History

On March 26, 2025, the State Bar filed its Notice of Discipline

related to nine clients. The Notice provided that after a full

investigation, the Board found probable cause to believe that

McKinney violated Rules 1.2(a) (lawyer shall abide by a client’s

decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation), 1.3

(lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in

representing a client), 1.4(a)(1)–(4) (lawyer should keep client

reasonably informed, reasonably consult with client about matters,

and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information),

1.5(a) (lawyer shall not collect an unreasonable fee), 1.16(d) (lawyer

shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a

client’s interests), 3.2 (lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to

expedite litigation), and 8.4(a)(4) (lawyer shall not engage in

professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct

4
found in Bar Rule 4-102(d). The maximum penalty for a violation of

Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, and 8.4(a)(4) is disbarment. The maximum penalty

for a violation of Rules 1.4(a), 1.5(a), 1.16(d), and 3.2 is a public

reprimand.

McKinney acknowledged service of the Notice of Discipline on

April 2, 2025. McKinney then filed a document entitled “Rejection of

Notice of Discipline” on May 2, 2025, but that rejection included no

sworn responses to the underlying Notices of Investigation, and

thus, was invalid as to all the clients except two for whom she had

previously submitted sworn responses after receiving the initial

Notices of Investigation from the State Bar. See Rule 4-208.3(b).

Three days later, on May 5, 2025, McKinney apparently recognized

her error and filed a document entitled “Amended Rejection of

Notice of Discipline” in which she provided a sworn response that

referenced all nine cases by their SDB docket numbers; admitted to

the conduct that constituted violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, and

3.2; and stated that she was prepared to provide restitution to each

aggrieved party. McKinney also detailed some of her mental health

5
challenges, noting that during the time period of her misconduct she

began experiencing severe mental health issues that caused her to

“not see a point in responding” to the grievances, but she explained

that she has been making steady progress with her mental and

emotional health and that she felt like she had “been given a second

chance to right [her] wrongs.”

The State Bar filed a response and stated that the rejections

were inadequate and insufficient because: (1) the May 2 rejection

failed to include sworn responses; (2) the May 5 rejection was

untimely; and (3) the response attached to the May 5 rejection

actually admitted that McKinney violated Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, and

3.2 in at least seven matters. The Bar further noted that McKinney

alleged that she intended to file a Bar Rule 4-227 Petition for

Voluntary Discipline as to these rule violations, but no such petition

had been filed. McKinney also admitted that she owed restitution to

the clients, but had not paid them, nor made any arrangements to

pay. Thus, the State Bar asked that this Court disbar McKinney

based on the Notice of Discipline and her purported admissions to

6
violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. McKinney

responded, contending that her rejections should be considered

timely and in compliance with Bar Rule 4-208.3(b). She also claimed

that since the amended rejection had been filed, “refunds have been

provided to all parties involved excluding [two client] matters,” but

she offered no documentation in support.

2. Our May 6, 2025 order

When the matter was initially presented to this Court, we

issued an order referring the matter to a Special Master to

determine whether McKinney ought to be deemed to be in default as

to the Notice of Discipline. We further directed that if the Special

Master determined that McKinney was in default, the Special

Master should refer the matter back to this Court for further

proceedings on the Notice of Discipline and default, but if the Special

Master ultimately determined that McKinney was not in default,

then it should direct the State Bar to file a formal complaint and

proceed in the ordinary course thereafter.

3. Proceedings before the Special Master

7
The Special Master held a status hearing and following the

hearing, the Special Master notified the parties of his preliminary

conclusion that McKinney was in default but provided her with the

opportunity to file a motion to open default.

(a) Motion to open default

McKinney filed a motion to open default and brief in support.

In it, she argued that she had fulfilled all of the conditions precedent

to opening a default under OCGA § 9-11-55(b)3 because she filed her

amended rejection along with the required responses under oath to

the previously issued Notices of Investigation on May 5, 2025, and

“announce[d]” that she was ready to proceed with trial and any

evidentiary hearing to be held in the matter. Moreover, she argued

that the case here clearly demonstrated a “proper case” for opening

default because depriving her of her license to practice law without

3 OCGA § 9-11-55(b) provides that “[a]t any time before final judgment,
the court, in its discretion, upon payment of costs, may allow the default to be
opened for providential cause preventing the filing of required pleadings or for
excusable neglect or where the judge, from all the facts, shall determine that a
proper case has been made for the default to be opened, on terms to be fixed by
the court. In order to allow the default to be thus opened, the showing shall be
made under oath, shall set up a meritorious defense, shall offer to plead
instanter, and shall announce ready to proceed with the trial.”
8
the ability to have this matter evaluated on the merits would

present a situation where injustice might occur. In addition, she

noted that there had been no showing that the State Bar would be

harmed or prejudiced if the alleged default was opened; rather, the

State Bar had every right to proceed against her “through the formal

process” which would also allow her the ability to defend herself.

And, while she acknowledged her initial failure to respond to each

Notice of Investigation, she stated that all responses to grievances

had now been provided, “restitution to all clients ha[d] been made,”

and she acknowledged accountability for her failures and had shown

remorse for the same. Finally, she claimed that there had been no

showing that she willfully ignored the Notice of Discipline or that

gross negligence was involved.

(b) State Bar’s response

The State Bar responded and asked that the Special Master

dismiss McKinney’s motion to open default, contending that such a

motion is not applicable to a lawyer’s failure to reject a Notice of

Discipline under the Bar Rules. The State Bar noted that Bar Rule

9
4-221.2(b) provides that “[i]n all proceedings under this Chapter

occurring after a finding of probable cause as described in Bar Rule

4-204.4, the procedures and rules of evidence applicable in civil cases

under the laws of Georgia shall apply, except that the quantum of

proof required of the State Bar shall be clear and convincing

evidence.” (emphasis supplied by State Bar). The State Bar also

noted that whenever the State Disciplinary Board has directed the

filing of a Notice of Discipline, a finding of probable cause has

necessarily occurred, potentially triggering application of the Civil

Practice Act (“CPA”). However, it contended that Notices of

Discipline are sui generis, and thus, they have no analog in the civil

law, such that there is no “automatic” basis for using § 9-11-55(b) to

open a failure to reject a Notice of Discipline as if it were a default

on a formal complaint.

Alternatively, the State Bar argued that, even if the statute

were applicable, McKinney’s motion should be denied because she

failed to set up a “meritorious defense,” which is a condition

precedent to opening default, see OCGA § 9-11-55(b), given her

10
admission to certain violations. Moreover, the State Bar provided

that another “condition precedent” in § 9-11-55(b) is the requirement

that the party in default “offer to plead instanter” and while nothing

stood in the way of McKinney submitting a Bar Rule 4-227(b)

Petition for Voluntary Discipline directly in this Court, she failed to

do so (despite claiming at the status hearing that she would). The

State Bar further argued that McKinney had not shown “excusable

neglect” as a basis to set aside her failure to reject the Notice of

Discipline. Indeed, her failure to follow the rules, by filing a timely

and adequate rejection or even a response to the Notices of

Investigation, further showed a lack of competence.

Finally, the State Bar contended that this was not a “proper

case” to set aside McKinney’s failure to reject the Notice of Discipline

according to the Bar Rules. The State Bar contended that, standing

alone, the prospect of McKinney losing her law license did not

present a “proper case” to give her more “bites at the apple” that she

already “discarded” by not following the Rules in the first place.

Moreover, it contended that McKinney was incorrect in her claim

11
that “the evidence establishes” that she has “timely and fully

participated in all aspects of the above-captioned matters” as she

failed to properly reject the Notice of Discipline on time and even

failed to file her motion to open default correctly. The State Bar

stated, “[g]ood for [McKinney] having paid restitution to ‘all clients’

– but she only did so after the State Bar filed Notices of Discipline

for Disbarment in a total of [11] matters, which has little if any

mitigating effect.” See In the Matter of Brantley, 311 Ga. 61, 65

(2021) (stating that “[t]he fact that [Brantley] has made restitution

carries no mitigating weight given that she did so only after the

initiation of disciplinary proceedings”). Moreover, the State Bar

noted that this Court could still choose to consider the information

she provided in her amended rejection, including her mental health

challenges, as it is ultimately up to the Court to consider what it

needs to look at when a lawyer is in default and also the appropriate

level of discipline. Finally, the State Bar contended that

unnecessarily broadening the proceedings by requiring a formal

complaint at this point would have the effect of prejudicing the State

12
Bar, the State Disciplinary Review Board, “and the proceedings, and

the rules” given that McKinney already admitted violating multiple

rules.

4. The Special Master’s Report

The Special Master issued his final report, in which he granted

in part and denied in part McKinney’s motion to open default. As an

initial matter, the Special Master concluded that McKinney did not

default with respect to two matters – SDB Docket Nos. 7997 and

8001 – because she responded to the Notices of Investigation within

the time limit set by Bar Rule 4-204.3. Accordingly, the Special

Master directed the State Bar to file a formal complaint and proceed

in the ordinary course as to those two matters.

However, the Special Master concluded that McKinney

defaulted with respect to the other seven matters, because she did

not respond to the Notices of Investigation regarding these clients,

nor did she include sworn responses to them in her timely May 2

rejection. As to the State Bar’s argument that § 9-11-55(b) does not

apply to defaults regarding notices of discipline, the Special Master

13
acknowledged that there was very little case law about opening

default in these circumstances but correctly noted that this Court

has indicated that it would be appropriate. See In the Matter of

Blount, 264 Ga. 539, 539 (1994) (noting that after this Court

disbarred Blount on a notice of discipline, “Blount filed a timely

motion for reconsideration claiming that he had a meritorious

defense and that his failure to timely respond was due to a medical

condition,” and that this Court granted the motion, vacating the

order of disbarment and remanding the matter to the Investigative

Panel, to hear evidence on certain issues and make findings of fact

and conclusions of law); see also In the Matter of Fair, Case No.

S10Y1025 (July 27, 2010) (vacating order of disbarment following

Notice of Discipline where attorney had defaulted and remanding

the case for appointment of a special master to (among other things)

“hear evidence and make findings on whether Fair’s physical,

mental, and emotional problems [as highlighted in his motion where

he claimed he had a meritorious defense for failing to respond]

prevented him from filing a timely response to the Notice of

14
Discipline”). Based on these cases, the Special Master concluded

that McKinney’s default may be opened upon a proper showing.

The Special Master then concluded, however, that McKinney

had only presented a meritorious defense as to the allegations that

she violated Rule 8.4(a)(4) in the seven remaining matters.

McKinney admitted under oath in her amended rejection that she

violated Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 3.2, and although she did not refer

to the alleged violations of Rules 1.5(a) and 1.16(d), she did not

contest those allegations either. Accordingly, the Special Master

denied the motion to open default with respect to those allegations.

See Alexander v. Francis, 369 Ga. App. 580, 588 (2023) (noting in

civil case that default can be entered on the issue of liability alone).

The Special Master concluded, however, that McKinney had made a

proper case for opening default with respect to Rule 8.4(a)(4),

because she denied any intent to defraud, deceive, or act dishonestly.

See, e.g., In the Matter of West, 301 Ga. 901, 904 (2017) (noting that

Rule 8.4(a)(4) contains an implicit intent requirement). See also

Bowen v. Savoy, 308 Ga. 204, 208, 209 (2020) (concluding that

15
“proper case” under OCGA § 9-11-55(b) permits “the reaching out to

take in every conceivable case where injustice might result if the

default were not opened” and that courts have “ample powers” to

open default to keep with the policy of deciding cases on the merits).

Moreover, the Special Master noted that this Court’s specific

guidance in deciding whether to open default is to determine

whether the “defendant’s failure to file a timely answer … resulted

from willful or gross negligence” and to consider “whether the

plaintiff will be harmed or prejudiced by opening the default.” Id. at

208–09.

Here, the Special Master determined that injustice likely

would result if default was not opened as to the Rule 8.4(a)(4)

violations for the seven remaining matters because it is among the

most serious types of misconduct, and with such a violation,

McKinney faced the prospect of significant discipline. Also, the

Special Master concluded that McKinney’s failure to file an

adequate and timely Notice of Rejection was not the result of willful

or gross negligence. She attempted to correct her mistakes by curing

16
the requirement that her answer be sworn and while she

misunderstood what was required, this resulted from mere

negligence on her part. The Special Master also concluded that the

State Bar had failed to show prejudice would result from opening

default, as “[r]equiring the State Bar to file a formal complaint if it

chooses to pursue [Rule 8.4(a)(4)] allegations is not an undue

burden, given the consequences to McKinney of a finding of [such a]

violation.” In sum, the Special Master determined that McKinney

was not in default with respect to the two client matters for which

she had filed sworn responses; that she was in default with respect

to allegations in the seven remaining cases that she violated Rules

1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a)(1)–(4), 1.5(a), 1.16(d), and 3.2; and that the

allegations in those seven cases that she violated Rule 8.4(a)(4)

should be opened and referred to the State Bar to file a formal

complaint.

After the matter was referred in part back to this Court, the

State Bar notified the Court of its election not to proceed on the

allegations that McKinney violated Rule 8.4(a)(4) in the remaining

17
seven matters. The State Bar stated that having reviewed

McKinney’s responses to the Notices of Investigation and her

testimony during the hearing regarding her intentions and the

circumstances when she agreed to represent the seven clients, it had

concerns about meeting its burden to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that she violated Rule 8.4(a)(4). Thus, those Rule violations

are no longer before us, but we still must consider whether the

Special Master erred in failing to open default in full.

5. Analysis and Conclusion

We conclude that default should have been opened as to all

pending matters, and not just the ones for which McKinney filed a

timely sworn response, so the State Bar should file formal

complaints as to the seven remaining matters for the Rules

violations that are still outstanding. We have held that OCGA § 9-

11-55(b), which governs the process for opening defaults, applies in

disciplinary proceedings. See e.g., In the Matter of Turk, 267 Ga. 30,

30 (1996). OCGA § 9-11-55(b) provides in relevant part that “the

court, in its discretion ... may allow the default to be opened … where

18
the judge, from all the facts, shall determine that a proper case has

been made for the default to be opened.” In Bonnell, we recently held

that “the proper-case ground for opening default should be liberally

applied so as to keep with the policy of deciding cases on their

merits” and that “[s]uch considerations for determining whether the

proper-case ground should apply include whether the failure to file

a timely answer resulted from ‘willful or gross negligence’ and

whether the other party ‘will be harmed or prejudiced by opening

the default.’” S25Y0965, slip op. at 14. Moreover, we held that

“where an attorney who is participating in the disciplinary process

is unreasonably deprived of the opportunity to defend the charges

against him, due process concerns may arise.” Id. at 13.

Here, we agree with the Special Master that McKinney’s

failure to file an adequate Notice of Rejection on time was not the

result of willful or gross negligence; rather, it appears to have been

simple negligence on her part, and she promptly corrected her error

on the next business day by filing an amended rejection with sworn

responses. The State Bar has also failed to show that it will be

19
harmed by opening default. While the State Bar contends that

allowing this case to proceed before a Special Master will prejudice

the State Bar and the “proceedings and the rules,” there are

currently at least four other pending matters regarding McKinney

that are being considered by the State Bar, so it is difficult to see

how providing the additional process in these seven matters will

cause harm, given that the Bar and the Special Master have other

ongoing matters with McKinney.

Of course, it is true that McKinney only challenges some of the

allegations in her answer and seemingly has admitted to multiple

rule violations, which the Special Master reasoned showed that

McKinney did not present a meritorious defense to those claims.

However, she did not admit to violating Rules 1.5 or 1.16(d), and

more importantly, McKinney did not admit that disbarment was the

appropriate discipline for the admitted rules violations, instead

asserting mitigating circumstances in her sworn response.

Although we have specifically said that the “proper-case ground” for

opening default “should be liberally applied so as to keep with the

20
policy of deciding cases on their merits,” see id. at 634, we see good

reason in also liberally applying the other requirements of OCGA §

9-11-55(b) to open default in disciplinary matters, including the

requirement to set up a meritorious defense. Finally, the Special

Master points to no case law or any Bar Rule that permits partially

opening default, and OCGA § 9-11-55, in referring to whether the

“case” is in default, seems to contemplate that the default is not

considered on a claim-by-claim basis. See OCGA § 9-11-55(a) (“If in

any case an answer has not been filed within the time required by

this chapter, the case shall automatically become in default . . . .”).

We acknowledge that the absence of clear bar rules on the topic of

default can make the determination of whether to open default a

difficult question for Special Masters. Even so, the Court hereby

rejects the Special Master’s report and remands this matter to the

State Bar for it to proceed pursuant to Rule 4-208.4, et seq.

Case remanded. All the Justices concur.