Long v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: April 8, 2025

S25A0116. LONG v. THE STATE.

WARREN, Presiding Justice.

Appellant Danny Long was convicted of malice murder and

other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Edmond

Irvin. 1 Long’s sole contention in this appeal is that the trial court

erred by not accepting the jury’s verdict finding him guilty of

voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder.

Because the trial court did not err in this respect, we affirm. 2

1 Irvin’s first name is also spelled “Edmund” sometimes in the record.

2 The crimes occurred on April 30, 2019. In October 2019, a Coweta
County grand jury indicted Long for malice murder, felony murder based on
aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated assault (one against Irvin and
the other against Evelyn Roman), terroristic threats, and criminal use of an
article with an altered identification mark. The terroristic-threats count was
nolle prossed before the jury trial, which was held from June 28 to July 2, 2021.
The jury ultimately found Long guilty of the remaining counts, and the trial
court sentenced him to serve life in prison for malice murder, 20 consecutive
years for the aggravated assault against Roman, and five consecutive years for
1. (a) As pertinent to Long’s only contention, the record shows

the following. The indictment charged Long with malice murder and

felony murder, both predicated on the same aggravated assault “by

shooting” Irvin, as well as other crimes. At Long’s request, the trial

court instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser

offense of both malice murder and felony murder. The jury then

deliberated and returned a verdict, finding Long guilty of voluntary

manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder and also guilty of

felony murder, among other crimes.

The trial court silently reviewed the verdict form (but did not

publish the verdict aloud), sent the jury out, and informed the

parties of the jury’s findings. The prosecutor argued that the court

was authorized to reject the verdict pursuant to Ingram v. State, 290

Ga. 500 (722 SE2d 714) (2012). Long’s trial counsel asserted that

criminal use of an article with an altered identification mark. The felony-
murder count was vacated, and the trial court merged the count of aggravated
assault against Irvin. Long filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later
amended. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion in April 2024.
Long filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to the term of
this Court beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the
briefs.
2
the court should accept the verdict and sentence Long for voluntary

manslaughter, rather than felony murder. The trial court concluded

that it was authorized to reject the verdict under Ingram and did so;

the court then brought the jurors back to the courtroom and

instructed them to continue deliberating. At the prosecutor’s

request, which Long’s trial counsel opposed, the trial court later

instructed the jury: “[I]n this case, [Long] cannot be found guilty of

both voluntary manslaughter and felony murder.” The jury

ultimately returned a verdict, which the trial court published,

finding Long guilty of malice murder and felony murder, among

other crimes, and Long was sentenced to serve life in prison for

malice murder.

(b) Long contends that the trial court erred by rejecting the

jury’s initial verdict of guilty of both voluntary manslaughter and

felony murder. That claim fails.

As we explained in Ingram, when a “jury renders a verdict for

voluntary manslaughter, it cannot also find felony murder based on

the same underlying aggravated assault.” 290 Ga. at 502 (citation

3
and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, a trial court is authorized

to refuse to accept such a verdict. See id. at 502-503 (holding that

“the trial court properly refused to accept the [jury’s] initial verdict

finding [the a]ppellant guilty of both felony murder and voluntary

manslaughter” and required the jury to continue deliberating

because “the same aggravated assault charge was both the predicate

felony for the felony murder charge and the act underlying the

voluntary manslaughter charge”). Here, as in Ingram, the jury

initially found Long guilty of both voluntary manslaughter and

felony murder based on the same aggravated assault—the act of

shooting Irvin. Under those circumstances, the trial court was

authorized to refuse to accept the verdict and to instruct the jury to

continue its deliberations. See id.

Long nevertheless argues—without mentioning Ingram—that

the trial court was required to accept the jury’s first verdict and

sentence him for voluntary manslaughter, rather than felony

murder, pursuant to the modified-merger rule that this Court

adopted in Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 (414 SE2d 463) (1992). That

4
rule provides that when a trial court accepts a jury’s verdict of guilty

of voluntary manslaughter and felony murder based on the same

underlying aggravated assault, the court must sentence the

defendant only for voluntary manslaughter. See id. at 865-867. But

Edge did not address whether a trial court is authorized to reject

such a verdict. Ingram controls that issue. And Ingram expressly

relied on Edge’s modified-merger rule in concluding that a trial court

is authorized to reject a verdict finding a defendant guilty of both

voluntary manslaughter and felony murder based on the same

underlying aggravated assault. See Ingram, 290 Ga. at 502-503

(explaining that “the jury could not find [the a]ppellant guilty of both

felony murder and voluntary manslaughter because, as charged, the

crimes were subject to the modified merger rule” and citing Edge).

In sum: Ingram controls the trial court’s refusal to accept the

jury’s initial verdict here, and the trial court did not err under that

precedent. Accordingly, Long’s only claim in this appeal fails. See

5
Ingram, 290 Ga. at 502-503. 3

Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, Bethel, Ellington,
McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.

3 Quoting language in a footnote in Edge, Long also mentions in his brief

in this Court that the jury was not instructed that “if it finds provocation and
passion with respect to the act which caused the killing, it could not find felony
murder, but would be authorized to find voluntary manslaughter.” 261 Ga. at
867 n.3. But Long did not list the omission of this instruction as an
enumeration of error. See Mims v. State, 310 Ga. 853, 854 n.2 (854 SE2d 742)
(2021). And in any event, we have held that such an instruction is not required,
Burke v. State, 302 Ga. 786, 790 n.3 (809 SE2d 765) (2018), and here, the jury
charge as a whole essentially covered the principle outlined in the language
quoted above.
We also note that Long does not contend that the trial court’s rejection
of the jury’s initial verdict implicates double-jeopardy principles. Cf. McElrath
v. Georgia, 601 U.S. 87, 96 n.4 (144 SCt 651, 217 LE2d 419) (2024) (expressly
declining to “address the Double Jeopardy Clause’s application to a trial
judge’s rejection of inconsistent or incomprehensible jury findings under state
law”); id. at 98-99 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that “[n]othing that we say
today should be understood to express any view about whether a not-guilty
verdict that is inconsistent with a verdict on another count and is not accepted
by the trial judge constitutes an ‘acquittal’ for double jeopardy purposes”). We
therefore do not address that issue.
6

321 Ga. 360
FINAL COPY

S25A0116. LONG v. THE STATE.

WARREN, Presiding Justice.

Appellant Danny Long was convicted of malice murder and

other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Edmond Irvin.1

Long’s sole contention in this appeal is that the trial court erred by

not accepting the jury’s verdict finding him guilty of voluntary

manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder. Because the trial

court did not err in this respect, we affirm.2

1 Irvin’s first name is also spelled “Edmund” sometimes in the record.

2 The crimes occurred on April 30, 2019. In October 2019, a Coweta
County grand jury indicted Long for malice murder, felony murder based on
aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated assault (one against Irvin and
the other against Evelyn Roman), terroristic threats, and criminal use of an
article with an altered identification mark. The terroristic-threats count was
nolle prossed before the jury trial, which was held from June 28 to July 2, 2021.
The jury ultimately found Long guilty of the remaining counts, and the trial
court sentenced him to serve life in prison for malice murder, 20 consecutive
years for the aggravated assault against Roman, and five consecutive years for
criminal use of an article with an altered identification mark. The felony-
murder count was vacated, and the trial court merged the count of aggravated
assault against Irvin. Long filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later
amended. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion in April 2024. Long
filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to the term of this
Court beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
1. As pertinent to Long’s only contention, the record shows the

following. The indictment charged Long with malice murder and

felony murder, both predicated on the same aggravated assault “by

shooting” Irvin, as well as other crimes. At Long’s request, the trial

court instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser

offense of both malice murder and felony murder. The jury then

deliberated and returned a verdict, finding Long guilty of voluntary

manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder and also guilty of

felony murder, among other crimes.

The trial court silently reviewed the verdict form (but did not

publish the verdict aloud), sent the jury out, and informed the

parties of the jury’s findings. The prosecutor argued that the court

was authorized to reject the verdict pursuant to Ingram v. State, 290

Ga. 500 (722 SE2d 714) (2012). Long’s trial counsel asserted that the

court should accept the verdict and sentence Long for voluntary

manslaughter, rather than felony murder. The trial court concluded

that it was authorized to reject the verdict under Ingram and did so;

the court then brought the jurors back to the courtroom and

2
instructed them to continue deliberating. At the prosecutor’s

request, which Long’s trial counsel opposed, the trial court later

instructed the jury: “[I]n this case, [Long] cannot be found guilty of

both voluntary manslaughter and felony murder.” The jury

ultimately returned a verdict, which the trial court published,

finding Long guilty of malice murder and felony murder, among

other crimes, and Long was sentenced to serve life in prison for

malice murder.

2. Long contends that the trial court erred by rejecting the

jury’s initial verdict of guilty of both voluntary manslaughter and

felony murder. That claim fails.

As we explained in Ingram, when a “jury renders a verdict for

voluntary manslaughter, it cannot also find felony murder based on

the same underlying aggravated assault.” 290 Ga. at 502 (citation

and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, a trial court is authorized to

refuse to accept such a verdict. See id. at 502-503 (holding that “the

trial court properly refused to accept the [jury’s] initial verdict

finding [the a]ppellant guilty of both felony murder and voluntary

3
manslaughter” and required the jury to continue deliberating

because “the same aggravated assault charge was both the predicate

felony for the felony murder charge and the act underlying the

voluntary manslaughter charge”). Here, as in Ingram, the jury

initially found Long guilty of both voluntary manslaughter and

felony murder based on the same aggravated assault—the act of

shooting Irvin. Under those circumstances, the trial court was

authorized to refuse to accept the verdict and to instruct the jury to

continue its deliberations. See id.

Long nevertheless argues—without mentioning Ingram—that

the trial court was required to accept the jury’s first verdict and

sentence him for voluntary manslaughter, rather than felony

murder, pursuant to the modified-merger rule that this Court

adopted in Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 (414 SE2d 463) (1992). That

rule provides that when a trial court accepts a jury’s verdict of guilty

of voluntary manslaughter and felony murder based on the same

underlying aggravated assault, the court must sentence the

defendant only for voluntary manslaughter. See id. at 865-867. But

4
Edge did not address whether a trial court is authorized to reject

such a verdict. Ingram controls that issue. And Ingram expressly

relied on Edge’s modified-merger rule in concluding that a trial court

is authorized to reject a verdict finding a defendant guilty of both

voluntary manslaughter and felony murder based on the same

underlying aggravated assault. See Ingram, 290 Ga. at 502-503

(explaining that “the jury could not find [the a]ppellant guilty of both

felony murder and voluntary manslaughter because, as charged, the

crimes were subject to the modified merger rule” and citing Edge).

In sum: Ingram controls the trial court’s refusal to accept the

jury’s initial verdict here, and the trial court did not err under that

precedent. Accordingly, Long’s only claim in this appeal fails. See

Ingram, 290 Ga. at 502-503.3

3 Quoting language in a footnote in Edge, Long also mentions in his brief

in this Court that the jury was not instructed that “if it finds provocation and
passion with respect to the act which caused the killing, it could not find felony
murder, but would be authorized to find voluntary manslaughter.” 261 Ga. at
867 n.3. But Long did not list the omission of this instruction as an
enumeration of error. See Mims v. State, 310 Ga. 853, 854 n.2 (854 SE2d 742)
(2021). And in any event, we have held that such an instruction is not required,
Burke v. State, 302 Ga. 786, 790 n.3 (809 SE2d 765) (2018), and here, the jury
charge as a whole essentially covered the principle outlined in the language

5
Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, and Bethel, Ellington,
McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.

Decided April 8, 2025.

Murder. Coweta Superior Court. Before Judge Sakrison.

Matthew S. Nestrud, for appellant.

John H. Cranford, Jr., District Attorney, Robert W. Mooradian,

Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,

Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm,

Matthew B. Crowder, Meghan H. Hill, Senior Assistant Attorneys

General, for appellee.

quoted above.
We also note that Long does not contend that the trial court’s rejection
of the jury’s initial verdict implicates double-jeopardy principles. Cf. McElrath
v. Georgia, 601 U.S. 87, 96 n.4 (144 SCt 651, 217 LE2d 419) (2024) (expressly
declining to “address the Double Jeopardy Clause’s application to a trial
judge’s rejection of inconsistent or incomprehensible jury findings under state
law”); id. at 98-99 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that “[n]othing that we say
today should be understood to express any view about whether a not-guilty
verdict that is inconsistent with a verdict on another count and is not accepted
by the trial judge constitutes an ‘acquittal’ for double jeopardy purposes”). We
therefore do not address that issue.
6