CourtListener 10680405

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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 17, 2024

S23A1118. THE STATE v. RANDALL.

BETHEL, Justice.

This criminal appeal — brought by the State1 from the grant of

Antonio Rodrick Randall’s motion to suppress evidence of his refusal

to submit to a blood test after his arrest for driving under the

influence — is the second appearance of this case before this Court.

In State v. Randall, 315 Ga. 198 (880 SE2d 134) (2022) (“Randall

I”), this Court vacated the trial court’s order suppressing the same

evidence at issue in this case based on our conclusion that the court

unnecessarily resolved Randall’s constitutional challenge to the

admissibility of blood test refusal evidence and to OCGA § 40-5-67.1

(b). 315 Ga. at 200-202 (1), (2). On remand, the trial court again

suppressed evidence of Randall’s refusal to consent to a blood test

1 See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5).
on constitutional grounds, a ruling that the State again disputes.

However, we need not determine the correctness of that ruling,

at least at this point in the case, because the trial court first should

have evaluated Randall’s argument that exclusion of the evidence

was warranted under OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”) before reaching

his constitutional claims. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s

order on Randall’s motion to suppress and remand the case for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. Case history.

We recounted the material facts of this case in Randall I:

On April 6, 2021, an Athens-Clarke County police officer
initiated a traffic stop after observing Randall’s vehicle
failing to maintain its lane while traveling on College
Station Road. During the traffic stop, the officer smelled
the odor of alcohol when Randall spoke to him and
observed that Randall had glassy eyes and difficulty with
balance when he exited the vehicle. The officer arrested
Randall for DUI, read Randall the statutory implied
consent notice for drivers aged 21 years and over, and
requested that Randall submit to a blood test. Randall
refused to submit to a blood test, and no test was
performed.

(Footnote omitted.) 315 Ga. at 198.

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Randall moved to suppress evidence of his refusal to consent to

the blood test, arguing that the admission of evidence of his

exercising his constitutional right to refuse a blood test violated his

due process rights under the federal and state constitutions. Randall

further argued that, to the extent OCGA §§ 40-5-67.1 (b) and 40-6-

392 (d), the implied consent statutes, allow the introduction of such

evidence, they also violate due process. The trial court agreed and

ordered suppressed evidence of Randall’s refusal to consent to a

blood test. But the trial court did not confine its analysis to the

arguments actually raised by Randall and went on to conclude that

the implied consent statutes have a chilling effect on a defendant’s

exercise of his constitutional right to refuse a warrantless search,

impermissibly and unduly burden a defendant’s exercise of his right

to refuse warrantless blood testing, and violate a defendant’s due

process rights under the United States and Georgia constitutions.

See 315 Ga. at 199.

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The State appealed, and in Randall I, this Court vacated the

trial court’s order. Because the parties had agreed that evidence of

Randall’s refusal to take the blood test was admissible for the

limited purpose of explaining the absence of blood test results, we

held that “the constitutional ruling by the trial court on the

admissibility of blood test refusal evidence [was] unnecessary.” 315

Ga. at 200-201 (1). We also held that, because Randall did not

challenge the constitutionality of OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) on the basis

that it chilled his right to refuse a warrantless search, the trial court

erred by expanding the scope of its review to the constitutionality of

the statute. Id. at 201-202 (2).

After the case returned to the trial court, Randall filed an

amended motion to suppress, again arguing that admission of

evidence that he exercised his constitutional right to refuse the

state-administered blood test violates due process, that the implied

consent statutes also violate due process to the extent they permit

the introduction of such evidence, and that the implied consent

statutes impermissibly burdened and chilled his constitutional

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rights. Randall also argued that evidence of his refusal was more

prejudicial than probative. While his argument did not expressly

invoke OCGA § 24-4-403, it did necessarily implicate those statutory

principles. See Rule 403 (“Relevant evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice . . . .”). Following a hearing, the trial court granted

Randall’s amended motion. As an initial matter, in ruling on

Randall’s amended motion, the trial court found that the parties did

not agree that evidence of Randall’s refusal of the blood test was

admissible to explain the absence of a test result as we determined

they had with respect to the prior motion to suppress in Randall I.

Then, employing the same reasoning verbatim as in its first

suppression order, see Randall I, 315 Ga. at 199, the trial court held:

To the extent that OCGA § 40-5-67.1 informs a person
that refusing to submit to blood testing may be offered as
evidence against them at trial, it needlessly and
unnecessarily chills a defendant’s exercise of the
constitutional right to refuse a warrantless search. To the
extent that OCGA § 40-6-392 (d) allows that evidence to
be admitted at trial, it impermissibly and unduly burdens
a defendant’s exercise of the right to refuse warrantless
blood testing. Therefore, to that extent, OCGA § 40-5-67.1

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and [OCGA] § 40-6-392 (d) violate a defendant’s due
process rights guaranteed by both the United States and
Georgia Constitutions.

The trial court expressly noted that, in light of its ruling on the

constitutional issues, it would not address Randall’s argument made

pursuant to Rule 403 that evidence of his refusal to consent was

more prejudicial than probative. The State now appeals.

2. Analysis.

As they did in the trial court, the parties focus their arguments

on the thorny and unresolved issues of constitutional law raised in

Randall’s amended motion to suppress and the trial court’s ruling

on that motion. 2 But, as we discuss below, it is not necessary for us

to reach those issues.

Generally speaking, this Court will not reach novel

constitutional questions when a case can be resolved without

2 Randall also argues that the law of the case prohibits the State from

arguing that evidence of his refusal is admissible for the purpose of creating
an inference of guilt, and that the State abandoned its argument that evidence
of the refusal is admissible for the limited purpose of explaining the absence of
a blood test. However, because of our holding here, we need not address these
arguments.
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passing on such issues. See Randall I, 315 Ga. at 200 (1) (“Properly

enacted statutes carry a presumption of constitutional validity, and

inquiry into the constitutionality of a statute generally should not

be made by the trial courts if a decision on the merits can be reached

without doing so.”). Indeed, it is well settled that

[w]e do not unnecessarily decide the constitutionality of
statutes. As early as 1884, we recognized that principles
underlying the separation of powers should also limit
occasions on which we determine whether statutes violate
the Georgia Constitution to those where such a decision
was truly necessary. Comity to a co-ordinate department
of the government requires, according to many decisions
of this and other courts, that causes shall not be disposed
of upon constitutional grounds when it is possible to avoid
such questions, without a sacrifice of the rights of the
parties. And it is especially so in cases where the
constitutional merits are important, novel, and difficult.

In re C.C., 314 Ga. 446, 451-452 (2) (a) (877 SE2d 555) (2022)

(citations and punctuation omitted). So too in this case.

As discussed above, in his amended motion to suppress,

Randall not only presented constitutional arguments in support of

suppression but also asserted that suppression was warranted

because evidence of his refusal to consent to the blood test was more

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prejudicial than probative. And although Randall’s amended motion

did not expressly invoke Rule 403, his argument necessarily

implicates those principles.3 The trial court, though, did not resolve

this evidentiary argument and instead proceeded to rule on

Randall’s constitutional claims. But Randall’s argument “presents a

threshold issue of constitutional avoidance” because if evidence of

his refusal to consent to the blood test is due to be excluded as more

prejudicial than probative, there will be “no occasion to reach the

merits of his constitutional claim.” State v. Mondor, 306 Ga. 338,

344-345 (2) (830 SE2d 206) (2019). Thus, rather than “jumping

straight to the constitutional question[,] [t]he trial court should have

resolved the statutory question first.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170,

3 In his supplemental brief before this Court, Randall also argues that

evidence of his refusal is not relevant and therefore should not be subject to a
Rule 403 balancing test. Of course, the trial court must address whether such
evidence is relevant under OCGA § 24-4-401 before determining whether its
probative value (of course, irrelevant evidence can have no probative value) is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403.
See Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 738 (8) (883 SE2d 802) (2023) (noting that
“relevant evidence is admissible even if it has only slight probative value,” but
that “relevant evidence may nevertheless be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” (citations and
punctuation omitted)). And because that question is reserved at least in the
first instance to the trial court, we express no opinion on the matter.
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171 (1) n.7 (751 SE2d 337) (2013).

Given the current posture of this case, we conclude that the

trial court’s order must be vacated and that remand is necessary.

Because “[t]he application of the Rule 403 test is a matter committed

principally to the discretion of the trial courts,” Olds v. State, 299

Ga. 65, 70 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016), we do not reach the merits of

that issue in the first instance. And because Randall’s Rule 403

argument presents a basis on which his motion to suppress may be

resolved without reaching his constitutional claims, we decline to

resolve those claims at this juncture.4 See In re C.C., 314 Ga. at 453-

455 (2) (a) (declining to address constitutional challenge to statute

before lower court had “properly addressed [a] preliminary question”

relevant to petitioners’ standing to raise constitutional challenge

and remanding case for lower court to apply correct standard to that

“threshold inquiry”). Accordingly, we vacate the order of the trial

4 Of course, if the trial court determines that Rule 403 — or some other

statutory rule of evidence — does not require suppression of the evidence at
issue, it then must proceed to consideration of Randall’s constitutional claims,
to the extent they were properly preserved.
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court and remand the case for the court to rule on Randall’s

statutory argument.

Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices concur.

318 Ga. 79
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