CourtListener 10680331

Testo completo

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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: May 29, 2024

S24A0478. BAKER v. THE STATE.

PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

Kenneth Lee Baker appeals his convictions for malice murder

and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime for the

fatal shootings of his wife, Lynnale Baker, and stepdaughter,

Shaelinda Sanders.1 He argues that the evidence was insufficient to

1 The victims were found dead on May 17, 2010. On February 8, 2011, a

Spalding County grand jury returned an indictment charging Baker with two
counts of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, possession of a firearm
during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon. At a trial that took place in September 2011, a jury found Baker guilty
on all charges except the felon-in-possession charge, which was not submitted
to the jury. On the State’s motion, the trial court then entered an order of nolle
prosequi of the felon-in-possession charge. On September 14, 2011, the trial
court imposed four consecutive life-without-parole sentences for the malice
murder and felony murder counts, along with a consecutive five-year sentence
for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. A consent order
entered on September 27, 2011, amended that sentence to state that the felony
murder counts “merged” into the malice murder counts “[b]y operation of law”;
a final disposition form filed in 2022 properly described the felony murder
counts as “vacated” and imposed two consecutive life sentences with the
possibility of parole for the malice murder counts, along with a consecutive
support his conviction, that the trial court plainly erred by failing to

give a jury charge on impeachment for bias, and that the trial court

abused its discretion by admitting into evidence certain autopsy

photos and a notebook found in his truck. We conclude that the

evidence was sufficient both as a matter of constitutional due

process and Georgia statutory law, that the trial court did not

plainly err in failing to give an instruction on impeachment for bias,

and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the

photos and notebook. We affirm.

1. Baker argues that the evidence was insufficient to

support his convictions, both as a matter of federal due process and

five-year sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.
On September 14, 2011, trial counsel filed a motion for new trial, which was
amended by new counsel on December 15, 2021. On September 29, 2022,
following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for
new trial. Motion-for-new-trial counsel filed a notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals on October 28, 2022. The Court of Appeals transferred the case to this
Court on April 11, 2023. On June 2, 2023, this Court remanded the case to the
trial court for consideration of whether motion-for-new-trial counsel should be
permitted or required to withdraw given a concern about his current licensure
status due to noncompliance with continuing education requirements. Baker
was assigned new appellate counsel on remand. New appellate counsel filed an
amended notice of appeal on October 13, 2023. The case was docketed to this
Court’s April 2024 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2
Georgia statutory law. We disagree.

When evaluating the legal sufficiency of evidence, we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdicts and inquire

whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). “Under this review, we must

put aside any questions about conflicting evidence, the credibility of

witnesses, or the weight of the evidence, leaving the resolution of

such things to the discretion of the trier of fact.” Mims v. State, 304

Ga. 851, 853 (1) (a) (823 SE2d 325) (2019) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

Applying this standard, the evidence presented at trial showed

the following. In the spring of 2010, Baker and Lynnale were in the

process of getting divorced. They were living in Griffin in Spalding

County with Shaelinda, who was a high school senior, and their

middle-school-aged son, K.B. A separation agreement provided that

Lynnale was to be awarded the house in the divorce.

K.B. testified that on May 16, 2010, he and his mother had

3
spent the night at his aunt’s home in College Park. At 5:39 a.m. on

May 17, 2010, Lynnale sent Baker’s cell phone a sexually suggestive

text message, apparently intended for someone else. Lynnale

dropped K.B. off at school and proceeded to the Griffin residence to

see Shaelinda, according to K.B. Lynnale’s phone called Baker’s

phone around 9:00 a.m., and records show the call lasted two

minutes and twenty-one seconds.

Phone records showed that at 11:16 a.m., Baker’s cell phone,

pinging off a cell tower in Tallapoosa, attempted a call to the phone

of Baker’s father, Randolph Young. Records showed that, twelve

minutes later, Young’s phone received a call of six minutes and

thirty-one seconds in duration from a pay phone located in

Tallapoosa, which is about two hours from Griffin. According to

Young’s testimony, Baker called around 11:00 a.m. or 11:15 a.m. and

said he “had shot Lynnale and the girl” and was “going to kill

himself.” Young testified that Baker asked Young to pick K.B. up

from school. Young testified that he had never been to Baker’s house

and they had little in common.

4
In response to a call from Young, law enforcement proceeded to

the Griffin residence, which was locked and showed no sign of forced

entry. There they found both Lynnale and Shaelinda inside a locked

bedroom, shot to death. Baker was suspected of the crimes, and law

enforcement placed lookouts on him and his vehicle.

In late July 2010, Andre Adams saw Baker on the America’s

Most Wanted television show and recalled seeing Baker’s “black

truck with a Georgia tag on it” at a park in Shreveport, Louisiana

on July 27, 2010. Adams returned to the park on August 3, 2010,

saw Baker and his truck, and called 911. Adams testified that he

overheard Baker mumbling, “I messed my life up; I shouldn’t have .

. . done that.” Baker was arrested at the park that day in a Mazda

pickup truck. He volunteered to an arresting officer that there was

not a gun in his truck. He asked an officer to check on his son and

expressed concerns over whether K.B. “was strong enough to handle

what he knew.”

Pursuant to a consent-to-search form signed by Baker, law

enforcement searched Baker’s truck and found divorce papers and a

5
notebook. The first page in the notebook began with the statement,

“My name is Kenneth Lee Baker,” and included Baker’s address and

names and some contact information for various people, including

Baker’s father and children. The notebook included apologies and

requests for forgiveness and statements indicating the writer no

longer wished to live, but did not clearly reference Lynnale,

Shaelinda, or any shootings or murders. Referencing K.B., the

writer said, “My father has temp custody of him for now.” The

notebook included a list of assets, including a “1995 Mazda Pickup.”

One page included the words, “Kenneth Baker last will” and another

the words, “I don’t want to live anymore I am sorry for all that I have

done. Kenny Baker 8-3-10 No more pain.”

Testifying in his own defense at trial, Baker said that he spent

the night before the shootings at the Griffin residence with

Shaelinda, but was not present for the shootings. He testified that

he could not remember where he went after he left the house that

morning. Baker said he spoke to Lynnale on the telephone on the

morning of the shootings and he understood that she was going to

6
Griffin. Baker also said he spoke to K.B. around 8:00 a.m. or 8:30

a.m. that morning and K.B. had not been dropped off at school.

Baker said he was not sure whether he called Young the morning of

the shootings, testifying that his phone had been broken. Baker

claimed that he did not have any relationship with Young, they did

not get along at all, and that previous attempts for Baker to live with

Young had failed, including after Baker had been released from a

previous incarceration for his assault on the mother of one of his

children. Baker testified that Young hated Baker “so much that he

got up [t]here and lied” to the jury about Baker calling that day.

Applying the Jackson v. Virginia constitutional sufficiency

standard cited above, we conclude that the evidence admitted at

trial was sufficient to authorize the jury’s verdict on the malice

murder counts. Baker argues essentially that the State did not prove

that he was the person who shot his wife and stepdaughter. But

among other evidence, the State presented evidence that Baker

confessed to Young that he had shot Lynnale and Shaelinda and

asked Young to pick up K.B. from school, prompting Young to call

7
the police. The scene encountered by law enforcement, who

conducted a welfare check at Baker’s home, showed that Lynnale

and Shaelinda had in fact been shot.

The record also contains various pieces of evidence of Baker’s

consciousness of guilt, including his departure from the Griffin area

in the wake of the violent deaths of his wife and stepdaughter,

remarks by Baker in a notebook found in his truck in which he

offered general apologies and said that he did “not want to live

anymore[,]” and the testimony by the tipster in Shreveport

regarding Baker’s statements that he had “messed [his] life up” and

“shouldn’t have . . . done that.” See Renner v. State, 260 Ga. 515, 517

(3) (a) (397 SE2d 683) (1990) (evidence authorized a finding by the

jury that defendant’s departure from the state following death of

victim “was occasioned by a consciousness of guilt”); see also Bostic

v. State, 294 Ga. 845, 848 (2) (757 SE2d 59) (2014) (testimony of

fellow inmate of defendant regarding statements by defendant that

showed consciousness of guilt was admissible as admissions of a

party opponent).

8
Baker claims that he had an alibi — that he had left his home

and was driving “toward I-20” on his way to Louisiana on the

morning of the shootings — and relies almost exclusively on his own

testimony in support. But Baker professed a lack of recollection as

to some of his actions on the morning of the shooting; that testimony

may itself support an inference of guilt if it were disbelieved by the

jury, given the other evidence of Baker’s guilt. See Mims v. State,

310 Ga. 853, 855 (854 SE2d 742) (2021) (defendant’s testimony “may

itself be considered substantive evidence of guilt when disbelieved

by the jury, as long as some corroborative evidence exists for the

charged offense”). To the extent Baker relies on cell phone records

showing that he was driving on I-20 near Tallapoosa before his

signal was lost, the relevant evidence showed that police began

tracking Baker’s location after the shootings in hopes of locating

him. Baker points to no evidence excluding the possibility that he

was at the Griffin home at the time of the shootings.

Baker also appears to argue that the evidence was insufficient

as a matter of Georgia statutory law. He cites OCGA § 24-8-823,

9
arguing that his alleged confession to Young was not sufficiently

corroborated. Under OCGA § 24-8-823 and its predecessor statute,

OCGA § 24-3-53: “All admissions shall be scanned with care, and

confessions of guilt shall be received with great caution. A confession

alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify a

conviction.”2 Corroboration of a confession “in any particular”

satisfied the requirements of former OCGA § 24-3-53. See Sands v.

State, 262 Ga. 367, 367 (1) (418 SE2d 55) (1992). Here, Baker’s

confession to Young was corroborated by various evidence cited

above, including the circumstances under which the victims were

discovered and the various evidence of Baker’s consciousness of

guilt. See id. at 367-368 (1) (OCGA § 24-3-53 satisfied where trial

testimony corroborated defendant’s confession as to the defendant’s

presence at the location of the murder, the means by which the

victim was killed, and the location where the victim’s body was

2 OCGA § 24-8-823 was carried forward from OCGA § 24-3-53 of the

former Evidence Code, which governed Baker’s 2011 trial. See Thomas v. State,
308 Ga. 26, 30 (2) (b) n.4 (838 SE2d 801) (2020). There is no specific corollary
to this rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Ronald L. Carlson & Michael
Scott Carlson, Carlson on Evidence 635 (9th ed. 2024).
10
found).3

Regarding sufficiency generally, Baker argues that it was not

established that he was the author of the writings in the notebook

or that the notebook referenced the shootings. To the extent that this

sufficiency argument implicates his argument that the notebook was

improperly admitted for lack of authentication, we consider even

erroneously admitted evidence in determining sufficiency, see Glenn

v. State, 306 Ga. 550, 553 (2) n.3 (832 SE2d 433) (2019), and, at any

rate, as discussed below, we ultimately reject his argument that the

notebook was improperly admitted. To the extent that the

expressions of guilt in the notebook were not clearly referring to the

shootings, that was for the jury to consider. Baker has not shown

that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his malice murder or

3 Baker’s primary brief to this Court does not cite OCGA § 24-14-6, which

provides that where a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, “the
proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall
exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the
accused[,]” or its predecessor in the former Evidence Code, former OCGA § 24-
4-6. To the extent that he attempts to raise a claim under OCGA § 24-4-6, it
also fails. See Blevins v. State, 291 Ga. 814, 816 (733 SE2d 744) (2012) (whether
an alternative hypothesis was a reasonable one under OCGA § 24-4-6 was a
principally a question for the jury).
11
firearms convictions as a matter of constitutional due process or

Georgia statutory law.

2. Baker argues that the trial court plainly erred by failing

to charge the jury on impeachment of Young based on Young’s bias

or motive to lie. We disagree.

Baker concedes that he did not preserve for ordinary appellate

review an objection to the trial court’s failure to give an instruction

on impeachment for bias or motive and therefore this claim is

subject to review only for plain error. See State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29,

32 (1) (718 SE2d 232) (2011) (establishing plain-error review for

unpreserved jury instruction claims). This Court established the

following test for determining whether there is plain error in jury

instructions under OCGA § 17-8-58 (b):

12
if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court
has the discretion to remedy the error — discretion which
ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.

Kelly, 290 Ga. at 33 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted;

emphasis in original). If one prong of the plain error test is not

satisfied, we need not address the other prongs of the test. See id. at

34 (2) (b) n.5. Satisfying this high standard “is difficult, as it should

be.” Id. at 33 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Here, Baker has not shown that it was obvious that the trial

court should have given an instruction on impeachment of a witness

for bias based on evidence about Baker’s estranged relationship with

Young. The trial court instructed the jury on its duty to determine

the credibility and believability of witnesses. In particular, in its

preliminary instructions to the jury, the trial court instructed the

jury that in determining the credibility or believability of the

witnesses, the jury might consider, among other things, the

witnesses’ “interest or lack of interest in the case[.]”And in its final

charge to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury that in

13
determining witness credibility the jury might consider “all of the

facts and circumstances of the case, the manner in which the witness

testifies, their means and opportunity for knowing the facts about

which they testify, the nature of the facts about which they testify,

the probability or improbability of their testimony and the

occurrences about which they testify[,]” as well as “their personal

credibility insofar as it may have been shown in your presence and

by the evidence.” We have said that even assuming there was slight

evidence supporting a charge on impeachment of a witness through

bias toward a party, a charge asking jurors to consider a witness’s

“interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case” substantially

covered the omitted charge on bias such that there was no error in

declining to give the additional charge. See Isaac v. State, 2024 WL

2138181, at *7 (3) (Case No. S24A0014, decided May 14, 2024).

Although the trial court here omitted the “interest or lack of

interest” language from its final charge to the jury, the court did

instruct the jury in its preliminary instructions that it was proper

to consider a witness’s interest or lack of interest in the case in

14
determining the witness’s credibility. And Baker has not pointed to

any binding case law showing that an additional instruction on bias

was required on this record, and we have not found any. Thus, Baker

has not shown that the failure to give an instruction on bias

amounted to plain error. See Simmons v. State, 314 Ga. 883, 889-

890 (2) (a) (880 SE2d 125) (2022) (no clear or obvious error where

appellant did not point to any authority that additional charge was

required).

3. Baker argues that the trial court erred by admitting

certain autopsy photos. We disagree.

During the medical examiner’s testimony, the trial court

admitted several pre-incision autopsy photos over Baker’s objections

that they were cumulative and were “probably meant to inflame

more than anything else” because they showed Lynnale’s breasts

and pubic area in addition to gunshot wounds. The medical

examiner testified that these photos were taken in the course of

standard procedure in an effort to address questions such as range

of fire and bullet trajectories. He also testified that when a photo

15
displays the breasts or sexual organs of a victim, that is because

what is shown bears some relevance to the victim’s wounds.

Baker argues that “[t]he prejudicial effect of these photos

outweighed any alleged probative value and should have been

excluded by the trial court” because “[r]reasonable jurors’ passions

would have been inflamed upon viewing these exhibits and weighing

the evidence against Baker[.]” The former Evidence Code did not

have a provision providing for the exclusion of evidence when it was

more prejudicial than probative, but we limited the admissibility of

post-incision autopsy photos given the potential for prejudice and

confusion. See Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 862, 866-867 (5) (302 SE2d

347) (1983), abrogated by the current Evidence Code as stated in

Venturino v. State, 306 Ga. 391, 395-396 (2) (b) (890 SE2d 110)

(2019).4 Nonetheless, our former Evidence Code case law was clear

that a trial court generally did not abuse its discretion in admitting

4 Of course, OCGA § 24-4-403 now specifically provides that “[r]elevant

evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.”
16
pre-incision autopsy photos showing the location and nature of a

victim’s wounds, even if they were duplicative, even if they might

“inflame” the jury, and even if the cause of death was not in dispute.

See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 106, 107-108 (2) (709 SE2d 768)

(2011). Although the three autopsy photos that Baker challenges on

appeal included Lynnale’s breast or pubic area, they also show the

location of her wounds, and we cannot say that the trial court abused

its discretion by admitting these photos. See, e.g., id. at 108 (2) (trial

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting pre-incision autopsy

photographs into evidence); Miller v. State, 277 Ga. 707, 709 (2) (593

SE2d 659) (2004) (no abuse of discretion when trial court admitted

pre-incision autopsy pictures depicting the location and nature of

the victim’s wounds); Rucker v. State, 270 Ga. 431, 433-434 (4) (510

SE2d 816) (1999) (no error in admitting pre-incision autopsy

photograph showing that a bra stay infiltrating a gunshot wound).

4. Finally, Baker argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting the notebook taken from his truck. We

disagree.

17
Baker argues that the notebook should not have been admitted

because the State did not establish that the writing was his. 5 Under

the former Evidence Code, our case law provided that the genuine

nature of a letter or note may be proved by circumstantial evidence

and need not be authenticated by a handwriting expert. See Johnson

v. State, 273 Ga. 872, 873 (1) (548 SE2d 292) (2001). 6 Here, Baker’s

notebook was authenticated by both its contents and the location in

which it was found. The writing within the notebook began with the

statement, “My name is Kenneth Lee Baker”; included Baker’s

address along with the names and contact information for Baker’s

family, including the phone number listed for Young that Baker

called on the morning of the shooting; listed assets, including the

“1995 Mazda Pickup” — the same type of vehicle from which the

notebook was collected; and included a page signed by “Kenny

5 Baker notes that he also raised a chain-of-custody objection at trial.

But he offers no argument in support of such an objection on appeal, so it is
abandoned. See former Supreme Court Rule 22 (“Any enumerated error not
supported by argument or citation of authority in the brief shall be deemed
abandoned.”).
6 The current Evidence Code now contains a comprehensive
authentication statute that is nearly identical to a federal rule. See OCGA 24-
9-901; Nicholson v. State, 307 Ga. 466, 476 (5) n.6 (837 SE2d 362) (2019).
18
Baker” and dated “8-3-10[.]” And the notebook was found in Baker’s

vehicle. Although Baker points to factual differences between his

case and the authentication case law cited by the State, we cannot

say that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Baker’s

authentication objection and admitting the notebook. See Foster v.

State, 294 Ga. 383, 384-385 (3) (754 SE2d 33) (2014) (circumstances

were sufficient to make prima facie showing of authenticity of letter

putatively written by the defendant where the letter referenced the

recipient’s relatives and friends, discussed the pending charges,

contained the defendant’s jail cell number, and was signed by an

alias of the defendant, and the recipient testified that she knew that

it was from the defendant “based on the names and the content of

the letter”); Arevalo v. State, 275 Ga. 392, 395-396 (5) (567 SE2d 303)

(2002) (citing contents of a letter, in addition to other circumstances,

in concluding that circumstances were sufficient to make a prima

facie showing of the writing’s authenticity); State v. Smith, 246 Ga.

129, 130 (269 SE2d 21) (1980) (“While possession alone is

insufficient to establish a prima facie showing of authenticity, it

19
should be recognized that possession, together with other

circumstances, may meet the burden [to show authenticity].”

(citation and punctuation omitted)).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

319 Ga. 456
FINAL COPY

S24A0478. BAKER v. THE STATE.

PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

Kenneth Lee Baker appeals his convictions for malice murder

and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime for the

fatal shootings of his wife, Lynnale Baker, and stepdaughter,

Shaelinda Sanders.1 He argues that the evidence was insufficient to

1 The victims were found dead on May 17, 2010. On February 8, 2011, a

Spalding County grand jury returned an indictment charging Baker with two
counts of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, possession of a firearm
during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon. At a trial that took place in September 2011, a jury found Baker guilty
on all charges except the felon-in-possession charge, which was not submitted
to the jury. On the State’s motion, the trial court then entered an order of nolle
prosequi of the felon-in-possession charge. On September 14, 2011, the trial
court imposed four consecutive life-without-parole sentences for the malice
murder and felony murder counts, along with a consecutive five-year sentence
for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. A consent order
entered on September 27, 2011, amended that sentence to state that the felony
murder counts “merged” into the malice murder counts “[b]y operation of law”;
a final disposition form filed in 2022 properly described the felony murder
counts as “vacated” and imposed two consecutive life sentences with the
possibility of parole for the malice murder counts, along with a consecutive
five-year sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.
On September 14, 2011, trial counsel filed a motion for new trial, which was
amended by new counsel on December 15, 2021. On September 29, 2022,
following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for
support his conviction, that the trial court plainly erred by failing to

give a jury charge on impeachment for bias, and that the trial court

abused its discretion by admitting into evidence certain autopsy

photos and a notebook found in his truck. We conclude that the

evidence was sufficient both as a matter of constitutional due

process and Georgia statutory law, that the trial court did not

plainly err in failing to give an instruction on impeachment for bias,

and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the

photos and notebook. We affirm.

1. Baker argues that the evidence was insufficient to

support his convictions, both as a matter of federal due process and

Georgia statutory law. We disagree.

When evaluating the legal sufficiency of evidence, we view the

new trial. Motion-for-new-trial counsel filed a notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals on October 28, 2022. The Court of Appeals transferred the case to this
Court on April 11, 2023. On June 2, 2023, this Court remanded the case to the
trial court for consideration of whether motion-for-new-trial counsel should be
permitted or required to withdraw given a concern about his current licensure
status due to noncompliance with continuing education requirements. Baker
was assigned new appellate counsel on remand. New appellate counsel filed an
amended notice of appeal on October 13, 2023. The case was docketed to this
Court’s April 2024 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdicts and inquire

whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). “Under this review, we must

put aside any questions about conflicting evidence, the credibility of

witnesses, or the weight of the evidence, leaving the resolution of

such things to the discretion of the trier of fact.” Mims v. State, 304

Ga. 851, 853 (1) (a) (823 SE2d 325) (2019) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

Applying this standard, the evidence presented at trial showed

the following. In the spring of 2010, Baker and Lynnale were in the

process of getting divorced. They were living in Griffin in Spalding

County with Shaelinda, who was a high school senior, and their

middle-school-aged son, K. B. A separation agreement provided that

Lynnale was to be awarded the house in the divorce.

K. B. testified that on May 16, 2010, he and his mother had

spent the night at his aunt’s home in College Park. At 5:39 a.m. on

May 17, 2010, Lynnale sent Baker’s cell phone a sexually suggestive

3
text message, apparently intended for someone else. Lynnale

dropped K. B. off at school and proceeded to the Griffin residence to

see Shaelinda, according to K. B. Lynnale’s phone called Baker’s

phone around 9:00 a.m., and records show the call lasted two

minutes and twenty-one seconds.

Phone records showed that at 11:16 a.m., Baker’s cell phone,

pinging off a cell tower in Tallapoosa, attempted a call to the phone

of Baker’s father, Randolph Young. Records showed that, twelve

minutes later, Young’s phone received a call of six minutes and

thirty-one seconds in duration from a pay phone located in

Tallapoosa, which is about two hours from Griffin. According to

Young’s testimony, Baker called around 11:00 a.m. or 11:15 a.m. and

said he “had shot Lynnale and the girl” and was “going to kill

himself.” Young testified that Baker asked Young to pick K. B. up

from school. Young testified that he had never been to Baker’s house

and they had little in common.

In response to a call from Young, law enforcement proceeded to

the Griffin residence, which was locked and showed no sign of forced

4
entry. There they found both Lynnale and Shaelinda inside a locked