DOAH Final Order — 26-004378RU

STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
ANGEL HOUSE ASSISTED LIVING,
INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE
CORPORATION AND AGENCY FOR
HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION,
Respondents.
/
Case No. 26-4378RU
FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
This is an unadopted rule challenge, in which Petitioner seeks to
challenge alleged statements of two different agencies, Florida Housing
Finance Corporation (FHFC) and the Agency for Health Care Administration
(AHCA). The alleged statements that Petitioner claims to be unadopted rules
both have an impact on Petitioner’s financial viability, but represent very
different issues. The case is currently scheduled for hearing on October 29,
2026.
On September 17, 2026, a Final Order of Dismissal without Prejudice was
issued, which stated that Petitioner’s Amended Petition did not identify the
statements made by either agency that it claimed were unadopted rules and
did not allege that the statements were agency statements. A procedural
history of the proceeding up to the point of the Final Order of Dismissal
without Prejudice is included in that Order.
On September 30, 2026, Petitioner filed a Second Amended Petition
Challenging an Unadopted Administrative Rule Pursuant to Section
120.56(4), Florida Statutes. On October 1, 2026, AHCA filed a Motion to
Dismiss Second Amended Petition, and on October 2, 2026, FHFC filed a
Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Petition.
Petitioner in this case is pro se, and appears to have been “aided” by
artificial intelligence, or influenced by the desire to make the writing
“scholarly.” As a result, much of what Petitioner may be trying to say is lost
in excessive verbiage. Despite the convoluted nature of Petitioner’s writing

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style, the undersigned has endeavored to sort through Petitioner’s claims and
find the agency statements she was directed to provide. Unfortunately, this
quest was in vain.
AHCA’s Motion to Dismiss
AHCA asserts that the Second Amended Petition fails to establish how
the alleged agency statement is an unadopted rule; how that statement
creates the alleged harm (i.e., the decision to deny financing made by non-
agency lenders); or how the agency statement requires compliance, creates
certain rights while adversely affecting others, or otherwise has the direct
and consistent effect of law.
As a starting point, AHCA states that the Second Amended Petition
identifies the AHCA “agency statement” at paragraph 19 as follows:
The agency shall utilize a flat, non-tiered master
voucher 	standard 	under 	Billing 	Code 	T2030 	to
reimburse vastly different types of intensive client
care work at an identical dollar baseline, completely
ignoring 	state-mandated 	staffing 	densities 	at
different size facilities. [1]
Both Petitioner and AHCA point to Exhibit C2 of the Second Amended
Petition as the source of the statement. However, an examination of Exhibit
C shows that AHCA is not the source of the statement. Part of Exhibit C is an
email response addressed to Doreen Campbell, Petitioner’s owner, from
Christina Leckinger, a government operations consultant for AHCA’s
Medicaid Policy Office. The email addresses, in part, Petitioner’s concern
regarding Billing Code T2030,3 with the stated problem identified by
Petitioner and the response by AHCA as follows:
1 It is inconceivable to the undersigned that an agency would author a statement that
indicates that it is “completely ignoring state-mandated staffing densities at different size
facilities.”
2 Petitioner has filed a series of “exhibits” since filing the Second Amended Complaint (and
did so with respect to the first two petitions as well). Some of these “exhibits” are referenced
in the Second Amended Petition, and it is assumed that Petitioner intended for them to be
incorporated by reference. Petitioner confirmed this intention during the Scheduling
Conference conducted on October 6, 2026.
3 Billing Code T2030 is a standard billing code used in order for assisted living facilities to
receive reimbursements. Petitioner does not explain the basis of the code; whether it is
authored by AHCA or some other entity; or whether it has been adopted as a rule.

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1. 	Actuarial Realignment of Billing Code T2030
The current flat-rate reimbursement pays an
identical voucher regardless of facility scale. This
creates an operational misalignment: a small 6-
bed neighborhood home is legally mandated to
provide 35.3 care hours per resident/week (212
total 	staff 	hours). 	Conversely, 	a 	100-bed
corporate facility utilizes a sliding scale grid
requiring 	only 	4.5 	to 	5.8 	care 	hours 	per
resident/week. 	We 	request 	a 	tier-based
realignment to slice this corporate excess by $600
and allocate it to frontline caregivers delivering
high-density care.
Response: Thank you for your recommendation
regarding 	the 	reimbursement 	methodology
associated with Billing Code T2030. The Agency
has referred this issue to its actuarial contractor
for 	consideration 	during 	ongoing 	rate
development 	activities. 	Under 	the 	Statewide
Medicaid Managed Care (SMMC) program, the
Agency 	develops 	actuarially 	sound 	capitation
rates 	for 	managed 	care 	plans; 	however, 	the
Agency does not prescribe how plans reimburse
individual 	assisted 	living 	facilities. 	Each
managed 	care 	plan 	negotiates 	reimbursement
with its contracted providers, and the SMMC
contract does not require plans to reimburse all
facilities using a uniform or flat methodology.
On its face, the statement attributable to AHCA is not in the email.
Further, AHCA’s response expressly states that AHCA does not prescribe
how plans (which are not part of the agency itself) reimburse individual
facilities. The statement does not require compliance, create certain rights
while adversely affecting others, or otherwise have the direct and consistent
effect of law. Dep’t of Fin. Servs. v. Capital Collateral Regul. Counsel-Middle
Region, 969 So. 2d 527, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
Petitioner describes the language at the end of this email as being a
“distinction without a difference.” But the Administrative Procedure Act
requires that the statement meeting the definition of a rule must be an
agency statement. See Fla. Ass’n for Child Care Mgmt., Inc. v. Early Learning
Coal. of Duval, Inc. Case No. 08-1717RU (Fla. DOAH Aug. 26, 2008)
(although school readiness program developed by an early learning coalition

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was reviewed by state agency, that review did not transform the program
into an agency statement). “A private entity which contracted to provide
services for a state agency does not thereby become a state agency itself.” Vey
v. Bradford Union Guidance Clinic, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1137, 1139 (Fla. 1st DCA
1981); see also First Quality Home Care, Inc. v. All. for Aging, Inc., 14 So. 3d
1149, 1153 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).
Moreover, in its Omnibus Response in Opposition to Respondents’ Motions
to Dismiss Second Amended Petition, Petitioner states (in bold) that “Section
120.54(2)(a), F.S., explicitly commands that agencies shall consider the
impact of rules on small businesses and implement tiering methods to
minimize economic destruction.” Section 120.54(2)(a), Florida Statutes, does
not contain this language. Section 120.54(2)(a) states, in its entirety:
(2) 	RULE 	DEVELOPMENT; 	WORKSHOPS;
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING.—
(a)1. Except when the intended action is the repeal
of 	a 	rule, 	agencies 	shall 	provide 	notice 	of 	the
development of proposed rules by publication of a
notice 	of 	rule 	development 	in 	the 	Florida
Administrative 	Register 	at 	least 	7 	days 	before
providing notice of a proposed rule as required by
paragraph (3)(a). The notice of rule development
must:
a. Indicate the subject area to be addressed by rule
development.
b. Provide a short, plain explanation of the purpose
and effect of the proposed rule.
c. Cite the grant of rulemaking authority for the
proposed rule and the law being implemented.
d. 	Include 	the 	proposed 	rule 	number 	and, 	if
available, either the preliminary text of the proposed
rule 	and 	any 	incorporated 	documents, 	or 	a
statement of how a person may promptly obtain,
without cost, a copy of any preliminary draft of such
rule or documents.
2. A notice of a proposed rule must be published in
the Florida Administrative Register within 180 days
after the most recent notice of rule development,
unless the Legislature expressly provides a different
date. The agency may only exceed this timeframe if
it submits to the committee, at least 7 business days
before the end of the 180-day timeframe, a concise
statement that identifies the reasons for the delay in

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rulemaking. The agency must update this statement
each quarter thereafter until it has filed a notice of
proposed rule in the applicable manner.
Section 120.541(2)(a), as opposed to section 120.54(2)(a), discusses the
requirements for a statement of estimated regulatory costs, and addresses
the impact of a proposed rule (or amendment to an existing rule) on small
businesses, as defined in section 288.703, Florida Statutes. However, nothing
in section 120.541(2)(a) requires the implementation of tiering methods to
minimize economic destruction. “Tiering” of proposed rules is discussed in
section 120.54(3)(b)2., which directs an agency to tier its rules “whenever
practicable” to minimize the impact on small businesses, and discusses the
methods for doing so. It is not clear, however, whether Petitioner is seeking
an adjustment to an existing rule to alleviate its effect on small businesses,
or pointing out a problem related to what it considers to be an agency
statement meeting the definition of a rule. If it is the former, Petitioner has
chosen the wrong method. If it is the latter, Petitioner must first demonstrate
that an agency statement meeting the definition of a rule exists. Petitioner
has not done so in this case with respect to AHCA.
Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss
With respect to FHFC, the Second Amended Petition states: “conventional
and commercial lending networks categorically refuse to provide funding
under any market conditions or at any interest rate, explicitly utilizing
unwritten automated screening scripts to block standard portfolio renewals
the moment an active state healthcare registry is detected on a 1-to-4 family
residential parcel.”
Exhibit D of the Second Amended Petition is a listing of the lending
denials Petitioner has experienced.4 All but one appear to be descriptions of
“lending denials” from private lending institutions or county housing
authorities. The one exception is the state apartment incentive loan (SAIL)
through the FHFC. Petitioner alleges that FHFC implements the
requirement that an applicant provide “proof of millions of dollars in multi-
family commercial project development volume ... bears zero rational
relationship to the preservation of an independent, pre-existing 6-bed
neighborhood care lifeboat, capital-starving the community-scale 4-15 bed
care assets that operate within standard 1-to-4 family residential footprints.”
4 The “lending denials” are Petitioner’s description of what she perceives to have occurred,
and are not actual communications from any financial or governmental entity, and are not
“statements” made by those entities.

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The most understandable portion of Petitioner’s challenge is at
paragraph 10 of the Second Amended Petition, in which Petitioner states,
Pursuant 	to 	Section 	429.01(2), 	Florida
Statutes, the Florida Legislature enacted a
strict public policy mandate requiring that
care 	facilities 	be 	developed 	to 	preserve 	a
protected, authentic “homelike environment.”
To 	fulfill 	this 	baseline, 	the 	Legislature
established under Section 419.001(2), Florida
Statutes, 	that 	an 	independent 	6-bed
neighborhood footprint is legally deemed a
non-commercial, single-family residential use
by right, which federal underwriters mirror
under Fannie Mae Selling Guidelines. It does
not get more homelike than an actual 6-bed
single-family 	house 	such 	as 	Angel 	House.
Respondent FHFC’s unwritten underwriting
statement completely subverts this statutory
framework. By executing an automated credit
overlay 	that 	summarily 	reclassifies 	a
standard 1-to-4 family residential parcel as a
commercial risk solely due to the presence of
an active AHCA health registry, Respondent
FHFC 	forces 	an 	artificial 	commercial
infrastructure 	requirement 	onto 	the 	most
literal manifestation of the state’s homelike
mandate. 	This 	direct 	conflict 	between 	the
health-licensure mandate and the housing-
finance gate function as an invalid, uncodified
rule that violates Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida
Statutes.
Petitioner’s argument is based, at least in part, on a misunderstanding of
the statutory framework to which it cites. For example, section 429.01(2) does
not mandate anything. It states that “the purpose of this act is to promote the
availability of appropriate services for elderly persons and adults with
disabilities in the least restrictive and most homelike environment. …”
Similarly, section 419.001(2) provides that homes of six or fewer residents
which otherwise meet the definition of a community residential home “shall
be deemed a single-family unit and a noncommercial, residential use for the
purpose of local laws and ordinances.” Petitioner does not allege that an
application for a loan is governed by local laws and ordinances.

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Case No. 26-4378RU
Further, the SAIL program is meant for the financing of housing for very
low-income persons, and program funds are, by statute, made available
through a competitive solicitation process. See § 420.5087, Fla. Stat. It is not
designed to provide funding for individual homes. To require individual
property owners to go through a competitive bid process for a loan would be
antithetical to the purpose of the statute. Petitioner has not alleged that
Angel House otherwise qualifies to participate in the SAIL program, and
from what has been alleged, it does not appear that such allegations can be
made.
Petitioner repeatedly states that FHFC “implements” a rigid underwriting
standard. But the Second Amended Petition’s failure is with meeting the
criteria required by section 120.56(4). The statute is not concerned so much
with implementation (although implementation may be crucial to
determining whether a statement is of general applicability). It is concerned
with whether the statement about which Petitioner complaints is a statement
of the agency. The Second Amended Petition still fails to identify the alleged
statement as a statement of FHFC.
Petitioner’s concern appears to be with a credit underwriting policy, used
by many entities, both public and private. This credit underwriting policy is
not a statement by FHFC, and Petitioner does not allege it to be.
Based on a careful review of the arguments of all parties, it is found that
Petitioner has not alleged a statement by either AHCA or FHFC that could be
the basis for an unadopted rule. Petitioner has already amended the Petition
twice, and was provided specific instructions regarding what was missing in
her Petition. No further opportunity to amend is required. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1. The hearing scheduled for October 29, 2026, is canceled.
2. Respondents’ Motions to Dismiss are granted.
3. The Second Amended Petition is dismissed with prejudice.
DONE AND ORDERED this 13th day of October, 2026, in Tallahassee,
Leon County, Florida.
S
LISA SHEARER NELSON
Administrative Law Judge

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DOAH Tallahassee Office
Division of Administrative Hearings
2001 Drayton Drive
Tallahassee, Florida 32311
(850) 488-9675
www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the
Division of Administrative Hearings
this 13th day of October, 2026.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Ken Plante, Coordinator
(eServed)
Doreen Campbell
Owner/Founder & Administrator
(eServed)
Rhonda DiVagno Morris, Esquire
(eServed)
Kristian S. Oldham
Medicaid Litigation Chief
(eServed)
Kim Kellum
(eServed)
Angeliki G. Sellers
Acting Executive Director
(eServed)
Alexandra Leijon, Program Administrator
(eServed)
Laura J. Cox, General Counsel
(eServed)
Glenn Wallace Rininger III
Chief Legal Counsel
(eServed)
Shevaun Harris, Secretary
(eServed)
Thomas M. Hoeler, Esquire
(eServed)
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial
review pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are
governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are
commenced by filing the original notice of administrative appeal with the
agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings within 30 days of
rendition of the order to be reviewed, and a copy of the notice, accompanied
by any filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of the district court of
appeal in the appellate district where the agency maintains its headquarters
or where a party resides or as otherwise provided by law.