Mercado v. Florida Department of Revenue

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________

No. 1D2024-0680
_____________________________

AMY MERCADO, Orange County
Property Appraiser,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT
OF REVENUE,

Appellee.
_____________________________

An appeal from an order of the Department of Revenue.
James Zingale, Executive Director.

June 10, 2026

NEFF, J.

In this appeal, the Orange County Property Appraiser (OCPA)
seeks review of an action of the Department of Revenue (DOR).
The action in question is a self-styled “Probable Cause Review”
which was filed with the agency’s clerk on February 29, 2024. The
OCPA asserts it established probable cause that “there exists a
consistent and continuous violation of the intent of the law or
administrative rules by the value adjustment board in its
decisions.” § 194.036, Fla. Stat. (2023). The DOR disagrees with
the OCPA’s argument and contends that its review demonstrated
the lack of probable cause. Upon examination of the clear and
unambiguous statutory language of section 194.036(1)(c), we find
no basis for the DOR to perform a “Probable Cause Review” of an
assertion filed by a property appraiser. Instead, the DOR should
follow the statutory requirements when it is reviewing an
assertion from a property appraiser.

Prior to the 1976 creation of then-section 194.032(6) (Ch. 76-
234, § 3, Laws of Fla.), which is now section 194.036(1), there was
no right of a property appraiser to appeal adverse decisions of a
value adjustment board. One of the primary purposes of the 1976
enactment, therefore, was to provide for the methods and
conditions of appeals by the property appraiser. The avenue of
appeal at issue in this case regards section 194.036(1)(c). The
relevant statutory language is as follows:

There is an assertion by the property appraiser to
the Department of Revenue that there exists a consistent
and continuous violation of the intent of the law or
administrative rules by the value adjustment board in its
decisions. The property appraiser shall notify the
department of those portions of the tax roll for which the
assertion is made. The department shall thereupon notify
the clerk of the board who shall, within 15 days of the
notification by the department, send the written
decisions of the board to the department. Within 30 days
of the receipt of the decisions by the department, the
department shall notify the property appraiser of its
decision relative to further judicial proceedings. If the
department finds upon investigation that a consistent
and continuous violation of the intent of the law or
administrative rules by the board has occurred, it shall
so inform the property appraiser, who may thereupon
bring suit in circuit court against the value adjustment
board for injunctive relief to prohibit continuation of the
violation of the law or administrative rules and for a
mandatory injunction to restore the tax roll to its just
value in such amount as determined by judicial
proceeding.

§ 194.036(1)(c). Other than changing the entity terminology from
the “board of tax adjustment” to the “value adjustment board,” the

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pertinent language of the relevant 2023 statutory text is identical
to its 1976 version.

Early in the statute’s existence, the understanding of the
DOR’s role in this statutorily created process became muddled. In
the first appellate opinion regarding the then-new statutory
framework, the Second District Court of Appeal declared, without
explanation, “In essence, by virtue of its general supervision over
property assessments, the Department of Revenue is charged with
deciding whether the property appraiser has probable cause to go
to court.” Prop. Appraisal Adjustment Bd. of Sarasota Cnty. v. Fla.
Dep’t of Revenue, 349 So. 2d 804, 805 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

A year later, the Second District Court of Appeal reiterated its
claim that the statutory framework required a mere “probable
cause” review by the DOR. In this instance, our sister court offered
additional terminology, but no further explanation. Those
additional phrases only deepened the uncertainty. The court
opined:

It is, in this sense, a true probable cause determination.
See, e.g., Property Appraisal Adjustment Board of
Sarasota County v. Florida Department of Revenue, 349
So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). Based solely upon the
record of Property Appraisal Adjustment Board
proceedings the DOR determines whether there is good
cause for the conclusion of the Property Appraiser that
the Property Appraisal Adjustment Board has
consistently and continuously violated a law or rule one
of the grounds for appeal now extended to the Property
Appraiser.

Mikos v. Prop. Appraisal Adjustment Bd. of Sarasota Cnty., 365
So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). To make things more opaque
for the DOR in its statutorily mandated review process, the court
not only called the determination a “true probable cause
determination,” but in the very next sentence labeled it a “good
cause” determination.

Several years later, in 1982, the Third District Court of
Appeal adopted the Second District’s understanding, stating:

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In essence, this statute provides that if, after
investigation, the Department of Revenue makes a
probable cause determination that “there exists a
consistent and continuous violation of the intent of the
law or administrative rules by the Property Appraisal
Adjustment Board in its decisions,” see Property
Appraisal Adjustment Board of Sarasota County v.
Florida Department of Revenue, 349 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1977), the Property Appraiser may bring suit to
enjoin such future violations and to “restore the tax roll
to its just value in such amount as determined by judicial
proceeding.”

Higgs v. Prop. Appraisal Adjustment Bd. of Monroe Cnty., 411 So.
2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

For nearly fifty years, the DOR has operated in a needlessly
confused environment where the task it is to perform under section
194.036(1)(c) has been completely detached from the plain
language of the text. Furthermore, rather than clarifying the
DOR’s statutory obligations, the unnecessary judicial exposition
has confused the process. Now the DOR has three possible
standards to apply—1) in essence, a probable cause review; 2) a
true probable cause review; or 3) a good cause review—none of
which has been explained and all of which remain subject to
various context-dependent definitions. See, e.g., Dohnal v.
Syndicated Offices Sys., 529 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1988) (“The
determination of good cause is based on the peculiar facts and
circumstances of each case.”); Goldstein v. Sabella, 88 So. 2d 910,
911 (Fla. 1956) (noting that “one need not be certain of the outcome
of a criminal or civil proceeding to have probable cause for
instituting such an action”); J.J. v. State, 312 So. 3d 116, 120 (Fla.
3d DCA 2020) (noting that probable cause in the criminal context
does not require proof that something is more likely true than
false, but only a fair probability, a standard understood to mean
something more than a bare suspicion but less than a
preponderance of the evidence at hand); Fish v. Dep’t of Health,
Bd. of Dentistry, 825 So. 2d 421, 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“To
sustain a probable cause determination there must be some
evidence considered by the panel that would reasonably indicate

4
that the violation had indeed occurred.”); Williams v. Estate of
Williams, 493 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (stating that
“[w]hat is or is not sufficient to establish ‘good cause’ . . . is
primarily addressed to the conscience and discretion of the probate
judge”).

When, as in this case, the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, “we need only resort to what Justice Thomas has
described as the ‘one, cardinal canon [of construction] before all
others’—that is, we ‘presume that a legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’” Page v.
Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Americas, 308 So. 3d 953, 958 (Fla. 2020)
(alteration in original) (quoting Connecticut Nat’l Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)). Due to the plainly laid out
process in section 194.036(1)(c), there is no need for any judicial
gloss 1 on the text. See White v. State, 666 So. 2d 895, 896 (Fla.
1996) (“The inclusion of manslaughter was a legislative choice
which, when plainly stated, offers little room for judicial gloss. We
must take it as stated.”).

The statute requires the DOR to “find upon investigation” that
a “consistent and continuous violation of the intent of the law or
administrative rules by the board has occurred.” § 194.036(1)(c).

1 Any judicial gloss on a statute which diverts the meaning of

a statute from its plain and obvious meaning to something else is
a distortion of the judicial function and an improper encroachment
into the legislative function. Wright v. City of Miami Gardens, 200
So. 3d 765, 774 (Fla. 2016) (“[A]s a coequal branch of government
with the utmost respect for the separation of powers, we can
neither legislate nor question the wisdom of the Legislature.”);
State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 433 (Fla. 1972) (“Governmental
powers are divided into the executive, legislative and judicial
branches. The lawmaking function is the chief legislative power.
This function involves the exercise of discretion as to the contents
of a statute, its policy or what it shall be. The judicial branch is
constitutionally forbidden from exercising any powers
appertaining to the legislative branch[.]”). Judicial lawmaking
under the guise of interpretation is antithetical to our
constitutional system of separated powers.

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This language reflects three deliberate legislative choices. First,
the word “finds” connotes substantive fact-finding rather than
threshold screening. Second, the phrase “has occurred” describes a
definitive determination, not a probability assessment. Third, the
statute conspicuously omits the phrase “probable cause,” which the
Legislature uses frequently and deliberately when it intends that
standard to apply. See, e.g., § 455.225(4), Fla. Stat.; § 456.073, Fla.
Stat.; § 901.15, Fla. Stat. The absence of that language in section
194.036(1)(c) is not an oversight, and we will not read it as one. It
reflects a legislative choice to impose a different, more demanding
standard—one that requires the DOR to determine whether a
violation has in fact occurred, not merely whether probable cause
exists to believe it did. The judiciary is not empowered to alter
these requirements, nor may the DOR ignore these requirements.

The preponderance of the evidence is the generally accepted
burden of proof in civil matters. Naples Estates Ltd. P’ship v.
Glasby, 331 So. 3d 863, 867 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021); Seropian v.
Forman, 652 So. 2d 490, 494 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); see also §
120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat.; § 194.301(2)(a), Fla. Stat. “Absent clear
direction from the Legislature, we find no reason to deviate from
that standard here.” Hack v. Janes, 878 So. 2d 440, 444 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2004). Thus, the language of the statute requires the DOR to
investigate the assertion, determine which asserted facts are
supported by evidence, and make a determination, based on the
preponderance of the evidence, whether a “consistent and
continuous violation of the intent of the law or administrative rules
by the board has occurred.”

We acknowledge this court has previously reviewed a case
with near identical facts and legal dispute. In Sowell v. State of
Florida Dep’t of Revenue, 168 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), we
reversed a “Probable Cause Review by the Department of
Revenue” and instructed the agency to enter an order finding
probable cause. Id. at 356. However, that prior, one-paragraph
decision offered no discussion about the language of the pertinent
statute, no analysis of the proper review standard, and no
explanation of how it reached its conclusion regarding the agency’s
review beyond noting that the parties strongly disagreed and that
probable cause therefore existed. Accordingly, this panel is not
bound by the decision of the prior panel as no rule of law was

6
articulated. 2 See Fla. Comm’n on Offender Rev. v. Johnson, 429 So.
3d 1073, 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026) (“Stare decisis binds us to what
a prior decision actually decided—not to what might have been
assumed or silently considered.”).

In the instant case, we find that the DOR has not carried out
its statutorily mandated review of the OCPA’s assertion in the
required manner. Despite our sister courts’ longstanding opinions
declaring that the DOR’s review of a property appraiser’s assertion
is accomplished through an undefined probable cause analysis,
those decisions are unmoored from the language of the statute and
we decline to follow them. Instead, as discussed above, the DOR is
required to investigate and determine whether a “consistent and
continuous violation of the intent of the law or administrative rules
by the board has occurred.” Absent legislative guidance otherwise,

2 We respectfully disagree with the dissent. An articulated

rule of law is a legal principle or standard that a court explicitly
formulates and applies to resolve a case, as distinguished from a
bare assertion or conclusory statement unsupported by reasoned
analysis. See Pedroza v. State, 291 So. 3d 541, 547 (Fla. 2020)
(stating that “[a] holding consists of those propositions along the
chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually
decided, (2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to the
judgment”). At best, Sowell held merely that because the parties
strongly disagreed as to whether the value adjustment board
committed a consistent and continuous violation of the intent of
the law or administrative rules, probable cause existed. Nothing
more. This panel’s decision is not at odds with Sowell as Sowell
never analyzed the appropriate review standard per the statutory
text. Rather than analyzing whether the statute requires a
probable cause standard, Sowell assumed it without any analysis
or any citation to authority to support the conclusion. This is
exactly what Johnson says does not bind a future panel. Id. at 1078
(“The opinion contains no discussion of the sentencing statutes
then in effect, no analysis of the sentencing guidelines or parole
framework, and no explanation of how the Court reached its
conclusion regarding parole eligibility. With no articulated rule of
law, we cannot supply one.”).

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the burden of proof is the default civil standard: a preponderance
of the evidence. Therefore, we set aside the final order of the DOR.

Finally, we certify conflict with the Second District’s decisions
in Prop. Appraisal Adjustment Bd. of Sarasota Cnty. v. Fla. Dep’t
of Revenue, 349 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) and Mikos v. Prop.
Appraisal Adjustment Bd. of Sarasota Cnty., 365 So. 2d 757 (Fla.
2d DCA 1978), as well as the Third District’s decision in Higgs v.
Prop. Appraisal Adjustment Bd. of Monroe Cnty., 411 So. 2d 307
(Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

SET ASIDE and REMANDED for further consideration consistent
with this opinion. CONFLICT CERTIFIED.

WINOKUR, J., specially concurs with opinion; LEWIS, J., concurs in
reversal and remand only and dissents as to the directions on
remand and certification.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________

WINOKUR, J., concurring specially.

While I concur with the court’s decision, I write to make two
observations.

First, I acknowledge that Appellant Mercado sought direct
review of the DOR’s decision in good faith, based on this court’s
decision in Sowell v. Department of Revenue, 136 So. 3d 1285 (Fla.

8
1st DCA 2014). 1,2 Nonetheless, I have doubts about Sowell’s
conclusion that a DOR decision pursuant to section 194.036(1)(c),
Florida Statutes, constitutes “final agency action” as that phrase
is used in section 120.68(1)(a), Florida Statutes, which authorizes
review by a district court of appeal.

Section 194.036(1) provides three methods for a property
appraiser to challenge decisions of a value adjustment board
(VAB). The first two methods allow the property appraiser to
“appeal” a “decision” of the VAB to the circuit court. 3
§ 194.036(1)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. The third, which is at issue here,
does not involve a challenge to an individual decision of the VAB,
but involves an allegation that the VAB’s decisions constitute “a
consistent and continuous violation of the intent of the law or
administrative rules.” § 194.036(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Because the
allegation does not involve an individual VAB decision that may
be “appealed” to the circuit court, paragraph (1)(c) permits an
original action in the circuit court, subject to a gatekeeping
function of DOR. The statutory process requires the property
appraiser to notify DOR of the claim against the VAB, and then for
DOR to decide, after an investigation, whether a consistent and
continuous violation of the intent of the law or rules by the VAB
has occurred. If DOR finds such a pattern of violations, the
property appraiser may “bring suit in circuit court against the
[VAB] for injunctive relief.” Id. As mentioned above, paragraph
(1)(c) does not authorize reversal of a VAB decision; rather, it
authorizes an injunction against the VAB. The statute does not,

1 This case is not the same as the one mentioned in the
majority opinion, Sowell v. State of Florida Dep’t of Revenue, 168
So. 3d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), but is a predecessor to that case.
2 See Art. V, § (4)(b)(2), Fla. Const. (giving district courts of

appeal the power of “direct review of administrative action, as
prescribed by general law.”); see also § 120.68, Fla. Stat.

3 Circuit courts have the “power of direct review of
administrative action [as] prescribed by general law.” Art. V,
§ 5(b), Fla. Const.

9
however, indicate what action may be taken by the property
appraiser if DOR does not find such a pattern of violations.

In Sowell, DOR apparently argued that its decision under
section 194.036(1)(c) finding that a VAB did not commit a
consistent and continuous violation of the intent of the law was not
subject to any requirements of Chapter 120, the Administrative
Procedure Act. For his part, the Property Appraiser argued that
the DOR decision was subject to Chapter 120, specifically by
appeal to the district court of appeal under the provisions of section
120.68(1), Florida Statutes. While I acknowledge our court’s
decision in Sowell, I believe that neither party was correct.

Choosing between these two positions alone, I would conclude
that DOR’s investigatory decision is not subject to Chapter 120.
While a DOR finding that a VAB has not committed “a consistent
and continuous violation of the intent of the law or administrative
rules” precludes a property appraiser from seeking injunctive
relief under section 194.036(1)(c), it does not preclude a property
appraiser from challenging any particular decision of a VAB
individually by appeal to the circuit court on the ground that the
VAB decision constituted “a specific constitutional or statutory
violation, or a specific violation of administrative rules.”
§ 194.036(1)(a), Fla. Stat. 4 In other words, a DOR decision that no
consistent and continuous violation occurred does not foreclose
relief by appeal of any individual decisions by the VAB.

To the extent that the DOR investigatory decision is subject
to Chapter 120, it is not by immediate appeal to a district court
under section 120.68. This court’s conclusion in Sowell to the
contrary comes from reading a single sentence in section 120.68 in
isolation: “A party who is adversely affected by final agency action
is entitled to judicial review.” § 120.68(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Noting that
“DOR will take no further action in the matter” following the
conclusion of its investigation, the Sowell court holds that “its

4 This conclusion would be particularly true if the DOR
decision is only a probable cause determination, although I agree
with the majority opinion that this standard is inconsistent with
the statute.

10
probable cause review is final agency action.” Sowell, 136 So. 3d at
1288. This argument, however, fails to view section 120.68 within
the broader context of Chapter 120.

The Administrative Procedure Act was enacted to provide a
“uniform” and comprehensive set of rules relating to agency
actions, including “administrative adjudication [and] judicial
review.” § 120.72(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1974). Sowell takes what is
explicitly an agency investigation and assigns it the status of an
“administrative adjudication,” for which a party may skip the
entire adjudicatory processes set forth in Chapter 120 and proceed
straight to judicial review by an appellate court. 5

If indeed Chapter 120 applies to the procedure set forth in
194.036(1)(c), then Mercado should be able to proceed under
section 120.569, Florida Statutes, as her “substantial interests”
were “determined by an agency.” If Mercado exhausted her
remedies under sections 120.569 and 120.57, resulting in an
appealable final order, then, and only then, she would be entitled
to judicial review as set forth in section 120.68. But she cannot
circumvent the entire process set forth in Chapter 120 and proceed
straight to the appellate remedies of section 120.68. See Pretzer v.
Swearingen, 394 So. 3d 175, 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (en banc) (“As
a matter of basic administrative law, a party challenging an
agency action or decision must exhaust all administrative
remedies before seeking judicial review.”).

If, conversely, Chapter 120 did not apply to DOR’s decision, I
fail to apprehend how Mercado could seek review under the
provisions of Chapter 120.68. Either Chapter 120 applies or it does
not, and if it does, Mercado’s remedies fall under section 120.569,
not section 120.68.

Accordingly, I discern at least two avenues for Mercado to
proceed following an unfavorable DOR decision on an assertion
under section 194.036(1)(c): she could appeal to the circuit court
any of the VAB decisions for which she claims the VAB violated

5 See § 120.57(5), Fla. Stat. (“This section does not apply to

agency investigations preliminary to agency action.”).

11
the law, pursuant to section 194.036(1)(a), or, presuming that
Chapter 120 applies at all, she could seek her administrative
remedies provided in sections 120.569 and 120.57. 6

Nonetheless, I recognize our decision in Sowell. Because
Mercado brought this action in good faith based on Sowell, and
because we are setting aside the DOR decision, my concerns about
Sowell need not be addressed to decide this case.

Second, I have concerns about the disposition of this case on
remand, and whether setting aside DOR’s decision is necessary in
light of them. I agree with the majority that the cases holding that
a DOR decision set forth in section 194.036(1)(c) is a probable
cause determination are inconsistent with the statute. However, it
seems likely that a decision by DOR that the evidence does not
support probable cause of a consistent and continuous violation—
as it made here—necessarily means that DOR did not find that a
consistent and continuous violation actually occurred.

In other words, I question whether this error adversely
impacted Mercado to the extent that she is entitled to have a court
set aside the DOR decision on review. Nevertheless, remand is
permitted when a “failure to follow prescribed procedure” impairs
the “fairness of the proceedings or correctness of [an agency]
action.” § 120.68(7)(c), Fla. Stat. Whether the record shows that
DOR necessarily found that a consistent and continuous violation
occurred, it did not follow the proper procedure prescribed in
section 194.036(1)(c). This alone is sufficient to support this court’s
disposition.

6 Section 195.092(2), Florida Statutes, reads, “[t]he property

appraiser . . . shall have the authority to bring and maintain such
actions as may be necessary to contest the validity of any rule,
regulation, order, directive, or determination of any agency of the
state.” I do not address whether Mercado has a separate judicial
remedy against DOR under this section.

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LEWIS, J., concurring in reversal and remand only and dissenting
as to the directions on remand and certification.

I agree with the majority that the Department of Revenue’s
Probable Cause Review should be reversed. However, I would base
the reversal on our prior opinion in Sowell v. State of Florida
Department of Revenue, 168 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), where,
as the majority acknowledges, this Court “reviewed a case with
near identical facts and legal dispute.” Contrary to the majority’s
conclusion that we are not bound to follow Sowell in this appeal
because it contained no discussion or analysis, we reversed the
Department’s Probable Cause Review in that case while
explaining:

Given the parties’ strong disagreement as to whether the
[Value Adjustment] Board’s actions in this case violated
the law and the complexities of the issues involved, we
agree with Appellant that the Department erred in
determining that there was no probable cause of a
violation of the law. We, therefore, reverse the
Department’s Probable Cause Review and remand for
entry of an order finding the requisite probable cause so
that Appellant may proceed to circuit court if he so
chooses.

Id. at 355–56 (emphasis added).

While the majority has certified conflict with the Second and
Third District’s opinions adopting a probable cause standard, it
claims that Sowell need not be followed because no rule of law was
articulated there. As the majority recognizes, however, the
doctrine of stare decisis “binds us to what a prior decision actually
decided.” See Fla. Comm’n on Offender Rev. v. Johnson, 429 So. 3d
1073, 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026). It is undisputed that what this
Court actually decided in Sowell was that the Department of
Revenue erred in finding that no probable cause of a violation of
the law had been shown on “near identical facts and legal dispute.”
In making that determination, this Court did not assume or
silently consider what review the Department must undertake
pursuant to section 194.036(1)(c), Florida Statutes. Instead, we
necessarily had to consider that review, and in observing that

13
probable cause was the “requisite” standard, we cited to section
194.036(1)(c), which is the same statutory provision that,
according to the majority, contains no probable cause standard.

While the majority is certainly free to disagree with Sowell,
the proper course of action would be to pursue en banc review of
the decision. See In re Rule 9.331, Determination of Causes by a
Dist. Ct. of Appeal En Banc, Fla. Rules of App. Proc., 416 So. 2d
1127, 1128 (Fla. 1982) (agreeing that a “three-judge panel of a
district court should not overrule or recede from a prior panel’s
ruling on an identical point of the law”); Wanless v. State, 271 So.
3d 1219, 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“We are of course bound to
follow our own decisions unless and until an intervening decision
from the Florida Supreme Court, the United States Supreme
Court, or this court sitting en banc compels otherwise.”); Taylor
Eng’g, Inc. v. Dickerson Fla., Inc., 221 So. 3d 719, 723 n.3 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2017) (“We also note the well-established rule that ‘a three-
judge panel of a district court should not overrule or recede from a
prior panel’s ruling on an identical point of the law.’”).

For these reasons, I agree that reversal and remand is
warranted in this case, but in accordance with our binding
precedent in Sowell, not based upon the majority’s reasoning. I
dissent as to the majority’s instructions on remand and
certification. As stated, Sowell requires that the entry of an order
finding probable cause be entered on remand so that the property
appraiser may file suit in circuit court.
_____________________________

Loren Eugene Levy and Sydney Elizabeth Rodkey of The Levy Law
Firm, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Timothy E. Dennis, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, and Donald Jason Harrison, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee; Thomas Andrew Pratt,
Assistant Attorney General, Orlando; Mark Sean Hamilton,
General Counsel, and Stephen J. Keller, Chief Assistant General
Counsel, of the Department of Revenue, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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