Vanessa Lea Williams A/K/A Vannessa Lea Williams v. Eric Allen Williams

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

VANESSA LEA WILLIAMS,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

ERIC ALLEN WILLIAMS,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 4D2025-0728

[June 3, 2026]

Appeal and cross-appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth
Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Anastasia M. Norman, Judge; L.T. Case
No. 562023DR000864AXXXHC.

Chet Eliot Weinbaum of The Law Office of Chet E. Weinbaum, P.A., Fort
Pierce, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Troy Klein, West Palm Beach, for appellee/cross-appellant.

GROSS, J.

We address multiple issues raised by the parties in this appeal and
cross-appeal from an amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage
entered after a trial. We affirm the trial court’s determination that a
residence titled in the wife’s name was marital property subject to
equitable distribution. We reverse four aspects of the final judgment as
set forth below.

Facts Regarding the Marital Home and
the Informal Mortgage

The parties married in 1997. Their only child was emancipated prior
to this proceeding.

In 2011, during the marriage, the parties jointly purchased a home
from Jacqueline Leavitt. The wife worked for Leavitt “for many years.” In
exchange for the home, Leavitt received an “informal mortgage” of $75,000.
The debt was memorialized by a Deed of Trust Note signed by the husband
and the wife in 2011. Entered into evidence at trial, the Note required the
parties to pay Leavitt and her husband $75,000 plus 4% interest in 20
annual installments of $5,400 beginning on April 1, 2012. However, both
parties testified that no payment had ever been made to Leavitt on this
loan.

The home was worth about $430,000 at the time of the 2024 trial.

Prior Divorce Action: Quitclaim Deed Transfer to Wife,
Marital Settlement Agreement, and
Dismissal Due to Reconciliation

The parties’ first divorce action began in 2015 but was dismissed in
2017 due to the parties’ reconciliation.

In April 2016, during the pendency of the first divorce action, the
husband and wife jointly executed a quitclaim deed conveying the home to
the wife alone. The parties later executed a corrective quitclaim deed to
correct the property’s legal description.

During a 2016 mediation, the wife’s attorney informed Leavitt about the
divorce action and where to send a demand letter for the $75,000 debt.
This discussion prompted Leavitt to send the parties a demand letter for
repayment of the note.

In January 2017, the parties entered into a Marital Settlement
Agreement (“MSA”), which was approved by the circuit court. The MSA
stated that the home “is the sole property belonging to Wife.” The MSA
further provided that, “[u]pon the sale of said real property,” the net
proceeds would be distributed for the satisfaction of mortgages; if any
balance existed, then $10,000 would be paid to the husband, with the
remainder of any proceeds from the sale going to the wife.

The parties later reconciled and filed a joint voluntary stipulation of
dismissal, bringing the first divorce action to a close.

After the reconciliation, the parties never took any action to invalidate
the 2016 quitclaim deed.

This Divorce Action

The Pleadings

In 2023, the husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, which
included a request for equitable distribution of the parties’ marital assets

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and liabilities. The wife’s answer sought no affirmative relief other than
an order dissolving the marriage and an award of attorney’s fees and costs.

Joint Pretrial Statement

In a joint pretrial statement, the parties agreed that no support
arrearages existed. The parties also listed the relief sought by each side.

The husband sought (1) dissolution of marriage, (2) equitable
distribution of marital assets and liabilities after setting apart nonmarital
assets and liabilities, and (3) an award of attorney’s fees and costs if the
wife engaged in excessive or vexatious litigation.

The wife sought (1) dissolution of marriage, and (2) the award of the
“former marital home exclusively to the [w]ife” on the basis that the
husband had “quit-claimed his interest on April 21, 2016.”

Trial

At the trial, the wife’s counsel conceded that the wife was “not asking
for enforcement” of the MSA. However, over the husband’s repeated
objections that the MSA was irrelevant and outside the scope of the
pleadings, the trial court took judicial notice of the prior divorce action,
including the MSA. The court also allowed testimony regarding the terms
of the MSA over the husband’s objections.

During trial, the wife raised the issue of the alleged debt to Leavitt for
$75,000 plus interest, along with property taxes that Leavitt had paid. The
husband contested the enforceability of this debt.

The wife testified that the husband had quitclaimed the home to her in
2016 because he did not want to make any payments toward the debt
owed to Leavitt. The wife also testified that the MSA contemplated that
she would sell the house whenever she felt like selling it.

The husband’s financial affidavit was admitted into evidence at trial,
but the wife’s was not.

In closing argument, the wife’s attorney argued that the quitclaim deed
“stood on its own” and was “not dependent upon the original marital
settlement agreement or anything.”

Amended Final Judgment

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In an amended final judgment, the trial court ruled that the home was
a marital asset.

The court calculated the balance of the mortgage owed to Leavitt as
$120,077.40. The court also determined that the parties owed Leavitt
$7,500 for property taxes. The court assigned the home and its associated
debt to the wife.

Based on the court’s equitable distribution scheme, the court
determined that the wife owed the husband an equalizing payment of
$146,300.80, less retroactive child support of $5,779.75, for a total
equalizing payment of $140,521.05.

The wife appealed and the husband cross-appealed the amended final
judgment.

The Trial Court Did Not Err in
Classifying the Home as a Marital Asset

The wife argues that because the quitclaim deed was signed after the
dissolution petition was filed in the first divorce action, the home should
have been classified as her nonmarital asset. The wife contends that
“because the change in title ownership and interest was to occur
immediately as opposed to when [the husband] received the ‘$10,000 at
time of sale,’” the MSA provision at issue “is properly classified as an
executed provision versus an executory provision and it is likewise binding
on [the] parties even after subsequent reconciliation.”

Discussion

“Marital assets” include “[a]ssets acquired . . . during the marriage,
individually by either spouse or jointly by them.” § 61.075(6)(a)1.a., Fla.
Stat. (2024). “Marital assets” also include “[i]nterspousal gifts during the
marriage.” § 61.075(6)(a)1.d., Fla. Stat. (2024); Marshall-Beasley v.
Beasley, 77 So. 3d 751, 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). By contrast, “nonmarital
assets” include assets “excluded from marital assets and liabilities by valid
written agreement of the parties[.]” § 61.075(6)(b)4., Fla. Stat. (2024).

“The cut-off date for determining assets and liabilities to be identified
or classified as marital assets and liabilities is the earliest of the date the
parties enter into a valid separation agreement, such other date as may be
expressly established by such agreement, or the date of the filing of a
petition for dissolution of marriage.” § 61.075(7), Fla. Stat. (2024). “This
section provides a bright line rule for setting the date to be used for

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classifying marital assets and liabilities for the purpose of equitable
distribution.” Schmitz v. Schmitz, 950 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 4th DCA
2007). “Accordingly, a trial court may not classify an asset purchased
after the filing of the petition as marital.” Knott v. Knott, 395 So. 3d 1147,
1152 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024). “This is true even if marital funds are used to
purchase the post-petition asset.” Id.

The statutory cut-off date applies only to dissolution actions that are
prosecuted to a final judgment. “When an action is dismissed without a
final adjudication on the merits, the parties are left as if the suit had never
been filed.” Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Americas v. Beauvais, 188 So. 3d 938,
946 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (cleaned up); accord Lohman v. Carnahan, 963 So.
2d 985, 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (explaining that joint voluntary dismissal
of dissolution action left the parties “as if the action had never been
brought”), abrogated on other grounds by Simmonds v. Perkins, 247 So. 3d
397 (Fla. 2018).

Still, “reconciliations do not abrogate those portions of a settlement
agreement which have been carried out.” Cox v. Cox, 659 So. 2d 1051,
1054 (Fla. 1995). In Cox, the Florida Supreme Court held that
“reconciliation or remarriage abrogates the executory provisions of a prior
marital settlement agreement unless there is an explicit statement in the
agreement that the parties intended otherwise.” Id. But “the executed
provisions of a prior marital settlement agreement are not affected by
reconciliation or remarriage absent a reconveyance or a new written
agreement to the contrary.” Id.

Applying the above law to this case, we conclude that the dismissal of
the first divorce action left the parties as though that action had never
been brought. We reject the wife’s argument that the execution of the 2016
quitclaim deed after the filing of the 2015 divorce requires that the home
be classified as a nonmarital asset. The rule from Knott—that a trial court
may not classify an asset acquired after the filing of a dissolution petition
as marital—does not apply to a dissolution petition that was voluntarily
dismissed and never resulted in a final judgment determining which assets
and liabilities should be classified as marital.

Instead, the applicable cut-off date here is the “date of the filing of a
petition for dissolution of marriage” in the second dissolution action in
2023. Therefore, because the husband executed the quitclaim deed during
the intact marriage, the home falls within the definition of a “marital
asset.”

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The transfer of the husband’s interest in the home through the
quitclaim deed constituted either an asset acquired by the wife during the
marriage under section 61.075(6)(a)1.a. or an interspousal gift during the
marriage under 61.075(6)(a)1.d. Either way, the home is properly
characterized as a marital asset. See Bardino v. Bardino, 670 So. 2d 183
(Fla. 3d DCA 1996). In Bardino, the Third District observed:

Whether the husband gifted his interest in the home to the
wife as the result of an informal settlement agreement, as the
wife maintained, or the home was a marital asset transferred
with the understanding that the proceeds from the home’s
sale would be shared by the spouses, as argued by the
husband, because the transfer took place during the
marriage, under the instant facts, the home would be
characterized as a marital asset under section 61.075(5)(a).

Id. at 183.

The wife failed to preserve her argument on appeal that the MSA’s
provision governing the home “is properly classified as an executed
provision versus an executory provision and it is likewise binding on [the]
parties even after subsequent reconciliation.” The only way the home
could be considered a nonmarital asset would be if the parties had entered
a “valid written agreement” to exclude the home from the marital estate.
See § 61.075(6)(b)4., Fla. Stat. (2024). Neither the pleadings nor the joint
pretrial statement included any request by the wife to enforce the MSA. At
trial, the wife’s attorney expressly waived any argument that the MSA
should be enforced. Her counsel stated that “we’re not asking for
enforcement of the agreement,” and reiterated this position multiple times.

“In order to be preserved for further review by a higher court, an issue
must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or
ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation
if it is to be considered preserved.” Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla.
1985). 1

1 The wife’s suggestion that the terms of the MSA were tried by consent is without

merit. While the husband’s counsel did question the wife about the MSA, this
occurred only after the trial court had overruled the husband’s repeated
objections to the admissibility of testimony concerning the MSA. See LRX, Inc. v.
Horizon Assocs. Joint Venture ex rel. Horizon-ANF, Inc., 842 So. 2d 881, 887 (Fla.
4th DCA 2003) (“An issue is tried by consent when there is no objection to the
introduction of evidence on that issue.”).

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Because the quitclaim deed was executed during a dismissed
dissolution proceeding and the wife waived any claim to enforce the MSA,
the trial court did not err in classifying the home as a marital asset. 2

The Trial Court Erroneously Allocated the
Parties’ Credit Card Debt in a Manner Inconsistent with the
Parties’ Stipulation and the Court’s Oral Pronouncement

After both parties rested at trial, they agreed that they wanted “to keep
whatever debts they have in their own name,” and the trial court orally
pronounced “I’m not equitably dividing any debts.”

Yet, in the amended final judgment, the trial court equitably distributed
the parties’ credit card and other debts.

“A stipulation properly entered into and relating to a matter upon which
it is appropriate to stipulate is binding upon the parties and upon the
Court. Such a stipulation must not be disturbed unless found to be
ambiguous or in need of clarification, modification or interpretation.”
Steiner v. Steiner, 638 So. 2d 174, 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (cleaned up).
Also, “[w]hen a trial court’s written order is inconsistent with its earlier
oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement generally controls and the
written order must be reversed.” Johansson v. Johansson, 348 So. 3d
1153, 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).

We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to eliminate the
debts—other than the Leavitt mortgage—from the equitable distribution
scheme.

The Amended Final Judgment Made Inconsistent Findings
as to the Value of the Marital Furnishings When Calculating the
Equalization Payment

In paragraph 15 of the amended final judgment, the trial court listed
the parties’ marital assets, including a “Bed frame, box spring, mattress,
topper sheet” valued at $2,000 and the “Remainder of furnishings in
home” valued at $30,000, and many other specific items of personal
property.

2 We affirm the trial court’s decision to make the wife responsible for the Leavitt

note without further comment, concluding that there was no abuse of discretion.

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But, in the equitable distribution scheme set forth in paragraph B of
the decretal portion of the amended final judgment, the trial court did not
include the “Remainder of furnishings” of $30,000. The equitable
distribution scheme did include the “Bed frame, box spring, mattress,
topper sheet” valued at $2,000.

“A dissolution judgment that is internally inconsistent should be
reversed and remanded for correction or clarification.” Weymouth v.
Weymouth, 87 So. 3d 30, 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). “While factual findings
by the circuit court are afforded deference on review, scrivener’s errors and
miscalculations must be corrected on remand.” Martin v. Martin, 923 So.
2d 1236, 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

The amended final judgment was internally inconsistent regarding the
valuation of the marital furniture that was to remain in the home. The
husband testified that the marital furniture was worth $30,000, but this
figure was based on the bedroom set alone being worth $30,000. By
contrast, the wife testified that the bedroom set was discontinued,
damaged, and worth $2,000 “at most,” and that the only other furniture
she was keeping was an old couch. Paragraph 15 of the judgment appears
to credit both parties’ testimony when it values a “Bed frame, box spring,
mattress, topper sheet” at $2,000, while also valuing the “Remainder of
furnishings in home” at $30,000.

A further inconsistency exists in the amended final judgment because,
despite valuing the “Remainder of furnishings in home” at $30,000 in
paragraph 15, the decretal portion of the judgment does not include this
$30,000 figure when distributing the marital estate and calculating the
equalization payment. By including only the $2,000 figure in the equitable
distribution scheme, the court may have intended to adopt the wife’s
figure, but it is impossible to say for sure. Although the trial court clearly
intended an equal distribution of the marital estate, the amended final
judgment is unclear as to how the court intended to value the marital
furniture.

Contrary to the husband’s argument, the transcript does not reflect
that the trial court made a final oral pronouncement accepting the
husband’s $30,000 figure.

On this issue, we reverse and remand to the trial court to clarify its
finding as to the value of marital furniture and then equitably distribute
the marital estate consistent with that finding.

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The Trial Court Violated the Husband’s Right to
Due Process by Including Child Support Arrearages
in the Amended Final Judgment

The issue of child support was not raised in the pleadings, in the
parties’ joint pretrial statement (which asserted that no support arrearages
existed), or at the final hearing. Nonetheless, the trial court sua sponte
included child support arrearages in the amended final judgment as a
superseding support order:

A Final Administrative Support Order was entered on April 15,
2016 in Case Number 2016DR000299 establishing the
Husband’s child support obligation of $388.05 per month and
$77.61 per month toward the retroactive support of $3,839.50
commencing on May 1, 2016. The child which is the subject
of that order emancipated on September 2, 2016 and there is
no longer an ongoing support obligation. However, the
Husband still owes arrears of $5,779.75 as of November 7,
2024. This Final Order constitutes a superseding order
pursuant to Section 409.2563(10)(c), Florida Statutes and
includes all arrears due in Case Number 2016DR000299,
which case shall be consolidated into this case. The Husband
shall be responsible to pay all arrears due as previously
established in Case Number 2016DR000299.

In addition, the final judgment imposed a $5,779.75 downward
adjustment to an equalizing payment owed by the wife.

Generally, “[a] trial court is without jurisdiction to award relief that was
not requested in the pleadings or tried by consent.” Wachovia Mortg. Corp.
v. Posti, 166 So. 3d 944, 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). “Due process requires
that a party receive notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to entry of
an order that affects [the party’s] interests.” Montemarano v.
Montemarano, 792 So. 2d 573, 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

To be sure, we have previously “recognized that a trial court can award
[child] support even where it is not sought in the pleadings.” Scariti v.
Sabillon, 16 So. 3d 144, 146 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). For example, in Freetly
v. Mascolo, 757 So. 2d 1286, 1287 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), we disagreed with
a mother’s argument that “the trial court could not have required her to
pay child support because the father did not seek it in his pleadings,”
relying on the principle that parents may not waive their child’s right to
support.

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However, Florida law establishes a distinction between prospective
child support and child support arrearages. “[A] parent cannot waive the
child’s right to support.” Alcalde v. Alcalde, 340 So. 3d 529, 531 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2022) (cleaned up). But a claim for enforcement of child support
arrearages can be barred. “[T]he defense of laches, in the presence of
extraordinary facts or compelling circumstances and where the child’s
welfare is not jeopardized, may bar enforcement of child support
arrearages.” Robinson v. State, Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. on Behalf
of Robinson, 473 So. 2d 228, 229 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). A court “may
entirely refuse to enforce payment of past due child support only under
certain exceptions,” which “are in the nature of laches, estoppel, waiver,
reprehensible conduct upon the part of the parent having custody or other
strong equitable reasons.” Panganiban v. Panganiban, 396 So. 2d 1156,
1157 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).

Here, the trial court violated the husband’s due process rights by sua
sponte including child support arrearages in the amended final judgment
as a superseding support order, even though child support was not raised
in the pleadings, the issue was not noticed for hearing or even mentioned
at trial, and the parties’ joint pretrial statement included a stipulation that
no support arrearages existed. See Ramirez v. Gregory, 403 So. 3d 414,
415 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (reversing retroactive child support award where
“retroactive support was neither pled nor tried by consent”); Steiner v.
Steiner, 638 So. 2d 174, 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“A stipulation properly
entered into and relating to a matter upon which it is appropriate to
stipulate is binding upon the parties and upon the Court.”).

On this point, we reverse and remand to the circuit court to eliminate
any reference to the child support arrearages in a later amended final
judgment.

The Circuit Court Erred as a Matter of Law When It Included
Blanket Reservations of Jurisdiction in the Judgment

The amended final judgment contains the following reservation of
jurisdiction as to the equalizing payment the wife owed to the husband:

The Court retains jurisdiction to enter further orders for
payment of these funds, including [but] not limited to
apportionment of proceeds of the sale of the home, or to
determine additional terms relating to the equitable
distribution of the above assets as is necessary for a just
and equitable result.

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(Emphasis added). Also, the amended final judgment contains another
reservation of jurisdiction stating that the court “expressly retains
jurisdiction” for the purpose, inter alia, of “modifying the terms” of the final
judgment.

“At the time a judgment of dissolution of marriage becomes final, the
parties’ property rights, if determined by the judgment[,] are fixed as a
matter of law.” Encarnacion v. Encarnacion, 877 So. 2d 960, 963 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2004). A trial court may clarify and enforce a final judgment. Id.
But once “a final judgment is rendered, a trial court lacks jurisdiction
under chapter 61 to determine property rights, unless the final judgment
reserves jurisdiction for a specific purpose regarding identified property.”
Id.

Accordingly, a “blanket reservation of jurisdiction for any modification
of the final judgment is erroneous as a matter of law and legally
unnecessary.” Knecht v. Palmer, 252 So. 3d 842, 847 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
(emphasis added); see also Rojas v. Otero, 399 So. 3d 1160, 1164 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2024) (“A blanket reservation for modification of the final judgment
is erroneous as a matter of law, warranting reversal.”).

Here, the trial court erred when it included blanket reservations of
jurisdiction to determine “additional terms relating to equitable
distribution” and “for purposes of . . . modifying the terms of this Final
Judgment.” While the trial court could have reserved jurisdiction for
enforcement, clarification, or a specific purpose regarding identified
property, the amended final judgment contained language operating as an
improper blanket reservation of jurisdiction to modify the parties’ property
rights.

On this point, we reverse and remand for the trial court to remove from
the amended final judgment any blanket reservation of jurisdiction that
would allow for modification of fixed property rights.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

MAY and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.

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