Michael Lawrence Woodbury v. State of Florida & Michael Lawrence Woodbury v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2024-0232
____________

MICHAEL LAWRENCE WOODBURY,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

____________

No. SC2024-1127
____________

MICHAEL LAWRENCE WOODBURY,
Petitioner,

vs.

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.

June 11, 2026

PER CURIAM.

Michael Lawrence Woodbury, a prisoner under a sentence of

death, appeals the circuit court’s denial of his initial motion for

postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have

jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief and deny

Woodbury’s petition.

I.

A.

Woodbury, while serving life sentences for killing three people,

murdered his cellmate. Woodbury v. State, 320 So. 3d 631, 638

(Fla. 2021). He did so by barricading the door to his cell and then

brutalizing his cellmate for hours with makeshift weapons. Id. At

his first court appearance, Woodbury invoked his right to represent

himself and underwent a Faretta 1 inquiry. Woodbury, 320 So. 3d at

638. Woodbury remained steadfast in his decision to waive

counsel, continually stating that he understood the disadvantages

he was to face and expressing frustration with the repeated Faretta

inquiries. Id. at 638-41. He later declined to present mitigation,

pled guilty to first-degree murder, and was sentenced to death. Id.

at 641-43.

1. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

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We affirmed Woodbury’s conviction and sentence on direct

appeal.2 Id. at 643. He then sought review by the United States

Supreme Court via a petition for writ of certiorari, which it denied.

Woodbury v. Florida, 142 S. Ct. 1135 (2022).

B.

Woodbury timely filed a motion to vacate judgment of

conviction and sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal

2. Woodbury presented eleven claims of error arguing that the
trial court erred by: (1) granting Woodbury’s waiver of counsel and
request to proceed pro se without first ordering a mental health
evaluation; (2) failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing to
determine if Woodbury was competent to stand trial; (3) accepting a
guilty plea that was not entered intelligently and voluntarily and
had no factual basis; (4) failing to renew the offer of counsel at the
start of the defense case-in-chief and when Woodbury announced
his change of plea; (5) accepting Woodbury’s waiver of mental
health mitigation without appointing special counsel to present
mitigation evidence; (6) finding that the murder was committed in a
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, and instructing the jury
on that aggravator; (7) admitting a noncomprehensive presentence
investigation report that contained impermissible sentencing
recommendations; (8) assigning minimal weight to the mitigator of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (9) rejecting a requested
special jury instruction on mercy; and (10) failing to instruct the
jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
aggravators outweighed the mitigators and were sufficient for the
death penalty. Woodbury, 320 So. 3d at 643. The eleventh claim
was a request for proportionality review which we declined to
address in light of our decision in Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544
(Fla. 2020). Woodbury, 320 So. 3d at 643 n.3.

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Procedure 3.851, seeking to vacate his conviction and sentence on

seven grounds. 3 The circuit court held a Huff 4 hearing and

summarily denied all seven claims. Woodbury appeals and has also

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus raising two claims.5

II.

A.

In reviewing a summary denial of an initial 3.851 motion, we

affirm “if the filings show that the movant has failed to state a

facially sufficient claim, there is no issue of material fact to be

3. Woodbury argued: (1) his death sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment because of his mental illness; (2) the trial court
unconstitutionally encouraged him to wear shackles and prison
clothes; (3) he was incompetent and should not have been allowed
to proceed pro se; (4) he was affirmatively misled during his Faretta
inquiries; (5) standby counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to call witnesses, obtain mental health records, and advise
the court-appointed expert about his mental health status; (6) the
State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to turn over mental
health records; and (7) he is insane and cannot be executed.

4. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).

5. Woodbury argues in his petition that (1) appellate counsel
on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise the claim that
Woodbury was unconstitutionally forced to wear shackles and
prison garb and (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise the claim that Woodbury was misled during the Faretta
inquiries.

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determined, the claim should have been brought on direct appeal,

or the claim is positively refuted by the record.” Kocaker v. State,

311 So. 3d 814, 821 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Barnes v. State, 124 So. 3d

904, 911 (Fla. 2013)). As to those claims that could have been

raised on direct appeal, we have said that they are procedurally

barred because such claims “are not cognizable through collateral

attack” and “are precluded from our consideration by collateral

review.” Smith v. State, 445 So. 2d 323, 325 (Fla. 1983). Our

review is de novo. Kocaker, 311 So. 3d at 821.

B.

Woodbury presents seven issues for our consideration. He

concedes that his insanity claim is not ripe for our review, so we do

not address it. As to the remaining six claims, we conclude none

demonstrate error.

To start, Woodbury argues that the circuit court erred when it

summarily denied his claim that the State committed Brady6 and

Giglio7 violations. However, his postconviction motion frames the

6. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

7. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

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issue only as a Brady violation. For that reason, any claim based

on Giglio is unpreserved for appeal and cannot serve as a basis for

relief. See Wickham v. State, 124 So. 3d 841, 853 (Fla. 2013)

(holding that a failure to raise a Giglio claim in a postconviction

motion renders the argument unpreserved for appellate review).

As to the alleged Brady violation, the postconviction court

properly denied Woodbury’s claim. The Brady rule only applies to

“the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to

the prosecution but unknown to the defense.” Rhodes v. State, 986

So. 2d 501, 507 (Fla. 2008) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427

U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). As a result, courts have denied postconviction

relief based on alleged Brady violations where the motion failed to

demonstrate the relevant information was unavailable to the

defense. For example, in Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 534, 547 (Fla.

2008), we held that a postconviction motion alleging a Brady claim

was insufficiently pled where the claim was based on the

defendant’s therapist’s notes, his motion did not explain how he

was unaware of his own therapist as a source of potentially

exculpatory information, and his motion failed to allege that the

notes were made unavailable to the defense by the State’s actions.

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Woodbury’s postconviction motion is based on allegations that

the State did not disclose Woodbury’s mental health records from

Jackson Brook Institute. 8 Importantly though, the motion does not

allege that the defense did not possess or have access to the

relevant mental health records. The motion likewise did not allege

that Woodbury could not have obtained the records.9 Instead,

Woodbury said he was only prejudiced by the alleged nondisclosure

because the court-appointed mental health expert and the trial

court were unaware of the information contained in the records.

Like Owen, Woodbury’s claim, which was based entirely on his own

8. Specifically, Woodbury says the State failed to disclose a
discharge summary from his second admission to Jackson Brook
Institute (which occurred on March 31, 1995). The discharge
summary contained a history of Woodbury’s illness and described
Woodbury’s 1994 psychotic episode, his prior admission to Jackson
Brook Institute, and two admissions to Augusta Mental Health
Institute. Woodbury also references a copy of his psychiatric
evaluation and a history and physical form from his second
Jackson Brook Institute admission.

9. In his reply brief, Woodbury cites to the transcript of the
postconviction hearing in support of his argument that his
postconviction motion alleges Woodbury did not have the relevant
medical documents. But even to the extent counsel’s argument is
construed as a statement that Woodbury did not have the records,
counsel’s mischaracterization of the motion at a hearing does not
cure deficient pleading.

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mental health records, was insufficiently pled and properly

denied. 10

Woodbury next argues that the postconviction court erred

when it denied his claim that the trial court “unconstitutionally

encouraged [him] to wear prison garb and shackled [him].” But as

the postconviction court concluded, this argument could have been

raised on direct appeal and is therefore procedurally barred. See

Sireci v. State, 773 So. 2d 34, 40 n.11 (Fla. 2000) (postconviction

shackling claim was procedurally barred since it was known during

the direct appeal and could have been raised then). And Woodbury

makes no attempt to argue he could not have raised the issue. It

was properly denied.

Likewise, Woodbury’s third claim that the trial judge misled

him during the Faretta inquiries is procedurally barred. As

Woodbury acknowledges, he argued on direct appeal that the trial

court erred when it granted Woodbury’s request to proceed pro se

without first ordering a mental health evaluation. Woodbury, 320

So. 3d at 645-47. Upon consideration of the argument, we

10. To the extent Woodbury presents a due process argument
as a subclaim, we reject it as unpreserved.

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concluded there was no error. Id. Now, Woodbury argues his claim

is unique because it is based on the trial court’s affirmative

misadvice about securing witnesses on Woodbury’s behalf. But this

challenge too is a mere iteration of his direct appeal claim and

therefore procedurally barred from review. See Demps v. State, 416

So. 2d 808, 809 (Fla. 1982) (defendant’s “claim was effectively

raised on direct appeal” and therefore precluded in subsequent

proceedings); Dailey v. State, 283 So. 3d 782, 793 (Fla. 2019)

(holding postconviction claims that were merely a restatement of

prior claims were procedurally barred). Even were it new, it still

does not escape procedural bars because it could have been raised

on direct appeal. Smith, 445 So. 2d at 325.

Woodbury’s fourth argument is that the postconviction court

erred in summarily denying his claim that the Eighth Amendment

prohibits his execution due to his mental illness. Woodbury again

presents a claim that could have been raised on direct appeal. Id.

Woodbury attempts to evade the procedural bar by claiming that

evolving standards of decency require review here. But Woodbury

argues that his mental illness has been prevalent since before his

direct appeal, which prevents him from clearing the procedural

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hurdles. See Zack v. State, 371 So. 3d 335, 349 (Fla. 2023) (“To

avoid this bar, [defendant’s] current iteration of his claim rests on

an ‘evolving standards of decency’ argument. But as noted already,

‘evolving standards of decency’ arguments in the Eighth

Amendment context have long been recognized, and [defendant]

could have raised this claim on direct appeal.” (citations omitted));

Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883, 886-87 (Fla. 2013) (finding a

mental illness and evolving standards of decency Eighth

Amendment claim procedurally barred because it could have been

raised on direct appeal); Covington v. State, 348 So. 3d 456, 466

(Fla. 2022) (“Because this Court has repeatedly concluded that

there is no categorial bar on execution of the mentally ill and

because this claim should have been raised on direct appeal, there

was no error in [summarily] denying this claim.” (citation omitted));

Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 511 (Fla. 2012).

Next, Woodbury argues that the postconviction court

reversibly erred in summarily denying his claim that standby

counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. This claim fails

because it is not cognizable. A pro se defendant, “ ‘even if he has

standby counsel[,]’ . . . ‘cannot later complain that the quality of his

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defense was substandard or amounted to ineffective assistance of

counsel.’ ” Doty v. State, 403 So. 3d 209, 218 (Fla. 2025) (quoting

McKenzie v. State, 153 So. 3d 867, 878-79 (Fla. 2014)); see also

Behr v. Bell, 665 So. 2d 1055, 1056-57 (Fla. 1996) (“[A] defendant

who represents himself has the entire responsibility for his own

defense, even if he has standby counsel. Such a defendant cannot

thereafter complain that the quality of his defense was a denial of

‘effective assistance of counsel.’ ” (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835

n.46)). The postconviction court properly denied relief.

Finally, Woodbury argues that the postconviction court erred

in summarily denying his claim that he was so mentally ill that he

was incompetent to proceed pro se at trial. But we already

considered this claim in Woodbury’s direct appeal. 11 See Woodbury,

320 So. 3d at 645 (“Woodbury argues that even if he was competent

to stand trial, the trial court knew he had a severe mental illness

that rendered him incompetent to represent himself, and that the

trial court therefore erred in granting his request to proceed pro

11. Woodbury acknowledges the claim was raised on direct
appeal but argues we “misapprehended” the facts. Such an
allegation does not except his claim from the procedural bar.

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se.”). It is therefore, as the postconviction court noted, procedurally

barred.

In sum, Woodbury fails to demonstrate the postconviction

court erred in summarily denying his motion for postconviction

relief. We affirm.

III.

A.

We next consider Woodbury’s petition for writ of habeas

corpus. To grant habeas relief based on ineffectiveness of appellate

counsel in accordance with the Strickland12 standard, we consider

whether the alleged omissions are outside the objective range of

professionally acceptable performance and whether there is a

reasonable probability that the errors prejudiced the defendant.

Smith v. State, 330 So. 3d 867, 875 (Fla. 2021). Appellate counsel

cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise an issue that “would

in all probability have been found to be without merit.” Rutherford

v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Williamson v.

Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)). For that reason, appellate

12. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

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counsel also cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise an

unpreserved issue unless the alleged error constitutes fundamental

error. Johnson v. Moore, 837 So. 2d 343, 347 (Fla. 2002) (citing

Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 646). Fundamental error reaches “down

into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty

could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged

error.” State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 644-45 (Fla. 1991) (quoting

Brown v. State, 124 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1960)). “Error during the

penalty phase is fundamental if it is ‘so prejudicial as to taint the

jury’s recommended sentence.’ ” Cruz v. State, 320 So. 3d 695, 718

(Fla. 2021) (quoting Jones v. State, 949 So. 2d 1021, 1037 (Fla.

2006)).

B.

Woodbury raises two claims in his petition—both of which are

similarly argued in his postconviction appeal. First, Woodbury

argues that the trial judge unconstitutionally encouraged him to

wear prison clothing and shackles and that appellate counsel’s

failure to bring this claim warrants habeas relief. Second,

Woodbury argues that his waiver of his right to counsel was

unknowing and involuntary because of misleading statements of

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the trial judge and appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising

this claim before. Both arguments fail.

As to his argument regarding prison clothing and shackles,

Woodbury failed to object to wearing either. The record

demonstrates that Woodbury initiated a conversation about

restraints by saying that he “need[ed] [his] hands free.” The judge

responded that he made the decision to restrain Woodbury and he

could wear a stun belt instead of the handcuffs to be discreet.

Woodbury answered “I’ll just wear the cuffs” and dismissed the

judge’s reassurances 13 about the stun belt. Woodbury did not

object during the discussion. Later, the following exchange

occurred:

THE COURT: All right. Do you have any problems—I
mean we’ve talked about it multiple times, with regard to
the fact that you’re wearing your prison clothes as well as
cuffs and things like that, do you have any problem
walking up there when you’re called as a witness or
would you prefer to be up there when they come back?

MR. WOODBURY: No, sir. The only question about
logistics I have, would I be able to use that laser pointer?

13. The judge pleaded with Woodbury: “No, no, no, wait. But
you’re going to know it’s there, but I’ve never seen one where
somebody had to push the button. . . . Wait, wait, don’t give up so
easily.”

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The state attorney subsequently asked: “[J]ust for the record,

obviously Mr. Woodbury is wearing a blue prison uniform which he

requested and handcuffs and shackles which he requested. Is that

still your request, Mr. Woodbury, or would you like to be dressed

out different?” Woodbury responded, “This is excellent.”

Despite his failure to object, Woodbury urges this Court to

consider the claim preserved because objections do not require

“magic words” and the trial court, though earnest, misunderstood

the law. We reject counsel’s invitation because Woodbury’s status

as a pro se defendant does not relieve him from his obligation to

preserve claims for appellate review. See Stueber v. Gallagher, 812

So. 2d 454, 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (observing that in Florida, pro

se litigants are bound by the same rules that apply to counsel and

pro se litigant was therefore not excused from preservation

requirements); see also McKenzie v. State, 29 So. 3d 272, 279 (Fla.

2010) (finding an appellate challenge unpreserved and procedurally

barred where pro se capital defendant did not make a timely

objection during jury selection). That is the case even if the trial

court, as Woodbury argues it did, misunderstands the law. See

Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1978) (“The requirement

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of a contemporaneous objection is based on practical necessity and

basic fairness in the operation of a judicial system. It places the

trial judge on notice that error may have been committed, and

provides him an opportunity to correct it at an early stage of the

proceedings.”).

After careful review, we conclude Woodbury failed to preserve

any error related to his attire or restraints. But that does not end

our analysis because Woodbury also argues that the issue still

should have been brought by appellate counsel on direct appeal as

fundamental error. In support, Woodbury cites Deck v. Missouri,

544 U.S. 622 (2005),14 arguing fundamental error occurred because

there was no basis to shackle him, and the determination was made

without a pre-shackling hearing.

We conclude any error was not fundamental. The right to be

free of restraint is not absolute. Bryant v. State, 785 So. 2d 422,

428 (Fla. 2001). To the contrary, both the United States Supreme

14. Deck held that the Federal Constitution prohibits “the use
of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court
determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are
justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.” 544 U.S.
at 629.

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Court and this Court recognize that shackles may be used when

warranted by the circumstances. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 633;

Bryant, 785 So. 2d at 428 (collecting cases). In addition, this Court

has held that a finding of the need to restrain on the record is only

required when a defendant timely objects. See, e.g., Bryant, 785

So. 2d at 429 (“a hearing on necessity must precede the decision to

shackle if a defendant timely objects and requests an inquiry into the

necessity for the restraints” (emphasis added)); see also Finney v.

State, 660 So. 2d 674, 682-83 (Fla. 1995) (rejecting a claim that the

trial court erred when it “failed to inquire into the reasons why [the

defendant] was shackled” because the defense “acquiesced to

proceeding without further inquiry”). And even where an objection

is made, we have applied the harmless error doctrine to a shackling

error. See, e.g., Bryant, 785 So. 2d at 429-30.

Given Woodbury’s violent history, his status as a pro se

defendant, 15 and our characterization of shackling errors as subject

15. A court may take a defendant’s pro se status into
consideration when deciding whether to impose some form of
restraint on him during trial. Weaver v. State, 894 So. 2d 178, 194
(Fla. 2004) (where a defendant charged with first-degree murder
represented himself and moved about the courtroom in close
proximity to trial participants, especially adverse witnesses, the trial

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to harmless error review, any error would not have been of the type

without which the guilty verdict and the jury’s recommended

sentence could not have been obtained. Appellate counsel cannot

be deemed ineffective for failing to raise an unpreserved and

nonmeritorious claim. See Farina v. State, 937 So. 2d 612, 629-30

(Fla. 2006). This habeas claim is denied.

In his second claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel, Woodbury argues that appellate counsel should have

included the trial court’s affirmative misadvice regarding its

responsibility in securing the appearance of defense witnesses as a

subclaim to the challenge of the Faretta waiver. However, even had

appellate counsel framed the Faretta argument in this way, it lacks

merit. As a result, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective.

As we have already determined:

[S]tarting from his first appearance, Woodbury never
wavered in his insistence on representing himself at trial.
As it was required to do upon receiving an unequivocal
request for self-representation, the trial court explained
the benefits of counsel and the pitfalls of self-
representation and conducted a full Faretta inquiry. The
court renewed the offer of counsel and conducted

court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the wearing of a stun
belt even though Weaver had no prior history of violent courtroom
behavior).

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additional Faretta inquiries approximately a dozen times
over the course of the proceedings. At the conclusion of
each inquiry, the court found that Woodbury’s rejection
of the offer of counsel was knowing and intelligent and
that Woodbury was competent to make his decision. We
agree. Woodbury responded appropriately to the court’s
questions and indicated that he understood both the
proceedings against him and the rights he was giving up
by proceeding pro se.

Woodbury, 320 So. 3d at 646-47 (footnote omitted). A review of the

record demonstrates that the trial court conducted numerous

Faretta inquiries throughout the trial proceedings, specifically

telling Woodbury seven times that an attorney could issue

subpoenas to compel the presence of witnesses. To the extent this

argument is not procedurally barred, it would have been

nonmeritorious, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise

it. Woodbury’s petition is denied.

IV.

We affirm the summary denial of Woodbury’s motion for

postconviction relief and deny his petition for writ of habeas corpus.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS,
and SASSO, JJ., concur.
TANENBAUM, J., did not participate.

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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Okeechobee County,
Sherwood Bauer, Jr., Judge
Case No. 472018CF000164CFAXMX
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus

Suzanne Keffer, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Marie-Louise
Samuels Parmer, Special Assistant Capital Collateral Regional
Counsel, and Jeanine Cohen, Staff Attorney, Southern Region, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida,

for Appellant/Petitioner

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Lisa-
Marie Lerner, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach,
Florida,

for Appellee/Respondent

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