Juan S. Castano v. Rudy Vega

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed November 19, 2025.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D25-0275
Lower Tribunal No. 25-DR-2-P
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Juan S. Castano,
Appellant,
vs.
Rudy Vega ,
Appellee.
An 	Appeal from 	the 	Circuit 	Court 	for 	Monroe County, 	Sharon 	I.
Hamilton, Judge.
Law Offices of Richard G. Dunberg, and Richard G. Dunberg for
appellant.
Rudy Vega, in proper person.
Before FERNANDEZ, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

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Appellant Juan Castano appeals from a Final Judgment of Injunction
for Protection Against Stalking entered in favor of Appellee Rudy Vega.1 We
review these orders for competent substantial evidence. Sutton v. Fowler,
332 So. 3d 1001, 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“But the question of whether
the evidence is legally sufficient to justify imposing an injunction is a question
of law reviewed de novo.” (internal citation omitted)).
Following review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s
findings are not supported by competent substantial evidence and reverse.
The record before us is insufficient to establish the minimum requirements
of stalking pursuant to Section 784.048, Florida Statutes. Ozyesilpinar v.
Jalali, 325 So. 3d 289, 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (concluding that where the
trial court made no express findings of the statutory elements of stalking and
where the 	incidents 	of 	record did 	not 	support 	the 	permanent 	stalking
injunction, the injunction is reversed and remanded); see § 784.048(2), Fla.
Stat. (defining stalking as “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ing],
harass[ing], or cyberstalk[ing] another person”); see also Sutton, 332 So. 3d
1 Castano 	included 	two 	unpreserved 	arguments 	in 	his 	appeal 	which
ultimately lacked the requirements for a fundamental error review. See
Faddis v. Luddy, 221 So. 3d 758, 759–60 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (finding
appellant failed to preserve his due process argument because no objection
was made to testimony of incidents that were unpled in the petition for
injunction).

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at 1005 (“In order to be entitled to a stalking injunction two separate
instances of stalking must be proven by competent substantial evidence.”);
Santiago v. Leon, 299 So. 3d 1114, 1117-18 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (concluding
that the purported stalker appearing outside the petitioner’s home on only
one occasion and frequently visiting the same restaurants as the petitioner
is neither “following,” nor willful or malicious); see also Klemple v. Gagliano,
197 So. 3d 1283, 1285-86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (describing that evidence of
the respondent outside the petitioner's front door and, on another occasion,
the respondent waited in his car outside the petitioner’s home “was vague
and does not amount to following, particularly where the parties live in the
same community”); Smith v. Melcher, 975 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 2d DCA
2007) (concluding the alleged stalker circling the restaurant where the
petitioner was eating in his vehicle, looking at petitioner, pointing at the
petitioner, and shaking his head was not stalking); Paulson v. Rankart, 251
So. 3d 986, 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (finding no stalking where the alleged
stalker stared at the petitioner while she sunbathed and there was no
evidence the respondent made any accompanying statements or gestures
evidencing 	a 	threat); 	§ 	784.048(1)(a), 	Fla. 	Stat. 	(“‘Harass’ 	means…
‘engage[ment] in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which
causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate

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purpose.”); § 784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (“Course of conduct” includes a
pattern or a series of acts over any period, which evidences continuity of
purpose.); Touhey v. Seda, 133 So. 3d 1203, 	1204-05 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)
(concluding there is no basis for the finding of “substantial emotional distress”
where a single incident occurs that the witnesses have no direct knowledge
of the stalking and none of them report any threats); Pickett v. Copeland, 236
So. 3d 1142 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (reversing a stalking injunction where a
single incident of passing by the petitioner falls short of harassment);
Robinson v. Robinson, 257 So. 3d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (“[M]ere
uncivil behavior or annoyance is not sufficient to obtain an injunction[.]”).
Reversed.