Jorge F. Espinosa v. State of Florida

2024-1269Fladistctapp3

Testo completo

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed December 10, 2025.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-1269
Lower Tribunal No. F14-2572A
________________
Jorge F. Espinosa ,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Florida ,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Thomas J.
Rebull, Judge.
Jorge F. Espinosa, in proper person.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Kayla Heather McNab and
David Llanes, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.
GORDO, J.
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Jorge F. Espinosa (“Espinosa”) appeals from a final order denying his
rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing.
We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(3). We affirm.
Espinosa argues that although he entered into a plea and informed the
trial court during the plea colloquy that he was doing so voluntarily, he was
coerced into taking the plea and his counsel was ineffective. “[T]his Court’s
standard of review following a denial of a postconviction claim where the trial
court has conducted an evidentiary hearing accords deference to the trial
court’s factual findings.” 	Lowe v. State, 2 So. 3d 21, 29 (Fla. 2008). 	After
hearing several days of testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied the postconviction motion, finding the State did not coerce Espinosa
into taking the plea and trial counsel rendered effective assistance. 	Upon
review of the record, we find competent substantial evidence for the trial
court’s findings and therefore affirm the final order under review. See Blanco
v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997) (“As long as the trial court’s
findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, this Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise
of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given to the
evidence by the trial court.” (quoting Demps v. State, 462 So. 2d 1074, 1075
(Fla. 1984))); State v. Anderson, 215 So. 3d 181, 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)
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(“The attorney’s performance is analyzed with great deference under an
objective 	standard 	of 	reasonableness. 	An 	attorney’s 	performance 	is
constitutionally acceptable if the attorney renders reasonably competent and
effective assistance.”); Stano v. State, 520 So. 2d 278, 279-280 (Fla. 1988)
(“These claims regarding ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance and the
involuntariness of Stano’s plea are an attempt to go behind the plea. . . .
Once the Defendant enters a plea of guilty before this Court, and assures
the Court under oath that the plea is voluntary, the Court will not go behind
the plea. The plea cuts off inquiry into all that precedes it. The Defendant is
barred from contesting events happening before the plea. Having previously
found that there was a competent basis for the trial court’s acceptance of
Stano’s guilty pleas and because it is clear that Stano’s guilty pleas were
freely 	and 	voluntarily 	given, 	without 	any 	duress, 	we 	agree.” 	(internal
quotation marks omitted)); Stinson v. State, 839 So. 2d 906, 909 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2003) (“In the instant case, the state made its offers in open court . . . .
Stinson accepted the offer in open court. . . . [T]he trial court was aware of
the circumstances surrounding Stinson’s plea [and] adequately inquired into
the voluntariness of Stinson’s plea. . . . Further, there is no suggestion that
the state was acting in bad faith. Indeed, the factual basis for Stinson’s plea
indicates that the state had a substantial case against both Stinson and his
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brother. Nor is there any suggestion that the brother exerted undue influence
on Stinson. Stinson testified that . . . he felt that he was in a no-win situation
at the time of the plea, but concern for one’s friends or loved ones does not
render a plea involuntary as a matter of law . . . and the fact that a defendant
is presented with unpleasant alternatives does not render a guilty plea
involuntary[.] The conviction is affirmed.”).
Affirmed.

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