State of Florida v. Julio Montez Morris

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 14, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
Nos. 3D25-1610, 3D25-1535
Lower Tribunal No. F13-10177B
________________
State of Florida,
Petitioner,
vs.
Julio Montez Morris,
Respondent.
A Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Alberto
Milian, Judge.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Jennifer A. Davis, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, for petitioner.
Arnaldo Suri and J. Rafael Rodriguez, for respondent.
Before SCALES, C.J., and GORDO and GOODEN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

2
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING, PETITION FOR REHEARING EN
BANC AND MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION
We deny the petitions for rehearing, rehearing en banc and motion for
certification but withdraw our previous opinion and substitute the following
opinion in its stead.
The State of Florida petitions for a writ of certiorari to quash a non-final
order requiring the case against Julio Montez Morris to proceed as a non-
death penalty case. We grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the
order below.
I.
Morris and Clifton Dickson were indicted for the first-degree murder of
Jazzmon Parker and the attempted premeditated murder of Donnell Parker
(“Original Indictment”).1 The State filed a Notice of Intent to Seek the Death
Penalty against Morris under the Original Case Number.2 Before his arrest,
Morris—with Dickson serving as a lookout—attacked Ezell Finklea, a key
witness who allegedly saw Morris murder Parker. 	Those charges were
brought in a separate indictment and consolidated into the Original Case
1 Case No. F13-10177B (“Original Case Number”).
2 The State waived the death penalty as to Dickson.

3
Number.3
Dickson was tried first and acquitted. Morris’s trial followed. Mid-trial,
Finklea and Ira Williams were murdered, and the court declared a mistrial.
A grand jury then indicted Morris, James William Kelly and Howard
Tranard Waters for the murders of Finklea and Williams (“Superseding
Indictment”).4 The State filed Notices of Intention to Seek Death against all
three defendants under the new case number. The Superseding Indictment
was later consolidated by the Clerk’s Office into the Original Case Number.
It charged Morris with three counts of first-degree murder—Parker (Count I),
Finklea (Count II) and Williams (Count III).5 Kelly and Waters were charged
only in connection with the murder of Finklea and Williams.
Nearly 	two 	years 	later, 	in March 	2021, 	while conducting 	routine
tracking audits on death cases, the Deputy Chief Assistant for the Legal
Division at the State—unaware of the Superseding Indictment or charges—
3 Case No. F14-8198AB. The charges included retaliating against a witness,
tampering with a witness, armed burglary with assault/battery, attempted
premeditated murder, attempted felony murder and armed robbery.
4 Case No. F19-5512C.
5 The Superseding Indictment also charged Morris with conspiracy to commit
first-degree 	murder; 	attempted 	premeditated 	murder; 	two 	counts 	of
retaliating against a witness, victim or informant (bodily injury/firearm); two
counts of tampering with a witness/victim in a life/capital felony; burglary with
assault or battery therein while armed; and attempted premeditated murder
with a deadly weapon or aggravated battery.

4
prepared and filed a form titled “Announcement of Death Penalty Waiver” as
to Morris only, based on the prior waiver of the original charges.6 By affidavit,
she confirmed the filing was solely an administrative record-keeping item that
she understood to apply only to the Original Indictment for Parker’s murder.
She did not know Morris was indicted on new charges for the murder of
Finklea and Williams or that the State filed a Notice of Intention to Seek the
Death Penalty against him on the Superseding Indictment. 	No waiver was
filed 	for 	Kelly 	or 	Waters, 	and 	the 	record 	contains 	no 	evaluation 	or
recommendation from the Death Penalty Committee for Morris’s waiver.
The waiver bypassed the State Attorney’s Office recommendation-
and-review process. 	It was never announced in open court or otherwise
communicated to the court or counsel, and it went unnoticed by everyone—
including penalty-phase counsel, who continued preparing Morris’s case for
trial for over 3 years. 	In June 2024, the current Assistant State Attorney
assigned to Morris’s case discovered the waiver and contacted Morris’s
defense counsel, Mr. Rodriguez. On June 18, 2025, the State filed a motion
for clarification and an affidavit detailing the circumstances surrounding the
mistaken filing.
6 The attorney that filed the waiver was not assigned to the case or listed as
an attorney of record.

5
Although the waiver certified service on defense counsel, counsel
stated at a hearing on the record that he never received it.7 And the
prosecutor confirmed that the State never made an oral announcement on
the record waiving the death penalty for Morris.8
At the hearing, defense counsel argued that the State’s intent was
irrelevant as the notice of waiver was now a filed document with the Court,
used 	the 	present 	tense 	and 	contained 	no 	reference 	to 	any 	particular
indictment. Thus, Morris’s counsel argued that neither the rules nor statute
permitted recission of a notice of waiver after the 45-day period for the State
to file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty after an indictment is filed.
The State responded that it never intended for the waiver to apply to the
Superseding Indictment, that the filing bypassed the required review process
and that it was never announced on the record.
The trial court acknowledged that based on the facts of the case, the
waiver was probably filed in error but decided that the State was “stuck” with
that mistake because it has to do with the death penalty—alluding to “death
7 See Pet. Cert. App. H at 15:11–13 (June 23, 2025) ([DEFENSE]: “In fact,
we 	didn’t 	even 	know 	about 	this 	until 	2024. 	That’s 	why 	we 	continued
mitigation [be]cause I asked the State [to] look into it with your legal
department.”).
8 See id. at 13:12–14 ([STATE]: “If this were to be waived[,] it would [have]
gone through the process, it would have been an announcement in open
court, so I’m not putting anything on defense counsel.”).

6
is different.”9
After hearing arguments by the parties, the trial court ruled that the
waiver would apply to Morris’ current indictment and all new charges. 	As
such, the State would be prohibited from presenting the case as a death
penalty case. This Petition for Writ of Certiorari followed.
II.
Our standard of review on a petition for writ of certiorari puts the
jurisdictional element first. 	A petitioner must show “(1) a material injury in
the proceedings that cannot be corrected on appeal (sometimes referred to
as irreparable harm); and (2) a departure from the essential requirements of
the law.” Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Cook, 277 So. 3d 263, 264 (Fla. 3d DCA
2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nader v. Fla. Dep’t of
Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 87 So. 3d 712, 721 (Fla. 2012)); accord
Am. Prime Title Servs., LLC v. Wang, 317 So. 3d 1183, 1185 (Fla. 3d DCA
2021) (quoting A.H. v. Dep’t. of Child. & Fams., 277 So. 3d 704, 706–07
9 “[T]he 	penalty 	of 	death 	is 	qualitatively 	different 	from 	a 	sentence 	of
imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life
imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or
two.” 	Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); see also
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 704 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]e have consistently required that capital
proceedings be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant concern for
procedural fairness and for the accuracy of factfinding.”).

7
(Fla. 3d DCA 2019)); State v. Lyons, 392 So. 3d 281, 284 (Fla. 2d DCA
2024). “Courts consider in tandem whether the contested order would cause
the petitioner material injury and whether the petitioner has an adequate
remedy on appeal, referring to the combined question as whether the
petitioner would suffer irreparable harm.” 	State v. Garcia, 350 So. 3d 322,
325 (Fla. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	“The requirement of
irreparable harm is jurisdictional.” Thomas-McDonald L. Firm, P.A. v. Silva,
400 So. 3d 753, 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). “Unless the petitioner establishes
irreparable harm, the court must dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.”
Damsky v. Univ. of Miami, 152 So. 3d 789, 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); accord
Stockinger v. Zeilberger, 	152 	So. 3d 	71, 	73 	(Fla. 	3d 	DCA 	2014)
(“[I]rreparable 	harm 	is 	a 	condition 	precedent 	to 	invoking 	certiorari
jurisdiction.”); Miami–Dade Cnty. v. Dade Cnty. Police Benevolent Ass’n,
103 So. 3d 236, 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Internal
Improvement Tr. Fund v. Am. Educ. Enter., LLC, 99 So. 3d 450, 454–55
(Fla. 2012)).
III.
We first examine whether the State has demonstrated irreparable harm
to overcome the first jurisdictional hurdle. Because the trial court’s ruling will
prevent the State from prosecuting its case against Morris as a death penalty

8
case under the Superseding Indictment, we find the State clears the first
jurisdictional hurdle.10 “Irreparable harm in the criminal context, when the
petition is brought by the State, is a unique issue due to the State’s limited
ability to appeal.”11 State v. Kilburn, 418 So. 3d 275, 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025)
(quoting State v. Milbry, 219 So. 3d 160, 161 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)); accord
State v. Pettis, 520 So. 2d 250, 253 (Fla. 1988) (“[T]here will be some
circumstances in which the [S]tate is totally deprived of the right of appellate
review of orders which effectively negate its ability to prosecute. If a nonfinal
order does not involve one of the subjects enumerated in [Fla. R. App. P.]
9.140(c)(1), the [S]tate would not be able to correct an erroneous and highly
prejudicial ruling . . . [and] could only proceed to trial with its ability to present
10 We recognize the Florida Supreme Court has abolished comparative
proportionality review—and its relative-culpability corollary—as a component
of appellate review of death sentences. See Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d
544, 552 (Fla. 2020); Cruz v. State, 372 So. 3d 1237, 1244–45 (Fla. 2023).
But that abolition addresses the scope of appellate review; it does not reach
the practical consequences at the trial level, where a capital defendant
remains free to argue to the penalty-phase jury that death is unwarranted in
light 	of 	the 	disparate 	treatment 	of 	an 	equally 	or 	even 	more 	culpable
codefendant who received a death-penalty waiver.
11 See Lyons, 392 So. 3d at 285 (citing Pettis, 520 So. 2d at 253) (“It is well-
settled that certiorari jurisdiction exists to review nonfinal orders that impair
the State’s ability to prosecute its case.”); see also § 924.07(1)(h), Fla. Stat.
(2026) (authorizing the State to appeal “[a]ll other pretrial orders”); 2 Philip J.
Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice pt. 3, ch. 27, § 27:24 n.4 (2026 ed.)
(“Because there is no comparable court rule for nonfinal orders, an appeal
to the district court of appeal under this section must be treated as a petition
for certiorari.”).

9
the case significantly impaired.”). And “the Florida Supreme Court has held
that where an order forces the State to proceed to trial with a significant
impairment, and no appeal from the order would be available on an acquittal,
the State may properly invoke certiorari review.” 	Milbry, 219 So. 3d at 161
(citing Pettis, 520 So. 2d at 253).
The order causes irreparable harm by permanently barring the State
from seeking the death penalty against Morris pursuant to the Superseding
Indictment and accompanying Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty.
That bar is not curable post-trial. 	Unlike an ordinary prosecution, a capital
case is bifurcated: upon a determination of guilt, the court conducts a
separate, trial-like penalty proceeding where the State must prove the
aggravating 	factors 	necessary 	to 	support 	a 	death 	sentence. 	See
§ 921.141(1), Fla. Stat (2026). 	Because that proceeding resembles a trial
on guilt, declining to impose the death sentence carries a consequence
without analogue in noncapital cases: it operates as an “acquittal” of the
death 	penalty, 	whereas 	ordinary 	sentencing 	carries 	no 	such 	finality.
Brown v. State, 521 So. 2d 110, 112 (Fla. 1988) (finding a trial court’s ruling
at a capital sentencing proceeding that the death penalty is inapplicable to
the defendant operates as an acquittal of the death sentence). 	Should the
case then proceed to a noncapital verdict, double-jeopardy principles may

10
well treat the resulting acquittal or life sentence as foreclosing any later
attempt to seek death—regardless of whether the order that produced that
result was legally correct. Cf. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211 (1984)
(“Reliance on an error of law, however, does not change the double jeopardy
effects of a judgment that amounts to an acquittal on the merits.”); Brown,
521 So. 2d at 112 (finding that despite the trial judge’s ruling as a matter of
law that the death penalty was inapplicable was erroneous, “the procedure
was correct,” and it would be a violation of double jeopardy for the court to
reopen the sentencing phase); accord Lyons, 392 So. 3d at 285. 	We need
not decide the precise reach of those principles to recognize that the State
would have no way to undo that loss on plenary appeal. 	See Pettis, 520
So. 2d at 253. That prospect is the essence of irreparable harm required for
certiorari review.
IV.
Next, we must determine whether the trial court departed from the
essential requirements of law. A departure from the essential requirements
of law is “a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a
miscarriage of justice.” Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 1983). It is
more than mere legal error. Id. at 95; cf. Jones v. State, 477 So. 2d 566, 569
(Fla. 1985) (Boyd, C.J., concurring specially) (“It means an inherent illegality

11
or 	irregularity, 	an 	abuse 	of 	judicial 	power, 	an 	act 	of 	judicial 	tyranny
perpetrated with disregard of procedural requirements, resulting in a gross
miscarriage of 	justice. The writ 	of certiorari properly issues to correct
essential illegality but not legal error.”).
“[C]learly established law” can derive from a variety of legal
sources, including recent controlling case law, rules of court,
statutes, and constitutional law. Thus, in addition to case law
dealing 	with 	the 	same 	issue 	of 	law, 	an 	interpretation 	or
application of a statute, a procedural rule, or a constitutional
provision may be the basis for granting certiorari review.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 890 (Fla. 2003); accord
City of Miami v. Blanco, 336 So. 3d 1268, 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“A
departure from the essential requirements of law can be demonstrated
based on statutes, rules of procedure, or case law.”). 	Thus, the sources of
“clearly established law” are not confined to decisional authority on the same
issue but may also derive from “an interpretation or application of a statute,
a procedural rule, or a constitutional provision”—any of these may furnish
the basis for certiorari review. Allstate Ins. Co., 843 So. 2d at 890. Because
it cannot pass constitutional muster, an order violating the separation of
powers doctrine necessarily departs from the essential requirements of law.
See, e.g., Dep’t of Corr. v. Harrison, 896 So. 2d 868, 870 (Fla. 5th DCA
2005) (“[T]he order under review violates the separation of powers doctrine
and thus departed from the essential requirement of law[.]” (footnote omitted)

12
(citing Dep’t of Corr. v. Grubbs, 884 So. 2d 1147, 1147–48 (Fla. 2d DCA
2004))); Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. K.R., 946 So. 2d 106, 107 (Fla. 5th DCA
2007) 	(“Because 	we 	conclude 	that 	the 	order 	in 	question 	violates 	the
separation 	of 	powers 	doctrine, 	and 	thus 	departed 	from 	the 	essential
requirements of law, we grant certiorari relief.”).
A.
“The cornerstone of American democracy known as separation of
powers recognizes three separate branches of government—the executive,
the 	legislative, 	and 	the 	judicial—each 	with 	its 	own 	powers 	and
responsibilities.” 	Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 329 (Fla. 2004). 	The
Florida 	Constitution 	codifies 	this 	separation, 	mandating: 	“No 	person
belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of
the other branches unless expressly provided herein.” Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const.
This provision “encompasses two fundamental prohibitions. The first is that
no branch may encroach upon the powers of another. The second is that no
branch may delegate to another branch its constitutionally assigned power.”
Chiles v. Child. A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1991) (citations
omitted). This case concerns the former.
“Under Florida’s constitution, the decision to charge and prosecute is
an executive responsibility, and the state attorney has complete discretion in

13
deciding whether and how to prosecute.” 	State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2, 3
(Fla. 1986); accord Cleveland v. State, 417 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla. 1982).
That 	discretion 	yields 	to 	judicial 	oversight 	only 	in 	the 	narrowest 	of
circumstances:
[T]he decision of whether or not to prosecute in any given
instance must be left to the discretion of the prosecutor. This
discretion 	has 	been 	curbed 	by 	the 	judiciary 	only 	in 	those
instances where impermissible motives may be attributed to the
prosecution, such as bad faith, race, religion, or a desire to
prevent the exercise of the defendant’s constitutional rights.
Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 3 (quoting United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771, 782
(5th Cir. 1975)). Applying that principle, the Florida Supreme Court held “that
article II, section 3, of the Florida Constitution prohibits the judiciary from
interfering with this kind of discretionary executive function of a prosecutor.”
Id. 	That deference is not a matter of policy but of constitutional structure:
“[P]rosecutorial discretion is itself an incident of the constitutional separation
of powers, and that as a result the courts are not to interfere with the free
exercise of the discretionary powers of the prosecutor in his control over
criminal prosecutions.” State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1367 n.8 (Fla. 1980)
(collecting cases); see Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. And nowhere is that discretion
broader than at the charging stage. 	See State v. Jogan, 388 So. 2d 322,
323–24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
This prosecutorial discretion includes whether to seek or waive the

14
death penalty. 	See Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 3 (“We conclude that the circuit
judge 	has 	no 	authority 	to 	interfere 	with 	the 	prosecutor’s 	discretion 	in
proceeding with this cause as a death penalty case. If we allowed the circuit
judge to make pre-trial determinations of the death penalty’s applicability, we
would 	be 	modifying 	the 	death 	penalty’s 	statutory 	scheme.”). 	Indeed,
“article II, section 3, of the Florida Constitution prohibits the judiciary from
interfering with the prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty in a first-
degree murder case.” 	State v. Donner, 500 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 1987);
Valdes v. State, 728 So. 2d 736, 738–39 (Fla. 1999) (“This Court has long
held 	that 	as 	the 	prosecuting 	officer, 	the 	state 	attorney 	has 	complete
discretion in the decision to charge and prosecute, and the judiciary cannot
interfere with this discretionary executive function.” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citations omitted)). 	And “[t]he decision to charge first-degree
murder and prosecute the case as a capital offense through adjudication
remains within the discretion of the state attorney.” 	State v. Jones, 209
So. 3d 6, 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). Accordingly, “[t]he trial courts simply have
no authority to determine the applicability of the death penalty to defendants
who have not been convicted of capital felonies.” 	Id. at 11; cf. Jogan, 388
So. 2d at 323 (recognizing that the pretrial prosecutorial discretion lies solely
with the state attorney).

15
B.
Florida law sets forth how the State pursues the death penalty. “If the
prosecutor intends to seek the death penalty, the prosecutor must give notice
to the defendant and file the notice with the court within 45 days after
arraignment.” 	§ 782.04(1)(b), 	Fla. Stat. 	(2025); 	accord 	Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.181. 	Once the prosecutor provides that notice, other procedural rules
come into play.12 See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.202 (mental-mitigation expert
notice); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203 (intellectual-disability bar); Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.780 (capital sentencing hearing). But there is no statutory equivalent as to
how the death penalty is waived once sought.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the case at hand. 	The State
administratively filed a notice of waiver in the court file directed to the Original
Indictment. 	The trial court, the parties and the attorneys on the case were
unaware of its existence. They continued to litigate this as a capital case for
several years.13
12 See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.112(b) (stating that any waiver directed to a death-
penalty charge is effective only if the State affirmatively makes the waiver
“on the record”).
13 See Pet. Cert., supra note 7; see also id. at 13:6–11 ([STATE]: “No one at
that point was believing that the State had waived. In fact, at that point the
defense was continuing with their mitigation method as reflected in the
docket, and the Court was under the impression it was still a death case, so
everyone was acting under the assumption it was a death case.”).

16
When the State informed the trial court of the waiver, the court applied
it as a waiver of death on all of Morris’s charges and decided the State was
“stuck” with its mistake because it was death-penalty related. 	In doing so,
the trial court not only fashioned a “Catch-22” or “gotcha” result this Court
has long refused to endorse but also, through judicial decree, supplanted the
executive branch’s exclusive charging discretion by extending a waiver
beyond the charges to which it was directed. 	See Salcedo v. Asociacion
Cubana, Inc., 368 So. 2d 1337, 1339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (“[T]he courts will
not allow the practice of the ‘Catch–22’ or ‘gotcha!’ school of litigation to
succeed.”); Nelson v. State, 855 So. 2d 132, 133 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
(collecting cases); Andreaus v. Impact Pest Mgmt., Inc., 157 So. 3d 442, 445
(Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (“The trial court should not have rewarded this ‘gotcha’
tactic, and we will not do so here.”); Harley v. Lopez, 784 So. 2d 447, 448
(Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (refusing to reward “gotcha” tactics, which have been
“long abhorred by this court”); M–5 Commc’ns, Inc. v. ITA Telecomms., Inc.,
708 So. 2d 1039, 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (“[R]eversal is . . . mandated by
an application of the anti-gotcha rule in its original and purest form.”).
We have found no constitutional, statutory or decisional authority
allowing a trial court to strike or overrule a prosecutor’s notice of intent to
seek the death penalty. 	To the contrary, the Florida Constitution provides

17
that the decision to charge and prosecute is an exclusively executive
function, and the state attorney has complete discretion in deciding whether
and how to prosecute. 	See Art. V, § 17, Fla. Const. (“[T]he state attorney
shall be the prosecuting officer of all trial courts . . . .”); accord Bloom, 497
So. 2d at 3; Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1367; State v. Mancuso, 355 So. 3d 942,
944–45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).
Applied here, these principles bar any judicial interference. 	The trial
court had neither the constitutional nor statutory authority to encroach on the
State’s exclusive prosecutorial authority to seek the death penalty or infringe
on the prosecutorial function of the State regarding the administrative waiver
of death notice. 	See Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 3. 	And it is the state attorney—
not the trial courts—who wields “complete discretion in making the decision
to 	charge 	and 	prosecute.” 	Cleveland, 	417 	So. 2d 	at 654; 	accord
Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1975) (footnotes omitted) (“The
prosecutorial discretion to which the appellant objects is no more than that
which is inherent in our system of criminal justice. Its origin is found in the
common law of England. Similarly in the Federal system the Federal Courts
have consistently held that the discretion of the Attorney General in choosing
whether to prosecute or not to prosecute, or to abandon a prosecution
already started, is absolute.”); State v. Bauman, 425 So. 2d 32, 34 (Fla. 4th

18
DCA 1982) (quoting Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1367) (“[T]he discretion of a
prosecutor in deciding whether and how to prosecute is absolute in our
system of criminal justice.”); State v. D.W., 821 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2002) (“The prosecutor is the only one who has the authority to make
decisions 	relating 	to 	the 	allocation 	of 	prosecutorial 	resources.”);
State v. D.D.B., 737 So. 2d 1178, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (concluding that
the trial judge did not have discretion to dismiss criminal mischief charge
against juvenile on court’s own motion, and doing so encroached upon
prosecutor’s authority).
We find the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law
by 	treating 	a 	mistaken 	administrative 	filing 	as 	a 	binding 	exercise 	of
prosecutorial discretion. 	The record evidence established that the State’s
Deputy Chief Assistant for its Legal Division who filed the waiver—who was
not assigned to the case or listed as an attorney of record—was unaware of
the Superseding Indictment, intended the filing only to reference the Original
indictment and bypassed the State Attorney’s Office recommendation-and-
review process. Moreover, the waiver was never announced in open court.14
14 See Pet. Cert. App. C ¶ 5 (June 18, 2025) (The process for evaluating a
death penalty waiver begins with a death penalty evaluation prepared by the
assigned ASA and presentation to the State Attorney’s Office Death Penalty
Committee—composed 	of 	the 	SAO 	Chief 	Assistant 	and 	Deputy 	Chief
Assistant, the Chief of the Legal Division and another member of the Legal

19
To be clear, no prosecutor exercising informed discretion ever decided to
waive the death penalty for the Superseding Indictment in this case.
Yet the trial court applied the waiver to the Superseding Indictment
anyway. 	In doing so, the trial court did not enforce a prosecutorial decision
but supplanted one, effectively shedding its judicial robes to assume an
executive role that separation of powers forbids it to occupy. 	The decision
whether to seek the death penalty is committed exclusively to the executive
branch, therefore, the trial court’s unilateral extension of the waiver to the
Superseding Indictment impermissibly interfered with the state attorneys
constitutionally protected prosecutorial discretion.
The 	trial 	court’s 	order 	did 	more 	than 	misconstrue 	a 	filing—it
transformed a document directed at one indictment into a binding waiver of
another. 	That intrusion departs from the essential requirements of law by
usurping a charging decision constitutionally reserved for the state attorney
by the express mandate of the Florida Constitution. 	See Harrison, 896
So. 2d at 870; Bush, 885 So. 2d at 329 (“This Court . . . has traditionally
applied a strict separation of powers doctrine.” (internal quotation marks
Unit. 	Once the Committee makes the decision to waive, that decision is
relayed to defense counsel, and in such case, the assigned prosecutor is
responsible for making an oral announcement on the record advising the
Court and defense counsel (and the defendant) that the death penalty is
waived. That process did not occur.).

20
omitted) 	(quoting 	State v. Cotton, 	769 	So. 2d 	345, 	353 	(Fla. 	2000)));
State v. W.D., 	112 	So. 3d 	702, 	704–05 	(Fla. 	4th 	DCA 	2013) 	(holding
separation of powers doctrine prohibits one branch from encroaching upon
powers reserved to another).
And so, certiorari lies. 	Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of
certiorari and quash the order under review. 	As this case is grounded on
unusual and specific facts, we emphasize that 	our holding should 	be
narrowly construed. 	This case shall proceed as a capital case until and
unless the State announces a formal waiver of the death penalty on the
record as to the current charges.
Petition granted; order quashed. 15
15 While we find this matter meets the requirements for certiorari, we note
that prohibition is the traditional remedy when a trial court attempts to block
a prosecutor’s right to pursue the death penalty. See Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 3
(“A writ of prohibition is the appropriate remedy when a trial court attempts
to interfere with the prosecutorial discretion of a state attorney.”); accord
State v. Demons, 351 So. 3d 10, 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022); State v. Chapman,
227 So. 3d 626, 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); State v. Lopez, 219 So. 3d 865,
865 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); Jones, 209 So. 3d at 8–9 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).
While prohibition cannot be used to revoke an order already entered, Bloom
remains instructive because it recognizes prohibition as a proper remedy to
thwart a trial court’s improper interference with a prosecutor’s right to pursue
the death penalty.