Jean Claude Belvant v. Abraham Cohen, et al.

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed November 19, 2025.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D23-1707
Lower Tribunal No. 15-16303-CA-01
________________
Jean Claude Belvant ,
Appellant,
vs.
Abraham Cohen, et al. ,
Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Charles
Kenneth Johnson, Judge.
Debra Kay Cohen, for appellant.
Michael S. Kaufman, for appellee Abraham Cohen.
Before FERNANDEZ, LOGUE and GORDO, JJ.
FERNANDEZ, J.

2
Jean Claude Belvant appeals the trial court’s order granting Abraham
Cohen’s motion to dismiss a replevin count with prejudice. For the following
reasons, we reverse.
Belvant and Cohen were co-owners of a taxi permit/decal issued in
April 2008 that allows taxi drivers to access the airport. They entered into an
agreement with Broward Airport Taxi and August J. Saint Vil, Broward Airport
Taxi’s owner, so Broward Airport Taxi and Saint Vil could use the permit for
two years. When the contract for the use of the permit expired, Belvant
requested that Broward Airport Taxi and Saint Vil return his permit/decal so
that he and Cohen could benefit from the continued ownership of the decal.
Belvant was a licensed taxi driver, while Cohen was not. The parties could
not agree on the return of the permit.
In July 2015, Belvant sued Cohen, Broward Airport Taxi, and Saint Vil
for conversion, civil conspiracy, and civil theft. In addition, he sued Saint Vil
and Broward Airport Taxi to obtain injunctive relief by writ of replevin. Belvant
did not sue Cohen in the replevin count, as Cohen was co-owner of the
permit.
Belvant moved to enter default final judgment as to all three defendants
after they failed to serve or file papers in the action. The trial court denied

3
Belvant’s motion without prejudice as to Cohen. Saint Vil and Broward Airport
Taxi were eventually defaulted in April 2016.
In September 2015, Belvant filed a verified petition for prejudgment writ
of replevin against Broward Airport Taxi and its owner Saint Vil because they
continued to maintain possession and control of the taxi decal. The trial court
issued 	the 	prejudgment 	writ 	of 	replevin. 	Although 	the 	writ 	was 	never
executed, Cohen returned the decal to Belvant on October 5, 2015.
In December 2015, Cohen moved to vacate the writ of replevin. He
argued that because he was a co-owner of the permit, replevin was an
improper action against him. Belvant responded that Cohen lacked standing
to vacate the prejudgment writ of replevin because the action was against
Saint Vil and Broward Airport Taxi, and Cohen was never named as a
defendant in the replevin action.
Also in December 2015, Cohen moved to dismiss Belvant’s complaint
for conversion, civil conspiracy, and civil theft for failure to state a cause of
action. The trial court granted Cohen’s motion to dismiss without prejudice
as to the counts for conversion, civil theft, and civil conspiracy but denied it

4
as to the count for replevin. The court gave Belvant 20 days to file an
amended complaint.1
In August 2016, the trial court granted Cohen’s motion to vacate the
writ of replevin issued against Broward Airport Taxi and Saint Vil. After given
a choice between posting a bond or returning the decal to Cohen’s attorney
to hold in trust pending further order of the court, Belvant surrendered the
decal to Cohen’s attorney. Belvant appealed, and this Court per curiam
affirmed in Belvant v. Saint Vil, 225 So. 3d 819 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).
Thereafter, in June 2017, Cohen filed a motion for entitlement to
attorney’s fees/costs/damages pursuant to section 78.20, Florida Statutes
(2015), 	which 	provides 	for 	attorney’s 	fees 	after 	the 	dissolution 	of 	a
prejudgment writ and a defendant prevails in a replevin action. The trial court
granted Cohen’s motion and entered a final judgment in favor of Cohen in
the amount of $25,695.00.
Belvant then appealed the attorney’s fees award, and this Court
reversed in Belvant v. Cohen, 346 So. 3d 1267 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). The
Court concluded that “to be entitled to a fee award under section 78.20 of
1 On October 11, 2016, Belvant filed his First Amended Complaint as to
Cohen only, asserting claims for an equitable accounting and dissolution of
partnership/certificate of public convenience, involuntary dissolution and
liquidation of the partnership, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud.

5
the Florida Statutes (2014), a defendant must prevail not only in having the
prejudgment replevin writ dissolved, but also in the underlying action for
replevin, which in this case remains pending.” Id. at 1268.
Cohen returned to the trial court once more in April 2023 and moved
to dismiss the replevin count with prejudice. In August 2023, the trial court
dismissed the replevin count (count IV of the complaint) with prejudice,
finding that Belvant was required to join Cohen as co-plaintiff in the replevin
action against third parties. The trial court stated that because its order was
disposing of the replevin count with prejudice, it was thus re-entering the final
judgment for attorneys’ fees in favor of Cohen in the amount of $25,695.00
it had previously entered. Belvant now appeals this order.
This Court reviews a trial court’s order granting a motion to dismiss
under a de novo standard of review. Howard v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 307 So.
3d 844, 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). In addition, review of a statutory fee award,
which is an issue of statutory construction and thus a pure question of law,
is de novo. Wright v. City of Miami Gardens, 200 So. 3d 765, 770 (Fla. 2016).
Belvant contends that Cohen was not an indispensable party to the
replevin claim requiring dismissal of the claim as to all parties with prejudice
and that the trial court erred when it reinstated the final judgment of attorney

6
fees in favor of Cohen upon the dismissal of the replevin claim against
Broward Airport Taxi and Saint Vil. We agree with Belvant on both points.
In the order on appeal, the trial court stated:
2. The Court notes that [Belvant] did not join as a co-
plaintiff the defendant, [Cohen], in the replevin against third
party(s). Because [Cohen] is a co-owner of the taxi permit in
question 	it 	was 	required 	that 	all 	owners 	be 	named 	as
plaintiffs 	in 	seeking 	replevin. 	The 	failure 	to 	include 	all
owners as plaintiffs rendered the replevin count legally
insufficient from the outset and precludes the trial court
from acting upon it. . . .
(emphasis added). However, Belvant was not required to join Cohen as a
plaintiff or an indispensable party because Florida law does not require it. A
replevin action in Florida does not always require that all owners of the
subject property be joined as plaintiffs because the primary issue in a
replevin action is the right to possession of the property, not ownership. As
acknowledged in Florida Jurisprudence:
Replevin is strictly a possessory action where the sole legal issue
is the right to immediate possession, not ownership or title. In a
replevin action, the right of immediate possession is the question
to 	be 	determined, 	and 	that 	right 	may 	prevail 	even 	against
absolute legal title to the property where title and possession
have become separated. Indeed, where the title and the right of
immediate 	possession 	are 	separated, 	a 	temporary 	right 	to
possession may prevail against an absolute legal right to the
property. Accordingly, the matter of title is secondary.
12 Fla. Jur. 2d Conversion and Replevin § 44 (2025) (footnotes omitted); see
Williams Mgmt. Enters., Inc. v. Buonauro, 489 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. 5th DCA

7
1986); Wisniewski v. Historical Ass'n of S. Fla., Inc., 408 So. 2d 746, 747-48
(Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Bringley v. C.I.T. Corp., 160 So. 680, 682-83 (Fla. 1935);
Southside Atl. Bank v. Lewis, 174 So. 2d 470, 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965).
Florida law recognizes that, generally, replevin cannot be maintained
against another co-owner who is legally entitled to possession of the subject
property. Parramore v. Smith, 27 So. 2d 670, 671 (Fla. 1946). The critical
factor to consider is the wrongful detention. In Brown v. Reynolds, 872 So.
2d 290, 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), the court recognized that replevin concerns
the wrongful detention of property. Thus, if a co-owner has a legal right to
possess the property in question, that co-owner’s possession cannot be
wrongful, and a replevin action against that co-owner would be improper.
Belvant filed the replevin count in his complaint against Saint Vil and
Broward Airport Taxi because those two defendants had possession of the
permit/decal, as they had kept the decal after the agreement between the
parties expired. Belvant needed the permit to continue his work as a taxi
driver. Thus, it was correct for Belvant to name the two parties that had
possession of the subject property at the time he filed his suit, and that is,
Saint 	Vil 	and 	Broward 	Airport 	Taxi. 	Here, 	as 	co-owner 	of 	the 	taxi
decal/permit, Belvant could sue for replevin against Saint Vil and Broward
Airport Taxi without joining Cohen as a plaintiff because Belvant had the right

8
to immediate possession of the property. Thus, Belvant had the right to act
independently to recover possession of the wrongfully detained taxi decal.
Accordingly, 	the 	trial 	court 	erred 	when 	it 	found 	that 	Cohen 	was 	an
indispensable party to the replevin action, and dismissal was not required.2
Furthermore, at the point in time the trial court entered the order on
appeal, both Saint Vil and Broward Airport Taxi had already been defaulted.
Because the replevin action had only been asserted against those two
defendants, there was no replevin action remaining for the trial court to be
able to dismiss. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting Cohen’s motion to
dismiss as to the replevin action for this reason, as well.
Turning to the portion of the order on appeal where the trial court
reinstated the attorney’s fees final judgment for Cohen in the amount of
$25,695.00, because the trial court erred in granting Cohen’s motion to
dismiss the replevin action, the attorneys’ fees award in the order on appeal
must also be reversed. Section 78.20, Florida Statute (2014), provides:
When 	property 	has 	been 	retained 	by, 	or 	redelivered 	to,
defendant on his or her forthcoming bond or upon the dissolution
2 Contrary to Cohen’s assertion, the per curiam affirmance by this Court in
Saint Vil, 225 So. 3d 819, had no precedential value in terms of whether
Cohen had standing to address the prejudgment writ of replevin. Vachon v.
Travelers Home and Marine Ins. Co., 403 So. 3d 451, 454 (Fla. 2d DCA
2025) 	(“Without 	a written opinion, 	the 	trial court 	could 	only 	speculate
regarding 	the 	rationale 	underlying 	this 	court’s 	per 	curiam 	affirmance
decision.”) (citation omitted).

9
of a prejudgment writ and defendant prevails, he or she shall
have judgment against plaintiff for his or her damages for the
taking, if any, of the property, attorney fees, and costs. . . .
As this Court held in Cohen, 346 So. 3d 1267, to obtain an award under
section 78.20, “a defendant must not only succeed in having the prejudgment
replevin writ dissolved, but also the defendant must ultimately prevail in the
underlying replevin cause of action.” Id. at 1271.
Here, Cohen was not a defendant in the replevin cause of action. In
addition, because the replevin count in Belvant’s complaint was erroneously
dismissed, Cohen has not prevailed on the replevin count. There was never
an adjudication on the merits of the replevin claim. Thus, Cohen is not
entitled to the $25,695.00 in attorney’s fees.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order on appeal and remand
to the trial court so it can determine damages for Belvant on the replevin
count and the other three counts of Belvant’s complaint against Saint Vil and
Broward Airport Taxi (as Belvant obtained defaults against both Saint Vil and
Broward Airport Taxi).
Reversed and remanded.