Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. St. Francy St. Fleur and Yvrose Hilaire

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
UNIVERSAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Appellant,
v.
FRANCY ST. FLEUR and YVROSE HILAIRE,
Appellees.
No. 4D2024-1378
[December 10, 2025]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; John Bowman, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE 20-21274.
Kara Rockenbach Link and David Andrew Noel of Link & Rockenbach,
PA, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Scott J. Edwards of Scott J. Edwards, PA, Boca Raton, and Vyacheslav
Borshchukov 	of 	Vyacheslav 	Borshchukov, 	PA, 	Fort 	Lauderdale, 	for
appellees.
MAY , J.
The age-old tale of David and Goliath found its way into voir dire in this
property damages dispute. 	The insurer appeals an adverse judgment. 	It
argues the trial court erred in denying its “for cause” challenge to juror
number nineteen and in its ruling on the admissibility of photographic
evidence. 	We agree and reverse.
The 	homeowners 	petitioned 	for 	declaratory 	relief 	after 	the 	insurer
denied coverage for their water damage claim, citing the policy’s existing-
damage exclusion. 	The parties disputed whether the loss was covered
under the policy. 	The court set the case for a jury trial.
During voir dire, prospective juror number nineteen raised his hand
when asked whether he would review the insurer’s evidence with a more
critical eye than he would the homeowners. 	When asked to elaborate,
prospective juror number nineteen explained his critical view was based
on two reasons: 	first, he viewed the insurance-company-versus-insured
context to be “very much like David and Goliath kind of setup,” explaining,

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“I think by nature David has 	to 	have a little bit of an advantage.”
(Emphasis added). 	Prospective juror number nineteen’s second reason
was due to his experience working with insurance companies in the
medical field, expressing that “their goal is clearly not to pay.”
The insurer moved to strike prospective juror number nineteen for
cause explaining, “he is the first person that raised David and Goliath
scenario specifically where the insurance company is the Goliath in this
and the Plaintiff is the David and he is leaning towards the plaintiff.” 	The
trial court denied the insurer’s for-cause challenge. The insurer used one
of its three peremptory challenges to strike prospective juror number
nineteen.
The insurer also moved to strike prospective juror number four for
cause because she expressed that she had a prior insurance claim that
she described as a “grueling insurance process” where attorneys and
adjusters 	were 	involved, 	and 	she 	was 	frustrated 	with 	the 	process.
Prospective juror number four stated that she believed she could be fair
and impartial.
The insurer moved to strike prospective juror number four for cause
based on her prior negative experiences with insurance litigation and her
response to the airplane hypothetical.1 	The insurer indicated “there
appears to be some lack of insight as to between the similarities between
the airplane scenario and her own scenario and the issue of [impartiality,]”
thereby expressing concern about juror number four’s ability to remain
impartial. 	The 	trial 	court 	denied 	the 	insurer’s 	for-cause 	challenge.
Because the insurer had no peremptory strikes left, the insurer asked the
court for a fourth peremptory strike, which the court denied. 	Prospective
juror number four became a member of the jury.
During 	trial, 	the 	insurer 	moved 	to 	admit 	2019 	home 	inspection
photographs of the homeowners’ property. 	The insurer sought to use
these photographs to support its affirmative defense that the homeowners’
claimed losses predated the 2020 policy, having already existed in 2019
when they purchased the property. 	The homeowner testified the photos
depicted his property and fairly and accurately represented the property’s
1 The insurer asked prospective juror number four if she would believe it was fair
that she would not be allowed to leave a plane after a pilot announced that
turbulence was expected and the pilot had prior issues flying through turbulence
but that he presently believed he could fly the plane safely. 	Prospective juror
number four responded that she did not think it would be fair if she were not
allowed to leave the plane in such a situation.

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condition 	when 	he 	purchased 	it. 	The 	homeowners 	objected 	to 	the
admissibility of the photographs on lack-of-predicate grounds, which the
trial court sustained.
The jury returned verdict for the homeowners. 	The insurer filed a
renewed motion for new trial and/or directed verdict. 	The insurer argued
the trial court’s erroneous denial of its for-cause challenge of prospective
juror number nineteen forced it to unnecessarily use one of its peremptory
strikes, which it would have instead used on prospective juror number
four. 	The seating of juror number four deprived the insurer of a fair trial.
The 	insurer 	also 	argued 	the 	trial 	court’s 	erroneous 	exclusion 	of
photographs from the homeowners’ home inspection report warranted a
new trial. 	The trial court entered final judgment for the homeowners
consistent with the jury verdict.
From this judgment, the insurer now appeals.
• 	The Analysis
o 	The For-Cause Challenge Issue2
The insurer argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
the insurer’s for-cause challenge and its request for a fourth peremptory
challenge. 	The homeowners argue the trial court did not err because
prospective juror number nineteen did not raise reasonable doubt as to
his 	impartiality 	warranting 	his 	excusal 	for-cause. 	They 	alternatively
suggest any error was harmless.
The insurer responds that prospective juror number nineteen’s targeted
disfavoring of one party sufficiently raised reasonable doubt as to his
impartiality. 	Finally, the insurer argues the homeowners’ harmless error
argument fails because they failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the trial court’s error did not contribute to the verdict.
We review a trial court’s denial of a for-cause challenge to a prospective
juror for an abuse of discretion. Weinstein Design Grp., Inc. v. Fielder, 884
So. 2d 990, 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). 	A for-cause challenge “must be
granted 	if 	there 	is 	any 	reasonable 	doubt 	as 	to 	a 	potential 	juror’s
impartiality.” Pelham v. Walker, 135 So. 3d 1114, 1116 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
2 We reject the homeowners’ suggestion that the insurer waived its argument
because it did not include a preservation analysis and “harmful error” analysis
in its brief.

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(citing Darr v. State, 817 So. 2d 1093, 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)); 	see also
Smith v. State, 699 So. 2d 629, 635 (Fla. 1997). 	Close cases should be
resolved in favor of excusing the juror. Four Wood Consulting, LLC v. Fyne,
981 So. 2d 2, 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citing Bell v. Greissman, 902 So. 3d
846, 847 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Peters v. State, 874 So. 2d 677, 679 (Fla.
4th DCA 2004)).
Because the trial court “has a unique vantage point to determine juror
bias,” its determination of bias is a mixed question of law and fact that will
not be disturbed absent manifest error. 	Smith, 699 So. 2d at 635-36.
However, where a prospective juror expresses unequivocal bias, “the trial
court’s superior vantage point and discretion are of little consequence.”
Weinstein Design Group, Inc., 884 So. 2d at 996 (quoting Franco v. State,
777 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)).
If the appellate court finds the trial court erred, the appellate court
must then determine whether the error was harmless. 	Seadler v. Marina
Bay Resort Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 376 So. 3d 659, 664-69 (Fla. 2023). 	Under
the harmless error standard, reversal is warranted only if there is a
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict. English v.
Port St. Lucie Police Dep’t, 404 So. 3d 413, 418-19 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025)
(citing § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (2023)).
A juror must be excused for cause if any reasonable doubt exists as to
whether the juror possesses an impartial state of mind. 	Smith v. State,
699 So. 2d 629, 635 (Fla. 1997). 	“[A] juror is not impartial when one side
must overcome a preconceived opinion in order to prevail.” 	Carratelli v.
State, 832 So. 2d 850, 854 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (quoting Price v. State, 538
So. 2d 486, 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). 	“Close cases should be resolved in
favor of excusing the juror rather than leaving a doubt as to his or her
impartiality.” 	Sydleman v. Benson, 463 So. 2d 533, 533 (Fla. 4th DCA
1985).
“[A]ny alleged error in failing to dismiss a juror for cause may be cured
by granting additional peremptory challenges.” Weinstein Design Grp.,
Inc., 884 So. 2d at 996 (emphasis added). 	“If, because of an erroneous
denial of a challenge for cause, a party is forced to exhaust his or her
peremptory challenges and, subsequently makes a request for additional
peremptory challenges which is denied ... an appellate court will reverse
and grant a new trial.” 	Imbimbo v. State, 555 So. 2d 954, 955 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1990) (quoting Longshore v. Fronrath Chevrolet, Inc., 527 So. 2d 922,
923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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The homeowners rely on Embleton to argue that prospective juror
number nineteen’s antagonistic characterization of the insurer did not
amount to the kind of specific or unequivocal bias that would have
required a for-cause strike. We find the juror’s general disenchantment in
Embleton 	distinguishable 	from 	prospective 	juror 	number 	nineteen’s
comments here, just as we did in Weinstein Design Group where jurors
“expressed strong feelings toward one of the parties.” 	See also Jaffe v.
Applebaum, 830 So. 2d 136, 137-38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
Here, prospective juror number nineteen raised his hand when asked
whether he would review the insurer’s evidence with a more critical eye
than he would the homeowners. Prospective juror number nineteen stated
that 	in 	his 	experience 	working 	in 	the 	medical 	field, 	an 	insurance
company’s “goal is clearly not to pay.” 	As a result of the trial court’s
erroneous denial of the insurer’s for-cause challenge to juror number
nineteen, the insurer was forced to exhaust its peremptory challenges and
request an additional peremptory challenge, which was denied.
In determining whether a final judgment will be reversed, and a new
trial will take place, the inquiry is two-pronged: first, whether the trial
court 	erred; 	second, 	whether 	the 	error 	or 	abuse 	of 	discretion 	was
harmless. See Long v. Fam. Support Servs. of N. Fla., Inc., 392 So. 3d 183,
191 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (citing Special v. W. Boca Med. Ctr., 160 So. 3d
1251 (Fla. 2014)).
“Harmless error is the appropriate standard for reviewing the erroneous
denial of a properly preserved cause challenge.” 	Seadler, 376 So. 3d at
665. A judgment cannot be reversed if an error is harmless. English, 404
So. 3d at 419 (citing § 59.041, Fla. Stat.).
Here, 	the 	homeowners 	argue 	the 	trial 	court’s 	error 	was 	harmless
because the insurer failed to present any witness testimony that the
damages were preexisting. 	Thus, no reasonable jury—regardless of its
composition—could have returned a verdict in the insurer’s favor. 	We
disagree. As the insurer points out, this ignores the insurer’s defenses on
the verdict form, the initial threshold burden placed on the homeowners
in the case, and excluded photographs that are being challenged on
appeal.
Each 	point 	was 	a matter 	on 	which 	reasonable 	jurors 	could 	have
reached different conclusions. 	The erroneous denial of the for-cause
challenge could reasonably have affected the verdict, as a different juror
in juror number four’s seat might have reached a different conclusion. 	In

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short, the error was not harmless. 	We therefore reverse and remand the
case for a new trial.
o 	The Evidentiary Issue
The 	insurer 	next 	argues 	the 	homeowners 	did 	authenticate 	the
photographs the trial court excluded on lack-of-predicate grounds. 	The
insurer claims the homeowners cannot prove harmless error because the
trial court’s erroneous exclusion of the photographs directly led to the jury
verdict. 	The 	homeowners 	respond 	the 	trial 	court’s 	exclusion 	of 	the
photographs 	was 	harmless 	because 	the 	insurer 	failed 	to 	prove 	its
affirmative defense that coverage was excluded. Notably, the homeowners
do not argue that the trial court’s exclusion was not an error.
The insurer replies that the homeowners argue the incorrect legal
standard for harmless error. 	And the photographs were critical to the
insurer’s defense rendering their exclusion harmful. 	We agree with the
insurer.
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an
abuse of discretion as limited by the rules of evidence. 	See Petit-Dos v.
School Bd. of Broward Cnty., 2 So. 3d 1022, 1025 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).
Under the harmless error standard, reversal is warranted only if there is a
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict. 	Special,
160 So. 3d at 1256. The beneficiary of the error bears the burden to prove
the error did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. 	Id.
Under Florida law, “[a]uthentication or identification of evidence is
required as a condition precedent to its admissibility.” § 90.901, Fla. Stat.
(2023). 	Only if a “picture ... i[s] verified as a true representation of the
subject about which testimony is offered, is [it] admissible in evidence.”
Adams v. State, 10 So. 106, 113 (Fla. 1891).
The 	“pictorial 	testimony” 	method 	is 	one 	common 	approach 	to
authentication. 	R.V. v. State, 388 So. 3d 952, 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024).
This method requires “a sponsoring witness with personal knowledge of
the image depicted” to testify that the photograph fairly and accurately
represents the subject matter. 	Id.
“This 	authenticity 	requirement 	has 	evolved 	into 	a 	one-sentence
predicate: 	‘Does 	this 	photograph 	fairly 	and 	accurately 	depict 	[the
subject]?’” 	Id. 	(quoting Brian Barakat & Bronwyn Miller, Authentication
of Digital Photographs Under the “Pictorial Testimony” Theory: A Response
to Critics, 78 Fla. B.J. 38, 40 (2004)). 	“Any witness with knowledge that

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[the photograph] is a fair and accurate representation may testify the
foundational facts.” 	Smiley v. State, 295 So. 3d 156, 167 (Fla. 2020)
(quoting Charles W. Ehrhardt, Ehrhardt’s Florida Evidence § 401.2, at 176
(2019 ed.)).
Here, the insurer authenticated the photographs, pursuant to section
90.01 by asking homeowner if the photographs were fair and accurate
representations of his home, which he answered in the affirmative:
Q: Do you recognize these photographs?
A: Yes.
Q: Are these photographs taken at your property?
A: Yes.
Q: Do these photos fairly and accurately represent the condition of this
property when you purchased the property?
A: All these photos describe exactly the condition when I first saw this
property, that is the way it was in that condition.
In short, the photographs were properly authenticated as the insurer
engaged the homeowner in the “one-sentence predicate” which satisfies
section 90.901’s authenticity requirement. 	The trial court’s exclusion of
the photograph on lack-of-predicate grounds was an abuse of discretion.
Regardless, the homeowners further argue the trial court’s exclusion of
the 	photographs 	was 	harmless 	because 	the 	2019 	bank 	inspection
photographs were taken before the homeowners closed on the property.
They note the bank required repairs before closing, so the damage shown
in the pre-closing 2019 photographs would have been repaired well before
the homeowners purchased the insurance policy a year later.
This point does not negate the trial court’s error in excluding properly
authenticated 	photographs 	on 	authentication 	grounds. 	Questions 	of
relevance can be raised once the evidence is admitted; they do not justify
excluding 	admissible 	evidence 	or 	rendering 	the 	erroneous 	exclusion
harmless. 	See 	Mullens 	v. 	State, 	197 	So. 	3d 	16, 	25 	(Fla. 	2016)
(“authentication for the purpose of admission is a relatively low threshold
that only requires a prima facie showing that the proffered evidence is
authentic”) (emphasis added).

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The significance of the photographs is further illustrated by the jury’s
written question during deliberation, which asked whether there were any
photographs 	in 	evidence 	for 	the 	jury 	to 	review. 	Contrary 	to 	the
homeowners’ arguments, a photograph need not prove or disprove a
party’s theory of the case to be deemed harmful. See Conner v. State, 987
So. 2d 130, 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (holding that although the erroneously
admitted photograph did not prove or disprove either party’s theory of the
case, the error was not harmless).
We therefore reverse and remand the case for a new trial on this
alternative ground.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
G ERBER and C ONNER , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.