Charles S. Busias v. State of Florida

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
CHARLES S. BUSIAS,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D2025-2007
[February 18, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
Lucie County; Michael C. Heisey, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2023CF000544 A.
Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Robert Porter, Assistant Public
Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Zi Jin Peter Chan,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
PER CURIAM .
Charles S. Busias appeals his sentences and specifically the trial
court’s denial of his motion for a downward departure. He argues the trial
court erred by determining he had not established, as a ground for
departure, that he has a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance
abuse or addiction and that he is amenable to treatment. 	We agree, and
we reverse his sentences.
“A downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence . . . is
prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably
justify the downward departure.” 	§ 921.0026(1), Fla. Stat. (2023).
A trial court’s decision whether to depart from the guidelines
is 	a 	two-part 	process. 	First, 	the 	court 	must 	determine
whether it can depart, i.e., whether there is a valid legal
ground and adequate factual support for that ground in the
case pending before it (step 1). 	Legal grounds are set forth in
case law and statute, and facts supporting the ground must
be proved at trial by “a preponderance of the evidence.” 	This

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aspect of the court’s decision to depart is a mixed question of
law and fact and will be sustained on review if the court
applied the right rule of law and if competent, substantial
evidence supports its ruling. Competent, substantial evidence
is tantamount to legally sufficient evidence, and the appellate
court will assess the record evidence for its sufficiency only,
not its weight.
Second, where the step one requirements are met, the trial
court further must determine whether it should depart, i.e.,
whether departure is indeed the best sentencing option for the
defendant in the pending case.
State v. Chubbuck, 141 So. 3d 1163, 1168–69 (Fla. 2014) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065, 1067-68 (Fla. 1999)).
Only step one is at issue in this appeal, as the trial court did not reach
step two.
Here, 	the 	defendant 	sought 	departure 	pursuant 	to 	the 	mitigating
circumstance in section 921.0026(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2023), so he was
required to “prove the following three elements by a preponderance of the
evidence: (1) the defendant has a mental disorder (unrelated to substance
abuse or addiction) or a physical disability; (2) which requires specialized
treatment; and (3) the defendant is amenable to such treatment.” 	See
Chubbuck, 141 So. 3d at 1171 (footnote omitted). 	“Amenability” has been
defined as “a reasonable possibility that . . . treatment will be successful.”
Id. at 1171 n.22 (alteration in original) (quoting Herrin v. State, 568 So. 2d
920, 922 (Fla. 1990)).
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated without elaboration,
“Having considered the defense argument for downward departure, the
court is not finding that the basis has been established for the downward
departure.” 	This was error. 	The defense witness, a forensic psychologist,
first opined that the defendant has “a psychological disorder,” “long-term
Depressive Disorder,” depression, and anxiety. 	Second, she testified that
he needs “specialized treatment” for his mental disorders of depression
and anxiety. 	Third, she testified that the defendant “would be very good
in 	treatment 	and 	he’s 	also 	amenable.” 	These 	opinions 	were 	not
perfunctory, having been the result of not only the psychologist’s interview
and testing of the defendant, but also her review of the defendant’s case
and 	his 	psychological 	evaluation 	by 	another 	doctor. 	While 	the
psychologist also indicated in her report that the defendant has an issue
with disordered or compulsive viewing of pornography, she clarified that
this was “not an actual addiction,” and she indicated a different treatment

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for 	his 	depression, 	anxiety, 	and 	emotional 	regulation 	than 	for 	his
compulsive pornography use. See Coniglio v. State, 397 So. 3d 60, 65 (Fla.
4th DCA 2024) (“[W]here the defendant demonstrates that he or she suffers
from multiple mental health disorders, including substance abuse, and
the treatment for substance abuse is different than the treatment for the
other 	disorders, 	then 	the 	trial 	court 	can 	legally 	downward 	depart 	if
evidence 	is 	offered 	regarding 	the 	treatment 	and 	the 	defendant’s
amenability to treatment . . . .”).
The trial court did not indicate that it rejected any portion of the
psychologist’s testimony or report, and, consequently, there was sufficient
evidence to establish a basis for departure. 	The trial court erred in
determining otherwise.
Thus, we reverse the defendant’s sentences, and we remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
CIKLIN, L EVINE and S HAW , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.