Jane Doe, formerly known as Diana Johnson v. Paul Finkelman, et al.

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
JANE DOE f/k/a DIANA JOHNSON,
Appellant,
v.
PAUL FINKELMAN, CAVIAR LA LLC, ANNAPURNA PICTURES LLC,
MEGAN ELLISON, EVAN GOLDBERG, BERT HAMELINCK, JASON
WOLINER, PEACOCK TV LLC, POINT GREY PICTURES LLC,
SETH ROGEN, MICHAEL SAGOL, and JAMES WEAVER,
Appellees.
No. 4D2024-1978
[December 3, 2025]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; G. Joseph Curley, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502023CA014138.
Jonathan 	L. 	Gaines 	and 	Karen 	L. Stetson 	of 	GrayRobinson, 	P.A.,
Miami, for appellant.
Jay Ward Brown, Charles D. Tobin, and Emmy Parsons of Ballard
Spahr, Washington, D.C., for appellee Paul Finkelman.
Michael K. Twersky and Alberto M. Longo of Fox Rothschild LLP, Blue
Bell, Pennsylvania, and Alex L. Braunstein of Fox Rothschild LLP, West
Palm Beach, for appellees Caviar LA LLC, Annapurna Pictures LLC, Megan
Ellison, Evan Goldberg, Bert Hamelinck, Jason Woliner, Peacock TV LLC,
Point Grey Pictures LLC, Seth Rogen, Michael Sagol, and James Weaver.
LEVINE , J.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s order dismissing, with prejudice, her
amended complaint for defamation and conspiracy to defame. 	The trial
court found that the “docuseries” at issue was a single publication rather
than multiple publications, and further that the series was not “of and
concerning” appellant, and that the statements in the series were not
capable of defamatory meaning. 	We disagree. 	Because the amended
complaint alleged legally sufficient causes of action for defamation and
conspiracy to defame, we reverse the dismissal order and remand.

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Appellant 	filed 	an 	amended 	complaint 	against 	the
defendants/appellees for defamation per se and conspiracy to defame.
According to the amended complaint, defendant Paul Finkelman wrote a
book entitled Duplicity: A True Story of Crime and Deceit in which he
accused 	appellant—his 	ex-wife—of 	various 	criminal 	acts, 	including
prostitution and being the “madam” of a prostitution ring. 	Based on the
book, the defendants created, produced, and published a “docuseries,”
entitled Paul T. Goldman, which was streamed and distributed on Peacock
TV. 	The series consisted of six episodes released on four different dates.
The first three episodes were released on January 1, 2023; the fourth
episode was released on January 8, 2023; the fifth episode was released
on January 15, 2023; and the sixth episode was released on January 22,
2023.1
The series featured Finkelman as himself, using the alias “Paul T.
Goldman.” 	Finkelman revealed his true identity throughout the series.
Appellant’s amended complaint alleged that the series referred to appellant
by a fictitious name, “Audrey Munson.” 	Appellant alleged that she was
“easily identifiable as the subject of the false and defamatory statements
published by Defendants.”
According to the amended complaint, the format of the show was a
documentary that operated on “multiple levels.” 	One level was the “real
life” story of Finkelman as told by the actual persons involved in the events
and by actors portraying the actual persons. 	The second level was a
“making of” documentary where the audience was taken “behind the
scenes” during filming and was “privy to parts of the actual creative
process.”
The amended complaint asserted six counts of defamation per se and
six counts of conspiracy to defame, with one count for each individual
episode. 	In the alternative, the amended complaint asserted one count of
defamation per se and one count of conspiracy to defame, with each count
based on the series as a whole.
The amended complaint summarized each of the episodes. 	The trial
court also reviewed the entire series, which the parties agreed could be
considered 	as 	part 	of 	the 	complaint.2 	The 	docuseries 	included 	the
following highlights in the six-part series:
Episode 1: This episode began with a statement from the director that
1 The series was still being streamed on Peacock TV during this appeal.
2 The series was included as part of the record on appeal.

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Finkelman said he “had an incredible true story to tell” and that “[t]his is
his 	story.” 	An 	actual 	newsclip 	covering 	Finkelman’s 	divorce, 	which
included an interview with Finkelman himself, reported his accusations
that appellant had a “secret double life,” a “sexy secret,” and was involved
in a “multi-million dollar crime ring.” A series of quick clips foreshadowed
future episodes. Finkelman then stated, “It’s all true. It happened to me,”
and “I couldn’t make this up.”
Finkelman 	met 	appellant, 	referred 	to 	by 	the 	pseudonym 	“Audrey
Munson,” through an online dating site. 	Finkelman accused appellant of
marrying him for his money. Finkelman claimed that, after their marriage
fell apart, Finkelman discovered that appellant lived a “secret double life,”
and 	what 	he 	found 	“turned 	into 	a 	whole 	new 	level 	of 	criminality.”
Finkelman stated that “[t]his is not a little ring” and that “I couldn’t believe
it, but I had to believe it.” 	Finkelman stated, “Multiple agencies don’t get
involved if there’s nothing there.” 	The viewer was then shown a photo of
Palm Beach County Sheriff Ric Bradshaw and what appeared to be an
arrest report with a suspect’s photo blocked out.
Episode 2: Finkelman stated that his book, Duplicity, upon which the
series was based, was as “accurate as it is unbelievable.” 	Finkelman
reaffirmed that Duplicity was 99% true and that only little things were
embellished. 	Finkelman obtained appellant’s phone records during their
divorce proceedings. Based on the phone records and a conversation with
appellant’s ex-husband, Finkelman concluded that he married a “hooker.”
Finkelman stated that appellant had sex with over one thousand men.
Finkelman also stated that appellant was a “madam” with a huge business
and ten girls working for her. Finkelman vowed to “bring down [appellant]
and her sleezy prostitution ring no matter what.”
Episode 	3: 	Finkelman 	consulted 	with 	a 	psychic, 	who 	stated 	that
appellant was part of a “big time prostitution . . . ring.” 	Finkelman once
again stated that “[t]he story is true. 	The events are true.” 	He then
clarified that his story was approximately 97% true “and none are made
up that have any bearing to criminal events by Audrey Munson [appellant]
and what happened to me. 	Every single thing of that is true.”
Finkelman 	hired 	a 	private 	investigator 	to 	follow 	appellant. 	A
surveillance video from the private investigator showed appellant, with her
face blurred out, and two other women at a park. 	At one point, they
appeared to be praying together. 	From this video, Finkelman stated that
they were “hookers praying to Jesus for more tricks” and that this was
“not a little prostitution ring.”

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Finkelman admitted he invented scenes with appellant and her alleged
pimp, “Royce Rocco.” He used his “imagination” to write a scene involving
a phone conversation between appellant and Rocco that occurred on
appellant and Finkelman’s wedding night.
Finkelman’s investigator recalled an incident where appellant met with
Rocco at a nightclub. The investigator said Rocco told another man, while
referring to appellant, “[O]ffer her $250 and see if she’ll take it.” According
to the investigator, appellant then left with the man.
Finkelman planned to meet with police to report the prostitution ring,
but cancelled after he was warned that Rocco “knows the Spencer County
captain.”3 Finkelman instead reported it to “internal affairs,” who stated,
“[W]e’ll take this case.”
Finkelman then went through Rocco’s garbage and stated that what he
found was “absolutely amazing.” Based on a visa and passport request, a
United Airlines jacket, plane ticket stubs, and a photo of a young Asian
girl, Finkelman concluded that Rocco was “a sex trafficker importing girls
from Southeast Asia to join his ring.”
Episode 4: This episode began with a fictionalized dramatization of one
of appellant’s “girls,” a “hooker,” visiting a doctor for treatment of an STD.
Finkelman reiterated that Rocco was a sex trafficker and claimed Rocco
worked with another man, “Albert Borelli.” 	The episode then dramatized
a meeting Finkelman claimed he had with the FBI. 	During the meeting,
the FBI stated that “this woman must be stopped” and that it would give
Finkelman’s evidence to the “high crimes unit.”
In an excerpt from an actual local television news broadcast concerning
appellant and Finkelman’s approaching divorce trial, Finkelman accused
appellant 	of 	being 	“the 	madam 	and 	working 	prostitute 	of 	a 	huge
prostitution ring.” 	The news reported that Finkelman, his lawyers, and
his investigators stated that they had evidence supporting this claim.
The episode then presented a dramatization where the FBI raided
appellant’s and Rocco’s homes and arrested them. 	Finkelman was clear
that 	this 	was 	fictional 	and 	that 	“this 	is 	what 	I 	wanted 	to 	happen.”
Finkelman stated he wanted to increase public awareness about his story
3 There is no “Spencer County” in the State of Florida. 	That is a fictionalized
name. When the name of the county was mentioned later in the series, the name
of the county was censored or obscured from an actual recording that was played
in the series.

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of “[a] regular guy discovering that his wife is a hooker and a madam and
later on discovering also that that ring is involved in international sex
trafficking.” 	The episode ended with another dramatization of appellant
and Rocco leaving in a boat for the Bahamas with a bag full of money, but
the boat blew up in a fiery explosion.
Episode 5: This episode began by depicting a fictionalized dramatization
of appellant’s funeral, which was attended by her “girls.” This was followed
by various scenes from The Paul T. Goldman Chronicles, described by
Finkelman as a “fiction [series] whose origins are nonfiction,” in which
Finkelman worked to bring down appellant and Rocco’s human trafficking
ring.
Finkelman discussed the process of looking for a director to make his
book, Duplicity, into a film. 	During a meeting, Finkelman assured the
director that appellant’s double life and sex trafficking were “all true.” 	In
a “pitch” video, Finkelman showed a photo that he described as his “ex-
wife meeting with her girls.” 	He then stated, “We’ve got hookers! 	We got
pimps!” 	The episode ended with the revelation of Rocco’s real name.
Episode 6: In the final episode, Finkelman stated, “I’m not like other
people. My mind in my head does not exist. The entire world is an illusion.
Everything is a projection of the mind. 	It’s not real. 	It’s like a movie.”
Finkelman 	then 	appeared 	in 	a 	fictionalized 	scene 	in 	which 	former
President Obama said to Finkelman, “Now, you’ve made some interesting
discoveries about your ex-wife.” 	Finkelman met with a media trainer in
preparation for the release of this series. 	When the media trainer asked
what the story was about, Finkelman reiterated that he married a madam
and working prostitute. 	In an interview, Rocco admitted to having a
relationship with appellant, including during her marriage to Finkelman.
During the interview, Rocco referred to appellant by her real name, Diana,
and denied being a pimp or being involved in a prostitution ring.
Finkelman continued to maintain appellant was a madam. 	Finkelman
stated that, from the phone logs, it was clear appellant was running a huge
business with ten girls working for her. 	The viewer was told that Diana
was contacted to tell her side of the story, but that she declined.
An actual news broadcast was then played stating a couple was found
dead at the Cote d’Azur condominiums in Singer Island. 	A photo was
shown of appellant and her parents, with appellant’s face obscured. Their
first names were captioned on the photo, including appellant’s real first
name, Diana. 	The police deemed the two deaths to be a murder-suicide.

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Finkelman stated appellant killed her parents and made it look like a
murder-suicide.
Finkelman was confronted with a video of “Albert Borelli,” whose real
name was revealed, whom Finkelman had accused of being involved in sex
trafficking. 	Borelli stated that he was living with Rocco and that the
garbage Finkelman took from outside of Rocco’s house—which contained
airline tickets, a photo, and other paperwork—had belonged to Borelli.
Borelli, in fact, had gone to India to do missionary work. The photo of the
young Asian girl Finkelman found in the garbage was an orphan in India,
who still lived in India. 	When confronted with this evidence, Finkelman
stated: “Well, we’ll have to take him out of the book.” 	Finkelman then
apologized on camera to Borelli.
The last episode concluded with Finkelman attending the premiere of
the docuseries. Finkelman stated, “I’m just a regular guy who all this s--t
happened to and decided to take some action.” 	As the credits rolled,
numerous 	“tweets” 	were 	shown 	commenting 	on 	the 	series, 	including
references to the series being “true crime” and a “documentary.”
The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint. 	Appellant
filed a response in opposition. 	The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss with prejudice for the following reasons. 	First, the trial court
found that the series was a single publication, rather than multiple
publications. 	Second, the series was not “of and concerning” appellant
because 	an 	average 	person 	viewing 	the 	series 	could 	not 	reasonably
conclude that appellant was Audrey Munson. 	The series did not mention
appellant by name or show any photographs of appellant without her face
blurred. Third, the series was not capable of defamatory meaning because
(a) the series was a “docuseries,” which the trial court equated to a
“fictionalized and imagined” “docudrama”; (b) a disclaimer appeared before
each episode; and (c) Finkelman’s story was portrayed as a “descent into
fantasy and self-delusion,” and no “reasonable and common minded”
viewer would understand Finkelman’s statements to be factual or credible.
Fourth, the conspiracy claims could not stand because the defamation
action failed. Additionally, the conspiracy counts did not identify which of
the defendants agreed to commit any unlawful act, or when the agreement
to defame appellant was entered. 	From this order, appellant appeals.
An order granting a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. 	Rhiner v.
Koyama, 327 So. 3d 314, 316 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).
Florida affords “high protection of personal reputation . . . .” Lawnwood
Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Sadow, 43 So. 3d 710, 729 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). 	“[A]

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publication is libelous per se, or actionable per se, if, when considered
alone without innuendo: (1) it charges that a person has committed an
infamous crime; (2) it charges a person with having an infectious disease;
(3) it tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or
disgrace; or (4) it tends to injure one in his trade or profession.” 	Blake v.
Giustibelli, 182 So. 3d 881, 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Richard v.
Gray, 62 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953)). “[D]amages are presumed to result
from defamation per se and need not be proved.” Lawnwood, 43 So. 3d at
727.
I. Single vs. multiple publications
Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding that the series was a
single publication that occurred in multiple parts. 	We agree that the trial
court erred and determine that each episode is a separate and distinct
publication giving rise to multiple causes of action.
“A 	false 	statement 	of 	fact 	is 	the 	sine 	qua non 	for 	recovery 	in 	a
defamation action.” 	Byrd v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 433 So. 2d 593, 595
(Fla. 4th DCA 1983). 	In evaluating whether a publication is defamatory,
the “publication must be considered in its totality.” 	Id.
Under the “multiple publication rule,” “each communication of the
same defamatory matter by the same defamer, whether to a new person or
to the same person, is a separate and distinct publication, for which a
separate cause of action arises.” 	Musto v. Bell S. Telecomms. Corp., 748
So. 2d 296, 297 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (citation omitted). 	“An exception to
this rule is the ‘single publication rule,’ which is applied where the same
communication is heard at the same time by two or more persons. 	The
‘single publication rule’ treats the communication to the entire group as
one publication giving rise to only one cause of action . . . .” 	Id. (citation
omitted); see also § 770.07, Fla. Stat. (2022) (stating that a cause of action
for damages founded upon a single publication accrues at the time of the
first publication). 	“[T]he rationale underlying the single publication rule
[is] 	avoiding 	a 	vast 	multiplicity 	of 	lawsuits 	that 	would 	result 	from
defamatory 	statements 	contained 	in 	a 	mass 	publication 	such 	as 	a
newspaper or magazine . . . .” 	Musto, 748 So. 2d at 298.
“In Florida, a single publication gives rise to a single cause of action.”
Callaway Land & Cattle Co. v. Banyon Lakes C. Corp., 831 So. 2d 204, 208
(Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citation omitted). “The various injuries resulting from
it are merely items of damage arising from the same wrong.” 	Id. (citation
omitted). Under the single publication rule, courts “treat[] a single edition
of a newspaper or book as a single publication.” 	Swedberg v. Goldfinger’s

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S., Inc., 338 So. 3d 332, 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). 	The single publication
rule does not apply where the “second publication was not the continued
dissemination of a single edition of a book, newspaper, or online article.”
Id. at 336. 	“[T]he application of the single publication rule turns on the
question 	of 	whether 	a 	separate 	and 	distinct 	decision 	was 	made 	to
republish the material. 	Any modification of the material might shed light
on whether a separate decision to republish was made, but the absence of
modification does not mechanically place a publication within the single
publication rule.” 	Id. at 337.
In this case, the trial court erred in finding that the series as a whole
was a single publication. 	Rather, each of the six episodes was a separate
and distinct publication, thus giving rise to multiple causes of action.
Each episode was akin to a “single edition of a book, newspaper, or online
article,” which is treated as a single publication. Id. at 336. Each episode
was “not the continued dissemination” of a previous publication but rather
were additional publications. 	Id. 	The rationale underlying the single
publication 	rule—avoiding 	multiple 	lawsuits 	based 	on 	the 	same
publication—was not implicated because each episode was a separate and
distinct publication. 	See id. at 335.
In 	Swedberg, 	a 	plaintiff 	whose 	image 	was 	used 	in 	social 	media
advertisements by an adult entertainment club brought an action for
misappropriating her likeness. 	Id. at 334. 	The issue was whether the
identical posts, published at different times to promote different events,
constituted a single publication. Id. After analyzing the single publication
rule, the Third District concluded that the two posts, although identical,
did not constitute a single publication. 	Id. at 335-37.
The fact that multiple publications occurred is even more apparent in
this case than in Swedberg where identical posts were found to be separate
publications. 	The instant case does not involve a single episode that was
simply republished on different days. Rather, there were six separate and
distinct 	episodes, 	each 	involving 	significantly 	different 	content,
statements, and dialogue. Additionally, the episodes were released on four
separate dates. Further, a viewer could have watched a single episode, or
several episodes, without viewing the entire series. The viewer could have
watched the first episode or dropped off after multiple episodes, which
would determine how much of the content the viewer watched. 	The
confrontation undercutting the truth of Finkelman’s accusations against
“Albert Borelli” was only in episode 6. 	A viewer who watched the first few
episodes would never have seen this “confrontation” of Finkelman, which
related to Borelli only. Thus, we find that the six episodes are six different
publications subject to six different claims of defamation per se and

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conspiracy to defame.
II. “Of and concerning” appellant
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that the series was
not “of and concerning” appellant. We agree that the trial court erred and
determine that the six episodes provided ample material indicating that
the defamatory statements were “of and concerning” appellant.
“[A] communication is defamatory if it prejudices the plaintiff in the
eyes of a ‘substantial and respectable minority of the community.’” 	Jews
for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1114 (Fla. 2008); see also Peck v.
Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909) (stating, in an opinion authored by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “If the advertisement obviously would
hurt the plaintiff in the estimation of an important and respectable part of
the community, liability is not a question of a majority vote.”). 	A cause of
action for defamation “cannot be maintained unless it is shown that the
libelous statements are ‘of and concerning’ the plaintiff.” 	Thomas v.
Jacksonville Television, Inc., 699 So. 2d 800, 805 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
“[T]he ‘of and concerning’ requirement is generally a question of fact for
the jury . . . .” 	Id. (citation omitted).
The trial court found that the series did not mention appellant by name
or show any photographs of her without her face blurred. However, as the
filmmaker defendants concede, episode six used appellant’s real first
name, Diana, on two occasions. 	Further, “[t]he defamed person need not
be named in the defamatory words if the communication as a whole
contains sufficient facts or references from which the injured person may
be determined by the persons receiving the communication.” 	Wolfson v.
Kirk, 273 So. 2d 774, 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). 	As this court has stated:
It is not essential that the person defamed be named in the
publication if, by intrinsic reference, the allusion is apparent,
or 	if 	the 	publication 	contains 	matters 	of 	description 	or
reference to facts and circumstances from which others may
understand that he is the person referred to, or if he is pointed
out by extraneous circumstances so that persons knowing
him can and do understand that he is the person referred to;
and it is sufficient if those who know the plaintiff can make
out that he is the person meant.
Harwood v. Bush, 223 So. 2d 359, 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969) (citation
omitted); accord O’Neal v. Tribune Co., 176 So. 2d 535, 548 (Fla. 2d DCA
1965).

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In Harwood, this court reversed the dismissal of a cause of action for
libel per se where, although the article failed to identify the plaintiff
directly, the “plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the article was meant to
refer to him . . . .” 	223 So. 2d at 362. 	Like in Harwood, here appellant
sufficiently alleged that people who knew her would have understood the
defamatory statements in the series to be about her. 	The amended
complaint alleged that appellant was “easily identifiable as the subject of
the false and defamatory statements published by Defendants.” 	The
amended 	complaint 	alleged, 	and 	the 	series 	revealed, 	that 	the 	main
character’s real name was Paul Finkelman, that the real name of his
second wife was Diana, and that they were involved in divorce proceedings
in Palm Beach County in 2007. Finkelman portrayed himself in the series.
The series included excerpts from a local news station reporting on the
couple’s divorce proceeding. 	Additionally, as alleged in the amended
complaint, and as seen in the series: “The Series also repeatedly shows
photos of Plaintiff with her face blurred, shows surveillance films of her,
and describes her as being at various specific locations at particular dates
and times.” 	The series showed a 2008 petition for injunction against
domestic 	violence 	appellant 	filed 	in 	Palm 	Beach 	County 	against
Finkelman. Thus, the amended complaint, and the series itself, contained
sufficient facts and references upon which to identify appellant.
III. Capable of defamatory meaning
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that the series was
not capable of defamatory meaning. We agree with appellant and find that
the trial court’s reliance on the following three reasons was in error.
1. Docuseries
In finding that the series was not capable of defamatory meaning, the
trial court found that the series was a “docuseries.” 	The trial court then
equated “docuseries,” with “docudrama,” which the trial court found are
“fictionalized and imagined.” 	However, a docuseries and docudrama are
not the same. A “docuseries” is defined as “a documentary that is telecast
in a series of programs.”4 A “documentary,” in turn, is “[a] work, such as
a film or television program, presenting political, social, or historical
subject matter in a factual and informative manner and often consisting of
4 	Merriam-Webster 	Online 	Dictionary, 	available 	at 	https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/docuseries (emphasis added).

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actual news films or interviews accompanied by narration.”5 	In contrast,
a docudrama is “[a] television or movie dramatization of events based on
fact.”6 	A person viewing the six-part “docuseries” would expect to see a
show that dealt with actual factual events. 	Combined with the use of
actual news video clips and interviews, the viewer would not expect a
“docudrama” but rather would understand it to be a “docuseries.” 	Thus,
we find the trial court erred in finding that the docuseries was equivalent
to a docudrama and not capable of defamatory meaning.
2. Disclaimer
The 	trial 	court 	also 	relied 	on 	a 	disclaimer 	that 	appeared 	at 	the
beginning 	of 	each 	episode 	for 	about 	three 	seconds, 	which 	stated:
“Statements expressed by individuals in this series should be taken as
speculation or opinion and do not reflect the opinions or beliefs of the
producers.” 	Initially, this disclaimer was insufficient because it was
directed 	only 	to 	the 	producers 	and 	made 	no 	mention 	of 	the 	other
defendants. Further, and more importantly, the disclaimer did not inform
the viewer that the series was fictional. Even when statements are offered
with a qualification, “actionable defamatory statements do not become
nondefamatory when, as here, the context of the statements swallows up
the caveats.” McQueen v. Baskin, 377 So. 3d 170, 178 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023).
Throughout the series, Finkelman repeatedly stated his story was true.
The 	disclaimer 	suggested 	that 	statements 	made 	in 	the 	series 	were
opinions. 	“However, a speaker cannot invoke a ‘pure opinion’ defense, if
the facts underlying the opinion are false or inaccurately presented.”
Lipsig v. Ramlawi, 760 So. 2d 170, 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). 	“[L]abeling
the statements as opinion does not necessarily shield the defendants from
an action for defamation.” 	Anson v. Paxson Commc’ns Corp., 736 So. 2d
1209, 1211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (reversing an order of dismissal where
defendants published defamatory remarks alleging that the plaintiff was a
drug-using 	prostitute). 	Thus, 	at 	the 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	stage, 	the
“disclaimer,” as written, does not “shield” the defendants from appellant’s
causes of action.
3. Finkelman’s credibility
The 	trial 	court 	found 	that 	Finkelman’s 	story 	was 	portrayed 	as 	a
“descent into fantasy and self-delusion” and no “reasonable and common
5 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, available at
https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=documentary (emphasis added).
6 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, available at
https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=docudrama.

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minded” viewer would understand Finkelman’s statements to be factual or
credible. 	The trial court failed to apply the correct standard for a motion
to dismiss. The trial court failed to accept all well-pled allegations as true
and 	improperly 	determined 	factual 	issues. 	Because 	the 	amended
complaint was legally sufficient, the trial court erred in granting the motion
to dismiss.
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and does
not determine factual issues. 	Rhiner, 327 So. 3d at 316. 	“All allegations
of the complaint must be taken as true and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom must be construed in favor of the non-moving party.” Id.
(citation omitted). 	“[I]f the analysis of a claim is factually intensive, it is
better addressed on a summary judgment motion, or at trial, but certainly
not on a motion to dismiss.” 	Id. (citation omitted). 	In ruling on a motion
to dismiss, “a court’s gaze is limited to the four corners of the complaint,
including the attachments incorporated in it . . . .” 	Alevizos v. John D. &
Catherine T. MacArthur Found., 764 So. 2d 8, 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Thus,
the trial court’s review was limited to the complaint and the contents of
the six episodes of the series itself.
A trial “court has a ‘prominent function’ in determining whether a
statement is defamatory . . . .” 	Smith v. Cuban Am. Nat’l Found., 731 So.
2d 	702, 	704 	(Fla. 	3d 	DCA 	1999). 	“Where 	the 	court 	finds 	that 	a
communication could not possibly have a defamatory or harmful effect,
the court is justified in either dismissing the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action or in granting a directed verdict at the proof stage.”
Wolfson, 273 So. 2d at 778; see also McIver v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc.,
489 So. 2d 793, 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (“If the publication can bear only
one meaning, the question of defamation is for the judge.”). 	“Where,
however, a communication is ambiguous and is reasonably susceptible of
a meaning which is defamatory, it is for the trier of fact to decide whether
or not the communication was understood in the defamatory sense.”
Wolfson, 273 So. 2d at 778-79 (reversing dismissal of a complaint for
slander where the trial court erred in determining that the words were not
reasonably susceptible of defamatory meaning). 	To determine whether a
communication 	is 	defamatory, 	“the 	trial 	court 	must 	evaluate 	the
publication, not by ‘extremes, but as the common mind would naturally
understand it.’” 	Byrd, 433 So. 2d at 595 (citation omitted).
It is clear that the docuseries is “reasonably susceptible of a meaning
which is defamatory.” 	Wolfson, 273 So. 2d at 779. 	In each and every
episode, 	and 	throughout 	the 	series, 	Finkelman 	repeatedly 	accused
appellant of being a prostitute, a madam, and part of a sex trafficking ring.
For example, Finkelman accused appellant of living a “secret double life”

13
and being involved in a “multi-million dollar crime ring.” Finkelman stated
that 	what 	he 	found 	“turned 	into 	a 	whole 	new 	level 	of 	criminality.”
Finkelman 	stated 	that 	based 	on 	appellant’s 	phone 	records, 	and 	his
research, he discovered appellant was a “hooker” who had sex with over a
thousand men. Based on the same phone records, Finkelman also stated
appellant was a madam with a huge business and ten girls working for
her. 	Finkelman stated that a surveillance video with appellant and two
women at a park depicted “hookers praying to Jesus for more tricks” and
that this was “not a little prostitution ring.” 	An investigator stated that
while at a nightclub, Rocco, appellant’s alleged pimp, offered appellant to
another man for $250. 	In a “pitch” for the series, Finkelman stated his
investigator took a photo of appellant “meeting with her girls” and further
stated, “We’ve got hookers! 	We got pimps!” 	Finkelman also accused
appellant of murdering her parents and her making it look like a murder-
suicide. These are just a few examples of Finkelman’s allegations that are
replete throughout the series.
In each and every episode, and throughout the series, Finkelman
repeatedly maintained that the allegations against appellant were all true
and that what was depicted in the series actually happened to him.
Although some statements can be “so obviously comedic and nonsensical
that no sensible person would take them seriously,” Ford v. Rowland, 562
So. 2d 731, 735 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), that was not how the allegedly
defamatory statements were presented in this series. 	The series was
presented in a way to convey indicia of truthfulness, relying on “evidence”
such as surveillance videos, interviews with private investigators, actual
news clips, and court documents, as well as a photo of Palm Beach County
Sheriff Ric Bradshaw. 	Others, such as the director and the private
investigator, offered statements corroborating Finkelman’s claims. 	For
example, the director stated Finkelman “had an incredible true story to
tell” and that “[t]his is his story.” 	Finkelman himself stated, “It’s all true.
It happened to me” and “I couldn’t make this up.” 	Finkelman stated that
his book, Duplicity, upon which the series was based, was as “accurate as
it is unbelievable.” 	Later, Finkelman reaffirmed that Duplicity was 99%
true and that only little things were embellished. 	Finkelman once again
confirmed that “[t]he story is true. The events are true.” He then clarified
that his story was approximately 97% true “and none are made up that
have any bearing to criminal events by Audrey Munson [appellant] and
what happened to me. 	Every single thing of that is true.” 	A news clip
reported that Finkelman, his lawyers, and his investigators stated they
had evidence that appellant was a madam and a working prostitute of a
large 	prostitution 	ring. 	Finkelman 	also 	assured 	the 	director 	that
appellant’s double life and sex trafficking were “all true.” Finkelman finally
stated, “I’m just a regular guy who all this s--t happened to and decided to

14
take some action.”
Although at times Finkelman admitted he made up certain scenes and
dialogue, at no point did Finkelman admit or suggest that he fabricated
the core allegations about appellant being a prostitute, madam, and sex
trafficker. 	Rather, 	he 	consistently 	and 	adamantly 	maintained 	the
truthfulness of those allegations. 	Finkelman’s admission to making up
certain specific scenes, while maintaining the veracity of those allegations
pertaining 	to 	appellant, 	further 	bolsters 	the 	conclusion 	that 	the
accusations 	relating 	to 	appellant 	were 	reasonably 	susceptible 	of
defamatory 	meaning. 	While 	episode 	six 	may 	have 	cast 	doubts 	on
Finkelman’s claims concerning Borelli’s participation in sex trafficking, at
no point did Finkelman ever retract his statements concerning appellant.
Simply put, even assuming a viewer watched all six episodes, nothing in
episode six exculpated appellant from Finkelman’s allegedly defamatory
allegations. 	Finally, since the episodes clearly can bear more than one
meaning for the viewer, the question of defamation was not for the trial
court to determine. 	McIver, 489 So. 2d at 794.
Again, a motion to 	dismiss tests only 	the legal sufficiency of the
complaint, and the allegations therein are to be taken as true. Rhiner, 327
So. 3d at 316. 	Taking the allegations of the amended complaint and the
series as true, appellant clearly stated legally sufficient causes of action
for defamation. 	“When a statement charges a person with committing a
crime, the statement is considered defamatory per se.” 	Blake, 182 So. 3d
at 884 (citation omitted). 	“Statements which impute unchastity on the
part of a woman plaintiff are libelous per se.” 	Ford, 562 So. 2d at 735
(citing Campbell v. Jacksonville Kennel Club, 66 So. 2d 495, 497 (Fla.
1953)). 	In Ford, the Fifth District reversed the dismissal of a libel claim
for a jury determination of whether the term “hooker,” as used in a poem,
could be understood as factually referring to the plaintiff. Id. at 735. Like
in Ford, here the statements accusing appellant of being a prostitute,
madam, and sex trafficker require a jury determination of whether the
statements could be understood as describing an actual fact about her.
Because the statements were “reasonably susceptible” of a defamatory
meaning, it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the communication
was understood in the defamatory sense. 	Wolfson, 273 So. 2d at 778-79.
Thus, the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss.
IV. Conspiracy allegations
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the
conspiracy allegations because they were legally sufficient. 	We agree the
trial court erred. A cause of action for defamation is “a necessary predicate

15
to a cause of action for conspiracy to defame . . . .” 	Hoon v. Pate Constr.
Co., 607 So. 2d 423, 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). 	Where a defamation claim
fails, “an action for conspiracy to defame predicated on such defamation
must also fail.” 	Id. 	Because we find the defamation claims were legally
sufficient, the conspiracy claims do not automatically fail.
The elements of civil conspiracy are: “(a) a conspiracy between two or
more parties, (b) to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful
means, (c) the doing of some overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy, and
(d) damage to plaintiff as a result of the acts performed pursuant to the
conspiracy.” 	Gordon v. Bethel, 359 So. 3d 802, 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)
(citation 	omitted). 	“Each 	coconspirator 	need 	not 	act 	to 	further 	a
conspiracy; each need only know of the scheme and assist in it in some
way to be held responsible for all of the acts of his coconspirators.” Charles
v. Fla. Foreclosure Placement Ctr., LLC, 988 So. 2d 1157, 1160 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The existence
of a conspiracy and an individual’s participation in it may be inferred from
circumstantial evidence.” 	Donofrio v. Matassini, 503 So. 2d 1278, 1281
(Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
In the instant case, the conspiracy to defame counts alleged:
• 	“Defendants acted in concert to further a scheme to shame,
defame, and disgrace [appellant] by falsely uttering words
of slanderous character.”
• 	“Defendants 	performed 	overt 	acts 	in 	pursuance 	of 	the
conspiracy by producing, creating and distributing the
Series, and publishing false defamatory statements about
[appellant] to third parties.”
• 	“The 	statements 	of 	criminal 	conduct 	by 	[appellant]
published by Defendants in [each of the six episodes and,
alternatively, 	the 	series 	as 	a 	whole] 	are 	false 	and
defamatory per se.”
The conspiracy to defame counts contained sufficient allegations to set
forth a cause of action for conspiracy. The trial court erred in finding that
the conspiracy counts were insufficient. 	The trial court found that the
conspiracy counts did not identify which of the defendants agreed to
commit an unlawful act. 	At this juncture in the proceedings, however, by
using the term “Defendants,” the amended complaint clearly referred to all
of the defendants. 	The trial court also found that the conspiracy counts
did not allege when the agreement to defame appellant was entered.

16
However, there is no requirement that a party allege a specific time when
the agreement to defame was entered. 	See Gordon, 359 So. 3d at 810
(setting forth the elements of civil conspiracy). 	Thus, we find appellant
sufficiently alleged causes of action for conspiracy to defame.
V. Pre-suit notice
In moving to dismiss, the defendants argued that appellant failed to
provide pre-suit notice as required by section 770.01, Florida Statutes
(2023). 	Although the trial court expressly declined to consider this issue,
we note, for purposes of remand, that this statute is inapplicable to this
case, which does not involve “media defendants.”
Section 770.01, Florida Statutes, states:
Before 	any 	civil 	action 	is 	brought 	for 	publication 	or
broadcast, in a newspaper, periodical, or other medium, of a
libel or slander, the plaintiff shall, at least 5 days before
instituting 	such 	action, 	serve 	notice 	in 	writing 	on 	the
defendant, 	specifying 	the 	article 	or 	broadcast 	and 	the
statements therein which he or she alleges to be false and
defamatory.
In the present case, it is clear that the pre-suit notice requirements of
section 770.01 were not applicable. 	The statute applies only to “media
defendants.” Zelinka v. Americare Healthscan, Inc., 763 So. 2d 1173, 1175
(Fla. 4th DCA 2000). The defendants were not “media defendants” because
they were not “engaged in the dissemination of news and information
through the news and broadcast media . . . .” 	Mancini v. Personalized Air
Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 702 So. 2d 1376, 1380 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
The purpose of the statute, which is to afford media defendants an
opportunity “to make a full and fair retraction,” is not implicated here.
Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 1950). 	Thus, the statute does not
apply.
Although we express no opinion on the ultimate merits of this case, see
Black v. Cable News Network, Inc., No. 4D2023-1257, 2025 WL 2608689,
at *7 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 10, 2025) , appellant has sufficiently alleged
causes of action for defamation per se and conspiracy to defame through
the medium of a docuseries widely available through Peacock TV. Peacock
TV can be accessed through a streaming service easily and is readily
obtainable. 	Justice Cardozo wrote nearly one hundred years ago, long
before the advent of modern technology, that what gives defamation its
“sting” is “its permanence of form” which “perpetuates the scandal.”

17
Ostrowe v. Lee, 	175 	N.E. 	505, 	506 	(N.Y. 	1931). 	The 	allegations 	of
defamation in this case, through this medium, illustrate the potential for
such damage.
In summary, for all the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court
erred in dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice. 	Accordingly,
we 	reverse 	the 	dismissal 	order 	and 	remand 	for 	further 	proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
CIKLIN and F ORST , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.