Aramide Yusuf v. Starfish Title Agency, LLC, et al.

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
ARAMIDE YUSUF,
Appellant,
v.
EDISON ILUNGA, BLUE MOON HOOKAH LOUNGE, LLC, and
STARFISH TITLE AGENCY, LLC,
Appellees.
No. 4D2024-1454
[November 19, 2025]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
Martin 	County; 	Michael 	J. 	McNicholas, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
432021CA000771.
Wayne 	S. 	Kramer 	of 	Midler 	& 	Kramer 	P.A., 	Fort 	Lauderdale, 	for
appellant.
Edison Ilunga, Houston, Texas, pro se.
No brief filed for appellee Blue Moon Hookah Lounge, LLC.
No appearance for appellee Starfish Title Agency, LLC.
FORST , J.
Appellant/third-party defendant Aramide Yusuf appeals from the trial
court’s entry of final judgment against him in favor of Appellee/third-party
plaintiff Edison Ilunga, and from the trial court’s order denying Yusuf’s
motion to dismiss Ilunga’s third-party complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, we conclude the trial court erred
in denying Yusuf’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s final judgment and remand with
instructions for the trial court to dismiss Ilunga’s third-party complaint
for lack of personal jurisdiction over Yusuf.

2
Background
In 	2021, 	Starfish 	Title 	Agency, 	LLC, 	filed 	a 	complaint 	for 	unjust
enrichment against Ilunga and several other defendants. In short, Starfish
alleged that it was tricked by a fraudulent email into wiring money that
wrongfully ended up in Ilunga’s possession. Ilunga, calling himself “a mere
unwitting mule in this much grander money laundering scheme” which he
blamed on Yusuf, moved to add Yusuf as an indispensable party.
The trial court granted the motion. 	In October 2022, Ilunga filed the
operative second amended third-party complaint for contribution and
fraud in the inducement against Yusuf, accusing Yusuf of persuading
Ilunga to deposit checks that Yusuf knew had an illicit origin and then
wire some of that money to Yusuf’s other friends in Texas. The third-party
complaint alleges that Yusuf “conspired with several others to commit wire
fraud and steal money from [Starfish]” and was “acutely aware of and
involved in the crime of wire fraud and money laundering that was taking
place in Florida harming Plaintiff Starfish Title which resulted in [Ilunga]
being subsequently defrauded by Yusuf and embroiled in this lawsuit and
sued.” 	Ilunga attached to his complaint an affidavit attesting, “Yusuf []
knew that the money he was handing me was from a Florida real estate
wire transfer he had helped illegally intercept.”
Ilunga’s third-party complaint did not plead a count for conspiracy,
specify what role Yusuf had supposedly played in the Starfish fraud, or
specify any communication which Yusuf had allegedly sent into Florida.
Notably, Starfish did not sue Yusuf, has never alleged that he was involved
in 	the 	fraud, 	and 	did 	not 	include 	any 	conspiracy 	count 	in 	its 	own
complaint.
Yusuf 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	Ilunga’s 	complaint 	for 	lack 	of 	personal
jurisdiction. 	Noting that both parties are Texas residents and Yusuf has
no 	contacts 	with 	Florida, 	Yusuf 	argued 	that 	Ilunga’s 	complaint 	and
affidavit failed to allege that “anything having to do with these checks
occurred in Florida.” 	Yusuf attached to his motion an affidavit attesting,
“Anything that occurred between myself and Mr. Ilunga on his behalf or
on behalf of his company occurred in Texas. . . . I have no connection to
the transaction that occurred in Florida that is the nexus of this case.”
In March 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Yusuf’s
motion 	to 	dismiss 	for 	lack 	of 	personal 	jurisdiction. 	The 	trial 	court
subsequently 	entered 	an 	order 	denying 	Yusuf’s 	motion. 	The 	order
contained the following findings of fact and law, in relevant part:

3
[Ilunga] . . . testified that all of the actions he testified to
occurred in the State of Texas.
. . .
[Yusuf] acknowledges that all contact with [Ilunga] was in the
State of Texas.
. . .
The Court further finds [Ilunga] has alleged sufficient facts to
establish [Yusuf] was in ambit of the state’s long arm statute
for purposes of the motion to dismiss.
Specifically, [Ilunga] alleges he received the funds from [Yusuf]
which the parties agreed was traced back to the stolen funds
from a Florida transaction.
While all of the allegations alleged by [Ilunga] occurred in
Texas and not in Florida, physical presence in Florida is not
required to “commit a tortious act” for purposes of Florida’s
long arm statute. 	[S]ee Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252
(Fla. 	2002). 	Thus 	the 	Court 	finds 	there 	are 	sufficient
minimum contacts to subject [Yusuf] to the jurisdiction of this
Court under Florida Statute §48.193(1)(a)(2).
(Emphasis added and paragraph numbering omitted). The order contains
no findings that Yusuf entered Florida, communicated with any person or
entity in Florida, or participated in the original internet fraud against
Starfish.
After Yusuf’s dismissal motion was denied, he filed an answer and
litigation proceeded. Following a non-jury trial in February 2024, the trial
court entered final judgment for Starfish on its unjust enrichment claim
against Ilunga. 	The trial court also entered final judgment for Ilunga on
his third-party contribution claim against Yusuf, finding Yusuf liable to
Ilunga for half the damages which Ilunga owed to Starfish, but in favor of
Yusuf on Ilunga’s fraudulent inducement count, finding that Ilunga had
known the funds had an illicit source and, accordingly, had not been
defrauded by Yusuf.
Yusuf timely appealed, raising the trial court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as his only issue.

4
Analysis
“The standard of review of a nonfinal order on a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction . . . is de novo as to the court’s legal rulings.
As for factual findings, the reviewing court defers to the trial court when
supported by competent substantial evidence.” 	Int’l Univ. of Health Scis.
Ltd., Inc. v. Abeles, 299 So. 3d 405, 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (citations
omitted).
Courts 	employ 	a 	two-step 	analysis 	to 	determine 	whether
personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant. The
first step focuses on the plaintiff’s complaint, and whether it
alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within
the ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute.
Under the second step, assuming the complaint is sufficient,
the trial court must consider whether the defendant satisfied
minimum contacts with Florida such that the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant complies with due process
requirements and does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. 	Both parts of this two-step
analysis must be satisfied for a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.
Guarino v. Mandel, 327 So. 3d 853, 860 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). 	This appeal focuses on the first step:
whether Ilunga’s third-party complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional
facts to bring the action within the ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute.
A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
who personally or through an agent does any of the acts
enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or
herself and, if he or she is a natural person, his or her
personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state for any cause of action arising from any of the following
acts:
. . .
2. Committing a tortious act within this state.
§ 48.193(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2021). 	The decisive question in this appeal is
thus whether Ilunga’s complaint sufficiently alleged a “cause of action
arising from” Yusuf “[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state.” 	See

5
Hunt v. Cornerstone Golf, Inc., 949 So. 2d 228, 230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
(“The determinative issue for this court is not whether Cornerstone has
proven that tortious interference actually occurred, but rather whether the
tort, as alleged, occurred in Florida.”).
Ilunga’s third-party complaint does not adequately allege the torts of
contribution and fraudulent inducement occurred in Florida. 	Moreover,
the trial court’s factual findings, to which we defer, expressly established
that “all of the allegations alleged by [Ilunga] occurred in Texas and
not in Florida[.]” 	Given that express finding, the trial court erred in
holding that Yusuf was subject to long-arm jurisdiction because the funds
could be “traced back to the stolen funds from a Florida transaction.”
Crucially, “a majority of the district courts, including this court, have held
that mere injury in Florida resulting from a tort committed elsewhere is
insufficient to support personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.”
Kaminsky v. Hecht, 272 So. 3d 786, 788 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). 	Instead, the statutory “arising from”
language “necessarily focuses analysis not on where a plaintiff ultimately
felt damages, but where a defendant’s tortious conduct occurred.” Guarino,
327 So. 3d at 861 (quoting Metnick & Levy, P.A. v. Seuling, 123 So. 3d 639,
645 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)).
In applying this analysis to Ilunga’s third-party complaint, we note that
personal jurisdiction must arise from the torts which Ilunga alleges Yusuf
committed against him. 	While Ilunga repeatedly references the separate
tort which he claims Yusuf committed against Starfish in Florida and
seeks to conflate the two, he does not, and would lack standing to, allege
that Yusuf is liable to him for a separate tort committed against a different
party. 	Ilunga’s 	third-party 	complaint 	does 	not 	allege 	that 	Yusuf’s
contribution or fraudulent inducement harmed Starfish in Florida—it
alleges that those torts harmed Ilunga in Texas after a separate, unpled
tort 	harmed 	Starfish 	in 	Florida. 	As 	Ilunga 	alleged, 	the 	Florida 	tort
“resulted in [Ilunga] being subsequently defrauded by Yusuf and embroiled
in this lawsuit and sued.” (emphasis added). This allegation is insufficient
to establish personal jurisdiction over Yusuf in Florida for his all-Texas
conduct against a fellow Texas resident.
We recognize that, “in order to ‘commit a tortious act’ in Florida, a
defendant’s physical presence is not required.” Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1260.
However, Wendt explains: “‘[C]ommitting a tortious act’ in Florida under
section 	48.193(1)([a]) 	can 	occur 	through 	the 	nonresident 	defendant’s
telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida. 	However,
the cause of action must arise from the communications. 	This predicate
finding is necessary because of the connexity requirement contained in

6
section 48.193(1).” 	Id.; accord Reiss v. Ocean World, S.A., 11 So. 3d 404,
406–07 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“The requirement that the cause of action
arise 	from 	the 	communications 	is 	necessary 	in 	order 	to 	satisfy 	the
connexity requirement of section 48.193(1). . . . Cases interpreting Wendt
have held that the communication into Florida must be tortious in and of
itself, such as defamatory statements or negligent legal advice to a client.”
(citations omitted)).
Further, 	Ilunga’s 	vague 	and 	conclusory 	allegation 	that 	Yusuf 	had
“conspired with several others to commit wire fraud and steal money from
[Starfish]” 	does 	not 	create 	personal 	jurisdiction 	in 	Florida 	on 	a 	“co-
conspirator theory” because he did not (and Starfish did not) plead a count
for conspiracy, nor did he plead with specificity any facts supporting the
existence of a conspiracy. 	See NHB Advisors, Inc. v. Czyzyk, 95 So. 3d
444, 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“[A] court will decline to apply the co-
conspirator theory to extend jurisdiction over nonresidents if the plaintiff
fails to plead with specificity any facts supporting the existence of the
conspiracy 	and 	provides 	nothing 	more 	than 	vague 	and 	conclusory
allegations regarding a conspiracy involving the defendants.”).
Conclusion
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s final judgment and remand
with 	instructions 	for 	the 	trial 	court 	to 	dismiss 	Ilunga’s 	third-party
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over Yusuf.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
C IKLIN and LEVINE , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.