John F. Schutz, P.L. v. Jared Schwalb, et al

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
JOHN F. SCHUTZ, P.L.,
Appellant,
v.
ALLY FINANCIAL INC., and JARED SCHWALB,
Appellees.
No. 4D2024-2838
[March 25, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Rosemarie Scher and Caryn Siperstein, Judges; L.T. Case
No. 502019DR007098XXXXSB.
John F. Schutz of John F. Schutz, P.L., Palm Beach Gardens, for
appellant.
Jacob Brandon Hanson and Benjamin Christian of Bradley Arant Boult
Cummings LLP, Tampa, for appellee Ally Financial Inc.
CONNER , J.
The 	appellant, 	a 	law 	firm 	(“the 	Firm”), 	appeals 	a 	final 	judgment
imposing a charging lien for unpaid legal fees against its former client, the
wife in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. Specifically, the Firm appeals
the trial court’s denial of the Firm’s motion to add the appellee bank as an
indispensable party to the charging lien enforcement proceeding and the
resulting failure to make the bank liable for unpaid attorney’s fees. 	We
affirm the trial court’s final judgment adjudicating the charging lien.
Background
The 	wife 	held 	two 	accounts 	with 	the 	bank. 	One 	account 	was
determined to be a marital asset, and the other account was non-marital.
While the dissolution proceeding was pending, the Firm withdrew from
representing the wife. The Firm filed a “Notice of Charging Lien” for unpaid
fees in the dissolution action. 	The notice did not refer to any assets. 	Nor
did the notice state the lien amount or the fees amount owed. The charging

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lien notice was served on the wife and the husband’s counsel. 	The
charging lien was not served on any other persons or entities at that time.
Several months later, a final hearing was conducted in the dissolution
action. 	The final judgment distributed all of one account and half of the
other account to the wife. 	Within a few days after the final judgment’s
entry, the wife withdrew most of the money from both accounts.
Between the final hearing and the final judgment’s entry, the Firm sent
a letter to the bank, attaching a copy of the charging lien notice which the
Firm 	previously 	had 	filed 	in 	the 	dissolution 	proceeding. 	The 	letter
identified bank account numbers awarded to the wife, but as stated above,
the notice of charging lien did not identify any assets subject to the lien or
the lien amount. 	The bank responded to the Firm’s letter with its own
letter explaining the bank was not waiving its right to proper process
service and the bank would need to be served with a court order.
The Firm moved to adjudicate the amount of its lien. 	In adjudicating
the 	amount 	of 	the 	lien, 	the 	Firm 	sought 	to 	add 	the 	bank 	as 	an
indispensable party to the charging lien litigation because the bank had
allowed the wife to draw down the account to a small amount within a few
days after the final judgment was entered. 	The Firm sought to hold the
bank liable for making disbursements after having received the Firm’s
letter and notice of the charging lien several months earlier. 	The Firm
contended that all it had to do was give notice of the charging lien to the
bank to make the bank liable for the wife’s unpaid fees.
The bank filed a response to the indispensable party motion. 	The trial
court held a hearing on the motion. 	The trial court disagreed with the
Firm’s arguments and declined to add the bank as an indispensable party.
The 	trial 	court 	adjudicated 	the 	charging 	lien 	amount 	for 	unpaid
attorney’s fees owed to the Firm and issued a money judgment against the
wife. 	The Firm gave notice of appeal.
Appellate Analysis
The Firm argues the trial court erred in denying its motion to add the
bank as an indispensable party to the charging lien litigation. 	The trial
court denied the motion after determining that it would be inequitable to
impose 	liability 	on 	the 	bank, 	as 	a 	disinterested 	third-party 	financial
institution for the unpaid attorney’s fees owed by the wife.

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Whether a party is indispensable is reviewed de novo. 	Century-Nat’l
Ins. Co. v. Frantz, 369 So. 3d 739, 744 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023). Pure questions
of law are reviewed de novo. See Sumner Grp., Inc. v. M.C. Distributec, Inc.,
949 So. 2d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citation omitted). 	Whether
an equitable remedy should be granted if the elements are met is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. 	See Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Groover, 337
So. 3d 799, 808 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (“In general, a trial court’s denial of
equitable relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” (citing Three Keys,
Ltd. v. Kennedy Funding, Inc., 28 So. 3d 894, 905 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009))).
Charging liens are an equitable right created under the common law.
CK Regalia, LLC v. Thornton, 159 So. 3d 358, 360 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)
(citing 	Sinclair, 	Louis, 	Siegel, 	Heath, 	Nussbaum 	& 	Zavertnik, 	P.A. 	v.
Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383, 1384 (Fla. 1983)). No Florida statute addresses
charging liens. 	For that reason, charging liens are governed by case law.
Mineo Salcedo Law Firm, P.A. v. Cesard, 333 So. 3d 222, 228 (Fla. 4th DCA
2022) (citing Sinclair, 428 So. 2d at 1384–85).
“In order to give timely notice of a charging lien an attorney should
either file a notice of lien or otherwise pursue the lien in the original
action.” 	Daniel Mones, P.A. v. Smith, 486 So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla. 1986)
(citations omitted). 	However, merely filing “a notice of intent to claim a
charging lien in the pending original action by the attorney does not
establish the attorney’s lien against the judgment nor give adequate
constructive notice of the attorney’s charging lien to parties dealing with
the client with respect to the judgment.” 	Dowda & Fields, P.A. v. Cobb,
452 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (emphasis added).
Here, as argued by the bank, the Firm’s “Notice of Charging Lien” was
a notice of intent to seek a charging lien and not an adjudicated lien
enforceable as to third parties. 	The “Notice of Charging Lien” stated
nothing as to an amount owed and did not refer to any assets to which the
lien would attach. 	The notice did not identify the bank accounts or the
amount 	encumbered 	by 	the 	charging 	lien. 	Thus, 	the 	notice 	was
insufficient to impose charging lien liability for unpaid attorney’s fees
against third parties who had no connection to the underlying litigation.
Below and on appeal, the Firm relied on Florida case law involving
charging liens asserted against parties to the underlying litigation or
nonparties who funded settlements to resolve the litigation. The Firm also
cited 	cases 	from 	other 	jurisdictions 	which 	have 	statutory 	provisions
governing charging liens. The Firm cited no common law cases allowing a
charging lien to be asserted against nonparty persons or entities that did
not provide settlement funds or funds to pay a judgment.

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Because the notice of charging lien filed in this case did not disclose
the amount of fees owed to the law firm or identify specific assets to which
the lien applied, we agree with the trial court’s determination that it would
be inequitable to construe charging lien common law to require banks to
freeze bank accounts for an unknown period, without a court order stating
specifying an amount and the assets to which the charging lien attached.
Because the trial court properly determined the “Notice of Charging
Lien” was insufficient to impose liability upon the bank as a matter of
equity, the trial court properly denied the Firm’s motion to add the bank
as an indispensable party to the proceedings.
“An indispensable party is one whose legal or beneficial interest in the
subject matter makes it impossible to completely adjudicate the matter
without affecting that party’s interest.” 	Lee v. Cole, 46 So. 3d 612, 613
(Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 	As to the
underlying 	dissolution 	action, 	the 	bank 	had 	no 	interest that 	needed
protection. As to the collateral proceedings to enforce the charging lien, in
opposing being added as a party, the bank raised arguments as to why it
was not liable under the charging lien. Thus, by opposing being added as
a party, the bank opposed its liability under the charging lien, and the trial
court was able to determine the bank had a full opportunity to protect its
interest, and no need existed to grant 	the Firm’s motion 	to add an
indispensable party.
Conclusion
The trial court properly determined that it would be inequitable to
impose liability on the bank for payment of the wife’s unpaid attorney’s
fees. 	The bank had no interest in the dissolution action because it was
not a party to the dissolution action and was not involved in obtaining or
participating in a settlement of the dissolution action. The Firm has cited
no cases imposing charging lien liability under the common law against a
nonparty to the underlying suit with no notice of the amount owed or the
assets to which the charging lien applies.
Affirmed.
KUNTZ , C.J., and S HAW , J., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.